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ABSTRACT

Claiming the Remains of the Past:
The Return of Cultural Heritage Objects to Colombia, Mexico, and Peru
by
Pierre Losson

Advisor: Susan L. Woodward

My research explores the reasons why three Latin American states (Colombia, Mexico,
and Peru) claim the return of cultural heritage objects from holding institutions in the
Western World, such as museums and universities. The literature on returns and
restitutions, which focuses on questions of ownership and possession of objects, opposes
two conceptions of cultural heritage: on the one hand, the internationalists argue that the
location of a cultural object must be decided according to the interests of science and
education, for the benefit and in the name of humankind; on the other hand, the
nationalists consider that cultural heritage is constitutive of the identity of each nation,
which gives nation-states the role of primary caregivers of this heritage. Focusing on the
domestic politics of return claims in six case studies (two per country), my dissertation is
the first in-depth analysis of the nationalist side of this debate. First, I demonstrate that
return claims continue the process of construction of national discourse in Latin America
through the appropriation of the remains of pre-Columbian cultures. Second, I use a
historical-institutionalist approach to analyze how return claims are best understood as
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the culmination of a process of institutional strengthening to care for the national
heritage. Finally, I examine the policy communities that support these claims for return
within each country and shed a new light on the practice of return by analyzing the
beliefs and agency of a series of actors (civil society individuals, experts, executive
authorities of the state, Indigenous communities, holding institutions) and their role in the
formulation and resolution of return claims. Overall, my research offers explanations for
the reasons why Latin American states seek the return of the remains of the past; the
timing of these claims, which have become more prominent since the late twentieth
century; and the variations in outcome among the different claims.
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Chapter 1 – Claiming the remains of the past: Latin American states and the
international debate on returns and restitutions
International media attention regularly focuses on high-profile claims for the return of
cultural heritage objects presented by a handful of “source countries” (Greece, Egypt,
Italy) to museums and other holding institutions located in the Global North. However,
more recently, other parts of the world have also shown a growing interest in claiming the
return of objects they consider theirs. For example, former African colonies of France
and Britain, among which Benin and Nigeria, are now taking a pro-active stance in
claiming objects displaced during the colonial wars in the nineteenth-century.
Latin American countries are not exempt of this phenomenon, as the examples I
use in my research will show. Peru fought a long and bitter battle with Yale University
for more than ten years until the university agreed in 2011 to return thousands of items
excavated from Machu Picchu and taken to the United States by explorer Hiram Bingham
in 1911-16. In 2013, Peru also obtained the return of a valuable collection of Paracas
textiles held by the Museum of World Culture in Gothenburg (Sweden), which had been
smuggled out of Peru by a Swedish consul in the early 1930s. In Mexico, the hypothetical
return of “Montezuma’s headdress” (made of quetzal feathers, it may have belonged to
the last Aztec emperor defeated by conquistador Hernán Cortés) has been a topic of
discussion since the mid-1980s, but the object remains in Vienna’s Weltmuseum as I
write. Mexico, on the other hand, did negotiate the return of half a collection of mural
paintings taken from the archaeological ruins of Teotihuacan in the mid-1960s and later
donated to San Francisco’s Museums of Fine Arts. In Colombia, the Constitutional Court
has ordered the government, in October 2017, to take the appropriate actions to seek the
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return of the “Quimbaya treasure,” currently on display in the Museum of America in
Madrid. This collection of objects in gold had been gifted by Colombian President Carlos
Holguín to the Queen of Spain in 1892. A decision from a lower administrative court also
compels the Colombian executive to seek the return of a series of statues from the
archaeological park of San Agustín, which were taken by German archaeologist Konrad
Preuss in the 1910s and are now in the collections of the Ethnological Museum in Berlin.
Although these are high-profile cases that have attracted media attention locally
and internationally, little research has been dedicated to claims for the return of cultural
heritage presented by Latin American countries. In particular, the reasons that push
governments in Latin American countries to seek the return of traces of an antique past
have not been elucidated – as if the debate between nationalists and internationalists,
described below, had naturalized the fact that states would, eventually, ask for the return
of some objects. As I propose explanations for why these states, which have been
formally independent for two centuries, embark on lengthy processes that often drag on
for several years or decades, I will also explore a series of related questions, in particular
about the timing of these demands and the actors involved in them. Return claims
concern objects displaced decades or centuries ago. How can we explain, then, that the
interest of their “country of origin” to reclaim their ownership has only come forth since
the last two decades of the twentieth-century? Also, I will seek to elucidate in the
following chapters, the reasons that push a variety of actors, within each country, to
support or oppose these demands. How is the decision to embark on this journey made,
and by whom? Who, within each country, pushes for the return, and why?
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I will answer these questions by, first, framing the return claims within the
broader context of official nationalist discourses in Latin America. I will demonstrate that
the claims continue decades-long cultural policies that have constructed official national
narratives by appropriating the Indigenous, pre-Colombian past into the contemporary
national mold. I will then develop a historical-institutionalist analysis of the evolution of
cultural policies (in particular regarding heritage protection) in these countries to
demonstrate that they have built the institutional capability to care for the cultural
heritage objects they claim back. I will continue by analyzing the political stakes in each
country and the motivations of the actors involved in the claims. Finally, I will compare
the arguments of the holding institutions that oppose the very idea of returns with those
of the few ones that have supported it, and will examine the content of the agreements
that have been found to solve the dispute over the ownership of the claimed objects.
“Return” claims?
Cultural heritage objects have been displaced throughout human history, sometimes
through trade, often in times of military conflict (as the object of looting or as spoils of
war), or under colonial rule. I borrow the term “cultural object” from Vrdoljak (2008)
because, “although not value-neutral,” its emphasis on the “movable physical
manifestations of the culture of the occupied people [and] the ability of a cultural object
to be physically possessed” (…) “gives rise to the central questions of removal and
return” (7). Heritage is often understood as the ensemble of such objects deemed of
enough value to be transmitted from one generation to the next. Since WWII, through the
adoption of a series of international conventions, “the scope [of what is considered
heritage] has broadened considerably from mere concern for individual buildings and
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sites to include groups of buildings, historical areas, towns, environments, social factors
and, lately, intangible heritage” (Ahmad 2006). Even though my own research is
concerned with the fate of objects, I will keep in mind, as I progress through my
argument, the warnings of the proponents of critical heritage studies, such as Curtis
(2008, 2012) and Smith (2006), who consider that the very concept of heritage and
related categories, such as those of “museum objects” and “items,” are constructions of
the Western world. Reducing a claim to that of ownership over an object may be
misleading when trying to understand the motives for the claim, especially when this
claim comes from native communities. The question of how Latin American states treat
the Indigenous pre-Columbian past will be central to my analysis. Thus, I will consider
the different meanings a cultural object can have for different actors, who may or may not
share similar conceptions of what their heritage is and what it means to them.
Consequently, following Smith (2006), I will think of “heritage” not so much in terms of
“things” inherited by contemporary people from their ancestors, but rather as a “cultural
and social process, which engages acts of remembering that work to create ways to
understand and engage with the present” (2).
For this research, I understand by “return” the physical transfer of cultural
heritage objects found on the territory of a contemporary nation-state and removed before
the implementation of international conventions – either during colonial rule or, as is
often the case in Latin America, in the early post-colonial period, when the state was
expanding its authority over its territory but had not yet passed laws protecting heritage,
and/or did not have the means to enforce them. Though the distinction is not consistently
respected in the literature, I draw on Cornu and Renold (2010) to distinguish “return”
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from “restitution” (the devolution of objects looted or stolen in more recent times, in any
case after a country has ratified one of the international conventions on the matter) and
from “repatriation” (a term most often referring to cases involving the devolution of
human remains and religious artifacts to Native communities in North America, Oceania,
and Scandinavia). Following this semantic logic, “restitution” would be restricted to
cases where current international and national laws apply and allow for the physical
process of devolution of an object that illegally left the borders of its “country of origin.”
In this context, Vrdoljak (2011) argues that “return” is also a term often deemed more
“neutral” than “restitution,” which is “loaded in international law terms with state
responsibility, internationally wrongful acts, and reparations” (3). As for “repatriation,” it
refers to a process that happens within a nation-state – a holding institution devolving an
object in its possession to the community where the object was fabricated, used, or buried
– or internationally, the state then acting on behalf of a specific domestic community. The
US 1990 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) is one of
the most studied and commented such process.
To be sure, both the practice of the field and the scholarly literature would seem
to invalidate this strict distinction among cases. Indeed, practitioners consider that their
duties cover all kinds of cases. For example, Blanca Alva Guerrero, who for many years
was the Peruvian Ministry of Culture’s director of “heritage defense,” worked on
restitutions and returns, which she conflates under the term repatriación [repatriation]
(Alva Guerrero 2009).1 There are, however, practical differences between returns and
restitutions. Both types of request are handled by a broadly comparable set of actors (the
1

In its Spanish translation, repatriación refers to a retorno a la patria [return to the homeland]. While this
term can conveniently encompass both returns and restitutions, its English use conflicts with the meaning
and practice of repatriation I exposed above.
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ministries of culture and foreign affairs, as well as customs and the attorney general’s
office), but only return claims involve the highest political spheres (up to the presidential
office). In the case of restitutions, state authorities of the claiming countries usually
benefit from the cooperation of their counterparts in the country where the object was
found, in application of existing multilateral or bilateral treaties. Yet, because there exists
no such legal instrument that covers cases of returns, returns occur through ad hoc
processes of negotiations. Hence, while restitution claims can be explained by a rather
functionalist understanding of the national heritage protection apparatus,2 return claims
respond to additional layers of political, administrative, and ideological complexity.
The semantic distinction among the three terms is seldom applied in the literature
on the subject, as most authors (for example Merryman 1986, Rudenstine 2001, Bauer,
Lindsay, and Urice 2007, Falkoff 2007, Greenfield 2007, Reppas 2007, Chimento 2008,
Nilsson Stutz 2008, 2013, Wolkoff 2010, Vrdoljak 2011, Roodt 2013) tend to conflate
them. I explain this failure to distinguish as the result of these authors’ concern for and
focus on the legal issues of ownership, possession, and/or trusteeship of the objects,
which in turn tends to obscure the distinct political logics at stake in cases of returns,
restitutions, and repatriations. Even though the distinction among restitutions and returns
may not be as clear-cut if taken as categories of practice, my work will demonstrate the
value of distinguishing them as categories of analysis. I will show that a focus on the
inherently political nature of return claims at the domestic level allows for a deeper
2

In this interpretation, the reason for seeking the restitution of cultural heritage objects is simply because
this is what the legal norms adopted by the state provide (for example, the article 11-4 of Colombia’s 1997
General Law of Culture posits that “the ministry of culture and other public institutions will make all
efforts to repatriate cultural goods that have been illegally removed from the Colombian territory”). This
norm would, in turn, condition the behavior of state agents. As Angela Escobar, head of the laboratory of
the heritage protection group of the ICANH in Bogota, expressed: “it is our task as an institution and our
duty as Colombians to bring back the archaeological heritage of the nation” (interview, Jun. 25, 2018).
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understanding of return claims (specifically) than that provided by legal analysis, making
this semantic distinction useful and, indeed, necessary. The “return” of a cultural heritage
object to its “country of origin” to be displayed in the national museum in the capital city
may, indeed, embody widely different political logics and meanings than the
“repatriation” of, say, human remains to their “community of origin” to be re-buried.
Conflating terms obscures these meanings. In the case of “returns,” it is a state that, on
behalf of the nation, claims ownership over a cultural object that was fabricated or found
within its territorial boundaries. In Latin America, as I will show, “repatriations” as
understood above are rare, but the literature on repatriations (Gabriel and Dahl 2008) has
not sought to elucidate why. This is all the more surprising that authors such as Bauer,
Lindsay, and Urice (2007) have noted the tension, among archaeologists, between
supporting the efforts of (Native or Indigenous) communities to recover control of their
material heritage and the risk of backing the hegemonic project of the nation-state, which
may ignore the claims and interests of specific communities within the national
boundaries. I believe that, by ignoring Latin America altogether and focusing on North
America, Oceania, and Scandinavia exclusively, the Anglo-Saxon literature on returns
and repatriations has missed an important opportunity to investigate the relationship
between specific communities and the state that pretends to represent them.
Internationalism vs. nationalism: debating the ownership of cultural heritage objects
An extremely influential article by art law professor John Henry Merryman (1986) has
framed the debate about returns and restitutions as opposing two conceptions of material
heritage: that of the “internationalists” (also referred to as “universalists”) against the
“nationalists.” While both sides claim to be concerned mostly by the care of the cultural
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objects, which provide important information about past and present cultures, the debate
stalls on the question of ownership and trusteeship: who should be in charge of taking
care of an object, and who can legitimately claim to own the remains of past cultures?
Within this rather narrow legal framework, the unresolved question is whether cultural
objects whose ownership is disputed between two contemporary nation-states (or
between a nation-state and a private entity, such as a museum or a university) should be
returned to where they were produced or discovered (their “country of origin,” regardless
of the existence of the contemporary state at the time the object was displaced), or if they
should remain in the collections of the institution that is currently caring for them.
This theoretical impasse is not without consequences: while in practice, as some
of my case studies will demonstrate, practitioners around the world have tried to come up
with original agreements of cooperation to overcome the question of ownership, many
cases have seen little to no development for decades. The Parthenon Marbles – also
referred to as the Elgin Marbles – held by the British Museum and claimed by Greece
represent the quintessential case study of a dispute that has gone far beyond the realm of
museums and academia to occupy much public space over the past four decades. This
case alone has generated a sizeable (academic and general) literature that focuses on the
historical circumstances of the removal of the Marbles, the legality of Lord Elgin’s
actions and of the subsequent purchase of the Marbles by the British Museum, the
influence of the Marbles on the development of art and taste in nineteenth and twentieth
century Western world, the attempts by Greece to recover possession of the Marbles in
the past decades, and the arguments in favor or against this return (Hitchens, Browning,
and Binns 1997, Greenfield 2007, Reppas 2007, Jenkins 2016). Analyzing social media
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posts about the Marbles debate, Angouri, Paraskevaidi, and Wodak (2017) have shown
that the basic argumentation about this case is built around the question of ownership and
legality, substantiated by narratives on national identity and the construction of the past.
Even when not the main object of a publication, the Parthenon Marbles case is often used
to provide background information on the issue of return claims (Chimento 2008,
Rengifo Lozano 2008). This case is often reduced – even though arguments on both sides
have been refined – to a conflict between the nationalist stance of the Greek government
and the internationalist view of the British Museum.
On the one hand, nationalists advocate in favor of the return of artifacts that were
produced, found, or excavated within the current borders of a source country. In a strict
application of the principle of sovereignty, the state, acting on behalf of the nation, is
considered the sole legal and legitimate authority to care for cultural objects and decide
on their fate. All contemporary states implement laws dictating which objects should be
considered “national heritage” (movable or immovable; from natural resources and prehistorical artifacts to modern and contemporary artistic production). Merryman (1986)
argues that the most recent international legal instruments, such as the 1970 UNESCO
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, favor the position of the nationalists by
offering a legal framework for the return of displaced cultural property – a departure from
earlier texts, such as the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, which framed the cultural objects to be protected as making a
contribution to the culture of the world, not the specific property of the alleged
descendants of the people that produced them. The United Nations Educational,
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Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has, indeed, sought to assist states in
preventing the illicit trade of cultural objects and to reinforce international collaboration
in favor of the restitution of illegally exported objects (Prott 1995, Rengifo Lozano
2008). In most countries, the ability to conduct archaeological research is strictly
controlled, and the legal trade in objects that have been classified as national heritage is
all but banned. These measures are implemented, in part, in order to stop the uncontrolled
export of artifacts and cultural objects, often the product of looting, illegal excavations, or
theft from museums, churches, and other places. A corollary to the restrictions on
archaeological research and exports is a growing emphasis on attempting to obtain, in the
name of the inalienability of national heritage, the return of these objects considered an
integral part of this heritage but that are physically located on the territory of other states.
The partisans of the nationalist position are most often government officials and
experts (including archaeologists) in the “source countries.”3 Many Western scholars
such as Renfrew (2000) are objective allies of the nationalist position in favor of trade
restrictions, as they denounce the practices of collectors who (directly or indirectly)
condone looting by purchasing unprovenanced objects to expand their collections,
leading to a great loss in scientific knowledge. Indeed, unprovenanced materials lose all
the information related to their archaeological context. According to Renfrew, Western
states, museums, and scholars are complicit in the trafficking: the states, by offering tax
exemptions to collectors who donate their collections to public museums, and the
3

This term refers to countries on the territory of which cultural heritage objects are found. Because they are
in high demand on the international market, these objects are (often illegally) exported towards “market
countries,” where they are sold to private collectors or, even though increasingly more rarely, museums.
Source countries include Egypt, Greece, Italy, Mexico, Peru, or Cambodia, among many others. From the
perspective of the internationalists, a source country is not the legitimate owner of the cultural objects
found or produced on its territory. Market countries are most often North American and Western countries,
as well as Asian countries such as Japan and Singapore, as well as the oil-monarchies of the Middle East.
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museums and scholars by offering a “full scholarly treatment” to unprovenanced objects,
which “sometimes amounts to academic laundering” (35).
On the other hand, Western museums and the advocates of free art and antiquities
trade argue that the 1970 UNESCO Convention undermines their universalist conception
of heritage and their mission to safeguard the remains of past civilizations for the benefit
of all mankind (Merryman 1986). In a(n) (in)famous declaration,4 published as they were
facing a surge of new return and restitution claims from countries such as Egypt and
Italy, the directors of nineteen major Western museums opposed these claims and insisted
on the value of their collections not for one country but for humanity as a whole, even
though they acknowledged that the cases of cultural property recently looted or stolen
must be differentiated from objects displaced in historically different contexts.
The internationalists’ arguments are well rehearsed. Legally, universal (or
encyclopedic) museums are the rightful owners of these collections, so the source
countries have no legal claim to them, and the museums hold their collections in
trusteeship on behalf of humanity as whole (MacGregor 2012). These collections being
inalienable, it is not in the power of the museums themselves to decide the fate of specific
objects.5 Also, internationalists often argue that the return of artifacts would jeopardize
ongoing research and scholarship. The objects may not be safe if displayed in source
countries’ museums due to the lack of expertise or to political instability and risks of
armed conflict (Appiah 2006, Merryman 1986). Finally, looming large in the debate is

4

Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal Museums, 2002:
http://archives.icom.museum/pdf/E_news2004/p4_2004-1.pdf
5
In civil law countries, museum collections are often part of the public domain, thus are protected by the
principle of inalienability. In common law countries, museum collections are often held in public trust, thus
cannot be disposed of by a simple decision of the museum’s executive; deliberations and a vote by the
competent legislative body would be necessary to de-accession these collections.
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the fear that agreeing to return even a few of the claimed objects would set precedents,
ultimately leading to a broader movement that would empty encyclopedic museums of
the collections they claim to hold in trust for humanity.
Overall, Western museums and scholars challenge the assumption that
contemporary nation-states are the legitimate owners of artifacts that pre-date the very
existence of these states (Appiah 2006). They dismiss the claims for return as mere
expressions of misplaced nationalism that oppose the museums’ universalist mission as
repositories of the world’s history and heritage, their collections having been assembled
and made available for scientific and public use: “modern nations claim an identity with a
nonexistent culture that only happened to have shared (and often only more or less) the
same stretch of the earth’s geography” (Cuno 2010, 18). Jenkins (2016) considers that the
demands placed on the encyclopedic museums to repair the mistakes of the past – and in
particular the way their collections have been amassed – by returning (at least part of)
these collections represents a danger of “organizing the present around mores of the past,
and (…) fighting the battles of now through the lens of history” (248). Internationalists
also argue that the “retentionist” policies implemented by source countries to restrict the
trade of cultural objects, far from protecting these countries’ heritage, actually contribute
to the development of a black market fueled by the product of the very practices (looting,
theft) these policies meant to abolish (Cuno 2010, 2012, Merryman 1986).6 Accordingly,
internationalists boast a decisively anti-state position that favors the deregulation of art
trade, an old (neo-)liberal trope that seeks to rid private initiative from overreaching law

6

According to this argument, the retention of all cultural heritage objects by the source countries, which
refuse all exports (including those of copies of similar objects), prevents the flourishing of a licit and
healthy international trade. Far from disappearing, all transactions are, instead, pushed towards a (actually
flourishing) black market.
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– in this case, on excavation, trade, and collectionism – as they consider that selfregulation is the most efficient tool to combat illicit practices (Boardman 2012).
Beyond the nationalist vs. internationalist debate
The scholarly literature has sought to overcome this stalled debate, arguing that both
sides should not necessarily be seen as mutually exclusive, especially because both care
for the conservation, publication, and public display of the objects (Reppas 2007).
Anthropologists in particular have criticized the position of the internationalists for
embodying a post-colonial attitude that fails to admit that the collections of Western
museums are the result of processes of political, cultural, and racial domination (Abungu
2008, Vrdoljak 2008, Curtis 2012). In other words, the claim to universality of the great
Western museums is not a neutral mold that would serve as the equalizing repository of
all the diverse cultural expressions of humans worldwide; quite to the contrary, these
institutions dictate the normative hierarchies of what constitutes art by choosing specific
types of objects to be displayed and by applying a Western-centric narrative to a history
of the arts, conceived as a linear temporal progression towards “civilization.”
Internationalism (or universalism) is a construction that stemmed from the role of
museums as justifiers of colonial domination by symbolically appropriating and
subjecting cultural objects from colonized groups; in that regard, it is the ideological
offspring of the colonial and imperial nationalisms that led to the appropriation of objects
in the first place (Vrdoljak 2008). Consequently, internationalism is not the exact
opposite of the contemporary nationalisms that seek the return of cultural objects from
the former colonial metropoles.
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Curtis (2012) notes a paradox in how universal museums see their collections,
which they resist considering as commodities that can be bought (arguing that they hold
them in trust for society), but at the same time relying on the rights accorded by property
common law to resist claims to remove items from their collections (75). Universal
museums also concentrate world treasures in a few major cities of the Global North
where, if indeed visited by millions of people every year, they remain largely inaccessible
for most people of the developing world. In that regard, internationalists pretend to ignore
that the return of displaced artifacts would serve to partly redress historical injustices
against former colonized countries (Skrydstrup 2008).
Scholars have also criticized the nationalist stance for perpetuating essentialist
concepts of identity (Nilsson Stutz 2008, Skrydstrup 2008). For Brown (2012), so much
harm has been done to former colonized people – in particular, Indigenous communities –
in the name of alleged universal values that the counter-reaction is understandable: let’s
first bring our heritage back, then we will think about sharing it with others. However,
“when untempered by the recognition of historical complexity or a willingness to
compromise, the [nationalist] logic of heritage protection invites fantasies about returning
to a mythical zero-point in which every culture is restored to a prior state of perfection”
(161). Also, the way Indigenous communities are sometimes recognized as source
communities – thus, as legitimate claimants for the return or repatriation of cultural
objects – is very much the product of the same essentializing anthropological concepts
that led to the creation of the universal museums (Curtis 2008, 2012).
Finally, the nationalist argument in favor of the return of cultural objects tends to
obscure the fact that the contemporary-nation state is itself the result of a process of
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domination through which one particular (ethnic, racial, socio-economic) group imposed
its own definition of the nation. Restitution and return claims tend to be presented by
states posing as representatives of the group (Gillman 2012) – the group being the nation
or, potentially, a specific ethnic sub-group within the nation. As García Canclini (1999)
noted, “even though heritage serves to unify a nation, the inequalities in the construction
and appropriation of this heritage require that it be studied as a space of material and
symbolic fight among classes, ethnic groups, and other social groups” (18). As I will
amply demonstrate in the case of Latin America, the nationalist point of view on the
question of returns validates the appropriation of specific (Indigenous) objects for the
purposes of the elaboration of a modern, invented (fictitious?) narrative (the criollomestizo nation-state) – a process no less symbolically violent than that imposed on that
nation-state by the universalist, post-colonial narrative.
Another part of the literature on returns and restitutions that seeks to go beyond
the nationalist/internationalist debate looks at alternative means of resolving the conflicts
between claiming states and communities, on the one hand, and holding institutions on
the other. While Reppas (2007) believes that litigation is indispensable to the
continuation of the growing movement in favor of returns because museums will not
voluntarily relinquish the ownership and possession of their collections, many advise
conflicting parties to agree to resort to alternatives to regular courts, in particular
mediation, arbitration mechanisms, and diplomatic negotiations (Chimento 2008, Cornu
and Renold 2010). Some authors also look at “mutually beneficial repatriation
agreements” (Falkoff 2007, Wolkoff 2010), which consist of creative solutions that go
beyond the zero-sum game of exclusive ownership of an object: proposing the long-term
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loan of other artifacts in exchange for the return of a contested object, or decoupling the
question of ownership and that of possession, among others. An overarching conclusion
is that solutions are to be found on a case-by-case basis, as I will discuss in chapter 6.
Bringing the politics back in: the return of cultural heritage objects in a comparative
perspective
As I have shown so far, the literature on the return of cultural heritage objects to their
country of origin spans several disciplines, particularly anthropology, archaeology, and
international law. The complexity of the legal frameworks that bound the practice of
restitutions justifies the existence of voluminous monographs dedicated to national and
international law on the matter (Carducci 1997). However, my case studies of “returns”
eschew any clear legal interpretation, as neither international conventions (such as
UNESCO 1970 and the 1995 UNIDROIT7 Convention On Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects) nor the bilateral treaties and agreements signed by states on the matter,
for example between the United States and Peru or Mexico (Truslow 1982, Roberts
1996), apply to cases of objects displaced before these instruments were implemented. As
McIntosh (2006) concluded in her examination of the Peruvian claim over the Machu
Picchu collection held by Yale (published before the University agreed to return it in
2011), Peru’s case would have been weak if it had ended up in court, but evolutions in
ethics and museum practices increasingly supported the claim for return. As I will show,
the resolution of this case ultimately depended on the involvement of the highest political
authorities in Peru (including two presidents) and the development of an international
campaign against Yale University, not the decision of national or international courts.

7

International Institute for the Unification of Private Law.
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My research contributes to the literature on the return of cultural heritage objects
from the perspective of political science, a discipline that has largely ignored the topic.
To overcome the stalled debate between internationalists and nationalists and understand
the reasons why Latin American governments have sought the return of cultural objects
since the late twentieth century, it is necessary to understand the role these claims play in
domestic politics within these countries. While I have grown to feel little sympathy for
the internationalist position, I do agree with its proponents on one major aspect: return
claims are the product of nationalist politics. But the internationalists (and, for that
matter, legal scholars) have shown no interest in understanding how and why nationalism
remains such a potent ideology to motivate return claims. As I have observed that most of
the literature (particularly, the legal one) that focuses on the topic of return claims
invariably cites the same few sources – always on the internationalist side, particularly
the ubiquitous article by Merryman (1986), which I have already mentioned – very few
actually study the arguments as developed directly from the nationalist side. In that
context, it is my hope that my study will contribute to a better understanding of the
nationalist point of view as I study return claims from the point of view of the claimant,
focusing on case studies from Peru, Mexico, and Colombia, where states have centered
their cultural policies on material heritage conservation and used heritage to promote
their vision of the nation.
The political nature of return and restitution claims is often underlined: Renfrew
(2000) argues that “the issue of restitution – the return to their country of origin of objects
which have been in private or public collections for many years (…) is a political one”
(21). Cuno (2010, 2012) also insists on the nationalist politicking that surrounds these
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claims, without going further than brief and simplistic statements denouncing the
“political” use of heritage to the detriment of expert-based opinions on the subject. The
tension between political and expert discourses will be a recurring and central part of my
analysis. In summary, the literature referenced here keeps focusing on the debate between
nationalists and internationalists and studies issues of returns, restitutions, and
repatriations from anthropological and/or historical perspectives, often developing
analyses of the legal question of ownership through the lens of their discipline.
As noted by Nilsson Stutz (2013), this literature neglects completely to investigate
the political use of return claims in their local context. This is the task I set for myself in
this study. For example, while I do not entirely disagree with Reppas (2007) when he
argues that “restitution is a psychological victory for a country and its people,” I believe
that it is necessary to refine this analysis and examine who the agents of this victory are:
who, within each country, led the campaigns in favor of the return, and for what reason?
Who is “the people” who allegedly claims victory, and how (and by whom) was this
“people” constructed? Answering these questions will require remaining critical towards
all the arguments formulated in support to or against those claims.
Research process and methodology
I base my argument on data gathered through archival research and semi-structured
interviews with actors linked with case studies from Mexico, Peru, and Colombia, and on
an analysis of media content about the return claims presented by these three countries.
I chose Mexico and Peru because, within Latin America, these countries boast an
internationally famous pre-Columbian heritage, and have been among the most active in
protecting their national heritage in recent decades. A significant share of these countries’
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population is of Indigenous descent, archeology and museums have been cornerstones of
their cultural policies, and their impressive pre-Columbian material heritage has been and
is being used in both political discourses and tourism promotion. In both countries,
indigenist political thought has been instrumental in these developments, and I believed
indigenism to be an important intellectual influence in the newer development
represented by return claims. For these reasons, Mexico and Peru are interesting case
studies to test the relation between return claims and the official nationalism promoted by
the state. I wanted to contrast these two cases with the experience of a third country with
different characteristics. I chose Colombia, whose Indigenous population is quantitatively
smaller, and where indigenist political thought has not fashioned the national mold to the
same extent as Mexico and Peru. For example, Colombia’s 1991 constitution reflects a
multicultural intellectual influence very different from Mexican and Peruvian official
policies of mestizaje. The next chapters will demonstrate that differences among the three
countries are not quite as clear-cut, and I will evidence the similarities and disparities
among these cases.
My project started with a search for newspaper articles published in each of my
three country-case studies about the specific claims presented above. My objective was
triple: to find as much information as possible on each case, identify potential
interviewees, and analyze how the nationalist discourse is relayed in the mainstream
media in these countries. Anderson (2006) has argued that the press has greatly
contributed to the spread of nationalism in previous centuries in Latin America. Even
though Guerra (2003) considers that other media, such as images and rituals, are just as
important, the potential of print capitalism to promote identity discourses has been even
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more powerful since the late twentieth-century, when the movement to claim the return of
cultural heritage objects started in Latin America, than it was in decades and centuries
past. Indeed, throughout Latin America, literacy rates have averaged 90% since the early
1990s, and newspapers (in their print and online editions) reach millions of readers
daily.8 As newspapers (but also, of course, novels and other literary genres) are more
widely accessible than ever, they represent the potential vectors of state-sponsored
nationalist discourses – justifying my decision to use newspaper articles as a primary
source of data for my research.
Newspapers in Latin America are also good sources to analyze official nationalist
discourses because they have demonstrated a relatively low level of autonomy in relation
to the state. According to Hughes’s model (2006), following the restructuration of the
news sector in the wake of neoliberal reforms implemented since at least the early 1990s,
“civic models of journalism,” which had developed in reaction to authoritarian models
subordinated to official discourses in the 1940s-1980s period, gave way to “marketdriven” forms of journalism: journalists only challenge official discourses and use
investigative methods when these do not endanger the financial stability of the media
group they work for. As I have shown elsewhere (Losson 2017), newspapers in Latin
America tend to uncritically relay official discourses around topics of heritage
conservation. This, of course, is also true for the audio-visual media. The pervasiveness
of nationalist discourses in the media throughout Latin America makes them excellent
sources for an analysis of how claims for the return of cultural heritage objects take a
8

For example, in Peru in 2016, the tabloid Trome was the most-read newspaper, averaging 1.9 million
readers every day in Lima alone. Its more serious (and elite-read) competitors El Comercio and La
República, which I use extensively for my study, reached 341,000 and 110,000 readers daily, on average
(Source: “Estudio de lectoría de diarios en Lima y 15 principales ciudades”. Compañía Peruana de Estudios
de Mercados y Opinión Pública, S.A.C., Oct-Nov 2016).
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nationalist stance, mostly directed to a domestic audience. In Peru, for example, El
Comercio (published in Lima, with several regional editions, including one in Cusco)
took to heart to remind its readers9 of its own contribution to the national effort to obtain
the return of the Machu Picchu collection through the publication of articles dedicated to
the topic between 1912 and 2010. I was able to consult many articles in their online
version prior to my field research. However, to find articles from the twentieth century
not yet digitalized, I used the services of the National Library in Lima, the Miguel Lerdo
de Tejada Library (run by the Secretary of Finance) in Mexico City, and the Luis Angel
Arango Library (run by the Banco de la República) in Bogotá. In total, I created a
database of 417 articles published in Spanish in newspapers and weekly magazines in the
three countries.10
During three field trips of approximately ten days each to Peru, Mexico, and
Colombia in 2017-18, I interviewed archaeologists, anthropologists, historians, museum
curators, and other scholars involved in one or several return processes; bureaucrats with
executive, semi-political positions in the national institute or ministry in charge of
heritage protection (themselves experts or scholars on the topic of heritage protection and
restitution); civil servants from the ministries of foreign affairs, including ambassadors;
politicians; civil society leaders claiming to have a stake in the return claim; and
journalists. I conducted additional interviews by phone or Skype with other actors I could
not meet when in Latin America, and also interviewed several people linked to my case

9

“Presidente de U. de Yale confirma devolución total de la piezas de Machu Picchu,” El Comercio (Lima),
Nov. 21, 2010.
10
See Annex 1 for a list of newspapers cited in this work. This list also includes publications in Spanish
from Spain and in other languages.
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studies in the United States, Sweden, and Austria. In total, I conducted fifty-two
interviews from April 2017 through May 2019, most of them in Spanish.11
Finally, during my research trips, I was granted access to the archives of the
department in charge of heritage protection in the Peruvian Ministry of Culture, which
contained hundreds of pages about the Machu Picchu case, and of the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs in Mexico City, where I could consult the files of the Mexican Embassy
in Austria and a special folder that archivists kept on the Montezuma headdress case. I
also found original documents related to the case of the Quimbaya collection in the
department of special documents of the Library Luis Angel Arango in Bogotá.
My analysis of the data collected through this research process is informed by the
main principles of critical discourse analysis, which “aims to investigate critically social
inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimised, and so on, by language use or in
discourse” (Wodak and Meyer 2015, 10), discourse meaning “anything from a historical
monument, a lieu de mémoire, a policy, political strategy (…), text, talk (…)” (3). I
particularly focus on the perpetuation and reinvention of the nationalist discourse,
conveyed in general newspapers and by state functionaries and experts linked with the
claims, as an instrument of political power and social domination.
Plan of the dissertation
The result of my research is the first in-depth examination, in a comparative perspective,
of the domestic politics that form the backbone of the return claims presented by three
Latin America countries.
In Chapter 2, I present the chronology and actors of all my case studies. These
fascinating stories start several centuries or decades ago, when objects found in Mexico,
11

The list of the interviews is available in Annex 2.
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Peru, or Colombia were displaced and brought to Europe or North America, and involve
historical figures and contemporary actors. While requests or concerns about the
whereabouts of these objects were occasionally expressed in their “country of origin”
throughout the twentieth century, it is not until the last two decades of the past century
that the movement claiming their return crystallized. Some of these stories are better
known than others among non-specialists. My purpose in that chapter is to introduce the
reader with all the necessary information to situate these case studies in the republican
history of these Latin American countries and the evolution of national and international
legislations on the topic of cultural heritage protection and return. I introduce the actors
whose role will be analyzed in depth in the following chapters.
Chapter 3 demonstrates that the claims for the return of cultural heritage objects
must be understood within the broader framework of the construction of national
discourses through the appropriation of the pre-Columbian cultural heritage by the newly
independent, criollo, 12 states. There exists a vast literature on the development of
nationalism and the concept of nation in Latin America. Most scholars have seen Latin
America as an outlier that only partly fits their theories about nationalism (Miller 2006). I
examine more specifically the relationship between nationalism and material heritage in
the region and the specific contribution of various currents of indigenist thoughts to this
relationship. Within this context, I continue to explain why the phenomenon of return
claims has appeared since the late twentieth century and argue that return claims
represent a continuation of state efforts to define the nation through the appropriation of
material remains left by pre-Columbian cultures. Earlier in the twentieth century, these
12

The term criollo in Latin America refers to Spaniards born in the colonies – as opposed to those born in
Spain. Criollo is not an equivalent to the English Creole, which is why I will keep using the Spanish word
throughout this work.
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efforts focused on archaeological research and heritage conservation, in order to establish
the continuity between these and the contemporary state. Why do states continue this
work of “nation-building”? In a rapidly changing world, Latin America states, whose
“infrastructural capacity” – as defined by Centeno and Ferraro (2013a), drawing on the
work of Michael Mann – has been historically weak, see their role as economic
organizers and purveyors of social welfare threatened by the imposition of neo-liberal
reforms. In this context, I argue that states seek to retain the highly symbolic role of
producer of a collective sense of belonging, and return claims emerge as new instruments
of nation-building for states in crisis of legitimacy.
Chapter 4 develops a historical-institutionalist analysis of the evolution of cultural
policies (in particular in regard to heritage protection) to demonstrate that Latin American
countries have built the institutional capabilities to care for the cultural heritage objects
they claim back – a strengthening that is part of a broader phenomenon I call the
expansion of the cultural state. I argue that return claims must be understood as the
intersection between the interests of the cultural state with those of the promotion of the
tourism industry, mitigated by the potentially conflicting interests that the diplomatic
bodies, which are in charge of the negotiations to obtain the return, must manage in their
conduct of the country’s foreign policy.
In Chapter 5, I analyze the political stakes at play in each country and the
motivations of the actors involved in the claims. To understand policy change and the
formation of a relative consensus within claiming countries, I apply Sabatier’s (1991)
influential “advocacy coalition framework” (ACF). The stories told in my case studies
feature colorful characters who have made the return of specific objects the personal
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purpose of their life; passionate experts in universities and ministries with deep expertise
of the pre-Columbian cultures they study; high ranking officials in ministries who have
dedicated their professional career to the protection of the national heritage of the
country; and politicians who seized the opportunity to (re-)activate nationalist or patriotic
sentiments and ride on the growing international wave that favors returns. I also analyze
the conspicuous absence of Indigenous communities in the process of claiming the return
of these objects, even though the claimed objects were produced in pre-Columbian times.
Finally, in chapter 6, I expand my analysis outside the borders of the claiming
states and analyze the impact of the international environment on the formulation of the
claims. I contrast the arguments used by the holding institutions to oppose the claims
with those of two institutions that, on the contrary, have agreed to negotiate the return of
parts of their collections. I also examine the role of the supporters that claiming countries
have found in the claimed country and beyond. I propose a summary of the different
configurations of actors involved in return claims to evaluate how their interaction
determines the outcome of the claim. A last section is dedicated to the analysis of the
content of the agreements that have already been signed, in three of the six case studies I
used for my research.
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Chapter 2 – Claims for the return of cultural heritage objects: case studies
This chapter describes in greater detail the case studies that form the backbone of my
argument, evidencing commonalities and discrepancies among them. The history of these
objects must be understood in the colonial and post-colonial context of their removal,
revealing how relations of cultural domination and influences between Latin American
countries, on the one hand, and their former metropolis Spain – but also more widely
European and North American powers – on the other, did not end with the advent of
independence, in various Latin American countries, in the nineteenth century. For this
reason, I present the history of the displacement of each object in parallel to that of the
institution that holds it in its collection and of the efforts implemented to return it to its
country of origin. Only one case (Montezuma’s headdress) is the direct product of the
Spanish conquest. Four of them (the Peruvian and Colombian cases) concern objects
taken away from their country of origin between 1890 and 1930, when the new science of
archaeology was almost entirely a prerogative of European and North American
researchers and, though not entirely unregulated in Latin America, not yet under the tight
control of the state. Only the Teotihuacan murals case is more recent, pre-dating the 1970
UNESCO convention by only a few years.
All six cases are, indeed, “return” claims (as defined in the previous chapter)
because all eschew any possibility for the object to be returned through a legal procedure
against their current holder by application of the UNESCO convention. However, as
described below, some of these cases do involve legal procedures: Peru launched one in
US courts in parallel to its diplomatic efforts to recover the Machu Picchu collection, and
both Colombian cases feature important legal developments – but ones limited to the
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Colombian internal judicial order. The chronology of the claims reveals a growing
interest in Latin America over the past forty years for the topic of returns, even though
earlier attempts had been made. Cases drag on for several years at best, even when the
claimed party proves willing to cooperate in the return.
Altogether, these cases show the necessity to study in detail the actors involved in
each claim and to unpack the simplistic use of the name of a country to describe a
claimant. While not inaccurate in the sense of international law and relations, mentioning
that “Mexico,” “Peru,” or “Colombia” claims the return of an object – as much of the
literature on returns and restitutions does – obscures the political dynamics at play within
each country, the variety of actors involved in these claims, and their motivations. The
triggering actors to the return process are, in four cases, civil society actors in the
claiming country; in the other two cases, the holding institution itself approached the
claimant state. Several entities of the executive branch are involved in these processes
(most frequently, the presidential office, the ministries of foreign affairs and culture, and
the national institutes of archaeology and anthropology), with nuances: in Mexico and
Peru, the executive is mostly reactive (to solicitations from abroad or internal pressures),
but the Peruvian executive made the return of cultural objects a greater political priority
than its Mexican counterpart; in Colombia, the executive branch is only acting under
pressure from the judiciary, which backs up requests coming from civil society. Besides
state entities, actors of the claims include motivated individuals who make these returns a
personal cause (often pretending to represent all or part of the national or civil society);
the community of experts (archaeologists, anthropologists, historians) whose professional
and moral opinions weigh in on the debate, either by their direct involvement or the
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arguments they voice in the media; the demanded party, of course (including museum
officials and the state and/or local political authorities of that country); and the
international supporters of the claim.
Peru – The Machu Picchu collection from Yale University
From 1911-16, US explorer Hiram Bingham led three expeditions through the
Amazonian highlands in search of “the lost city of the Incas” (Bingham 1951). Among
other archaeological sites he visited in the surroundings of the former Inca capital Cusco
during his first expedition in June 1911, he was one of the first foreigners to ever reach
Machu Picchu – and the one who revealed its existence to worldwide audiences. The
following year, funded by Yale University and National Geographic, Bingham conducted
the first scientific excavations at Machu Picchu (Heaney 2010), the citadel that has since
become Peru’s cultural and touristic icon. Aware of the restrictions on excavations and
the exportation of their product imposed by a 1911 presidential decree,1 Bingham, with
the support of US President Taft, sought and obtained the consent of Peruvian President
Leguía in October 1912 to ship back to Yale several crates containing ceramics and other
archaeological objects, including human remains, to be studied at the university. 2
Subsequently, Bingham bought a private collection from Cusco antiquarian Tomás
Alvistur and smuggled it from the country in late 1914 (Heaney 2010). In January 1916,
he obtained a second decree allowing the export of yet more archaeological findings to
Yale, the product of the third archaeological expedition of 1914-15. This time, though,

1

Decreto supremo n. 2612, Aug. 19, 1911.
Resolución n. 1529, Ministerio de Instrucción, October 31, 1912 (published in the official gazette El
Peruano, Nov. 4, 1912). This document retrospectively authorizes Bingham to excavate and export the
objects found in Machu Picchu, but the Peruvian government reserves its right to claim back from Yale
University and National Geographic all unique and repeated objects extracted during Yale’s campaign.

2
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the decree specifically requested the return of the objects within eighteen months3 – a
deadline Bingham acknowledged.4

Figure 2.1: Objects from the Machu Picchu collection presented in the National
Palace in Lima in April 2011 upon their return from Yale University
(Photo: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores from Perú; 2011; CC BY-SA 2.0)

These, at least, were the facts largely used by Peruvian authorities and relayed in
the Peruvian press throughout the 2000s: Yale was denying the return of objects that had
been on loan since the 1910s. Yet Yale authorities and the curators of the university’s
Peabody Museum have contested this understanding of the legal case, arguing that only
the objects from the 1914-15 expeditions were to have been returned – which they were
in 1921 – but that the Machu Picchu objects excavated in 1912 were not subject to the
same legal requirements.5

3

Resolución n. 31, Dirección General de Instrucción Pública [Bureau of Public Education], Jan. 27, 1916.
In a letter Bingham sent to Gilbert H. Grosvenor (director of the National Geographic Society) on Nov. 28,
1916, Bingham wrote: the objects “do not belong to us, but to the Peruvian government, who allowed us to
take them out of the country on condition that they be returned in eighteen months.”
5
Lucy Salazar, “Machu Picchu: el arca política,” Caretas (Lima), Nov. 11, 2010. See also Heaney (2010,
pp. 217-20 and 224-26) for a presentation of both sides of the legal dispute. I find a striking parallel
between this dispute over the applicability and interpretation of legal texts and the endless controversy, in
4
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In these years, the consciousness of the necessity to protect the monuments left by
pre-Hispanic cultures was developing among young Cusco intellectuals such as Luis
Valcárcel.6 As early as 1912, a few voices had objected to the permission granted to Yale
to excavate and export the product of the search,7 and the increasing acrimony against the
Yale expedition led Bingham to put an end to his Peruvian adventure in 1916 (Salvatore
2003, Heaney 2010). From 1916-21, Peruvian authorities did seek the return of the
exported materials in at least two occasions. In response to a November 1918, request
from the Peruvian ambassador in Washington, DC, the director of the National
Geographic Society explained that World War I had kept Bingham away in Europe and
slowed down the research process. When the Peruvian consul again requested the return
of the collection in October 1920, Yale answered that Bingham was sick and had not
been able to complete his research, asking for an extension of the loan through January
1922, which was granted. In September 1921, as mentioned above, Yale did return
several boxes containing human remains from excavations at sites other than Machu
Picchu,8 but the objects from Machu Picchu itself were never returned. In 1928, a
the Parthenon Marbles case, about the exact extent of the powers conferred by the sultan’s firman to Lord
Elgin to study, draw, cast, dismount, and eventually export the marbles. In the Machu Picchu case, it is
unclear whether the judge in Hartford, CT (where the case was pending at the time the final agreement was
signed in November 2010), would have ruled in favor of Peru by rejecting that the statute of limitations had
expired and interpreting the different texts cited here in the light of their Peruvian understanding. The
Machu Picchu case represents an excellent example of the limited view of the question of the return of
cultural heritage objects that can be gained by focusing solely on the legal quibbles of each case –
highlighting, as explained in Chapter 1, the necessity to focus on the political stakes of all actors involved
in the dispute.
6
“Por nuestra historia,” La Prensa (Lima), Jul. 13, 1913.
7
“Nuestras riquezas arqueológicas,” El Comercio (Lima), Oct. 25, 1912. Also, Heaney (2010) recounts
how Emilio Gutiérrez de Quintanilla, director of the national museum in Lima, understanding the
importance of the materials that were being taken away from Peru, tried – unsuccessfully – to stop the
export of the last batch of objects.
8
The nature and quantity of the objects returned in 1921 remain to some extent uncertain. Early in the
claiming process, a confidential memorandum (“Informe de status, Objetos de Machu Picchu en Posesión
de la Universidad de Yale,” Feb. 3, 2003; Archivos de la Dirección General de Defensa del Patrimonio
Cultural, Ministerio de Cultura, Lima, Peru - ADGDPC) shows that the Peruvian side and his National
Geographic ally were unsure whether several crates were, indeed, returned to Peru, as Yale declared.
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representative from the Universidad Nacional San Antonio Abad del Cusco (UNSAAC)
asked the Ministry of Education in Lima to request again the return of the objects.9
Throughout the following decades, a few articles in the Peruvian press mentioned
the collection but Peruvian authorities apparently made no further attempt at recovering
it. The memory of the collection faded; for example, Peruvian newspapers made no
mention of the alienated collection during Bingham’s first visit back to Peru in October
1948, for the inauguration of the road that bears his name connecting the nearby town of
Aguas Calientes to Machu Picchu.10 However, in 1961, an organization dedicated to
archaeology in Cusco used the local edition of the newspaper El Comercio to ask the
Ministry of Education to send back to their town the boxes kept in the museum of
anthropology in Lima, which Yale had returned in 1921.11 The same year, as Cusco was
preparing the celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of the “discovery” of Machu Picchu,
the UNSAAC, noting that a few boxes were, indeed, deposited in Lima, announced it
would arrange for the return of the other boxes from Yale.12 At the time, even the
intervention of one of Bingham’s sons was insufficient to incentivize the university to
send back the objects to Peru, yet Yale provided access to the collection to Peruvian
Several years later, much uncertainty remained, mostly because the inventory of the objects returned in
1921 was missing, whether because it was not established or had disappeared (Letter from Blanca Alva
Guerrero, director of defense of historical heritage, to Cecilia Bákula Budge, director of the National
Institute of Culture (INC), Jul. 20, 2010; ADGDPC).
9
Letter from Luis Guillermo Lumbreras, director of the INC, to Alberto Carrión Tejada, executive director
of the subsecretary in charge of exterior cultural policy of the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sep. 13,
2004; ADGDPC. It is unclear, however, whether another request was presented to Yale at the time.
10
This visit took place in a moment of great political instability, as a mutiny of pro-APRA (Victor Raúl
Haya de la Torre’s party American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) marines, on October 3, led to the
demise of the civilian government of José Luis Bustamante through a military coup, on October 27. This
context may, in part, explain that few in Peru may have been interested in questioning the fate of the
collection taken away by Bingham a few decades earlier.
11
“Devolución cerámica,” El Comercio (Cusco), Mar. 2, 1961. It is unclear whether the authors of this
open letter knew that thousands of objects were still in Yale at the time. Luis Lumbreras told me he found
these boxes in the museum when he became its director in 1973, but that the objects were from the
surroundings of Machu Picchu, not the citadel itself (interview, Apr. 24, 2017).
12
“Gestión en ‘Yale’,” El Comercio (Cusco), Apr. 10, 1961.
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visitors, such as indigenist intellectual Luis Valcárcel, in 1962 (Heaney 2010, 221). In
1981, Peru and the USA signed an agreement13 on the return of stolen archaeological
artifacts (Truslow 1982), but this text was not meant to apply to cases of long-displaced
objects such as the Machu Picchu collection.14 In 1989, El Comercio claimed, in a selfcongratulatory article, to have acted as a watchdog in the case of the Machu Picchu
collection, announcing that the remaining objects would soon be claimed, and that Yale
had shown a favorable disposition to collaborate – to no avail.15
The collection, which had lain dormant in the reserves of Yale’s Peabody
Museum of Natural History since the 1920s, became again an object of study for
anthropologists Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar in the 1980s. It formed the basis of the
show “Machu Picchu: Unveiling the Mystery of the Incas” presented at the Peabody in
early 2003, which traveled to seven US cities from 2003-2005 and was accompanied by a
catalogue (Burger and Salazar 2004). Yet, over more than eight decades in New Haven,
the collection had only yielded (at least until the 2000s) a limited body of scientific
knowledge16 – an argument used by the Peruvian side over the decade of the 2000s.

13

Agreement Respecting the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural
Properties, Sep. 15, 1981, United States-Peru, TIAS n. 10, 136.
14
Peruvian and US authorities were concerned at the time with an increase in trafficking of pre-Columbian
objects. Cases such as Yale’s Machu Picchu collection were clearly out of the scope of the agreement,
which was not retroactive. In any case, the US party would most likely not have admitted at the time that
the Machu Picchu collection had been looted or stolen.
15
“‘El Comercio’ y Machu Picchu,” El Comercio (Lima), Jan. 15, 1989. Whatever discussions may have
taken place from the 1920s through the 1980s between the Peruvian government and the university, if they
happened, are not referenced in internal or public official documents from the Peruvian government
produced since the early 2000s; these documents only mention the letters sent in 1918 and 1920 to the
university to demonstrate the government’s early efforts to recover the collection. That this 1989 article did
not have more impact at the time may, again, be explained by the political situation of the country. The last
months of Alan García’s first term (1985-90) were tumultuous, as hyperinflation and the internal armed
conflict with the Shining Path were the main points of focus in Peruvian public opinion.
16
The list of scientific publications based on research done on the collection, provided by Yale in the
document “Mitos y hechos sobre los materiales de Machu Picchu en la Universidad de Yale” published in
June 2008, reveals a gap from the mid-1910s through the 1980s. The number of publications only
significantly increased in the 2000s.
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In 1999, Peruvian historian Mariana Mould de Pease, who opposed a project for a
cable car in Machu Picchu during Fujimori’s semi-authoritarian regime, started to recover
the memory of the collection through her research in archives in Cusco and at Yale. She
evidenced not only that Bingham was not the “discoverer” of Machu Picchu (residents of
the area and a few foreign travelers knew of the ruins) but also that the objects he took
with him at the end of his expeditions had not been returned to Peru; she linked this
question to the overall issues of conservation facing the citadel (2000, 2003, 2004).
Mould de Pease soon rallied to her cause the archaeological community in Peru and
obtained a contract as a consultant with the National Institute of Culture (INC)17 during
the government of transition in late 200018 to continue her research. Her work also
interested the UNSAAC in Cusco, which wrote to the Presidency and the Ministry of
Foreign Relations (MREP) in 2001 to ask them for their collaboration in obtaining the
return of the collection (Mould de Pease 2003, 88);19 subsequently, a letter signed by INC
Director Luis Enrique Tort was sent to Yale, but did not receive a response. Other
individuals who soon gained access to the entourage of President Toledo, elected in mid2001, also became interested in the topic: among them, Luis Guillermo Lumbreras, who
became the director of the INC from 2002-06; and José Koechlin, a tourism entrepreneur
who owns hotels in Aguas Calientes and contributed to involve National Geographic and
its then-President Terry Garcia in the nascent controversy. Over the next decade, the
17

A state entity in charge of culture and heritage, created in 1971 and ascribed to the ministry of education,
the INC was replaced by a Ministry of Culture in 2011.
18
Following Alberto Fujimori’s resignation in November 2000, the Peruvian congress named its president,
Valentín Paniagua, as president of transition, in charge of organizing new elections, which took place in
July 2001. During his short tenure, Paniagua started the liberalization of Fujimori’s semi-authoritarian
regime and oversaw the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in charge of examining the
abuses against human rights committed during the internal armed conflict.
19
This request from UNSAAC is also mentioned in a letter from Alberto Carrión Tejada, executive director
of the subsecretary in charge of exterior cultural policy of the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to
Leonor Cisneros Velarde, director of the INC, Jan. 27, 2002; ADGDPC.
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Machu Picchu collection was a topic that recurrently appeared in the cultural pages of
national Peruvian newspapers (and occasionally on the front pages, particularly in
November 2010, when the final agreement was signed).
Elected in July 2001, Alejandro Toledo made much of his Indigenous origins
during the campaign and held an inauguration ceremony at Machu Picchu. First Lady
Eliane Karp, an anthropologist and a controversial character in Peruvian politics, is often
credited for being the mind behind the indigenist tone of Toledo’s campaign. She directly
supervised the bitter negotiations that started in summer 2002 with a visit of Richard
Burger and Lucy Salazar, who were looking for support for their New Haven
exhibition.20 In fall 2002, Yale took out from the Peabody Museum’s online catalogue all
objects from and related to Machu Picchu, triggering fears in Peru that the university was
trying to conceal information about the objects it held.21 Several meetings in New Haven
evidenced the differences between Yale and Peru’s position, and the relations became
more acrimonious. In October 2005, the Peruvian ambassador in the USA, Eduardo
Ferrero, addressed a letter to Yale’s President Richard Levin, requesting “officially and
formally” the immediate return of the collection and concluding that, in case of a
negative, Peru would pursue any available legal means.22
As negotiations publicly broke off in March 200623 over the recognition by Yale
of Peruvian ownership of the collection and a new long term loan,24 it became clear that

20

Burger and Salazar described this meeting to me in an interview in similar ways as Arthur Lubow
recounts it in his detailed article, “The Possessed,” for The New York Times, Jun. 24, 2007.
21
Letter from Enrique González Carré, director of the national system of state museums, to Luis Lumbreras,
director of the INC, Oct. 10, 2002; ADGDPC.
22
Letter from Eduardo Ferrero, ambassador of Peru, to Richard Levin, president of Yale University, Oct. 7,
2005; ADGDPC.
23
Press release, Yale University, Mar. 1, 2006.
24
Press release “Yale debe reconocer que piezas extraidas de Machu Picchu son peruanas,” INC, Mar. 3,
2006.
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Toledo’s administration would not obtain the return of the collection before the end of its
term in July, even though Toledo himself discussed the topic with US President George
W. Bush in March.25 The MREP and the INC had started to explore legal options in the
United States as an alternative to the failing negotiations and had chosen a law firm to
represent Peruvian interests,26 but the high costs involved in such a procedure and the
uncertainty over its outcome ultimately deterred Toledo from launching it. Nevertheless,
he made sure the topic would not die with the inauguration of his successor:27 in between
Alan García’s election (July 4) and his inauguration (July 28), the Peruvian congress
passed law n. 27887 (which had been under consideration since at least 2004), declaring
the return of the collection a matter of “national interest” and creating a high commission
in charge of the topic.28 The commission included representatives of the MREP, the
Ministry of Justice, the INC, the Peruvian (unicameral) congress, the regional
government of Cusco, and the local government of Aguas Calientes and Machu Picchu;
its members quickly rotated over the following weeks as the new administration was
taking over. Observing that negotiations had stalled, the commission encouraged the new
government to re-open them while continuing to prepare for a legal battle in US courts.29
Alan García named his minister of public housing, Hernán Garrido Lecca, as his
special negotiator. Reestablishing official contact with the university, Garrido Lecca
signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in September 2007. The document

25

Informe de la Comisión de Alto Nivel para la Repatriación de los objetos arqueológicos que forman parte
de la colección Machu Picchu (CANRMP), Dec. 29, 2006; ADGDPC.
26
Informe “Piezas arqueológicas de Machu Picchu en posesión de la universidad de Yale,” prepared by the
ministry of foreign relations and transmitted to the INC, May 23, 2006; ADGDPC.
27
Under the terms of the 1993 constitution, Peruvian presidents cannot be immediately reelected, but can
be newly elected after the term of their successor.
28
Congreso de la República, Ley n. 28778 de repatriación de los objetos arqueológicos que forman parte de
la colección Machupicchu de la Universidad de Yale, published Jul. 13, 2006 in El Peruano.
29
Informe de la CANRMP, op. cit., note 25.
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acknowledged Peru’s ownership over the collection, yet only the “museum quality”
pieces would return to Peru upon completion of an international tour of the Peabody’s
exhibition; the rest – the vast majority of the collection – would remain in New Haven for
an additional ninety-nine years.30 When its content became public a few weeks later, the
MOU generated an outcry in Peru and beyond for being too generous with Yale.31 Yet the
MOU brought one important progress for the Peruvian side: years of negotiations had
evidenced the gaps in Peruvian knowledge about the collection. What exactly had
Bingham taken with him? Which objects, if any, had been returned in 1921? What was
left in New Haven? Peru finally obtained permission to send a delegation of seven
archaeologists and historians from the INC – led by Director Cecilia Bákula herself – to
Yale, in February 2008. The inventory yielded a list of more than 46,000 elements
(including all fragments) of approximately 5,500 different objects,32 including ceramics,
lithic, wooden, and metal instruments, as well as animal and human remains. Of those,
only about 350 were “museum quality pieces,” i.e., of potential interest for public display
– though not the most spectacular Inca objects that can be seen in public collections
throughout the world. The rest of the collection was of great scientific value but not
museum material.33

30

Memorandum de entendimiento, suscrito entre el gobierno del Perú (Perú) y la Universidad de Yale
(Yale), Sep. 14, 2007. Text in Spanish available at http://ley29164.blogspot.com/2011/09/memorandum-deentendimiento-peru-yale.html, last accessed Jul. 10, 2019.
31
For the controversy it generated in Peru, see for example “Acuerdo cuestionado,” La República (Lima),
Mar. 17, 2008. The MOU also became public news in English-speaking media: see Eliane Karp (op-ed
contributor), “The lost treasure of Machu Picchu,” The New York Times, Feb. 23, 2008.
32
Newspaper articles and archival documents reveal discrepancies that drag on for years over the exact
number of pieces to be included in the inventory, depending on how those are counted. All the other cases
detailed below – except Montezuma’s headdress, always counted as one single object – reveal similar
points of contention among parties as they establish the exact content of the collections in dispute.
33
“Yale descarta presencia de oro peruano,” La República, Sep. 22, 2007. Among the rumors circulating in
Peru about the collection was the presence of objects in gold, smuggled by Bingham.
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On the political side, negotiations kept stalling. In June 2008, Yale published a
document in Spanish contradicting the arguments circulating in Peruvian media at the
time.34 The same month, National Geographic’s Vice-President Terry Garcia, who since
2002 had in several meetings manifested his support to the Peruvian claim, publicly
asked Yale to return the collection. 35 In parallel to the diplomatic negotiation, the
Peruvian government, having named Eduardo Ferrero (the former ambassador of Peru to
the US) an ad-hoc attorney for the case, launched the legal procedure: on December 5,
2008, Peru presented a demand before a federal court in the District of Columbia; this
was redirected to the court of Connecticut on July 30, 2009. The likeliness of success of
the legal procedure remains an object of debate, however, because of the inapplicability
of conventions such as UNESCO 1970 and the statue of limitations (McIntosh 2006,
Swanson 2009).
Aiming to obtain the return of the collection in time for the celebration of the
hundredth anniversary of the “discovery” of Machu Picchu in 2011, Alan García
intensified his international campaign against Yale in fall 2010, seeking public support
not only from National Geographic but also Yale’s alumni,36 US Senator Christopher
Dodd, Bingham’s family, and even US President Barack Obama;37 threatening to launch
a penal procedure against Yale’s President Richard Levin; leading a march that gathered
34

Yale University, “Mitos y hechos sobre los materiales de Machu Picchu en la Universidad de Yale.” The
document addresses the absence of objects in gold in the collection, the question of ownership over the
collection, the number of objects and fragments, the conditions of conservation of the collection, the
alleged benefits the university obtained from the 2003-05 touring exhibition, and the scientific publications
based on research into the collection. Available at: http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con2_uibd.
nsf/ 99477ACD63872880052577DF007786D6/$FILE/MITOS-Y-HECHOS-SOBRE-MACHU
PICCHU.pdf, last accessed Jul. 10, 2018.
35
“Yale debe devolver piezas incas al Perú,” La República, Jun. 19, 2008.
36
The fate of the Machu Picchu collection was widely discussed in Yale’s student newspapers; also,
twenty-three Yale graduates living in Peru addressed a letter to Richard Levin dated Sep. 21, 2010, calling
the university to return the collection.
37
Letter from Alan García to Barack Obama, Nov. 2, 2010, reproduced in El Comercio (Lima), Nov. 19,
2010.
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more than 3,000 people in Lima on November 5 (the same day, marches also took place
in Cusco and Aguas Calientes); and receiving former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo,
a Yale alumnus and the director of the university’s Center for the Study of Globalization,
sent to Lima for a final mediation. Under intense pressure, the university agreed to return
the collection, 38 in three installments, through a tripartite agreement 39 involving the
Peruvian government, Yale, and the UNSAAC. On November 20, 2010, Peru’s major
newspapers announced the agreement on their front pages.40
In March 2011, the museum quality pieces arrived in Lima; these 363 objects
were immediately brought to the presidential palace to be shown in a public exhibition,
which had to be extended several times to cater to the crowds: over three weeks in April
2011, more than 300,000 people visited the exhibition.41 The pieces were then transferred
to Cusco to be exhibited in Casa Concha, a colonial house belonging to the UNSAAC
and restored by Yale. In December 2011, the second lot, containing human and animal
remains, arrived in Cusco; the third and last batch (35,000 fragments and artifacts)
arrived in Peru in November 2012. Under the terms of the tripartite agreement, the entire
collection is now held in Casa Concha. The curators of the collection at Yale’s Peabody
Museum, US-Peruvian couple Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar – among the fiercest
opponents to the return throughout the decade of the 2000s – remain in charge of
managing the collection and travel to Cusco every summer for that purpose.
38

The agreement concerns only the pieces excavated at Machu Picchu in 1912, but does not cover other
objects Bingham collected or bought in Cuzco and surroundings, for example the Alvistur collection.
39
Memorandum de entendimiento entre la República del Perú y la Universidad de Yale, Nov. 23, 2010;
Memorandum of Understanding between the Universidad Nacional de San Antonio Abad del Cusco and
Yale University Regarding the UNSAAC-Yale University International Center for the Study of Machu
Picchu and Inca Culture, Feb. 11, 2011.
40
“Yale devolverá piezas” [Yale will return the pieces] (El Comercio); “Yale abrió el candado” [Yale
opened the lock] (La República); “Al fin, Yale devuelve” [Finally, Yale gives back] (Perú21).
41
“Muestra de piezas de Machu Picchu fue vista por más de 300 mil personas,” El Comercio (Lima), Apr.
25, 2011. The article gives a final tally of 303,600 visitors.
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As I will argue in the following chapters, the return of the Machu Picchu
collection was made possible by the emergence of a coalition of actors in Peru interested
in the return of the collection, including civil society members, experts (archaeologists
and historians), and politicians (at the highest level of state office), as well as allies
abroad. This coalition has remained remarkably stable throughout the process.
Peru – Paracas textiles from the Museum of World Culture in Gothenburg, Sweden
Located 250km south of Lima, the Paracas peninsula sits in an arid coastal desert that
favors the conservation of human and organic remains. A complex culture flourished in
that region from approximately 500BC to 300AD.42 Paracas people buried their dead in a
seated position, wrapped in embroidered textiles of cotton and camelid hair, dyed with
bright colors. Nothing was known of the Paracas culture until these funerary bundles,
looted by tomb raiders, started appearing in private collections and on markets in Lima in
the early twentieth century. Julio C. Tello, who is often considered the founder of
Peruvian scientific archaeology, resolved to find the origin of these textiles and, in 1925,
was led to Paracas by one of the grave diggers. Over the following years, Tello excavated
housing compounds and burial sites in the peninsula, unearthing several hundred funerary
bundles. However, with the fall of Peruvian President Leguía in 1930, Tello had to resign
from his position as director of the museum of Peruvian archaeology and stop his work in
Paracas; over the following months, looters took advantage of the vacuum left by
archaeologists and unearthed several hundred more bundles, which fueled the growing

42

Source: http://www.paracas.se/en/history/. Last accessed Jul. 10, 2019. The Paracas culture is named
after the site where its remains were first discovered, but it had expanded to several valleys along the
Pacific coast.

39

demand for Paracas textiles on the local and international markets.43 In this context, Sven
Karell, consul of Sweden in Peru, brought approximately eighty-nine of these textiles
back to Sweden and donated them to the museum of the city of Gothenburg, under the
condition that his gift would remain anonymous – which it did for decades.

Figure 2.2: The “manto calendario,” one of the first four Paracas textiles
returned from Gothenburg, Sweden, to Peru, in 2014
(Photo: @2019, Världskulturmuseerna [Museum of World Culture, Gothenburg]

After the collection was deposited in the ethnographic department of the
Gothenburg museum, it was shown on several occasions and moved to several different
facilities over the following decades. The ethnographic museum closed in 2000 and its
collection was transferred in 2001 to the new state-owned Världskulturmuseet [Museum
of World Culture], which opened in 2004. Its collection includes approximately one
hundred Paracas textiles, including the eighty-nine owned by the city of Gothenburg.
Following the opening of the new facility, the museum developed original curatorial
concepts highlighting specific topics in a transcultural perspective. It is in this mindset

43

Among other institutions, the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, the American Museum of Natural History in
New York City, and the Brooklyn Museum of Art hold important collections of Paracas textiles.
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that the exhibition “A Stolen World: The Paracas Collection” opened in September 2008
and remained on view through January 2011;44 it told the story of how Paracas textiles
became much sought-after artifacts and were smuggled away from Peru, questioning the
attitude a museum should adopt towards the history of its own collections.
This bold curatorial choice – consciously or not – opened the door to a Peruvian
claim. While the Gothenburg’s Paracas collection was well known among Peruvian
experts, the possibility of its return to Peru had never been publicly discussed. However,
in the context of the Machu Picchu claim throughout the 2000s (described above), which
had increased the interest in the question of cultural heritage returns in Peru, the Swedish
admission of guilt triggered the reaction of Peruvian authorities. In December 2009, the
Peruvian ambassador to Sweden wrote to the Swedish minister of foreign affairs,45 the
director of cultural affairs of the City of Gothenburg, and the museum, praising the
museum’s transparency about the origin of its collection and asking for its return to Peru;
in April 2010, the city’s board of culture agreed to start the process that would lead to the
return of the collection to Peru (Willén 2011).
This quick resolution of the demand did not lead, however, to an immediate return
of the collection. Negotiations stalled mostly over conservation issues. Over the previous
decades, the collection had been handled with great care in state-of-the-art facilities, as
the Peruvian part repeatedly acknowledged.46 The Swedish part was now concerned with
Peru’s (financial and technical) capacity to conserve fragile textiles; in Peru, several
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experts also expressed concern about the damage aerial transportation could cause to the
textiles. In early July 2011, shortly before the end of his second term, President Alan
García grew impatient and threatened to file criminal charges in Peru for robbery.47 The
reasons for García’s declaration remain subject to interpretation: he may have hoped to
repeat his success from a few months prior, when he had obtained the return of the
Machu Picchu collection after threatening Yale’s president to launch a penal procedure,48
or – adopting a strategy not very different from his predecessor Alejandro Toledo in the
Machu Picchu case – he may have wanted to lock in the topic in the realm of Peruvian
politics, using the weeks between his successor Ollanta Humala’s election and
inauguration to publicize the topic, ensuring it would not die out with the change of
administration.
Negotiations, indeed, continued quickly under the new administration, led by the
new vice-minister in charge of heritage, Luis Jaime Castillo; in August 2011, the socialdemocrat mayor of Gothenburg, Anneli Hultén, acknowledged in writing the Peruvian
property of the eighty-nine textiles in possession of the city.49 The city council formally
agreed to the return in October 201350 and to cover the costs involved in the return
process, including the manufacturing of anti-vibration boxes for the packaging of the
very delicate textiles and for air transportation – for a total amount of at least $2
million.51 The memorandum of understanding signed in June 2014 in Lima by the mayor
of Gothenburg and the ministers of culture and of economy on behalf of the Peruvian
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government regard the eighty-nine textiles in possession of the city (not those owned by
the Swedish state and also displayed in the museum); the first four textiles from
Gothenburg arrived in Lima that month. After a period of rest to analyze how they were
acclimatizing to their new environment in Lima, they were shown to the public for a
limited time in September-October 2014, attracting over 3,000 visitors. 52 They are
conserved, at least for now, in the National Museum of Archaeology, Anthropology, and
History (MNAAH)53 in Lima, where they shall remain at least until the inauguration of
the new National Museum of Archaeology of Peru (MUNA) currently under construction
in Pachacamac.54 A second batch of fifty textiles arrived in Lima in December 2017;55
the rest of the collection is to be returned to Peru at the latest by 2021, in time for the
200th anniversary of the country’s independence and the 400th anniversary of the
foundation of Gothenburg.
In the case of the Paracas textiles returned to Peru from Sweden, the Peruvian
state once again reacted to conditions created by other actors, with one major difference:
in the Machu Picchu case, the pressure built up domestically and the holding institution
showed great resistance; in Sweden, the museum itself opened the door to a claim by
acknowledging the illicit nature of its collection.
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Mexico – Penacho de Moctezuma in the Weltmuseum of Vienna, Austria
Much uncertainty remains on the exact function of the penacho de Moctezuma
[Montezuma’s headdress] and how and why the object was sent to Europe in the early
sixteenth century. The nature of the object (and even, for that matter, its precise
geographical origin) has been the object of much speculation, particularly since the late
nineteenth century, when the historians who examined the object linked it to Montezuma
himself. The prevalent contemporary scientific opinion, though, is that the penacho was a
ceremonial object (possibly a headdress) used by Aztec priests at the time of the conquest
rather than the Aztec emperor’s crown or another personal symbol of power; the binational commissions of experts who examined the penacho in 2002 and in 2011-12 have
referred to it as the penacho del México antiguo [headdress from ancient México] (Haag
et al. 2012). This evolution is reflected in the terms employed by the Mexican press,
which has often preferred, over the course of the years, the more evocative reference to
the last Aztec emperor and the more romantic versions of its arrival in Europe to
historical uncertainties; yet, from the 1990s, when almost all articles referred to
“Montezuma’s feathered crown,” articles have progressively introduced elements of
information relaying the questions that surround the object.
Made of thousands of quetzal feathers, the penacho may have been a gift sent by
Montezuma to Emperor Charles V, although popular mythology sees it as part of the
spoils of the ransack of Montezuma’s palace by conquistador Hernán Cortés; yet another
version says that the object arrived in Europe on a privateer’s boat that seized the gift in
the Atlantic Ocean (Peimbert Moreno 2011). None of these stories have been confirmed.
What we do know is that the penacho has belonged, since the late sixteenth century, to
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several cabinets of curiosity56 of the extended Habsburg family – among which the
collection of Archduke Ferdinand II at Ambras Castle in Tyrol – until its arrival to a
Viennese palace in the early nineteenth century. Its property was transferred from the
court to the Austrian state in 1878, when it entered the collections of the museum of
natural history. Submitted to several processes of restoration since the late nineteenth
century, the penacho was moved to a new ethnological museum in 1935 and spent WWII
in the reserves of the national bank; it only briefly left Vienna to be exhibited in Zurich in
1946-7 (Feest 2012). As the ethnological museum undertook several phases of expansion
and renovation, the penacho was taken out from public view for several years, much to
the chagrin of many Mexicans: following the 2004-07 restoration of the entire museum,
the penacho remained in the museum’s reserves until the conclusion of the 2010-12
conservation process of the object; then, from 2014-17, the museum closed again for a
complete transformation of the permanent collections.

57

Renamed Weltmuseum

[Museum of the World] in 2013, the museum reopened to the public in late 2017.
According to van Bussel (2012), an early mention of a return of the object to
Mexico would have come from Marxist intellectual Bruno Frei, who spent World War II
in exile in Mexico, as a gesture of gratitude and friendship from Austrian authorities for
Mexico’s protest at the Anschluss in 1938.58 President Echevarría of Mexico would have
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requested the return in the 1970s; following the controversy about Kurt Waldheim in
Austria, the idea to return the penacho to improve Austria’s image abroad would also
have floated.59 The idea of a return of the penacho to Mexico has periodically reappeared
in the Mexican and Austrian press since then, often triggering cascades of passionate
comments in favor or against it. Mexican media have recurrently announced that the
penacho would soon be returned to Mexico – to no avail.

Figure 2.3: The “penacho de Moctezuma,”
held in the collections of the Weltmuseum, Vienna

(Photo: © Weltmuseum. Mexico, Aztec, early 16th c., feathers of the resplendent quetzal, cotinga,
roseate spoonbill, squirrel cuckoo, kingfisher; wood, fibres, paper, cotton, leather, gold,
gilded bronze, h. 116, w. 175;)

In 1987, Mexican citizen Antonio Gómora (who adopted the name
Xokonoschtletl60) staged folkloric dances of Mexican Indigenous inspiration in front of
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the museum in Vienna to demand the return of the penacho to Mexico; he repeated his
protest for several consecutive summers throughout the 1990s and 2000s. He also
coordinated marches in several European capitals with up to one hundred dancers he
brought from Mexico in order to attract attention and gather signatures in support of his
efforts. Over the years, Xokonoschtletl was received by mayors, politicians, and crowned
heads such as Pope John Paul II, the king of the Netherlands, and the prince of
Liechtenstein, who have shown sympathy for his efforts and, occasionally, material and
financial support. Other civil society voices active in favor of the return over the past
three decades include Blanca Moctezuma Barragán, who claims to be a fifteenthgeneration descendant of Emperor Montezuma; she has written to and interacted with
Mexican authorities, and has talked about the topic at length in the Mexican media. Both
she and Xokonoschtletl have repeatedly blamed Mexican authorities for their passivity on
the topic of the penacho. They have, at the very least, achieved to force Mexican
authorities to forge an official position about the penacho.
These have demonstrated a cautious and fluctuating interest in the topic. The
Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs (SRE) sought, at least in 1987-88, to maintain the
position of a sympathetic observer towards Xokonoschtletl’s efforts in Vienna, while not
considering it appropriate to present a formal claim to the Austrian authorities at the
time.61 Official involvement of the Mexican state started in 1991, when the director of the
National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH)62 sent a letter (left unanswered)
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to the Austrian ministry of science and culture, requesting the “devolution” of the
penacho to exhibit it in Mexico’s national museum.63 The INAH has engaged more
actively with voices such as Xokonoschtletl’s, endorsing him and his organization
Yankuikanahuak as “auxiliaries” in the “recuperation (…) of the cultural patrimony (…)
of the Mexican nation.”64 Over the following years, the penacho became a recurring topic
of the Mexican-Austrian bilateral relation.
In June 1996, conservative Austrian President Thomas Klestil declared publicly
that he was in favor of returning the penacho to Mexico. Supported by the Austrian
social-democrat and green parties and voices such as Rudolf Burger, a philosopher and
rector of Vienna’s University of Applied Arts, Klestil’s declarations were violently
opposed by the conservative government, who argued that the president had exceeded his
purely honorific title and had no authority over national patrimony and that only an act of
congress (controlled by conservative parties) could authorize a return of the object to
Mexico. In July 1996, the president of Mexico’s National Council for Culture and the
Arts (CONACULTA), Rafael Tovar y de Teresa, accompanied by the director of the
INAH and functionaries of the SRE, traveled to Vienna to discuss the matter further; he
brought with him a letter from Foreign Affairs Secretary José Angel Gurría thanking
Klestil for his offer to return the penacho, stating that Mexico was “interested in
President Klestil’s offer to gift the headdress” to Mexico.65 This letter did receive a
negative response, under the form of a letter signed by Austrian Minister of Foreign
(CONACULTA), itself a dependency of the secretary of education. The INAH is currently attached to the
Secretary of Culture, created in 2015.
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Letter from Robert García Moll, general director of the National Institute of Anthropology and History
(INAH) to Erhard Busek, minister of science and culture of Austria, Mar. 4, 1991; AHGE-SRE.
64
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Affairs Wolfgang Schüssel, who argued that the absence of legal basis for the return (the
museum having acquired the penacho legally) and the excellent care provided to the
object in Austria since it became a museum object justified that Austria would continue
to take care of the object for the benefit of future generations.66 Since then, the Austrian
position, defended by the government and the museum, has repeatedly used the same
arguments, progressively adding the following elements: the danger for European
museums to set a precedent by returning the penacho; the fragility of the object, which
should not be displaced; the fact that more than four hundred years of presence on
Austrian territory has made the penacho as much an object of Austria’s national heritage
as Mexico’s; the absence of an official petition from the Mexican government (a more
surprising argument, in the light of what precedes, which I will discuss further in Chapter
5); finally, the historical inaccuracy of attributing the penacho to Montezuma himself (in
order to dismiss the historical argument for the return). Yet, on this last point, the
Mexican authorities had themselves decided since 1995 to avoid discussing the question
of the authenticity of the object (in particular, whether it was Montezuma’s) on the basis
that the Austrians recognized that, regardless of its exact historical function, ownership,
and conditions of removal, the penacho was, indeed, a “Mexican patrimonial good.”67
Following the 1996 episode, the Mexican diplomacy continued to engage
Austrian authorities on the topic by proposing the creation of a bi-national commission to
obtain more scientific knowledge about the object. 68 In 1998, the president of the
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Austrian parliament, Heinz Fischer, floated the idea of a ninety-nine-year loan to Mexico.
In 2000, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional [Revolutionary Institutional Party, PRI]
abandoned its supremacy over the Mexican presidency and congress when Vicente Fox,
from the right-wing Partido Acción Nacional [National Action Party, PAN], won the
presidential election – a political earthquake in a country used to the dominance of the
PRI since the 1930s. Yet this did not translate into radical changes in Mexico’s foreign
and cultural policies (Peimbert Moreno 2011). On the specific question of the penacho,
Fox (2000-06) and his successor Felipe Calderón (2006-12) maintained a position similar
to that of their PRI predecessors, regularly showing interest in the topic (as a candidate,
Fox told Barragán Moctezuma that he was “interested” and would “take on the
challenge”)69 without intervening personally in the diplomatic negotiation: the Mexican
state sought to obtain a unilateral gift from Austria through diplomatic means, without
formulating a presidential request that would likely be responded to negatively and
damage the bilateral relation.
The idea of a bi-national expert commission finally came to light in 2002 with the
visit to Vienna of three Mexican experts,70 who, however, were denied direct access to
the penacho. During an official visit to Mexico by the now President of Austria Heinz
Fischer, in May 2005, Fox and Foreign Affairs Secretary Luis Ernesto Derbéz delivered
an aide-mémoire requesting that the topic of the penacho be discussed in a “politicodiplomatic” perspective71 – yet Fischer had learned the lesson from Klestil’s declarations
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and remained cautious. In 2005, too, the topic reached the Austrian parliament, where
socialist deputies proposed exchanging the Viennese penacho for the copy kept in
Mexico City. The topic was debated in commission over the following year – the
Mexican ambassador, Patricia Espinoza, testified in front of the commission in April
2006. A month before, preceding the European Union-Latin America forum that took
place in Vienna, and in reaction to the congressional commission on the topic, Espinoza
(who would become secretary of foreign relations under Calderón) had transmitted a
verbal note to the Austrian ministry of foreign affairs confirming Mexico’s interest in the
congressional initiative. Another combined delegation from the INAH and SRE traveled
to Vienna in 2007 to reiterate this interest to Austrian authorities. Mexican legislators
also showed interest in the topic during the first decade of the twenty-first century: the
lower chamber of Mexican Congress twice requested the executive branch, in 200572 and
2009,73 to seek the return of the penacho through diplomatic means.
From 2009, the Mexican diplomacy floated several options 74 to its Austrian
counterpart: a donation without compensation; a permutation, i.e., the exchange of the
penacho for another object of symbolic value for Austria, such as Emperor Maximilian’s
coach or another pre-Hispanic feathered object in from a Mexican museum;
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temporary custody without exchange; or a long-term loan of the penacho to Mexico, in
exchange for a long-term loan of another object from Mexico (Peimbert Moreno 2011).
Yet, as Mexican newspapers once again were announcing, in early 2011, that a final
agreement was close, this latest initiative stalled after another bi-national commission of
experts, created in 2010, conducted a conservation process of the penacho, in 2011-12 –
this time the Mexican experts involved in the process were given physical access to the
object. In November 2012, the commission concluded that the penacho is now too fragile
to resist the vibrations implied by air transportation to Mexico (Moreno Guzmán 2014),
putting an end to the rumors of a return to Mexico. While many in Mexico have contested
this expert opinion, the Mexican government has not challenged it and seems to have lost
interest – at least as of mid-2019. Articles reappear periodically in the Mexican press
about the topic (for example, about a TV documentary about the penacho, or the
reopening of the museum in Vienna). I will show in the subsequent chapters why we
may, however, expect to see the current situation challenged over the next few years.
The Mexican case, thus, presents differences with the Peruvian cases: experts in
Mexico do not form a unified front in favor of the return (as they did in the Machu Picchu
case), and the successive Mexican presidents, though they have shown interest in the
return, have not sought to instrumentalize it for political gain (as Toledo and García did
in Peru), avoiding a clash with Austrian authorities over this topic. Mexican state entities
(in particular the SRE and the INAH) reacted to the pressures of civil society actors such
as Xokonoschtletl Gómora and Blanca Moctezuma and to the opportunities created by
favorable opinions voiced in Austria, rather than implemented a concerted plan to obtain
the return of the penacho.
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Mexico – Teotihuacan murals from San Francisco’s De Young Museum
The archaeological area of Teotihuacan, which features the two great pyramids of the sun
and the moon, and several architectonical ensembles, such as the Quetzalcoatl temple, is
located at the northern edge of Mexico City’s urban area. Teotihuacan developed into one
of the most populated cities on earth between the first and seventh centuries AD, with at
least 100,000 inhabitants. Destroyed by fire and abandoned around 650AD, it greatly
influenced all the Mesoamerican pre-Columbian cultures that succeeded it (Pasztory
1988).76 The first archaeological excavations were conducted in the 1860s. Mexican
anthropologist Manuel Gamio led extensive works of excavation and conservation in the
late 1910s and 1920s, as well as a detailed anthropological study of the population living
around the site. Presidential decrees of 1907, 1964, and 1988 have created and
subsequently expanded the Archaeological Monuments Zone at Teotihuacan.
Teotihuacan also became a useful tool in the policies of cultural tourism promotion: in
2017, it received more than 4.1 million (national and international) visitors.77
It is most likely between 1960 and 1964, as a new round of excavations expanded
the archaeological area and a road surrounding the complex was being built, that the
remains of painted murals in a yet unexplored housing compound would have been
looted from the site, then exported to the US in circumstances that remain unclear (Berrin
1988b). Examples of Teotihuacan murals had started to appear in museums and galleries
in the US, Europe, and Mexico since the early 1960s (Millon 1988) but in 1976, collector
Harald Wagner bequeathed seventy fragments of painted murals from Teotihuacan’s
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classical period (400-700AD) to San Francisco’s De Young Museum78 – by far the largest
collection of Teotihuacan murals outside Mexico. Informed of Wagner’s will, 79 US
customs authorities contacted their Mexican counterpart, and Mexican authorities
solicited the help of the US attorney’s office to block the gift and recover the murals. Yet,
in summer 1978, with the settling of Wagner’s will, the museum was declared the legal
owner of the murals. The San Francisco city counsel, acting on behalf of the museum,
managed to prove that Wagner had purchased and imported the murals in the 1960s,
before the signatures of the 1970 US-Mexico agreement on the recovery of stolen cultural
properties80 and the 1970 UNESCO Convention: the museum was legally entitled to keep
the murals, and Mexico had no legal case to demand their return. Yet, the two texts
mentioned above, as well as greater awareness of the damaging effects of looting for
Mesoamerican archaeology thanks to the work of Clemency Coggins (1969), probably
contributed to a new ethical context and consciousness in North American museums,
encouraging the De Young to reach out to Mexican authorities about the bequest
(Seligman 1988). Thus started what Mexican Ambassador Marcelo Vargas sheepishly
called “long and difficult negotiations” over the fate of the murals,81 which lasted for
almost a decade and led to the return of approximately half of the fragments to Mexico.
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Figure 2.4: Teotihuacan mural (fragment)
held in the collections of the De Young Museum, San Francisco
(Photo: © de Young Museum – Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco)

Thomas Seligman, deputy director for exhibitions and education of the De Young,
led the negotiations on behalf of the museum. In 1978, INAH representative María José
Con and conservator Víctor Ríos, from the Centro Churubusco (specialized in restoration
and conservation), traveled to San Francisco to authenticate the murals (other
Teotihuacan specialists based in the US, such as art historian Esther Pasztory and
archaeologist René and Clara Millon, were also consulted). In April 1979, a Mexican
delegation, which included INAH counsel Javier Oropeza Segura, reached a 10 pointagreement with the museum that involved the conservation, voluntary return of “a few”
fragments, and educational programs. Yet the agreement stalled as the then director of
INAH, Gastón García Cantú, refused to sign it, claiming the return of all murals and
demanding that the museum pay for all restoration, packaging, and transportation costs.
Negotiations broke down until the fall of 1980, when the museum presented a counteroffer: it would voluntarily return at least 50% of the fragments and raise funds from
private sources to support the conservation process,82 while the Mexican counterpart
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would provide the services of conservation specialists (who had substantially more
experience in the treatment of Teotihuacan frescos than their North American colleagues)
and lend pre-Columbian objects for their presentation in San Francisco. On this basis, the
museum and the INAH signed an agreement in December 1981.83 The document avoided
the question of ownership, which had been granted under the terms of US laws to the
museum, but which the Mexican state could not relinquish under the terms of its own
1972 law on monuments and archaeological, artistic, and historical zones, which
establishes public ownership of all archaeological properties. 84 With the change of
administration in Mexico in 1982, the implementation of the agreement fell on a new
INAH director, Enrique Florescano Mayet, who confirmed in 1983 the validity of the
agreement signed by his predecessor. On May 2, 1984, eight years after Wagner’s death,
San Francisco mayor Dianne Feinstein inaugurated the exhibition of the murals in the De
Young Museum.
The first phase of the joint conservation effort took place over the following
weeks, in a gallery of the museum specially conditioned for the purpose, putting the
conservation process on display for visitors, behind a glass wall. The Mexican and US
teams quickly disagreed over the best treatment course (Berrin 1986, 1988b) and the
implementation of the technical provisions of the 1981 agreement evidenced “differences
of opinion [that] put tremendous pressure on [the] joint conservation process” (Berrin
2007). 85 Yet, this collaborative process also led to significant advances in the
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“Agreement governing the return of Teotihuacano frescos,” Dec. 7, 1981; ADYM.
Letter from Kathleen Berrin to Stacy Schaefer, Apr. 28, 1982; ADYM.
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One of the main disagreements between the Mexican and US conservation teams had to do with the
extent of backing to be removed from the fragments: the Mexican solution consisted in replacing much of
the adobe backing below the painted surface of the frescoes with a synthetic product, which had two
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easier to manipulate. The US team, however, criticized this solution for compromising the integrity of the
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conservation techniques of frescoes and to the discovery of the exact provenance of the
fragments by René Millon (1988).
In January 1985, another Mexican delegation to San Francisco, led by
archaeologist Joaquín García Bárcena and Sergio Montero, conservator in chief at Centro
Churubusco, reached a technical agreement with their US counterparts for the mounting
and transportation of the murals. They also negotiated the final list of murals that would
return to Mexico86 – a negotiation that Berrin (2007) considered easier than the one on
conservation techniques. The San Francisco exhibition closed in January 1986 and the
exhibition “Recuperación de Frescos Teotihuacanos” [Recovery of Teotihuacan
Frescoes] opened in February in Mexico City’s National Museum of Anthropology. The
returned murals87 are now split between the collections of the Museum of Anthropology
and a museum dedicated to mural paintings in the archaeological area of Teotihuacan.
However, the murals retained their potential for controversy well beyond the
1980s: an article published in Mexico about the reopening of the De Young Museum in a
new facility in 2005 cited a spokesperson for the museum who claimed that the fragments
that remained in San Francisco were in fact a gift from Mexico to the museum,88
triggering a flurry of comments and criticism among heritage experts and INAH
functionaries. Over the following weeks, they discussed and asked how and why INAH

pieces, and for being irreversible: the replacement of the backing could not be undone if better treatment
options became available in the future.
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“Teotihuacan murals distribution,” February 5, 1985; ADYM.
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Numerically, these account for 70% of all the fragments bequeathed by Wagner to the museum, yet
Berrin (1988, 2017) says that the INAH was more interested in the quantity of fragments being returned,
while the museum wished to keep the biggest and most beautiful ones for further study and display.
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Sanjuana Martínez, “Murales teotihuacanos regalados a Estados Unidos,” Proceso, Nov. 6, 2005. I
remain unsure as to why the spokesperson made that comment, as I have not found any reference, in any
article or document I have consulted, or through my conversations in San Francisco and Mexico about this
case, of such an arrangement. The INAH did not gift the murals to the Museum.
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directors in the early 1980s could have settled for the return of only part of the collection,
while they were under the legal obligation to protect Mexican heritage as a whole.89
Overall, the case of the Teotihuacan murals reveals the evolution over time of
ethics in the matter of restitution and returns of cultural heritage objects. Throughout the
1980s, the agreement signed in December 1981 between the museum and the INAH was
hailed as setting a precedent regarding how North American museums should handle
stolen materials, opening the possibility of returning objects even in the absence of
enforceable legal mechanisms constraining the museums to do so. For the same reason,
the agreement was also criticized in the US museum establishment. The 1981 agreement
was also original because two institutions with different legal statuses (a museum
belonging to the city of San Francisco and a Mexican state entity) negotiated directly
between themselves,90 the Mexican consulate in San Francisco and the US embassy in
Mexico City often serving as intermediaries (Seligman 1988, Berrin 2017).
Colombia – The Quimbaya collection from the Museum of America in Madrid
The so-called “Quimbaya treasure”91 includes part of the findings by gravediggers in
October 1890 in two tombs of Quimbaya caciques,92 near the town of Filandia in what is
now the department of Quindío, Colombia. Grave digging, fueled by the legend of El
Dorado and its promises of vast riches of gold, was then common in Colombia; it became
89

See the series of articles in Proceso: Sanjuana Martínez, “Florescano: “Un logro mío, recuperar los
murales de Teotihuacán,” Nov. 13, 2005; Judith Amador Tello, “Violación a la ley de monumentos:
Cottom y Becerril Miró,” Nov. 13, 2005; Columba Vertiz, “Castro Leal y Uriarte niegan el ‘regalo’,” Nov.
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reportaje de Proceso,” Nov. 27, 2005; Sanjuana Martínez, “‘Más que regalo, fue un robo’: el restaurador,”
Dec. 4, 2005; Armando Ponce, “Murales teotihuacanos: el INAH peleó con todo,” Dec. 4, 2005.
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Barbara Braun, “Subtle diplomacy solves a custody case,” ARTnews, 81 (6), summer 1982, pp. 100-3.
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While newspapers and publications of general interest use the term “treasure,” speakers at the public
audience of the Constitutional Court and several actors of the claim prefer the term “collection,” which I
will use subsequently.
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The objects were most probably crafted and buried during the early (also called classical) period of the
Quimbaya culture, between approx. the years 450-600 AD. Caciques were the leaders of groups or tribes.
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an important economic activity, together with coffee growing, as populations from the
province of Antioquia migrated towards the region of the Cauca River valley, left
relatively untouched during the Spanish colonization (Gamboa Hinestrosa 2002). Most
objects in gold found at the time were brought to cities such as Medellin or Manizales to
be melted – their weight being of far more value than their historical or cultural
significance. The Quimbaya collection escaped this fate thanks to the exceptional quality
of its pieces, which attracted the attention of Colombian collectors of the time. Interest in
pre-Columbian cultures, nourished by the accounts of European travelers, the publication
of the edited volumes of the Chorographic Commission of the 1850s, and the first
archaeological excavations of the Quimbaya, Chibcha, and San Agustín cultures, was still
incipient in Colombia in the late nineteenth century, and limited to a small circle of
collectors, who were the first to show an aesthetic and intellectual interest in the preHispanic past. Gravediggers often had better prospects to sell the product of their
searches abroad than locally, which explains why the major collections of pre-Columbian
cultural objects can be found in European and North American museums. For example,
Carlo Vedovelli, an Italian merchant based in Bogota in charge of selling the Quimbaya
collection, published a notice in French aimed at European audiences.93
Seven decades after independence, Colombian elites were more interested in the
new models of progress and modernity imported from Europe than in Indigenous
civilizations. In 1888, Madrid announced the organization of the Hispanic-American
Exhibition commemorating the four-hundredth anniversary of the “discovery” of
America, to be held in 1892, which would focus on the figure of Columbus and display
93

“Catalogue de la Collection ‘Finlandia’ [sic], Museo Comercial Italiano in Bogota, 1890”; Sala de libros
raros y manuscritos, Biblioteca Luis Angel Arango del Banco de la República, Bogota, Colombia (SLRMBLAA).
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the state of the Americas at the time of the discovery. Most importantly, the exhibition
would celebrate the renewed links between Spain and its former colonies – “Columbus’
daughters”:94 Colombia, for example, had only recently established diplomatic relations
with Spain, in 1881. The acting Colombian president at the time, Carlos Holguín, was a
member of the conservative party. An admirer of Spain and its monarchy, Holguín had
been Colombia’s first ambassador in Madrid, where he had met and developed a close
relationship with Regent Queen María Cristina of Habsburg. He established a
commission in charge of coordinating the Colombian representation in the Madrid
exhibition, as well as in Chicago’s 1893 World’s Columbian Exhibition – a task all the
more important that, due to a lack of available funds, Colombia had only been
represented by private efforts in the 1889 Paris Universal Exhibition. Holguín decided to
purchase, with public funds, 433 objects from the Quimbaya collection,95 of which 122
were sent to Spain to be one of the highlights of the Colombian pavilion in the exhibition,
representing the most brilliant example of the country’s pre-Columbian cultures – and the
first official manifestation that the pre-Hispanic past was part of what was now Colombia
(Botero 2006). Private collectors bought the objects from the Quimbaya collection not
purchased by the Colombian government; approximately seventy of those were sent to
the 1893 Chicago exhibition, together with ceramics that had also been exhibited in
Madrid. These objects were subsequently sold to the newly created Field Museum in
Chicago (Gamboa Hinestrosa 1998, Botero 2006).96 Additionally, a few objects (gold and
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“Centenario de Colón: Colombia en la exposición”, El Criterio (Bogota), May 9, 1892.
“Contrato sobre compra de una colección de objetos de oro, Bogota, Aug. 20, 1891”; SLRM-BLAA.
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While there is incipient interest – from the Academia de Historia del Quindío (Nicolás Marín Navas,
“¿Regresará la Colección Quimbaya al país?,” El Espectador, Jan. 3, 2018) and a few Colombian citizens
residing in the USA – to claim the return of the objects deposited in the Field Museum, this movement has
not garnered similar public attention as the case of the Museo de las Américas. I hypothesize that this is
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ceramics) from the tombs in Filandia, having belonged to different private collections or
been sent to the 1892 Italian-American Exhibition in Genoa, may now be part of the
collections of Rome’s Museo Nazionale Preistorico Etnografico and the Smithsonian
Institution in Washington, DC (Verde Casanova 2016).

Figure 2.5: Objects from the Quimbaya collection
held in the Museum of America, Madrid
Sitting statuette of a Quimbaya cacique (Photo: Luis García; 2008; CC BY-SA 3.0);
Quimbaya gold helmet with human figures (Photo: Dorieo; 2013; CC BY-SA 4.0)

Before it was sent to Madrid, the collection was presented to the public in Bogota,
in the house of Vicente Restrepo, the most famous collector of the time and the secretary
of the commission established by President Holguín, in charge of choosing the pieces to
be sent to both exhibitions. It was the first public exhibition of Indigenous artifacts in
Bogota. Seen by approximately 600 visitors, the show signaled a nascent interest among
Colombian elites for the pre-Hispanic past. Yet, this interest – and the admiration for the
quality of the exhibited objects, so fine that one would believe they were “the fruit of a
civilization as advanced as the Spanish”97 – hardly reflected a sense of identification or

the nature of the objects themselves (ceramics, not gold). However, I expect the return of the Quimbaya
collection from Madrid to Colombia – if and when it happens – to trigger a similar process to claim the
return of the collection held in Chicago.
97
“Exposiciones de Madrid y Chicago,” El Correo Nacional (Bogota), Feb. 24, 1892.
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connection with the “barbarous and anthropophagous tribes” (in the words of Restrepo
himself),98 the “primitive inhabitants,” and the “disgraced race”99 that produced these
objects. The idea of a Colombian national heritage including pre-Columbian remains
would only fully develop in the first decades of the twentieth-century, but the 1892
Madrid exhibition represented the first time that Colombia represented itself through the
archaeological remains of the pre-Columbian cultures that had populated its territory
before the conquest (Muñoz Burbano 2012). Holguín himself was certainly conscious of
the historical value of the collection he was sending to Spain – mostly, as he declared to
congress in 1892, as evidence of the “relic of a dead civilization.”100 Few voices spoke
against sending the collection to Spain; most notably, poet Rafael Pombo (brother of
Felix Pombo, then director of the national museum) argued that the collections of the
museum were being depleted, revealing the Colombians’ incapacity to care for the
testimonies of their past.101
In 1893, at the close of the Madrid exhibition, Holguín gifted the 122 objects of
the Quimbaya collection to the Spanish government,102 in appreciation for the efforts of
the regent queen, who, in 1891, had arbitrated in favor of Colombia over a long-standing
border dispute with Venezuela. 103 Yet common gossip in Colombia has it that the
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Hinestrosa (2002) and Botero (2006).
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sentimental relationship between Holguín and María Cristina really motivated the gift.104
The legal validity of this gift is at the center of the judicial battle that has been taking
place over the past fifteen years in Colombia, as detailed below.
The collection remained in the archaeological museum until the Spanish Civil
War (1936-39), when it left Madrid to be deposited in Valencia, Catalonia, and later
Switzerland, with other artworks from Madrid’s museums. After its return to the
archaeological museum in Franco’s Spain in May 1939, the collection was transferred to
the new Museo de América [Museum of America] around 1943, and was exhibited from
1965 through 1978, before being taken out of public view because of security concerns in
the museum, and replaced by copies.105 The original collection was returned to the
renovated museum and put on public display in 1994 (Verde Casanova 2016).106 Yet
historian Clemencia Plazas, a former director of Bogota’s Museo del Oro [Museum of
Gold],107 who was given access to the collection in the 1970s, has expressed concerns
that the collection was not always submitted to the best standards of care at the time.108 In
this regard, it is tempting to read the new installation of the collection in a state-of-the-art
facility of the renovated museum and the publication of the first monograph by the
museum (Perea, Verde Casanova, and Gutiérrez Usillos 2016) in the twenty-first century
as gradual efforts by the museum to justify the presence of the collection in Spain as
claims were mounting in Colombia in favor of the return.
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Oscar Alarcón, “Holguín y los Borbones,” El Espectador (Bogota), Jun. 9, 2014.
The only other city where the original collection has been shown is Seville, in the 1929 Ibero-American
Exhibition and the 1992 Universal Exhibition.
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Early Colombian attempts at recovering the collection date back to the 1970s.
Following a research trip to Europe, where she inventoried the Colombian collections of
thirty-three museums, in 1972-73, Plazas, then a curator of the Museo del Oro, proposed
to exchange a few select pieces from the Quimbaya collection (representing examples of
archaeological materials absent from the collections of Colombian museums) against 145
objects of the Museo del Oro’s own collections (duplicate pieces belonging to several
pre-Columbian cultures, not exclusively Quimbaya). Validated by the board of the
museum in October 1976,109 the proposal did not receive an official response from
Madrid. Another similar initiative was championed by Belisario Betancur, ambassador of
Colombia to Spain from 1975-7 and president of the country from 1982-86; offering to
transfer more pieces from Colombia against the return of fewer pieces from the
Quimbaya collection, that initiative was in turn opposed by the then director of the
Museo del Oro, Luis Duque Gómez. The return of two pieces was announced in the days
leading to the inauguration in 1986 of a new Museo del Oro Quimbaya in Armenia,
capital of the department of Quindío, but this did not happen.110 After his visit to the 1992
Universal Exhibition in Seville, Ernesto Samper, then ambassador of Colombia in Spain
(and later president of Colombia from 1994-98), declared that, even though it had not
been officially claimed by the Colombian government, “the Quimbaya treasure claims
itself” because the objects it contains belong to “a same family, a same tradition, same
blood” as other objects displayed in Colombian museums.111 Another personal initiative
included a letter sent by the mayor of Armenia, César Hoyos Salazar, to King Juan Carlos
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“Memorandum signed by Luis Carlos León, secretary of the board, directed to Luis Barriga del Diestro,
director of the museum, Oct. 22, 1976,” Clemencia Plazas’ personal archive (APCP).
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Clemencia Plazas, interview, Jul. 21, 2018.
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in 1992, which was answered negatively, arguing that the collection had been legally
gifted to Spain.112 As underlined by Plazas, these efforts were the result of personal
initiatives and remained relatively confidential. Not the product of concerted efforts
among different entities of the Colombian state, they did not yet amount to an official
state policy seeking the return of the collection.
The very existence of the Quimbaya collection in Madrid took on greater (and
public) importance in Colombia only in the early twenty-first century, when two
initiatives combined. On the one hand, inspired by Gamboa Hinostrosa’s articles and
book (1992, 1998, 2002), the Academy of History of the Quindío (AHQ, a group of
amateur historians based in the city of Armenia) and its president Jaime Lopera started to
send letters to the Spanish king and presidents of the Spanish government from 2003
onwards, with copies to UNESCO and/or the Colombian embassy in Madrid. These
letters were left unanswered. The AHQ also solicited several entities of the Colombian
state, including the office of the presidency, the ministries of culture and foreign affairs,
and the National Institute of Anthropology and History of Colombia (ICANH), where its
requests were met at best with skepticism. The AHQ had more success in mobilizing
support from local politicians, convincing the governor of the department of Quindío to
create a “high commission for the awareness, recuperation, and repatriation of the
‘Quimbaya tresure’” in 2005,113 which included local authorities and individuals but did
not have much impact beyond the moment of its creation.
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“España se niega a devolver tesoro,” El Tiempo, Mar. 19, 1992.
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On the other hand, lawyers José Antonio Rengifo and Felipe Rincón launched a
demanda de acción popular114 on behalf of the Colombian people in 2006, arguing that
the collection, having been purchased with public funds, had entered the nation’s
patrimony and acquired the characteristics of public goods: inalienable, imprescriptible,
and unseizable – qualities already inscribed in the Colombian civil code at the time
Holguín gifted the collection to Spain. Over the following decade, the legal case passed
through different levels of Colombian courts: in September 2009, a civil court in Bogota
found in favor of the plaintiff and asked the Colombian government to claim the return of
the treasure; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MREC) appealed the decision and the
administrative tribunal of the department of Cundinamarca overturned it in February
2011. The case was brought to the Consejo de Estado [Council of State], the highest
administrative tribunal in the country, which refused to examine it in June 2011. Felipe
Rincón then introduced a different procedure (acción de tutela) requesting the protection
of his fundamental rights,115 which was again rejected by the Council of State in January
2012. As the last resort, Rincón requested the Constitutional Court to review the case.
Magistrate Alberto Rojas convoked a public audience, which took place in January
2016,116 gathering forty exponents, including Rincón, Jaime Lopera from the AHQ, and
experts from several disciplines. All – including a Spanish citizen expert on cultural
policy – declared in favor of claiming the return. Only state officials from the
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administrative office of the presidency, the MREC (by then led, ironically enough, by
Minister María Angela Holguín, who is related to former President Carlos Holguín), and
the Ministry of Culture declared against presenting a formal claim; they argued that the
treasure had been gifted to Spain, that international conventions on the restitution of
cultural heritage do not apply to the case of the Quimbaya collection, and that it is the
exclusive competence of the president to conduct international affairs, under the terms of
the 1991 Colombian constitution. In October 2017, the Constitutional Court ruled in
favor of the plaintiff,117 upholding the 2011 decision from the administrative tribunal on
the basis that several articles of the 1991 Colombian constitution referring to the
protection of national heritage have been violated. The decision demanded that the
presidency, the MREC, and the Ministry of Culture take all necessary steps to claim the
return of the Quimbaya collection from Spain. The court also ordered the creation of a
monitoring committee to keep track of state actions in the matter; the committee includes
representatives from several state entities (including the two ministries, as well as the
ombudsman’s office, among others) and the AHQ – but noticeably not the plaintiff, a
decision that he is currently challenging.118
Throughout the judicial process, newspapers of national circulation, such as El
Tiempo and El Espectador, provided their readers with regular updates on the case,
occasionally publishing editorials or opinion columns scolding the Colombian executive
branch for its apathy in claiming the return of national heritage objects.119 The case of the
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Quimbaya collection is open as of July 2019, but with the presidency and the MREC less
than enthusiastic to enter into a conflict with the Spanish government over the issue, and
with no ally in Spain to support the claim or mount a media campaign, the prospect of the
collection returning to Colombia is grim.
Colombia – San Agustín statues from the Ethnological Museum in Berlin
My second case study from Colombia focuses on megalithic sculptures from the
archaeological park of San Agustín, in the southern and mountainous department of
Huila.120 The funerary sites of the San Agustín region were abandoned around 1350AD
and rediscovered during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by generations of
European travelers, such as Italian cartographer Agostino Codazzi.
Yet, it was the 1893 publication of Colombian historian Carlos Cuervo Márquez’s
expedition that inspired European archaeologists to take a more scientific interest in the
area.

Among

them,

German

ethnologist

Konrad

Theodor

Preuss

conducted

archaeological fieldwork in 1913 and took away thirty-five statues; these left Colombia
after the end of WWI and arrived in Berlin in 1923 to be further studied. They were never
returned. At the time, a few voices expressed concern with the removal of the statues: in a
letter to the director of the national museum, the mayor of San Agustín wondered who
had granted Preuss the authorization to take the statues. The translators of Preuss’ book
on San Agustín, published in Spanish in 1931, also expressed their disbelief in a footnote:
“in any other part of the world, not only would the exportation of the original statues
have been prevented, but copies of the molds would have been requested” (Botero 2006,
tesoro quimbaya,” El Tiempo, Jan. 23 2016; Andres Hurtado García, “Ministra, corrija su abuelo,” El
Tiempo, Jul. 4, 2017.
120
These funerary monuments, erected during the Regional Classic period (0-900 AD), guard the entrance
of large stone tombs of elite individuals of chiefdom societies that developed in the region around 1000 BC.
For more details, see: https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/744
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212). The Colombian government has officially protected the archaeological area in the
surroundings of San Agustín since 1931,121 and listed the park on UNESCO’s World
Heritage List (WHL) in 1995.

Figure 2.6: Statue from San Agustín,
Colombia, held in the collections of
the Ethnological Museum of Berlin
(Photo: © Ethnologisches Museum der
Staatlichen Museen zu Berlin - Preußischer
Kulturbesitz;
Ident.#: V A 62069)

Since the 1990s, an increase in the looting of statues from the site, caused, in part,
by the deterioration of security conditions in the area due to the rise of non-state armed
groups, has attracted the attention of national Colombian media on San Agustín.
Colombian authorities have successfully recovered some of the robbed statues through
long judicial processes, most notably in France, Denmark, and the United States.122 Yet,
the relations between Colombian state entities and inhabitants of the contemporary town
121

Congreso de Colombia, Ley 103, Oct. 6, 1931.
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of San Agustín have been difficult in recent years. As in many sites of the WHL, policies
of archaeological conservation often clash with the economic interests of local
communities, who live from tourism, and with land rights, particularly those of a nearby
resguardo [reservation] of the Yanaconas, a “reindigenizing” community relocated near
San Agustín in the early 2000s (Jackson and Ramírez 2009). 123 Also, San Agustín
inhabitants opposed the temporary removal of several statues from the archaeological
park to be presented in an exhibition in Bogota in 2013 (Montero Fayad 2016), out of
concern that that they would not be returned to their community.
It is in this contentious context that David Dellenback, a US citizen who moved to
San Agustín in the 1970s, launched a campaign to press the Colombian government to
claim the return of the statues taken by Preuss to Germany, whose return has never been
requested. Dellenback visited the Ethnologishes Museum in Berlin 124 in 1992 and
discovered that only three statues were on display and many had not been researched and
published (not even by Preuss himself), remaining practically untouched in the museum’s
storerooms (Dellenback 2013). 125 In December 2012, Dellenback started gathering
signatures among residents of San Agustín. The movement took a judicial turn in 2015
with the help of lawyer Diego Márquez, who used the derecho de petición [right of
petition] to request information from the government of the Huila department, the
ministries of foreign affairs and culture, and the ICANH, about their knowledge of and
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actions in favor of the return of the collection. Using the precedent of the Quimbaya
collection case, Márquez then presented an acción de tutela to Bogota’s administrative
judge, requesting that the presidency and all relevant state entities undertake all necessary
actions to obtain the return of the thirty-five statues from Berlin. During the course of the
case, the government of Huila, originally a defendent, joined the plaintiff in demanding
action from the central government. In September 2017, the demanded parties signed a
pacto de cumplimiento [compliance agreement] with the demanding parties, agreeing to
undertake diplomatic actions with German authorities.
The museum has claimed that “a basis for downright repatriation barely exists,
given the lapse of time and the fact that the Colombian government has obviously known
about the sculptures’ whereabouts in Berlin without having submitted any concrete claim
for repatriation to the German government.”126 As of January 2019, in spite of the
compliance agreement described above, the museum had not directly received a formal
request from the Colombian government for the return of the statues.127
Colombia, Mexico, Peru: what can we learn from case studies from three Latin American
countries?
Drawing from the case studies described above, several questions arise, to which I will
propose answers in the subsequent chapters:
-

Why is there a parallel movement to claim the objects in all three countries

since the last decades of the twentieth century? In Chapter 3, I will situate these claims in
the process of construction of a national discourse in all three countries, contrasting the

126

Letter from Hermann Parzinger, president of the Stiftung Preussicher Kulturbesitz, to David Dellenback,
Jun. 3, 2013; David Dellenback’s personal archive (APDD).
127
Manuela Fischer, curator of the Ethnologishes Museum’s South American collection, personal
communication.
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more centralizing discourse from the Mexican state with the dualism of Peruvian national
construction and the latitude given to local initiatives in Colombia to strengthen local
identities through these claims.
-

How do we explain that a similar set of state entities (presidency, ministries of

foreign relations and culture) in all three countries behave differently? In particular, why
have the Peruvian state entities embraced the cause of the returns while Colombian
authorities have been at best careful in their approach to the topic – with Mexican
authorities fluctuating between these two poles? I will develop in Chapter 4 a
comparative analysis of the development of policies and institutions in three fields of
public policy – culture (with a specific focus on archaeology, museums, and heritage
protection), foreign relations, and economic development (in particular, tourism) – to
provide an explanation for the variation in governmental approach to the question of
returns across country-case studies.
-

Why and how do actors mobilize for or against the return claims? Using Paul

Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework, I will demonstrate in Chapter 5 how the
process of democratization in Latin America has empowered new actors (individuals
from the civil society) to speak up and demand that the state act to protect the national
heritage, triggering the creation of coalitions that push for the return of cultural heritage
objects deemed of great significance. In turn, the alignment of the actors behind the cause
offers an explanation, through the example of Peru, of the conditions necessary for a
claim to be successful.
-

Can we predict the outcome of pending cases? While this chapter has

evidenced the specificities of each case, I will return in Chapter 6 to the circumstances
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that have prevailed to the resolution of the two Peruvian cases and one Mexican case to
present an array of possible arrangements that would lead to a resolution of the
outstanding Mexican and both Colombian cases. I will argue, in turn, that these
specificities make the establishment of precedents and the creation of a global movement
of returns unlikely.
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Chapter 3 – Return claims: instruments of the construction of national discourses in
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries
In 1948, Manuel E. Cuadros, correspondent for United Press in Peru, wrote in his article
about the opening of the new Hiram Bingham Highway, which leads visitors to Machu
Picchu, about “our ancestors the Incas.”1 More than sixty years later, La República
considered that “Peru is and has always been the legitimate owner of all the objects
extracted from Machu Picchu.”2 In November 1987, the Mexican embassy in Vienna
posited in an internal document, at a time when the SRE was struggling to define a policy
about the penacho, that the object was a “symbol of our nationality.”3 Similarly, the
representatives of a cultural organization based in a Mexico City suburb wrote that the
penacho is “an inheritance from our ancestors,” a “part of our culture.”4 In Colombia,
lawyer Felipe Rincón considers that the Quimbayas are “part of the identity and history
of Colombian ancestors,” and that their “treasure belongs to the Colombian cultural
heritage”5 – a feeling shared by a reader of the newspaper El Tiempo, who wrote to
encourage the Colombian government to ask for the return of the Quimbaya collection as
a “way to reaffirm our identity as a nation.”6
These are only a few among countless examples of appropriation of the preColumbian past for the construction of a discourse about the nation that I have
encountered in my research. The diversity of voices (civil servants, journalists, readers of

1

Manuel E. Cuadros, “La inauguración de la carretera Hiram Bingham en Machupicchu,” El Comercio
(Lima), Oct. 20, 1948.
2
“Perú pide devolución de objetos extraídos de Machu Picchu,” La República (Lima), Apr. 22, 2009.
3
Aide-mémoire prepared by the Embassy of Mexico in Austria, Nov. 23, 1987; AHGE-SRE.
4
Letter from the Conferederación Nacional Sureste de Puebla, SA, to José Angel Gurria Treviño, minister
of foreign relations, Dec. 15, 1995; AHGE-SRE.
5
See Rincón’s declaration to the Colombian constitutional court, Dec. 16, 2015:
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2017/su649-17.htm
6
Foro del lector, El Tiempo (Bogotá), Apr. 14, 2009.
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national newspapers) who carry it and its ubiquity (in national and local media outlets as
well as official internal and communication documents) show that this discourse has been
naturalized well beyond the circles of political and intellectual power that have originated
it, and is generally considered self-evident. These are examples of the nationalism
denounced by the internationalists who oppose the return of cultural heritage objects to
their “country of origin.”
To overcome the stalled debate between internationalists and nationalists and
understand the reasons why Latin American governments seek the return of cultural
objects in the early twenty-first century, we must examine the role of nationalism in the
domestic politics of these countries – a task internationalists have not been interested in.
How are these claims inscribed in the history of the construction of nationalist discourses
in Latin America? Why have these claims appeared in the late twentieth-century, and not
before? In this chapter, I situate the claims presented by Peru, Mexico, and Colombia
within the broader framework of the construction of national discourses through the
appropriation of the pre-Colombian cultural heritage by the criollo states.7 This chapter
does not propose causal mechanisms that explain the formation of return claims as the
necessary consequence of discourses; rather, it analyzes the intellectual context that
informs the historical development of public policies leading to the formulation of the
claim (detailed in chapter 4) and the formation of coalitions, within each country, that
advocate in favor of the return of cultural heritage objects (see chapter 5).

7

See chapter 1, note 12 about the word criollo. I mean here that the fight for independence was largely led,
throughout Spanish America, by criollos, i.e., Spaniards born in the colony – not by mestizos, Indigenous
people, or Afro-descendants. After independence was achieved, the criollos formed the political and
economic elites of the new republics.
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In chapter 3, I first review the literature on the development of nationalism and
the concept of nation in Latin America; scholars have seen Latin America as an outlier
that only partly fits their theories about nationalism (Miller 2006). I then examine more
specifically the relationship between nationalism and material heritage in the region and
the contribution of various currents of indigenist and multicultural thoughts to this
relationship. Having detailed this intellectual framework, I identify commonalities among
all the cultural objects claimed by Mexico, Peru, and Colombia, and suggest an
explanation for why each cultural object described in chapter 2 is of specific interest for
the country that claims it. I propose an interpretation of what these objects reveal about
the relationship between the state and the nation in each country, particularly in terms of
how national and local identities mirror concepts of centralism and regionalism.
In the last section of the chapter, I hypothesize about why the phenomenon of
return claims has appeared only in the late twentieth-century. I suggest that three factors
– democratization, internal armed conflicts, and neoliberal globalization – have led the
homogenizing discourse on the nation, promoted until then by the state, to be challenged.
Latin American states, whose “infrastructural capacity” has been historically weak
(Centeno and Ferraro 2013a), see their centralizing role as economic and administrative
organizers and purveyors of security and social welfare threatened by the internal armed
conflicts and the imposition of neo-liberal reforms. Fighting back a widely shared feeling
of crisis within their society, these states, reminded of their responsibility by individuals
who have internalized the ideology of national homogeneity promoted by the state itself
throughout the twentieth century, seek to retain the highly symbolic role of producer of a
collective sense of belonging: return claims emerge as new instruments of nation-
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building for states in crises of legitimacy and represent a continuation of the efforts to
define the nation through the appropriation of material remains left by pre-Columbian
cultures. In this context, I conclude this chapter arguing that return claims are better
understood as performances: rather than demonstrating the interest of the state for
specific objects, these claims enact the nationalist discourse for an internal audience.
Cultural heritage in the construction of the nation in Latin America
The literature points at nationalism in Latin America as an elite-led project that
developed in the nineteenth century to put the newly independent republics on the path to
progress and modernity. I introduce here the idea that the discourse about the nation,
which has appropriated the pre-Columbian past since the late nineteenth century, has
become hegemonic and is now reproduced from below by citizens and sub-national
organizations that hold the state accountable to defend this concept.
Nationalism and nation in Latin America.
Hobsbawm (1995) describes nationalism in Latin America as an ideology used by liberal
elites in the post-independence nineteenth century to overcome the obstacles posed to
their objectives of progress and modernization. Centeno and Ferraro (2013a), drawing on
the work of Michael Mann, envision the construction of nationalist discourses throughout
the nineteenth century as an essential part of state-building projects: seeking the
consolidation of their “symbolic” power, Latin American states used nationalism to
provide “the ideological linkages that serve to create collectives that view themselves as
such and that provide the foundational legitimacy for state claims to power” (13). They
explain the relative underdevelopment of nationalism in the region by the contradiction
between the commitment of liberal elites (liberalism being one of the most influential
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ideological currents in the modern history of the region) to social and political equality
(at least in principle), their aversion to a strong bureaucratic state, and their fear of
nationalism from below. In the absence of powerful bureaucratic machineries (the
“infrastructural capacity” of the state), efforts at building strong nationalist sentiments
remained only partly successful until the twentieth century.
The main alternative to this broad narrative of the development of nationalism in
the region comes from a seminal study that has largely influenced the study of nations
and nationalism, in Latin America and elsewhere, over the past three decades: Anderson
(2006) sees nationalism as the liberal, secular vector of new “imagined communities”
being created in Spanish American colonies as these were fighting for their
independence. He explains the development of several (instead of one pan-American)
nationalisms in the region by a series of intertwined factors. The imposition of artificial
administrative boundaries by the Spanish crown, the prohibition of trade among colonies
and that of criollo civil servants to serve in another colony than the one they were born
in, and the development of print-capitalism limited to a local scale, concurred to create
the sentiment, among criollos, that they were not only different from the Spaniards, but
also from one another. For Anderson, nationalism is not an ideology but a “cultural
artifact” (4) that, though clearly inscribed in modernity, is not the purposeful instrument
of an elite’s economic project, as for Hobsbawm.
The causal chain posited by Anderson has been widely debated and criticized
(Lomnitz 2001, Chasteen and Castro-Klarén 2003), and the consensus remains among
Latin Americanists that national identities started to be defined in the region only after
the independences, not before as Anderson argued, and that they became mass
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phenomena only in the first half of the twentieth century (Brading 1994, Centeno and
Ferraro 2013b). In post-revolutionary Mexico, for example, that was the case under the
impulsion of a post-revolutionary, corporatist, and interventionist state (Brading 2001).
For Hobsbawm, it is indeed only after the Mexican Revolution that nationalist ideologies
throughout the region included the masses, including the poor and the Indigenous
communities. Guerra (2003) argues that, though print capitalism may have played a role
in the diffusion of nationalist discourses, it did so only after independence, as there were
actually very few presses in the region up until the 1810s. At a conceptual level, Lomnitz
(2001) argues that Anderson’s conception of “nation” does not take into account the
shifting understanding of the Spanish word nación in the centuries before independence;
that nationalism is built more on hierarchical social relations than on Anderson’s
“horizontal comradery”; and that nationalism is not necessarily associated with
secularization. In spite of these rebuttals, Anderson’s has remained one of the most
influential contributions to the study of nationalism in Latin America over the past
several decades (Miller 2006), particularly for its intuition about the power of print
capitalism to promote identity (nationalist) discourses as well as the very title of his book.
The description of the nation as an “imagined community” represents a conceptual leap
from the traditional understanding of nación in Latin America as an ethnic or ancestral
group of inhabitants associated with a kingdom (Thurner 1997, Lomnitz 2001); to be
sure, the very concept of “imagined community” has been overwhelmingly adopted by
scholars of Latin American history, politics, and anthropology.
Most importantly for my own research, the literature on nationalism in Latin
America, whether constructivist/modernist or instrumentalist, rejects essentialist
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conceptions of the nation as a pre-existing, dormant entity, of which nationalism would
be the awakening and affirmational instrument. For all the scholars cited above who
followed Gellner (2006),8 it is nationalism that induces nations, an idea that implies,
potentially, the necessity to endlessly continue the labor of national construction, even
well into the twenty-first century. As the historical (economic, social, political)
conditions that presided over the birth of nationalism in the modern era have waned or
morphed, the nation as a never fully realized concept requires its proponents (the states,
according to Gellner and, after him, Centeno and Ferraro) to continue this labor. As a
discourse, nationalism needs permanent and positive reinforcement. Hence, in spite of the
challenges to the unified vision of the nation by Indigenous political movements since the
late twentieth century (Yashar 2005), Miller (2006) suggests that “the place of the state in
constructing Latin American national identities is likely to continue to be important”
(212). It is in this perspective that I frame the efforts of Latin American states to recover
objects that form part of the national cultural heritage held in foreign institutions. Indeed,
the cases of return claims I examine here demonstrate, rather than a challenge to the
unifying discourse of the nation through the appropriation of the pre-Columbian past, an
acceptance of this discourse and a demand formulated to the state by the supporters of the
claims to continue this work of nation-building. Indeed, all my case studies concern
cultural objects from the countries’ pre-Columbian past that the state claims on behalf of
the nation, not on behalf of Indigenous communities – a vastly different logic from cases
of repatriations, as practiced in North America, Oceania, and Scandinavia. Latin
American states consider themselves the legitimate owners of this heritage, an opinion
8

Gellner, who did not study Latin America, considers nationalism to be a function of modernity,
transforming a folk culture into a high culture to respond to the needs for cultural homogeneity induced by
industrialization.
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largely shared by experts and intellectuals of these countries and accepted within civil
society, including by Indigenous groups themselves.
Historical continuity, cultural appropriation, and material heritage
Proponents of nationalist discourses in the newly independent republics of Spanish
America faced the challenge of building a politically unified community on the soil of
ethnic and linguistic diversity. Making sense of this diversity implied to manage
difference not only among three main categories of inhabitants – Spanish, Indigenous,
Afro-descendants – but also within each of these broad groups: there was no such sense
of a community of destiny among widely diverse Indigenous communities or among
Afro-descendant groups, and mestizaje (racial mixing) had in any case largely contributed
to undermine any strict delimitation among ethnic and racial groups (Knight 1990,
Chasteen 2003). What kind of a past was thus necessary to “imagine a community”?
In the context of the post-colonial modernization process, scholars have
emphasized the consolidation by Latin American states of their “legitimate monopoly on
the past” (López Caballero 2008, 330), i.e., their capacity to include or exclude entire
sectors of the population in their conception of the national community, as reflected for
example in their treatment of archeological objects and ruins. In a study that owes much
to Hobsbawm’s (1992) idea of “invention of tradition” but also to Nora’s (1989) material
and symbolic lieux de mémoire [sites of memory], Earle (2007) shows how criollo elites
who fought for independence from the Spanish crown in the early nineteenth century
used symbols and material remains of the pre-Columbian era to build their legitimacy and
lay the ground for Latin American nationalisms. One of the criollos’ main issues was to
simultaneously differentiate themselves from Spain but also from the Indigenous groups
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that inhabited the territory of the newly independent republics. One solution was the
reinvention of a glorious and imperial past, much along the model of Roman and Greek
antiquities – an analogy also signalled by Thurner (2003), which legitimized the fight for
independence and cut contemporary Indigenous communities from any claim to that
glorious past: what Earle calls “Indianesque nationalism.” From the perspective of this
elite-led nationalism, only those born in America (contrary to those born in Spain) could
claim a continuity with the glorious leaders who were crushed by the conquest (for
example, Cuauhtémoc 9 in Mexico and Atahualpa 10 in Peru), but contemporary
Indigenous individuals, who had lost all the virtues of their pre-conquest ancestors, could
not legitimately be considered their heirs. To paraphrase Méndez G. (1996) about Peru,
this was a nation of Incas, not of Indians. The term indio acquired a strong derogatory
connotation in Spanish, as pointed out by De La Cadena (2000), among other scholars.
This is how the last pre-Hispanic historical period (the Inca empire in Peru and
surrounding Andean republics, the Aztec empire in Mexico, and to a lesser extent the
Muisca in Colombia) became a past of predilection that was put forward in official
celebrations and historiography, setting a trend that can be traced all the way to the early
twenty-first century. For example, my analysis of newspaper articles on return claims
shows that, in Peru, the claim over the Machu Picchu (Inca) collection garnered
considerably more attention from the press than the Paracas case.11

9

A cousin of Montezuma’s, Cuauhtémoc, the last Aztec emperor, was executed in 1525. Statues, streets,
and a metro station in Mexico City are named after him, making him one of the heroes of Mexican
nationalist historiography.
10
The last Inca emperor, Atahualpa was executed by Francisco Pizarro in 1533. The story of his death is a
popular myth in Peru that has inspired countless paintings and novels, particularly in the nineteenth century.
11
I found seventy-three articles in El Comercio and seventy-six in La República published from 2008
(when the first memorandum of understanding, signed in 2007, provoked an outcry, to 2012 (when the last
batch of objects was effectively returned to Peru). In comparison, I could only find eight articles published
in El Comercio and nine in La República between 2011 and 2014 about the Paracas case.
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To be sure, Earle describes how independence heroes progressively replaced preconquest figures as national heroes in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The preColumbian past ended up forming the backbone of a sublimated prelude to these
countries’ “real history,” which started with the conquest in 1492. Ultimately, it is only in
the early twentieth century that elites saw an interest in the physical remains of preColumbian civilizations and that these stopped being seen as a collection of archeological
antiquities with no association to contemporary Indians to become an “authentic
heritage,” incorporating Indigenous communities into the nation (Coggins 2002, Earle
2007, López Caballero 2008). On October 25, 1912, El Comercio in Lima dedicated the
first page of its morning edition to the question of heritage conservation, denouncing the
exclusivity offered to Yale University on the products of its archaeological excavation in
Peru, and sharing the Peruvian Historical Institute’s concern that the country was being
“dispossessed of its historical riches.”12 This shift in the nationalist discourse proved
particularly pervasive and powerful among general audiences; while this discourse may
have remained confined in the early twentieth century to the literate segment of the
population who would learn about these issues in the newspapers, it reached broader
audiences later in the century. Reviewing several dozen articles from the national press,
official documents by the ministries of culture and foreign affairs, and letters from
individuals to state authorities in Peru, Mexico, and Colombia, I find that critical views
about the historical appropriation of an ancient past by an elite minority for its
homogenizing, nationalist purposes remain largely confined to the realm of academia:
since at least the mid-twentieth century and well into the twenty-first century, the
essentialist concept of the contemporary nation as the natural heir of glorious pre12

“Nuestras riquezas arqueologícas,” El Comercio (Lima), October 25, 1912.
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Columbian predecessors has been uncritically conveyed in newspapers, by official
authorities, and by citizens, as shown by the recurrent use of plural possessive pronouns
to refer to nuestro (our) heritage and ancestors, forging a deep past for the nation.13
Archeology as a discipline, particularly in its early, culture-historical phase, has
greatly contributed to the construction of nationalist narratives (Kohl and Fawcett
1995).14 In Latin America, the task of linking the glorious but in-ruins pre-Columbian
past to the present fell not to history but to archaeology and the iconographic
representation of unearthed ancient cities, a practice largely grounded in the writings of
early nineteenth-century European travelers and in the development of archaeology as a
scientific discipline in Europe (Poole 1997, Castro-Klarén 2003, Thurner 2003, Botero
2006, Qayum 2011). Monumental ruins were of particular interest, as they allowed
showcasing the high level of civilization of the nation’s ancestors, also revealing the
hierarchy among Indigenous cultures introduced by nineteenth-century European
concepts of civilization, which celebrated architectural achievements as one of the
highest degree of cultural – thus, racial – development. Latin American countries indeed
made use of the products of a discipline (archaeology) that was born in the Western
colonizing world, imported to Latin America, and progressively “nationalized”
throughout the twentieth-century. Manuel Gamio in Mexico followed the teachings of
German-American anthropologist Franz Boas at Columbia University, and Julio C. Tello
in Peru those of German archaeologist Max Uhle. Both defined the contours of a national
13

This reach to the deep past appears, for example, in a letter Blanca Moctezuma addressed to Felipe
Calderón, by then the candidate for the PAN to the 2006 presidential election: she mentions that the history
of the penacho has been transmitted orally “from remote times and the dawn of Anahuac” to the present
(Anahuac is the highland basin where the Aztecs founded their empire, and where Mexico City now sits).
Letter from Blanca Moctezuma to Felipe Calderón, May 24, 2006; APBMB.
14
Culture-historical archeology divides historical societies into distinct ethnic and cultural groupings
according to their material culture. It was often influenced by a nationalist political agenda, being utilized
to prove a direct cultural and/or ethnic link from prehistoric and ancient peoples to modern nation-states.
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(and nationalist) archaeology in their respective country. Similarly, in Colombia, the
practice of archaeology was introduced by foreign researchers, such as Preuss, before
national archaeologists took over (Gnecco 2008). Ultimately, national archaeologies form
the basis to claim sovereignty over objects found on their territory, and Latin American
archaeologists keep promoting the nationalist discourse based on the appropriation of the
pre-Columbian past up to this day. In Peru, according to Ruth Shady,15 “our [Peruvian]
cultural identity will be strengthened if we obtain the return of these [Machu Picchu]
objects that so many [in Peru] have never seen”; for Luis Lumbreras,16 “Yale [had] to
respect our [Peruvian] sovereignty and return the objects.”17 In Mexico, for Felipe Solis,
curator of the Aztec room of the National Museum of Anthropology, the penacho is “part
of our Indigenous nationality,” and upon its return to Mexico will form, together with
other archaeological artifacts, “an altar to Mexican nationality.”18
A corollary to the development of archaeology as a (nationalist) science is the
creation of state-sponsored national museums in charge of constructing and displaying an
official narrative of the nation’s past for visitors (Anderson 2006, Vrdoljak 2008), a
process that started early right after independence in Latin America, in the 1820s
(Morales-Moreno 1994, Schmilchuk 1995, Botero 2006, Earle 2007, Muñoz Burbano
2012). To be sure, manipulations of the past for the legitimizing purposes of the elites is
not an invention of the nineteenth century. The Aztecs themselves had already
constructed a narrative of their own (hi)story, envisioning themselves as the heirs of the
15

A respected archaeologist, Shady is in charge of the site Caral-Supe, labeled the oldest city in America.
A proponent of the Latin American school of social archaeology, inspired by Marxist principles,
Lumbreras was director of the MNAAH in the 1970s and director of the INC during the government of
Alejandro Toledo, from 2002 to 2006.
17
“Bingham pidió a Yale devolver las piezas de Machi Picchu al Perú,” La República, April 7, 2009.
18
Patricia Vega, “Antropología o el Templo Mayor, ideales para exhibir el Penacho,” La Jornada, Aug. 2,
1996.
16
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Toltecs and, before them, the builders of the formidable Teotihuacan pyramids (Fowler
1987). Also, this role played by archeology, anthropology, and museums in the
construction of nationalist discourses is not particular to Latin America. For example,
Vrdoljak (2008) examines how Britain used museums to build domestic support for its
colonial expansion, and Anderson (2006) shows how Southeast Asian countries inherited
these practices of “political museumizing” (183). Nevertheless, this has been a
particularly important phenomenon in countries such as Peru and Mexico (Gotkowitz
2011), and to a lesser extent in Colombia (Muñoz Burbano 2012), in great part because of
the influence of indigenismo as an official ideology of the state.
From indigenismo to multiculturalism: shifting the intellectual framework to think ethnic
difference within the nation
In Latin American countries that boast numerically important Indigenous populations,
indigenist intellectuals and politicians in the early twentieth century denounced the
criollo state that obtained independence from Spain for largely failing to unify a nation.
Indigenous populations remained politically, socially, culturally, and economically
dominated by the descendants of the Spanish elite (Thurner 1997, Chasteen 2003).
Following decades of liberal thought that saw a complete assimilation of
Indigenous individuals in the mold of republican citizenship as the only solution to the
“Indian problem” (Marzal 1981), the process of consolidation of the central state at the
turn of the twentieth century, led alternatively by liberal and conservative political
movements – particularly under Porfirio Díaz (1870-1911) in Mexico, in Peru during the
so-called Aristocratic Republic (1895-1919), and in Colombia during the era of the
Regeneration (1886-1909) – continued to undermine the collective social and political
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rights of Indigenous communities such as collective land holding. It is in the first decades
of the twentieth century that political indigenismo, born within the intellectual framework
of cultural anthropology, rediscovered “the Indigenous.” The First Interamerican
Indigenist Congress, held in Pátzcuaro (Mexico) in 1940, gathered representatives from
several countries of the Western Hemisphere (including Peru and Colombia) and
contributed to the institutionalization of indigenismo: national indigenist institutes were
created throughout the continent19 and indigenismo informed many policies of the state
(particularly in Mexico) to protect and improve the lot of Indigenous communities in the
fields of education, public health, and economic and agricultural development, with
mixed results (Marzal 1981).
But indigenismo is not a uniform ideology: it took different forms and came to
embody divergent political programs throughout the region and over time (Marzal 1981,
Patterson 1995); it also evidenced contrasting and shifting understandings of race as a
category of identity (Gotkowitz 2011), providing a racialized intellectual framework to
conceive the nation as a unified community. In Mexico, indigenist intellectuals such as
José Vasconcelos and Manuel Gamio sought to foster a new vision of the nation that
would absorb Indigenous populations through mestizaje (racial mixing). Vasconselos’
vision of a new, “cosmic race” (2015) came to symbolize this process of creation of a
new Mexican people, which would lead to an improvement in the living conditions of
Indigenous communities through their assimilation into the national mold and the
modernizing project of the state. Indigenous cultures, particularly in the work of
anthropologist and archaeologist Manuel Gamio who excavated in Teotihuacán (Marzal
19

Such as the National Indigenist Institute (INI), created in Mexico in 1948; its current name, since 2018, is
the National Institute of Indigenous Peoples (INPI). It had equivalents in Colombia (Indigenist Institute of
Colombia – IIC) and Peru (Instituto Indigenista Peruano – IIP).
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1981, Brading 2001), were seen as the incarnation of Mexican roots, but at the same time
as having no future, since they would be absorbed into a homogeneous Mexican national
identity (Coggins 2002). Indigenismo contained its own contradictions, which explains
why it did not completely succeed in suppressing racism in Mexico and in forging a
mestizo nation: race, much as indigenismo itself, are the constructs of non-Indians –
concepts developed and applied by non-Indians (Knight 1990).
In Peru, indigenistas in the ancient Inca capital of Cusco developed complex and
shifting definitions and uses of race, Indianness, and mestizaje. Earle (2007) notes that
the Peruvian criollo minority, which took control of the new independent republic,
entered the era of modernity and political independence with a relationship to its
Indigenous majority based on fear: the recollection of the Tupac Amaru II insurgency in
the 1780s limited the perspective of assimilation of Andean Indigenous communities into
a unified national mold. This explains, for Knight (1990), why Andean elites, for whom
the threat of castes20 seemed truly present, adopted indigenismo with more reservations
than Mexican elites, who only in retrospect viewed zapatismo as the awakening of
Indigenous peoples during the Mexican Revolution. In Peru, indigenismo alternatively
promoted acculturation in the late 19th century, served socialist philosopher José Carlos
Mariategui’s (1968) revolutionary projects of land reform, and aimed at creating a
culturally pluralistic nation through writer José María Arguedas’ works (Gotkowitz
2011). Indigenismo shifted from biological to cultural definitions of race; while these
varying definitions did not suppress all possibility of agency and self-definition by
Indigenous people themselves, they also perpetuated discriminatory practices, shielded
20

In Spanish American colonies, castes represented a complex system of mixed racial categories
(European-white, Indigenous, Afro-descendants, and all their possible combinations) that defined the social
and legal standing of individuals upon their birth.
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from accusations of biological racism but based on educational level (De La Cadena
2000). An important difference with Mexican indigenismo is the intellectual ambivalence
regarding – if not rejection of – mestizaje in the work of prominent indigenist Peruvian
intellectuals such as Luis Valcárcel, who saw mestizaje as a source of racial and moral
degeneration more than as an improvement (Marzal 1981, De La Cadena 2000).
Valcárcel was also an early promoter of the preservation and study of the ruins of preColumbian (particularly, Inca) cultures.21
In Colombia, the efforts to forge a racially coherent mestizo nation had focused
since the mid-nineteenth century on the use of instruments such as maps and drawings to
inform public policy and promote the country abroad (Appelbaum 2013). The
rediscovery of the pre-Columbian past had been largely driven by the work of foreign
researchers and travellers (Botero 2006). Until at least the 1930s, the official discourse
sought to project the idea of whitening the nation, as mestizaje was to lead to the
progressive disappearance of Indigenous and Afro-descendant traits from the national
population. The Indigenous population of Colombia is numerically much less important
than Mexico’s and Peru’s and the influence of indigenismo more limited than in these
two countries. Yet, it contributed to reveal to the country the extent of the “Indian
problem,” i.e., the disastrous living conditions of Indigenous communities and the lack of
state action to incorporate them in the national mainstream. Split between a strict
adherence to academic research and political activism, institutional and political
indigenismo in Colombia was mostly influential in the 1940s but largely curtailed by the
21

In 1913, Valcárcel founded the Instituto Histórico de Cuzco [Cusco Historical Institute] with the aim of
fostering historical, archaeological, and anthropological studies of the region, as well as protecting the
“remains of ancient civilizations.” This work implied improving the knowledge and ensuring the
preservation of the local “folklore,” and was to be achieved by “purging it from the contamination of
mestizaje.” “Por nuestra historia,” La Prensa (Lima), Jul. 13, 1913.
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Violencia (1948-1958). 22 As in Mexico, indigenismo aimed at reaching a greater
inclusion of Indigenous communities into the modernizing project of the state (Correa
Rubio 2007); accordingly, it strengthened the idea of the pre-Columbian past as that of
the Colombian nation as a whole.
For all its limitations, indigenismo succeeded in revealing, within each country,
the very existence of Indigenous communities, which had not disappeared through
centuries of colonization and mestizaje, as well the structural inequalities that were
affecting their social and economic well-being. In turn, indigenismo, by promoting the
greater incorporation of these communities within the nation, contributed to the further
appropriation of pre-Columbian material remains by the national discourse. In the late
twentieth century however, indigenismo has almost disappeared and ceased to inform
public policy (Coggins 2002). As an ideology, it has faded as the principles of
multiculturalism have gained foot, particularly in Colombia.
While indigenismo promoted the assimilation of the Indigenous difference into
the homogenous nation in the name of equality and modernity, multiculturalism on the
contrary strives for the recognition of difference and cultural autonomy of groups (Taylor
1994), thus questioning the very principles on which Latin American nations have based
their own narratives since independence. Van Cott (2006) argues that the adoption of the
1991 Colombian Constitution, which includes a wide set of Indigenous rights, was made
possible by the alliance of leftist and Indigenous delegates in the constituent assembly,
who decided not to challenge the two major parties on the question of neoliberal reforms,
focusing instead on measures such as decentralization that favored Indigenous autonomy
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A period of heightened political violence between liberals and conservatives.
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at the local level. 23 Van Cott also notes that Latin American countries with small
Indigenous populations (particularly Colombia, with barely 2% of the population
identifying as Indigenous) adopted more extensive multicultural policies than those with
larger Indigenous populations, including Mexico and Peru. She explains this inverse
relationship by the fact that the adoption of wide-ranging multicultural policies in
countries with a small Indigenous population had relatively little consequence for the
overall equilibrium among economic and political forces. I would add to this thoughtful
argument the relative strength of the previously dominating ideology regarding the
management of ethnic difference: indigenismo.
In Mexico and Peru, the dominant narrative of the nation, inspired in part in
indigenismo, impeded a complete switch to the multicultural discourse, even though both
countries have made concessions to the internationally dominant multicultural ideology
and officially acknowledged the nation-state as pluricultural.24 In Peru, following decades
of efforts to assimilate Indigenous communities,25 the 1993 Constitution recognized the
multicultural nature of the nation and the application of Indigenous customary law,
abandoning the nineteenth-century constitutional ideal of a culturally homogeneous
nation-state. Yet, the implementation of the principles enunciated in the new constitution
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Multicultural policies in Latin American most often include the recognition of collective land rights for
Indigenous and Afro-descendent communities, the recognition of traditional authorities, laws, and customs
at the local level, and, as is the case in Colombia, reserved seats in the national assembly for Indigenous
representatives. On the cultural level, they often involve increased access to education in Indigenous
languages and the creation of culturally appropriate curricula.
24
Van Cott (2006) ranked Latin American countries according to the extent of the multicultural
constitutional reforms and policies they implemented. She classifies both Mexico and Peru in the category
of countries with “modest” multicultural policies, while she ranks Colombia as a country with “strong”
such policies.
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For example, the leftist-military government of Juan Velasco (1968-1975), implementing the most
ambitious agrarian reform in the history of the country, officially changed the name of Andean
communities from “Indigenous” to “peasants” to avoid the stigmatization associated with the former. The
same government implemented a policy of standardization of the Quechua language, which was recognized
as an official language of Peru in 1975.
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remained limited (Yrigoyen Fajardo 2002). In Mexico, the 1992 constitutional reform did
represent a shift away from the traditional representation of the nation as the product of
mestizaje in favor of the official recognition of the existence of distinct “Indigenous
peoples” (De la Peña 2006). From being a problem to be solved (through
homogeneization and modernization), “Indians” came to be officially recognized as part
of Mexico’s multiethnic heritage, but the 1994 Zapatista insurrection in Chiapas, which
called international attention to the dire conditions of Indigenous populations in southern
Mexico, challenged the definition of multiculturalism proposed by the state by claiming
greater political autonomy, beyond the recognition of cultural difference (Ortiz Elizondo
and Hernández Castillo 1996). Yet the Zapatista movement was not immune to the risks
of essentialization of indigeneousness, used to shed a positive light on the movement’s
demands for greater autonomy among international audiences. This, in turn, seemed to
leave only two options to Indigenous communities to represent themselves: either
primitive, in the tradition of nineteenth-century liberalism, or essentialist, depicting
themselves as millenarian, democratic, and ecological cultures (Hernández Castillo
2002).
Indigenismo, multiculturalism, and the continued appropriation of pre-Columbian
cultural objects
As noted above, the centrality of the Indigenous past in the nationalist discourse has
fluctuated since independence. In interviews, several participants in all three countries
actually noted a decline over the past few decades in the interest among general
audiences in this part of the national history. Kohl and Fawcett (1995) propose that the
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very efforts among post-processual archaeologists 26 to depoliticize their scientific
practice explain, in part, the relative decline in interest for the discipline and its results.
Yet, the interest to claim the return of cultural heritage objects has never been as strong.
How can we expect the progressive shift from indigenismo towards multiculturalism in
the region to have impacted the position of the states regarding material heritage and
informed their position on the specific question of returns?
The cultural policies inspired by indigenist thought placed heritage preservation
and cultural property at the center of the state’s intervention in the realm of arts and
culture. Anthropologists got to decide which aspects of Indigenous cultures merited
inclusion in the national imaginary, and archeological objects became fundamental to
“enact the national myth” (Gotkowitz 2011, 21). This was particularly the case in Mexico
and Peru, where indigenismo was stronger than in Colombia. At the moment of forming
an official policy regarding the return of cultural heritage objects in the late twentieth
century, Latin America states are caught between old habits inherited from the indigenist
credo of a mestizo nation that has appropriated the Indigenous past, on the one hand, and
the new ideology of multiculturalism, which would require greater consultation and
participation of, as well as respect for the opinion and aspirations of, Indigenous
communities, on the other. By focusing on current social and economic issues of
Indigenous communities and their political representation, multiculturalism is expected to
consider Indigenous cultures as living and changing, leaving aside interpretations of these
cultures as a heritage to be preserved. Applied to archaeology and museums,
multiculturalism would promote the inclusion of local (Indigenous, Afro-descendant)
26

Challenging positivist conceptualizations of science, post-processual archaeology emphasizes the
subjectivity of the interpretations that can be drawn from the archaeological record and the relativity of our
understanding of the past (Whitley 1998).
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communities in the process of excavation, conservation, interpretation, and presentation
of the results.
I propose here that each of the three countries I examine embodies a different
variation in the relative weight and influence of indigenismo and multiculturalism. Peru
represents a case where the attitude of the state, which has most vigorously fought for the
return of cultural objects, reflects a more traditional approach of appropriation of the preColumbian past in both the Machu Picchu and the Paracas cases: of the three, it is the
country where multiculturalism has impacted the least on the policy on return claims. The
state claims this heritage to be its own, and acts in consequence. Mexico, on the other
hand, shows the shift from a more voluntarist attitude in the 1980s in the case of the
Teotihuacan mural towards a more cautious attitude from the 1990s onwards in the case
of the penacho; in spite of the discourse of appropriation, the Mexican state, confronted
with challenges from Indigenous organizations to recognize the pluricultural composition
of the nation, now seems to hesitate in pushing its claim over the penacho. Finally, in the
case of Colombia, I identify two competing explanations of the impact of the adoption of
multicultural policies on the Colombian executive’s prudent attitude in the cases of the
Quimbaya collection and San Agustín statues. This coyness can either be interpreted as a
newly developed sense of respect for the autonomy of Indigenous cultures, a
consequence of which being that the state renounces appropriating the remains of preColumbian societies (regardless of whether they are claimed by Indigenous descendants);
or, vindicating the position of scholars who criticized the adoption of multicultural
policies as a strategic diversion to avoid deeper challenges to the neo-liberal socioeconomic model (Van Cott 2006), it could be argued that the Colombian state only paid
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lip service to multicultural concerns and was simply never interested in the past and
present cultural expressions of Indigenous communities.
I will complicate this reading of policy choices in the subsequent chapters. For
now, having reviewed how the discourses on the nation in Latin America have
appropriated the pre-Columbian past, I analyze, in the following section, the reasons why
specific objects are of interest to the country that claims them. I hypothesize that these
objects are important in allowing each state to reclaim not only physical possession of the
object, but also control of the narrative that this object can sustain. This, in turn, reveals
different characteristics of nationalism in Mexico, Peru, and Colombia.
Narratives of the nation and return claims: common grounds
Considering returns and restitutions from the perspective of the historical construction of
national discourses allows displacing the analysis, as suggested by Bauer, Lindsay, and
Urice (2007), from legal questions of ownership to the fight for control over the
presentation of the past – a fight in which political elites and scientists have allied, up
until the twenty-first century.
Claiming the remains of the past, controlling the narrative of the past
In the return cases I analyze, experts in the claiming country were dispossessed from the
materials that would have allowed them to write the national history – a task based on
scientific methods they often have learned from European or US experts but that they
cannot carry out because the object has been taken away from them. The (pseudo-)
scientific study of the past has been largely imported to Latin America by foreign
travelers and scientists, as Botero (2006) has shown in the case of Colombia. Hence, the
longing for an object expressed in a return claim is also a longing for the writing of the
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national history by nationals themselves, and the reclaiming of the object is a reclaiming
of the possibility to take control of the narrative. This feeling has not diminished
throughout the twentieth century, quite to the contrary. Robert García Moll, director of
the Mexican INAH, proposed in the 1990s to modify the law on cultural heritage in order
to make it easier for objects held in collections abroad to visit Mexico, albeit for a short
period of time; this would “allows us [Mexicans] to forge our own understanding of our
history.”27 Well into the twenty-first century, Mexican authorities kept insisting that
Mexican experts be involved in the conservation process of the penacho; several
witnesses in the audience at the Colombian constitutional court in the Quimbaya case
argued in favor of its return on the scientific-emotional argument that it was necessary to
develop Colombian perspectives on the collection; and Peruvian experts kept expressing
their frustration of not being able to access the Machu Picchu collection.
This last case serves as an indictment of North American archaeology as an
emblem of US imperialism. Already in the early 1910s, Cusco intellectuals who protested
against Bingham’s expeditions were conscious that they were the victims of an “imperial
project of knowledge” (Salvatore 2003). Yale’s attitude in the Machu Picchu case
embodied the Yankee imperialism so resented throughout Latin America, as the
university did not abide by the terms of the agreements it had signed with the Peruvian
government in 1912 and 1916, and Bingham did not acknowledge the help he received in
Peru from established figure such as UNSAAC president and archaeologist Alberto
Giesecke, even though the latter was a US citizen.28 In 1961, for the fiftieth anniversary
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Adriana Malvido y Anne Huffschmid, “El gobierno debe pedir a Austria devuelva el Penacho de
Moctezuma,” La Jornada, Dec. 5, 1994.
28
Albert Giesecke (1883-1968) was an American scholar of German origin, who taught at Cornell and
University of Pennsylvania, before he was hired in 1909 by the Peruvian government to participate in the
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of the “discovery,” newspapers in Cusco were publishing the stories of Peruvians who
had reached Machu Picchu, in 1902 and again in January 1911, a few months before
Bingham; in that occasion, one article recounts, the group of young local “doctors,”
overcome by emotion, “spontaneously” sang the Peruvian national hymn as they
contemplated the ruins of the citadel for the first time.29 The message to the reader was,
clearly, that Peruvians had not waited for a North American explorer to visit the ruins of
their Inca past. Logically, after the return of the collection to Peru was announced, Jorge
Secada, a Peruvian professor at University of Virginia, could declare that the return of the
collection and the creation of a research center in Cusco are an “extraordinary
opportunity [for Yale] to take a leadership position in the historical reparation by Western
archeology of its aberrant history.”30
“Algo que no corresponde en un lugar que no corresponde”: repairing historical
injustice
Another common feature of the discourses mobilized to justify the claims is the existence
of injustices to be repaired. As Diego Márquez, lawyer in the San Agustín case, noted: “I
find it aggressive and violent that something that does not fit be in a place that does not
correspond to it.” 31 The Spanish conquest and the subsequent three centuries of
colonization serve here as foundational traumas for the national discourse; beyond, the
position of political and economic subordination of Latin America in the long nineteenth
century (a period often referred to as of “neo-colonialism”) also created resentment. As
modernization of the Peruvian education system. He was the rector of the UNSAAC during the years
Bingham organized his expeditions. Mould de Pease (2000) argues that Giesecke’s relations with Bingham
were instrumental in helping Bingham reach Machu Picchu.
29
Gerardo Calderón G., “Cuzqueños descubrieron ruinas de Machupicchu,” El Sol (Cusco), Mar. 8, 1961.
30
Jorge Secada, “El futuro de la arqueología peruana,” El Comercio (Lima), Nov, 23, 2010.
31
Diego Márquez Arango, interview, Oct. 1, 2018. My translation from his original quote, which I used in
the title of this section: “me parece agresivo y violento que algo que no corresponde esté en un lugar que no
corresponde.”
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Barkan (2002) noted, “restitutions can provide the necessary mechanism to mediate
between the histories of perpetrators and victims” (17). The victims, as a consequence,
are not only the Indigenous populations that were conquered, but also their descendants
(regardless of their genetic connection) who have been deprived of material heritage
objects left by their “ancestors.” The descendants include, in the homogenizing narrative
of dispossession, all the co-nationals. “The story is always the same: the strongest strips
away the weakest. An imperative of equity must put an end to these abuses and return to
each culture what corresponds to it by tradition and history.”32
The return claims hence acquire a post-colonial quality that also reveals the
attitude of each state towards its own colonial past. Indeed, “times have changed, many
empires have fallen, and history and justice offer to repair the plunder.”33 The feeling of
injustice is all the stronger given that the museums holding the claimed cultural objects
are located in the former metropolis (the Quimbaya collection in Spain): in European
countries with a strong colonial past and/or of intervention in the region (the penacho in
Austria, the San Agustín statues in Germany) or in the arch-villain of the region, the
Monroe-doctrine United States (the two Peruvian cases and the Teotihuacan murals). In
this context, these cases serve a narrative of spoliation and dispossession, which ideally
cater to the idea of necessary national unity to recover what belongs to the nation as a
whole and to settle historical accounts. This more strident form of nationalist discourse
probably represents the nationalism often disparaged by the internationalists who oppose
return claims. This is not, by any means, a narrative of internal dispossession of one
group’s cultural heritage by another. The nation is the victim, not the oppressive
32

“Nefertiti y los Quimbayas,” El Tiempo, Apr. 13, 2009. In this article, the weak refers to the Colombian
nation, the strong to the foreign powers (Germany, Spain) who hold pre-Columbian artifacts.
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“Tesoros expoliados,” El Tiempo. Oct. 23, 2009.
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community that has sought to blend cultural and ethnic differences into a homogenizing
whole. As noted by Aguilar Díaz (2011) in the case of Peru, “the process of appropriation
of heritage, led by hegemonic institutions of knowledge, is reproduced by state discourses
through the process of ‘patrimonialization’ of the Andean societies’ past. Machu Picchu,
in this sense, has been discovered, re-discovered, appropriated, and recuperated by agents
who have not – or barely – involved the descendants of their creators” (215).
The national press in the three countries offers multiple examples of this discourse
of revenge or repair, demonstrating that the state need not carry the narrative itself;
rather, having successfully engrained it among its own population, it is being held
accountable to act. For example, Mexico can use the penacho case to settle accounts with
both Spain and Austria, with which it shares a long history: Charles I of Spain, who
reigned when Tenochtitlan fell in 1521, was also the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V
and the Archduke of Austria. Hence the “presence of the penacho in Europe remains a
material symbol of the conquest of Mexico”34 and its return can be considered, “no more
but no less as a five-century historical claim that would wash away, on a diplomatic level,
the affront of the conquest.”35 After independence, following the French intervention in
Mexico in 1861-65, Napoleon III sought to install Maximilian of Habsburg on the newly
reinstated throne of Mexico. Maximilian was defeated and executed by the republican
Mexican forces of Benito Juárez in 1867. Mexican-Austrian relations warmed up in the
twentieth century: in March 1938, Mexico was the only country to officially protest,
before the League of Nations, to the annexation of Austria by the armies of Nazi
Germany. A simplified reading of this last episode sees the re-gift of the penacho to

34
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Homero Aridjis, “El penacho de Moctezuma,” Reforma, Jul. 11, 1999.
David Martín del Campo, “Xokonoschtletl y Wolfgang,” Reforma, Feb. 2, 2010.
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Mexico as the conclusion of centuries of troubled history.36 Similarly, the fight to obtain
the return of the Teotihuacan murals can be read as a rebuttal of the arrogance of the
Northern neighbor which, after intervening militarily in Mexican affairs until the 1920s,
is now the destination of artifacts illegally exported from Mexico – a symbolic
continuation of the spoliation of the country, which has lost more than half of its territory
to the USA since its independence, now through the looting of its archaeological remains.
The Colombian case of the Quimbaya collection, on the other hand, does display
both a case of external appropriation (by Spain) and of spoliation of the Colombian
people by its own government, implying a moral obligation for the government to amend
this historical error and repair an injustice made to its own people by presenting a “just
and necessary claim.” 37 On the one hand, the Colombian (past and current) elites’
Hispanophilia notwithstanding, many Colombians express their resentment towards the
former metropolis: “shouldn’t Spain have the decency to give back a gift that, as it seems,
it did not deserve?”38 The state is accused of having itself gifted part of the national
heritage to a foreign power – its former metropolis – and journalist Andrés Hurtado
García invites “Minister [of Foreign Relations María Angela] Holguín to amend what her
great-grand-uncle did in good faith, but with a sad result.”39 That the post-colonial
condemnation of President Holguín’s gift is lost on the current Colombian executive
authorities (the presidential office and the MREC) as well as those, in Colombia, who
argue that Colombia cannot claim the collection since it was voluntarily given away,
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bears witness to the strength of the bond between Hispanophile elites and their former
metropolis. This attitude illuminates the Colombian executive’s cautious approach of
both the Quimbaya and San Agustin cases.
In Peru, the discourse about the injustice inflicted on the country revolved in great
part around the question of the conditions in which the Machu Picchu had been exported:
it was, after all, a loan from the Peruvian government, agreed upon by President Leguía
in 1912. While many press articles40 used this argument to prove Peru’s right during the
legal procedure before the court in Connecticut, they constructed for the Peruvian
audience, rather than a legal case whose outcome was uncertain, the idea that the country
had been unfairly dispossessed. As a consequence, the return of the collection would be
an act of justice. To be sure, the discourse is not supported only from the press, but also
from academia. Historian Miguel Aguilar Díaz (2011), for example, proposes to consider
the return of the Machu Picchu collection as an “act of reparation.”
The fascination with monuments and gold
Looking at the nature of each object offers a point of entry into the analysis of the
national discourse in each country. As signaled in the first section of this chapter,
travellers, collectors, and the first scholars of pre-Columbian cultures in the early
nineteenth century posited a hierarchy of civilization (later strengthened by archaeology)
that favored monumentality: those cultures that had built the formidable structures whose
ruins could be explored had achieved certain level of “civilization” (Botero 2006, Earle
2007, Muñoz Burbano 2012). If we admit that this bias has survived into the early
twenty-first century (if, for no other reason, than as a driver for mass tourism), we may
approach an explanation for the interest of Peru, Mexico, and Colombia for at least one of
40
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the objects each of them is claiming: the Machu Picchu collection held in Yale came
from the ruins of an Inca citadel that has been constructed as an icon of Peruvianness and
whose topography is immediately recognizable by tourists worldwide; the De Young
Museum murals were looted from one of Mexico’s most emblematic pyramids in
Teotihuacan, which have been used since the early twentieth century in the construction
of the discourse about Mexico as a mestizo nation; the San Agustín statues were taken
from Colombia’s allegedly most spectacular archaeological ruins.
Exceptional craft compensates for the other objects’ lack of monumentality. They
find their place in the hierarchy of civilization – thus, as desirable objects – thanks to the
materials they are made of (gold, of course, for the Quimbaya collection, but also quetzal
feathers for the penacho, and dyed camelid hair for the Paracas textiles, all rare and
valuable materials, now and at the moment they were fabricated) and the high level of
technical sophistication reached by their creators.
The abundance of gold found by Spanish conquistadors contributed to generating
the myth of El Dorado, with which Colombia has often been associated; in the nineteenth
century, the appreciation for the exceptional craft of pre-Columbian cultures that used
gold contributed to their reevaluation and re-classification as “civilized” (Field 2012).
Colombia’s participation in the 1892 Madrid exhibition was a great success thanks to the
presentation of the collection: the country was by far the one among its American peers
that presented the greatest number of cultural objects in gold. These reflected such
technical skills that they confirmed that Indigenous people had, indeed, reached a certain
level of “civilization” before the conquest (Muñoz Burbano 2012). This feat improved
the image of late nineteenth-century Colombia among visitors to the exhibition, as
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reported by the Colombian ambassador in Madrid Julio Betancourt and other Colombian
visitors to the exhibition (Gamboa Hinestrosa 2002). In the early twenty-first century,41
gold has not lost its appeal and may explain the particular interest in the Colombian press
(and among Colombians) for the Quimbaya collection: gold evokes riches and the
existence of a “treasure.”42 Gold also contributed to the controversy that surrounded the
removal by Bingham of objects from Machu Picchu: many locals believed, though most
probably erroneously, that he had smuggled objects in gold through another route than
the one he took for the rest of the collection (Heaney 2010). Such beliefs still prevailed in
1961 for the fiftieth anniversary of the “discovery” of Machu Picchu.43 Yet, scholars have
shown that most gold had probably been taken away by the Incas themselves as they left
the city upon the arrival of the Spaniards in the region and none but a handful of objects
returned in 2011 are in gold (Burger and Salazar 2012).
Having identified common characteristics of the objects that are claimed, I now
turn to an analysis of the specific narrative that is carried by each of the objects claimed
in Mexico, Peru, and Colombia.
Nationalism, centralism, and regionalism in Peru, Mexico, and Colombia
As Anderson (2006) underscored, a paradox of nationalism is that, as a social-cultural
concept, nationalism is universal, yet each nationalism has its own concrete
41
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manifestations. In the following paragraphs I highlight a few characteristics of each
national narrative as revealed by the claims for the return of specific cultural heritage
objects. In particular, these objects support a range of discourses about the relation of the
state vis-à-vis the nation that can be inscribed in a continuum from the more centralizing
(Mexico) to the more regionalist (Colombia).
The centralizing force of Mexican nationalism
López Caballero (2008) has described the Mexican nationalist narrative as linear (in its
sequence of historical periods), centralist (all Mexicans should identify with MexicoTenochtitlan), and institutionalist (political power residing, then and now, in the state).
The excavation of the remains of the Templo Mayor itself and the discovery of
impressive stone artifacts in the surrounding areas since the late eighteenth century may
have been the most important contribution of archaeology to Mexican nationalism
(Brading 2001, Coggins 2002), precisely because the Templo Mayor, which was the
politico-religious center of the Aztec empire, is located next to the cathedral and the
current national palace, the residence of the president of the republic. Consequently, the
penacho, as an object possibly used by the emperor himself in or around the Templo
Mayor, confers on the contemporary Mexican state (which now claims its physical
possession) the same position at the center of the Mexican polity. The penacho speaks of
the centralism of power in Mexico at the same time that it reveals the Aztec-centered
nature of the Mexican nation: Mexico City remains, five hundred years after
Montezuma’s defeat, the heart of the nation-state (Monnet 2014). Blanca Moctezuma
considers the penacho a “symbol of power that is the property of the people of
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Mexico,”44 a statement probably shared by the civil servants and experts who, working
on the claim during Felipe Calderón’s administration (2006-12), floated the idea that the
penacho could be displayed in the presidential palace45 instead of the National Museum
of Anthropology and the Museum of the Templo Mayor – the options most often cited
until then.46 The variety of voices carrying this centralizing discourse reveals the extent to
which the assimilation of the Mexican nation with its glorious Aztec predecessor has
been naturalized among Mexicans, to the point of being largely undisputed. When
Virginia Ortiz de Sarate – another self-declared descendent of the emperor – writes to the
Mexican president that the penacho is “a banner that symbolizes the Aztec identity,
which belongs only to the people of Mexico,”47 she replicates a nationalist discourse that
is hegemonic on various levels: territorially, the current United States of Mexico largely
encompass the borders of the Aztec empire, which had subjugated other ethnic groups to
dominate Mesoamerica; temporally, this hegemony continues under the form of a state
whose bureaucratic organization is centralized in Mexico City.48
Yet, three peculiar characteristics of the penacho as a symbol of Mexican
nationalism need further explanation. First, Peimbert Moreno (2011) notes the irony, for
the formation of Mexican nationalism, of using an object associated not with a glorious
hero but rather with the defeated leader of a conquered empire. Yet, Renan (1990) had
44
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centralizing tendencies of the PRI, which ruled a country that is officially a federation, were its corporatism,
as the PRI had coopted numerous Indigenous and/or peasant organizations in its structure of power,
decreasing the likeliness of Indigenous identities being captured by other, non-state entities for political
mobilization purposes. This strategy worked at least until the 1990s, but the Zapatista insurrection of 1994
signaled it was being contested.
45
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already noted that the sense of belonging is built as much (if not more) on grief and
sacrifice as on the glory of victory. Hence, if we apply Nora’s (1989) concept of lieu de
mémoire49 to an object such as the penacho, then its potentiality to strengthen (rather than
weaken) Mexican nationalism lies not in the heroic acts of he who possessed the object,
but in the lived, sublimated, existential (albeit constructed) link that contemporary
Mexicans feel with that person. The penacho can perform a role just like a war memorial
can, as the nation coalesces around its former and legitimate leader, regardless of his
(un)glorious deeds. It is this work of memory that individuals such as Xokonoschtletl and
Blanca Moctezuma push the Mexican state to accomplish, when the state has seemed
more interested in seeing the penacho as history through the works of the experts it sent
to Vienna, both in 2002 and 2011.
Second, the claim for the penacho works to consolidate within Mexico a trait of
Mexicanness – or rather, as Bartra (1992) has called it, the national myth: 50
malinchismo.51 For years, the official history about the penacho was that it had been a
gift by Montezuma himself to Cortés upon the arrival of the conquistadores, which
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For Nora, the lieu de mémoire lies at the intersection of history as a science and memory as the link
between a contemporary people and its (real or imagined) past, which the development of historiography in
the twentieth century has disconnected. The lieu de mémoire, in this sense, need not be an actual place.
50
For Bartra, “Mexicanness” is the product of intellectual elites, an ideological construction that supports
the hegemonic system of the post-revolutionary Mexican state and prevents the development of modern
democracy by making Mexicans the subject of their own national culture.
51
The term malinchismo derives from the historical figure of Malintzin, or La Malinche, conquistador
Hernán Cortés’ Indigenous translator and lover. Commonly used in Mexico, malinchismo refers,
disdainfully, to xenophilious people who show greater interest in everything foreign rather than in Mexico.
The claim for the penacho through the lens of malinchismo speaks to the centralism of Mexican
nationalism: the figure of Malinche is often equated to that of the traitor in Mexican popular culture.
However, this understanding of Malinche, which assimilates her to Mexico and Mexicanness, is ahistorical
and the product of the fostering of the very idea of a fatherland in nineteenth-century Mexico, as Bartra
shows. Indeed, Malinche was not Aztec; she came from another Indigenous group, subjugated by the Aztec
empire. Rather than an act of rebellion against the Aztec rule, her rallying to the Spanish has been recast as
an act of betrayal. Accordingly, the gifting of the penacho (if considered as a royal emblem) by Montezuma
himself would then represent an act of submission or even of betrayal of his subjects, as he welcomed the
foreign conqueror rather than fighting him.
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undermined the contemporary Mexican claim to obtain its return from Austria: the
Mexican state could not be claiming the devolution of an object gifted centuries ago by
the Aztec sovereign. The narrative of a voluntary dispossession by the Mexican in favor
of the visitor has been vehemently denounced by both Xokonoschtletl and Blanca
Moctezuma and largely questioned in the Mexican press since the mid-1990s; historians
now admit that there is no provable hypothesis about the conditions in which the penacho
made its way to Europe in the sixteenth century (van Bussel 2012).

Figure 3.1: Copy of “Montezuma’s headdress” exhibited
in the National Museum of Anthropology, Mexico City
(Photo: Thomas Ledl; 2015; CC BY-SA 4.0)
Finally, the penacho largely owes its iconic status as symbol of Mexican
nationalism to a replica. Following the Mexican Revolution, the Mexican state intensified
its efforts to strengthen a sense of national identity, and the headdress became one of its
symbols. Aberlado L. Rodríguez (acting president of Mexico from 1932-34)
unsuccessfully expressed interest in the return of the penacho and ordered a replica for
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the National Museum. Completed in 1938-9, this copy – a work of art in its own right52 –
now occupies a central place in the National Museum of Anthropology, opened in 1964
(Moreno Guzmán and Olmedo Vera 2012).53 Its display allows visitors to photograph
themselves as if they were wearing it,54 possibly contributing to the popularization of the
penacho as a symbol of national identity among generations of Mexican visitors to the
museum (von Zinnenburg Carroll 2017). Hence, the vast majority of Mexicans physically
encounter the penacho in Mexico through its copy – few of them can afford the trip to
Vienna, where they enjoy free access to the Weltmuseum.55 The very existence and
symbolic force of the copy demonstrate that the claim for return is more about control
over the (re)writing of the past and the construction of the nation than about the
ownership of an object per se: when the copy of a multi-century-old object fosters a sense
of national pride among a population, it inhabits the realm of the “invention of tradition”
(Hobsbawm 1992), i.e., the re-creation of supposedly ancient traditions, where historical
accuracy matters little.56 The physical possession and display of the original penacho is
not necessary to keep writing the (hi)story of the continuity between the Aztec empire
and the Mexican state – the copy very well plays this role. However, the claim for the
52

So much so that Benita Ferrero Waldner, secretary of foreign affairs of Austria, declared during an
official visit to Mexico that the replica was “prettier” than the original – an additional argument, in her
logic, to leave the original in Vienna (see Antonio Bertrán,“El Penacho de Moctezuma se quedará en
Austria,” Reforma, Jan. 23, 1997). In interviews, I heard similar comments from functionaries of the
Mexican SRE.
53
This copy was made by Mexican amanteca (a craftsman specialized in feathers) Francisco Moctezuma (a
predestined name if there ever was one!), who never saw the original. He worked from photographs. The
copy is itself a unique object because it was made with feathers from bird species that are now extinct, thus
it could not be itself identically replicated.
54
Francisco González Rul, “El ‘penacho’ de Moctezuma,” Arqueología Mexicana (Mexico City), n. 13, pp.
57-9 (May-June 1995).
55
The Weltmuseum provides free access to Mexican citizens with presentation of their passport – part of an
agreement with the Mexican government since November 2012, sponsored by Telekom Austria.
56
I insist here on “re-creation,” for, as stated in chapter 2, there is little certainty as to who exactly used the
penacho, and if it was even a headdress. Yet, the copy is appropriated by visitors to the museum who
metaphorically “wear” the headdress when they photograph themselves in front of the vitrine, reembodying in the present the ill-fated Aztec emperor.
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original penacho signals the strength of the spiritual link that nations (in this case, the
Mexican one, which claims to be the legitimate heir of the Aztecs and of Montezuma)
maintain with their dead (or, as underscored by Renan, those dead they choose to honor,
not those they forgot). Hence, the original penacho is a relic57 of that deep past – a status
that the copy cannot achieve.
The relic is invested with a quasi-sacred, mystical power of community healing, a
fetishism conveyed by the individuals that push the Mexican state to claim the original
penacho. For Blanca Moctezuma, the return of the penacho will “bring positive results
for the mood of the [Mexican] people”58 and will allow Mexico to “recover the greatness
it had before the arrival of the Europeans.”59 For Xokonoschtletl, the penacho will bring
back to Mexico a “balance” broken by the conquest.60 In their discourse, the community
to be healed, in the early twenty-first century, is the nation, a healing that will come from
the deep, pre-Columbian past that has a virginal quality. This past is, of course,
unverifiable and uncontestable by historians, who do not have access to written records to
challenge that version. Blanca Moctezuma’s and Xokonoschtletl’s alternative versions
somehow contest the official state doctrine of mestizaje as their discourses seem to
privilege a “pure” Indigenous blood, pre-conquest vision of the Mexican nation –
versions that are not without a certain contradiction since both Moctezuma and
Xokonoschtletl could themselves be considered perfect examples of Mexican mestizaje.
The Mexican state tolerates these versions (only to a certain extent, as I demonstrate in
57

The word “relic” seems particularly appropriate in the case of a country as profoundly marked by
Catholicism as Mexico.
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Letter from Blanca Moctezuma to Andrés Manuel Lopez Obredor, president-elect of Mexico, Aug. 2,
2018; APBMB.
59
Interview with Blanca Moctezum and her husband, Jesús Juárez Flores, Jul. 28, 2018.
60
Interview with Antonio “Xokonoschtletl” Gómora, May 25, 2018. Xokonoschtletl expresses similar ideas
in his self-published books, such as En busca de un imposible (which can be ordered online) or in videos
available on his website: http://www.xoko.org/espanol/xoko.html
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Chapter 5) because neither of them has challenged that the Mexican nation (thus, the
state) is the legitimate owner of the penacho. In that regard, Blanca Moctezuma and
Xokonoschtletl are a sign that the discourse over the nation through the appropriation of
the Indigenous past has been naturalized and internalized by Mexicans to the extent that
the state, as an autonomous entity, need not carry it all by itself: its citizens have taken it
upon themselves to do it.
But Mexican nationalism has not only appropriated the Aztec empire, the latest
avatar in a long series of politico-cultural entities that form the history of Mesoamerica.
The movement of rediscovering the cultures that preceded the Aztecs started earlier in
Mexico than it did in Peru with the predecessors of the Incas. The excavation and
exploitation of the pyramids of Teotihuacan and the archaeological sites in the southern
regions of Oaxaca and Yucatán, in particular, have highlighted the architectural
achievements of Zapotec, Maya, and other Indigenous cultures, showing a diversification
of the national pre-Columbian imaginary. 61 Yet, the claim for the return of the
Teotihuacan murals from San Francisco also signaled the strengthening of Mexican
centralism and the consolidation of Mexico City as the heart of Mexican nationalism,
rather then its diversification. First, the Aztecs themselves knew Teotihuacan and thought
of it as the place where the sun and the moon of the era in which they lived had been
born; they believed the many buildings of what is today called the “Avenue of the Dead”
in Teotihuacan were, indeed, the funerary monuments of the city’s rulers. Hence the
continuity from the Aztecs to the contemporary Mexican state can easily be stretched
61

I am fully aware that the choice of case studies, restricted to the penacho of Montezuma and the
Teotihuacan murals, opens my argument to criticism of sampling on the dependent variable. Certainly, the
Mexican state has also sought and obtained the return or restitution of cultural objects from many
Indigenous cultures, in particular Maya. However, I do contend that no other case has formed the basis for
such powerful discourses on the nation as the two I am observing for this research.
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further in the past to Teotihuacan (Pasztory 1988). Second, Teotihuacan became central
to the indigenist discourse of the Mexican state in the immediate post-revolutionary
period, through the archaeological and anthropological work of Manuel Gamio,
substantiating the narrative of a great mestizo nation rooted in the grandeur of its preColumbian cultures (Gamio 1972). Finally, Teotihuacan is today geographically located
at the northern edge of the greater metropolitan area of Mexico City: most visitors today
take a day trip to the archaeological area. The former Aztec capital and Teotihuacan are
now symbolically united in a single, continuous urban ensemble.
Overall, my two cases studies of objects claimed by the Mexican state reveal the
centralizing strength of Mexican nationalism, centered on the Mexico City/Tenochtitlan/
Teotihuacan urban ensemble. The national discourse had forged the deeply engrained
idea, among the Mexican population, of a historical continuity between the Mexican state
and its powerful Mesoamerican predecessors, Teotihuacan and the Aztec empire, which
both occupied the geographically central part of the current Mexican territory. This idea
is so engrained that the state itself has, to a certain extent, been overwhelmed by
individuals such as Blanca Moctezuma and Xokonoschtletl, who demand that the state
live up to the expectations it created to defend this heritage that it appropriated.
The duality of Peruvian nationalism
In Peru as in Mexico, the nationalist discourse – the “creole nationalism” that, according
to Méndez G. (1996), has represented the ideological basis of the oligarchical system,
dominant through the 1970s – has progressively appropriated the ruins of pre-Columbian
cultures (in particular those from the Andes, and most specifically Inca) and, drawing on
the work of archaeologists, turned them into preeminent symbols of national identity.
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They now represent a “national heritage” to be “proud” of.62 None of them surpasses
today the prestige and recognition of Machu Picchu. In this section I contend that the
claim for the return of the Machu Picchu collection reveals the dual nature of Peruvian
nationalism, split between the political capital Lima, home of the criollos who forged the
nationalist discourse, and Cusco, the capital of the Inca empire and, to many, the cradle
of Peruvianness. I then turn to the current reevaluation of other pre-Columbian cultures,
among which Paracas.
The existence of Machu Picchu was only revealed to the world through the work
of Hiram Bingham in 1911, but it has since come to symbolize Peru as a whole, at the
national and international levels, in great part through its promotion as a major tourist
destination (I will address the role played by tourism in the formulation of return claims
in chapter 5). The language used in official documents and newspaper articles in Peru
about Machu Picchu is often lyrical – an adequate tone to laud the virtues of a nation and
its prestigious past. For example:
[Machu Picchu is] the greatest and invaluable monument we inherited
from our ancestors the Incas (…). Machu Picchu arises as the most
sublime inspiration of men of privileged nature and gifted mentalities (…),
is and will be the fundamental cell of Peruvianness. [Its] wonders speak of
the greatness and apotheosis of the Inca race and are the admiration of the
entire world since their happy discovery; they represent an invaluable
heritage left to our youth and for the future, as a symbol of the morality
and high conception of fulfilled duty and as a milestone and
archaeological flag of America, cradle of great civilizations.63
More recently, a who’s who of Lima’s political, intellectual, and artistic world published
a pronunciamiento in the Peruvian press to claim the return of the Machu Picchu
collection from Yale, asking that Machu Picchu “be recognized as a symbol of
62

“La exposición de de piezas recuperadas de Machi Picchu cautivó al público,” El Comercio (Lima), April
5, 2011.
63
José D. Bustos, “Machupicchu: Hito y Bandera de la Patria,” El Sol (Cusco), Mar. 5, 1961.
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Peruvianness, as it not only expresses the universality of all great human work but also
the deep Andean and Amazonian roots of our country.”64 This publication, destined for a
Peruvian readership, leaves no room for any particular (Indigenous) group to claim
Machu Picchu: the citadel is Peruvian because it is Indigenous. A similar discourse
sustains the claim as it is formulated to Yale: “these materials belong to the people of
Peru and are central to the history and heritage of the Peruvian nation.”65
But if Machu Picchu has become a symbol of Peruvianness, then why is the return
of a collection of objects extracted from the citadel also necessary? Why is the place
itself not sufficient? As I suggested above, more than the possession of a collection of
objects, the claim for the return of the collection reflected the necessity, for Peru, its
politicians, and its experts to be in control of the data that allow the country to write its
own history. Bingham, indeed, conducted excavations in Machu Picchu according to the
scientific standards of his time, which means that the archaeological context of the
objects he unearthed was recorded. This explains Mariana Mould de Pease’s insistence in
claiming not only the return of the objects but also of all notes and photographs taken by
Bingham during his fieldwork (or, at least, that Peru be provided with a complete set of
copies of these). Being in control of the objects, thus, allows being in control of the
narrative.66 This also explains the importance, for Mould de Pease (2000) and others, of
debunking Bingham’s role as the adventurous explorer of the Andean-Amazonian jungle,
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“Pronunciamiento: salvar Macchu Picchu, patrimonio peruano universal,” insert published by the Cusco
office of the National Institute of Culture, Apr. 28, 2004; ADGDPC. Among the signatories of this
document are former president Alan García, former interim president Valentin Paniagua, the president of
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and rector of the Catholic University Salomon Lerner,
anthropologist and former minister of culture Juan Ossio, anthropologist Carlos Ivan Degregori, painter
Fernando de Szyszlo, Mariana Mould de Pease, etc.
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Letter from Eduardo Ferrero to Richard Levin, op. cit., chapter 2, note 22.
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I will return to this question in chapter 6 to demonstrate how the tripartite agreement Peru – Yale –
UNSAAC may not be, in this regard, entirely satisfying.
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and reinstalling local scholars (Alberto Giesecke)67 and inhabitants (Agustín Lizárraga)68
as co-participants in the process of “discovering” Machu Picchu. In this logic, Peruvians
do not owe their icon exclusively to the deeds of a heroic Yankee: rather, Bingham
becomes he who “discovered Machu Picchu for the world,”69 while Peruvians can claim
that the knowledge of the citadel had never really been lost, since the ruins were located
on maps published in Peru in 1874 (Mould de Pease 2004).
In the case of Peru, Nora’s differentiation between memory and history (1989)
also provides an explanation for the apparent paradox between the astounding public
success of the exhibition hastily organized in the national palace in Lima upon the return
of the Machu Picchu collection in November 2011 (more than 300,000 visitors in three
weeks70) and the general apathy among the Peruvian population for topics of heritage
conservation, bemoaned by the experts I interviewed: understood as a lieu de mémoire,
the Machu Picchu collection speaks to a glorious past that has long been heralded as
essential in the constitution of the nation (and for the worldwide iconic status that Machu
Picchu has acquired through the boom of the tourism industry). From the realm of
memory, the identification process among large constituencies with pre-Columbian
cultures can easily be activated and form the basis of a nationalist claim for the return of
the collection. Thus, the rector of the UNSAAC, which owns the house where the Machu
Picchu collection is now sheltered, can emphatically declare, upon the arrival of the
second batch of artifacts from Yale, that this was a “historical, unique, and unforgettable
67

See note 28.
Lizárraga, a Peruvian farmer, visited Machu Picchu as early as 1904, as attested by an inscription he left
on one of the monuments of the citadel.
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The Peruvian government officially designates Bingham’s 1911 expedition as the “discovery of Machu
Picchu for the world” [Descubrimiento de Machu Picchu para el mundo]. See for example “Cerca de 100
mil personas visitaron exposición de piezas de Machu Picchu en primera semana,” El Comercio (Lima),
Apr. 12, 2011.
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day” for Peru.71 On the other hand, objects such as the Paracas textiles remain an object
of historical and museum study, but not of collective memory; consequently, the
exhibition organized for the return of the first batch of textiles from Gothenburg gathered
barely more than 3,000 visitors.72
If the Mexican and Peruvian nationalisms coincide in their will to recover control
of the instruments that support their narrative, they feature vastly different logics
regarding the centrality of the capital and the geographical localization of the national
principle. As mentioned above, Mexico City – the capital of the viceroyalty of New
Spain, then of the Mexican republic – was built on the ruins of Tenochtitlán, capital of
the Aztec empire, signaling the centralizing effect of the Mexican national discourse
around its capital. In contrast, the Peruvian nationalism features a dualism that opposes,
on the one hand, a political capital in Spanish-founded, criolla, Lima, on the coast, 73 and,
on the other hand, Indigenous Cusco, in the Andes, the capital of the late Inca empire, the
intellectual center of Peruvian indigenismo, and contemporary Peru’s main tourist hub as
the necessary point of access towards Machu Picchu.
It is in this dualism that we can understand journalist Renato Cisneros’ opinion
that “for [Alan] García’s government, the recuperation of the [Machu Picchu] artifacts
may represent, more than a triumph for the Peruvian state as it tries to register its
heritage, a reconciliation with Cusco, a city that usually looks at [the Peruvian

71

“Segundo lote de piezas de Machu Picchu fue trasladado a Casa Concha”. El Comercio (Lima),
December 15, 2011.
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“Última semana (…), op. cit., chapter 2, note 52.
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Yet, this broad characterization must be nuanced, as internal migrations in Peru over the past four
decades have changed the sociological composition of coastal cities. People from the Andes, attracted by
greater economic opportunities but also, during the 1980s and 1990s, pushed away by the internal armed
conflict that affected mostly rural areas, formed new suburbs in the outskirts of traditionally criolla cities
such as Lima (a sprawling city of more than eight million inhabitants) or Trujillo.
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government] with constant disbelief.”74 Just as symbolic of Cusco’s defiance towards
Lima’s central power, an official ceremony organized for the arrival to Cusco in July
2011 of the first objects from the Machu Picchu collection saw an “Inca” invite the (local
and national) official authorities to publicly show the recovered treasures to the local
population, and to the rest of the world, in the main square.75 The return of the Machu
Picchu collection takes several meanings in the context of the rivalry between Lima and
Cusco: on the one hand, the central government in Lima, which led the negotiations,
reaffirmed its power (Cusco regional authorities alone would most likely not have
obtained the return of the collection). It was, indeed, the sole prerogative of the central
government to lead diplomatic negotiations and to commit the necessary funds and
human resources to the task. The claim was both a way to reassure Cusco on the
importance of Andean (Inca) heritage, considered a cause worth fighting for, and a
declaration that Cusco was not the only bearer of this marker of Peruvianness. On the
other hand, the central government ultimately conceded to Cusco the privilege of being
the final destination of the collection when it was returned. Museums of the capital could
have been chosen as the new home for the collection, for scientific and conservation
reasons; such a choice would also have signaled the centralizing effort of the Peruvian
state to remain in control over objects with a powerful potential for the national narrative.
Rather, the Peruvian government agreed to send the collection to Cusco, the heart of the
empire, to be hosted in a colonial house built on an ancient Inca palace. In this sense,
Cuzqueñismo (or the feeling of belonging in/to Cusco) is Peruvianness: it is a regionalism
that has a vocation to be national, so sending the collection back to Cusco did not
74

“Yale muestra las piezas, pero no asegura que vaya a devolverlas todas,” El Comercio (Lima), Jun. 1,
2008.
75
“Luego de cien años… el reencuentro con nuestro pasado,” La República, Jul. 3, 2011.
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represent a threat to the nation – quite to the contrary, it catered to its dual nature. Hence,
the resolution process of the Machu Picchu case, full of symbols, reveals how the Inca
past has been fully appropriated by the Peruvian national discourse, but also how this
nationalism is built on at least two geographical poles: Lima and Cusco.
By contrast, the Paracas culture was symbolically absorbed in the narrative of the
national past controlled by Lima, as the textiles returned from Sweden found a new home
at the MNAAH, in the capital. Paracas textiles were not returned to the Paracas region.
While conservation considerations played an important role in the decision of where both
collections were deposited (see chapter 4), these choices reveal the preeminence of the
Inca past in Peruvian nationalism, justifying that the remains of the most iconic Inca ruins
find their final destination in the heart of Inca highlands, close to where they were found
a century ago, while the remains of many pre-Inca cultures (including Paracas) are
conflated in one great narrative at the national museum. The focus on Machu Picchu and
the Incas has obfuscated, among general audiences (in Peru and abroad), the work of
prominent archaeologists on other cultures, such as Julio C. Tello’s work on Paracas
culture. Over the past decades though, the interest has grown in Peru for the remains of
other pre-Colombian cultures, fueled by spectacular discoveries (such as the tomb of the
Señor de Sipán on the northern coast in 1987 and several archaeological sites near the
city of Trujillo) and the Ministry of Tourism’s efforts to promote alternative destinations
to the overcrowded Machu Picchu (the nearby ruins of Choquequirao and those of
Kueláp in the northern Andes, for example), which have contributed to the rebirth of
regional identities, as evidenced in the literature (Silverman 2002) but also in my
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interviews. Yet, as signaled above, no other culture (or at least its representation through
its ruins) can rival with the Incas and Machu Picchu for the interest of the press.76
The multipolarity of Colombian nationalism
The two cases of return claims to Colombia reveal how Colombian nationalism has not
centralized the idea of the Colombian nation around one or two poles, as Mexican and
Peruvian nationalisms did. The centralization of the Colombian state and of the
accompanying discourse about the Colombian nation has been impinged upon by the
never-settled battle between liberals and conservatives, which among many other topics
concerned the administrative organization of the state and the autonomy of the regions
against the capital, Bogota. The Colombian state has also failed to affirm its exclusivity
on the appropriation of the pre-Columbian past, as occurred in Mexico and Peru, leaving
the initiatives to push for the return of the Quimbaya collection and the San Agustin
statues to individual and regional actors.
I argued above that Mexican and Peruvian nationalisms have largely appropriated
the archaeological ruins of pre-Columbian cultures, i.e., their immovable remains; the
return claims they present today concern movable cultural objects associated with these.
The Quimbaya collection lacks the monumentality of its Mexican and Peruvian famous
counterparts (or for that matter, that of the San Agustín statues): the collection itself is
movable, and its “place of origin” (the tomb it was unearthed from) is not an architectural
wonder of the likes of Mesoamerican pyramids and Andean citadels.77 Yet, as explained
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See note 11 in this chapter.
For that matter, the tomb cannot even be visited since its exact location is today uncertain. An important
difference between the two Colombian cases is that San Agustín, as an archaeological park, is indeed a
“place” that is easily identifiable (and the object of tourism exploitation).
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above, the collection makes up for this disadvantage with its material, gold, which played
important roles in pre-Columbian societies.
At the audience organized by the Constitutional Court in 2016, the ombudsman’s
office stated, following Gamboa Hinestrosa (1992), that in 1893, when President Holguín
gifted the collection to the regent queen of Spain, the recuperation of the Indigenous past
had already begun in Colombia.78 Muñoz Burbano (2012) argues, on the contrary, that the
Madrid 1892 exhibition was actually one of the key moments that led Colombians to
reevaluate the pre-Columbian past. Both views can be reconciled. Prior to the 1890s, the
interest for this past was the prerogative of individual intellectuals and collectors. The
Madrid exhibition signaled the nascent interest of the state for this past, now considered
of sufficient value to represent Colombia abroad, but also important enough for the
country that discussions took place about whether the collection should remain in
Colombia and be deposited at the national museum, rather than being gifted to a foreign
sovereign (Gamboa Hinestrosa 2002). During the audience at the Constitutional Court in
2016, a consensus emerged that the Quimbaya collection represented an “exceptional
legacy” for all Colombians, as was also conveyed on national television.79 Only the office
of the presidency and the MREC hid behind the argument that the collection had been
gifted by President Holguín, so that Colombia had no claim to it anymore. By refusing to
make a national cause of the collection, these branches of the executive allowed the
Quimbaya collection to be appropriated locally to articulate a discourse of regional
identity, inscribed, however, within the broader framework of the national discourse. This
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is in no way a claim supporting a demand for local political independence. As the
Colombian state failed to seize this past, the governor of Quindío, Carlos Eduardo
Osorio, following the decision of the Constitutional Court, could declare that the
collection is “the heritage of the Quindío and of all Colombians; it is part of our culture,
was made by our ancestors, and belongs to our department.”80
The Quimbaya collection was unearthed near the town of Filandia, by the
southern border of the region of Antioquia (one of Colombia’s wealthiest regions and
strongest political rivals against Bogota’s political leadership) with the region of Cauca.
Following the arrival of colonizers from Antioquia, including many gold diggers, the area
became a separate department named Caldas in 1905, with the city of Manizales as its
capital. Caldas in turn was split into three departments in 1966, and Filandia came to be
part of the new department of Quindío. A few decades later, the Quimbaya collection is
used to articulate a discourse of local identity associated with this new administrative
structure: Quindianidad [Quindianness]. In this task, a few local intellectuals and
political leaders have invested the Indigenous past to create a sense of belonging with an
area that was scarcely populated until the late nineteenth century and that barely boasts a
half-century of administrative existence.
The case of the Quimbaya collection offers a contemporary insight into the
process of identity-making: in 1993, the director of the Museo del Oro Quimbaya
[Museum of Quimbaya Gold] in Armenia, the capital of Quindío, declared that “we
Quindianos [inhabitants of the Quindío] have valued what is ours for a long time and
transmitted to our children our love for our history. The community feels that the
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aboriginal past is its own.”81 To prove as such, members of the Academia de Historia del
Quindío (AHQ) – the organization that has promoted, from Armenia, the return of the
collection to Colombia – have argued the importance that this return would have not only
for Colombia but for their region’s identity. Felipe Robledo Martínez, a lawyer affiliated
with the AHQ, considers that the decision of the Constitutional Court in February 2017
represented a “foundational milestone of our Quindianidad” and signaled a “new relation
of the state with the communities.” Robledo also argues that the absence of the collection
represents a negation of the cultural rights of his community [Quindío].82 Thus, the claim
would favor the re-creation of a historical continuity with the “great-grand-parents” who
migrated to the area and, beyond them, the societies (such as the Quimbaya) who
inhabited the territory of the department in centuries past. Significantly, this attempt to
foster the local identity of a relatively new regional identity is based on the appropriation
of a pre-Columbian past and does not connect with self-identifying Indigenous
communities, even though, as signaled by anthropologist Roberto Restrepo,83 Indigenous
communities of the Embera culture who reside in the Quindío now claim to be
descendants of the Quimbayas.84
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Hence, Colombian nationalism accommodates the articulation of local/regional
identities that draw on a reservoir of shared memories (gold, Indigenous) not dissimilar to
the national mold. In Colombia, the “national Indigenous” are the Muiscas, who
inhabited the highland region of Cundinamarca, around Bogota, because they, contrary to
other cultures such as the Quimbayas, built cities whose remains have survived. But the
Quimbaya and San Agustín cultures are two of many other pre-Columbian cultures that
are geographically remote from the capital, whose remains have only become known
since the late nineteenth century, and whose memory-history has only been recently
linked to that of the Colombian nation-state. Hence, in the context of the adoption of
multiculturalism as an official set of policies towards Indigenous communities, these
cultures remain available for the purpose of the definition of a local identity, in a very
recent administrative entity, by local political entrepreneurs.
The comparatively less centralizing force of Colombian nationalism is also
revealed by the interrogations about where to deposit the Quimbaya collection, if it were
to return from Spain. The idea that it should go to a museum in Armenia, the capital of
the Quindío (either in the existing Museo del Oro Quimbaya, the archaeological museum,
or a new facility to be built specifically for the collection) is largely shared in Bogota and
in the Quindío; many prefer this solution to the collection entering the Museo del Oro or
the National Museum in Bogota. To be sure, a similar logic exists in the case of San
Agustín: statues recuperated through processes of restitution since the 1990s have been
sent back to the archaeological park of San Agustín, and the individuals now pushing the
state to claim the statues from Berlin certainly expect that these will come back to San
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Agustín, too.85 While San Agustín does have the monumental quality required to become
a national emblem, its geographical isolation and decentering (close to the southern
border of the country) makes it a rather impractical symbol for national appropriation
(contrary to Tenochtitlan and Teotihuacan in Mexico); it is not associated, either, with an
imperial power (such as that of the Incas in Peru).
I do not contend here that there is no hegemonic discourse of national
appropriation of the past in Colombia at all; rather, this discourse reveals a different
articulation of the state vis-à-vis its sub-national entities. Both Colombian claims, coming
from individuals and local organizations who seek the support of the judiciary to force
the executive branch to present an official return claim, actually reveal that Colombians
expect the state to act as a defender of the national heritage. It is bad enough that
Colombia’s own government has given away the Quimbaya collection to a foreign
government in 1892 (worst of all, to the former colonial metropolis!) or let foreign
scientists take away the statues from San Agustín. Regardless of the regional identities
that can be fostered through these objects, the state is considered the legitimate entity that
must carry out this task on their behalf.
This examination of the construction of Mexican, Peruvian, and Colombian
nationalisms through the appropriation of pre-Columbian archaeological remains raises
an additional question: what role do the claims for return perform in perpetuating the
nationalist discourse at the beginning of the twenty-first century? In other words, why did
these states wait until the last decade of the twentieth century to ask for the return of
objects that left their national territory decades or centuries ago? I proceed now to a
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review of the political, social, and economic conditions that have challenged the concept
of homogenized nations that states have promoted and that pushed them to conceive new
devices to reframe the national discourse.
Why have return claims appeared since the late twentieth century?
During my field research, I often heard arguments about the historical contingency of the
return claims: Mexico claimed the penacho because Xokonoschtletl demonstrated in
Vienna in the mid-1980s; Peru claimed the Machu Picchu collection because Yale
reminded the country of its existence when it organized the touring “Unveiling the
mystery of the Incas” exhibition in the early 2000s, and the Paracas textiles because the
Gothenburg museum presented “Stolen world” in 2008; etc. I propose to read these
events as triggers that found a resonance in the ideological context of hegemonic
discourses of the nation based on the appropriation of an ancient heritage. Smith (2006)
posits that “heritage is about the promotion of a consensus version of history by statesanctioned cultural institutions and elites to regulate cultural and social tension in the
present” (4). What is it, then, that the claims for the return of cultural heritage objects say
about contemporary nations in Latin America and the state-nation relationship? I have
shown above how the nation, understood as a discourse rooted in a deep, mostly
reinvented past, represents a never-ending process that must permanently be reinforced.
The nation is never achieved; it is always in the making. Catering to this process, certain
periods of time involve a sense of crisis, triggering the need to reaffirm the jeopardized
nation.
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Living through a crisis
The feeling of living through a moment of crisis is evidenced in numerous documents
that refer to the claims for cultural heritage objects. In Mexico, in the last fifteen years of
the twentieth century, several individuals preoccupied with the fate of the penacho seem
to consider that their country is going through a profound crisis, and that the return of the
penacho, mediated by the state, is a solution to it. I have already mentioned above how
Xokonoschtletl and Blanca Moctezuma see the penacho as an instrument of healing for
the mestizo nation in crisis. Others share the feeling that things are not going well in
Mexico: “in the present moments of difficulty and social danger, (…) [Xokonoschtletl’s]
symbols and attitudes (…), duly channeled, can help improve the state of things, in
benefit of an identity, trust, and nationalist strengthening that is so needed,” writes a
citizen to the SRE. 86 Blanca Moctezuma herself mentions the “fateful and difficult
moments our nation is going through” as she writes to President Ernesto Zedillo; the
“presence in Mexico” of this “symbol” would “allow us to find our essence and the origin
of our existence.” 87 Yet another Mexican citizen confers a curative quality to the
penacho: asking for its return would be a way to “overcome the situation of the
country.”88
In Colombia, too, the Quimbaya case unfolds in a largely shared feeling that the
nation is going through a crisis. Gamboa Hinestrosa (1998) references historian Marc
Bloch, for whom societies experiencing a “growth crisis” often turn to their past. At the
audience of the Constitutional Court, the representative of the attorney general’s office
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stated that it is a “necessity for all people to search for their roots, particularly in the
critical moments of their historical development.”89 And, in a striking parallel with the
Mexican advocates for the return of the penacho, Robledo Martínez (2015) argues that
the return of the Quimbaya collection will improve the “social health” (i.e., to build
social relations based on trust) of his community, the department of Quindío.
Yet, if the experience of a “crisis” seems widely shared, exactly what this crisis
entails remains unspecified. In the following section I seek to identify the political, social,
and economic factors affecting Mexico, Colombia, and Peru in the late twentieth and
early twenty-first century that may trigger a shared consciousness of a double crisis of the
nation and the state. In turn, claiming the return of cultural heritage objects represents a
symbolic solution available for the state to reassure its citizens by retaking control of the
discourse over the nation.
A crisis? What crisis?
I envision the construction of “imagined communities” as a path dependent process that
binds the state to continue its labor of national homogenization and unification through
the re-appropriation of the past. I identify three intertwined factors that account for the
state’s need to retake control of this narrative in the late twentieth century.
Democratization. First, return claims happen in the general context of democratization in
Latin America over the past thirty years. While the quality of the newly democratic
regimes shall not be overestimated – in a contest of adjectives, Karl (1990) spoke of
“conservative” and “corporatist” democracies, while O'Donnell (1994) qualified Latin
American democracies as “delegative” – the democratizing trend in the region, when
compared with the situation in the mid-1980s, is undeniable (Hagopian and Mainwaring
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2005). Democratization has a direct impact on the discourse on the nation. The literature
on nationalism in Latin America has not only focused on official discourses and topdown conceptions of national construction; scholars have also analyzed how social
groups have been capable of absorbing and mediating the nationalist discourses
emanating from the elites, and of constructing their own vision of the nation (Miller
2006). For example, in the context of neoliberal reforms in the late twentieth century,
Yashar (1998) has shown how ethnic movements contest the myth of national unity that
Latin American states tried to create, and ask for recognition of the ethnic diversity and
plurinational composition of their countries. However, as noted by Hobsbawm,
Indigenous movements in particular (for example, the Zapatista movement in Mexico
since 1994) have seemed more intent on renegotiating their position within the nationstate (which may include greater levels of political autonomy) than seeking formal
independence from the central state. The case studies I am analyzing here highlight the
role, not of groups within the national community, but of individuals in the contemporary
discourse on the nation. Indeed, as I will analyze in greater details in chapter 5,
Indigenous communities, in particular, are not – or very loosely – associated with these
claims. Rather, individuals take it upon themselves to remind the state of its obligations
as the forger of the national identity based on the appropriation of the pre-Columbian
past. In this sense, return claims present the paradox of revealing greater political
openness in Latin American countries (allowing individuals to challenge the state), yet
the discourse these individuals push forward is not revolutionary. On the contrary, it
sustains the well-rehearsed proposition that it is the duty of the state to care for the
heritage of the nation.
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In Mexico, 2000 remains the symbolic date of the end of the PRI’s “perfect
dictatorship”90 with the election of Vicente Fox, candidate of the PAN, but the transition
had started in the 1980s as the dominant party progressively allowed its PAN and PRD
(Party of the Democratic Revolution, left) competitors to win local and regional elections.
2018 marked a new step in that direction with the election, after two terms of PAN
presidents and the come back of the PRI in 2012, of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a
long time staple of the Mexican left. In Peru, too, 2000 marked the return to democratic
rule after two decades of internal armed conflict and Alberto Fujimori’s autocratic rule in
the 1990s. Colombia has not had a military leader since the late 1950s, but the regular
alternation between liberal and conservative presidents has left little room for political
alternatives; the 2018 presidential election, however, saw a candidate from the left reach
the run-off for the first time. Overall, the past three decades have witnessed an
“expansion of the political arena” (O'Donnell 1988), 91 which allowed for a greater
participation in politics of a variety of actors whose voices were previously silenced, and
forced the state to be more responsive to civil society actors on a variety of topics. Thus,
from the mid-1980s onward, individuals such as Xokonoschtletl Gomorra92 and Blanca
Moctezuma93 were able to use the media to accuse the Mexican state of neglecting its
duties towards national heritage by not acting diligently to seek the return of the
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emperor’s headdress. The media, in turn, has been increasingly inquisitive and critical on
a variety of topics, including heritage conservation, while, until the 1980s, Mexican
newspapers had tended to be submissive to the official discourse, which was relayed
uncritically (Hughes 2006).94
Similarly, in Peru, by the end of Fujimori’s semi-authoritarian regime, Mariana
Mould de Pease, widow of a respected Peruvian historian, started publishing articles and
op-eds in national newspapers reminding the state that it had foregone the claim to what
“rightfully” belonged to all Peruvians.95 These public accusations found an echo in
national publications precisely because the state had, during the previous decades,
affirmed its own role as the main purveyor of national identity through its management of
the archaeological heritage.
In Colombia, as the executive branch showed little to no interest in Jaime
Lopera’s campaign in favor of the return of the Quimbaya collection, the collection
became an object of contention among branches of power. Lawyers Felipe Rincón and
José Antonio Rengifo (a professor at the National University) introduced a demanda de
acción popular [class action] that led to the October 2017 ruling of the Constitutional
Court, which requested the executive branch to act diligently in favor of the return – a
thorn in the side of the highest spheres of the executive. In Colombia, the courts have
become an ally for individuals facing indifference from the executive branch, too focused
in the early twenty-first century on the security situation of the country to indulge in any
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exercise of historical revisionism. As in Mexico, the Colombian media have
progressively shown greater interest in the topic.96 In the context of the political violence
that has characterized Colombia in the past decade, including the assassination of union
organizers, Indigenous and peasant leaders, environmentalists, and human rights activists
throughout the country, Lopera, Rincón, and Rengifo’s battle to push the state to claim
the Quimbaya collection should not be overlooked. It is a sign that the Colombian state
has had to learn to cope with political inconveniences, if not frank opposition. The case
of the San Agustín statues is even more revelatory in this regard: David Dellenback97 says
he launched a derecho de petición [right of petition] procedure because, in the southern
small town of San Agustín, nobody else dared speak against local and national
authorities. Using legal means to force the state to take into account the claims of the
town’s people seemed a safer route than other forms of political organizing. Even though
he has lived in Colombia for several decades, Dellenback’s status as a (male, white,
North American) foreigner may also have represented an additional, invisible but
effective, protection from pressures or intimidations.
At a micro-level, these cases reveal how return claims participate in the process of
democratization through the opening of the debate beyond the small circles of experts
and political elites, introducing a process of co-construction of the memory of the nation
with individuals from civil society. I will show, however, in chapter 5, that this process
remains limited.
Internal armed conflicts and sociological transformations. The second factor is the impact
of internal armed conflicts at the end of the twentieth century, in the context of an
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increasing rejection of indigenist ideologies and the adoption of multiculturalism as the
new intellectual framework to deal with ethnic diversity (or, at least, pay lip service to it).
Closely related to democratization, this second factor implies profound sociological
changes linked to internal migration and the political representation of minorities in the
three countries.
In Peru, the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission evidenced
that Indigenous people were among the principal victims of the armed conflict between
the state and armed groups such as Shining Path and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement in the 1980s and 1990s (CVR 2004). In parallel, a process of internal
migration from the Andes and, to a lesser extent, from the Amazon Basin – movements
induced, in part, by the armed conflict – have launched a sociological recomposition of
Peruvian coastal cities – this coast where the criollo national discourse was originally
built. The process of choloization, whereby Indigenous individuals adapted to urban life,
has marked the creation of an Indigenous-mestizo urban culture (a bottom-up identity
process, unlike the state-led appropriation of pre-Columbian heritage) that “re-culturized”
an entire segment of the population that the state, since General Velasco’s leftist military
dictatorship (1967-1973), had corporatized as “peasants” (Escobedo 2013). I suggest here
that the combination of this socio-cultural evolution with the accusations contained in the
CVR report against state authorities and the army may have encouraged the Peruvian
state to regain control on the (top-down) production of the national narrative.
In Mexico also, previously silenced voices of Indigenous communities came
forward to push for greater social inclusion. The most spectacular expression of this
phenomenon was the Zapatista insurrection (EZLN) launched in January 1994, which the
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Mexican state decided to face (mostly) through negotiation rather than overt military
repression. Overall, Indigenous communities (but also, the diverse forms of racism and
discrimination they suffered) became more visible in Mexican society (Gotkowitz 2011).
Finally, in Colombia, the adoption of a new constitution in 1991 with a strong
multicultural flavor (Van Cott 2000) took place as internal armed conflicts between the
state and non-state armed actors, including far-right paramilitary groups and leftist
insurgent armies such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC),
linked to narco-traffic, provoked massive displacements of population
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disproportionally affected ethnic minorities (among them, Afro-descendants and
Indigenous communities). So, even as Indigenous communities obtained a guaranteed
representation in parliament (with two seats in the national assembly), their social,
economic, and political conditions remain precarious.
In all three countries, internal armed conflicts and their related causes and
consequences (political representation of minorities, or lack thereof; internal migration)
contribute to the feeling of “crisis” described above, which signals the need to re-coalesce
the nation.
Neoliberalism. Third, the process of neoliberal economic globalization has impacted
Latin America from the 1980s onward. As mentioned above, liberalism has been one of
the main ideological forces at the heart of the elite project for economic development
throughout the region since independence, so neoliberalism did not apply to unchartered
territories. However, neoliberalism followed decades of state-led economic development,
inspired in part by modernization and dependency theories and implemented, most
98
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famously, under the modality of import-substitution industrialization (ISI) policies. From
the 1980s onward, (semi-)authoritarian governments in both Mexico and Peru
implemented the provisions of the so-called “Washington consensus,” leading to a
disengagement of the state from economic production while, theoretically, strengthening
its bureaucratic capability in key attributes of state sovereignty, such as tax collection.99
Democratically elected governments after 2000 – even those that campaigned on leftist
platforms, such as Ollanta Humala in Peru in 2012 – have not modified the neoliberal
orientation of their state’s economic policies. As a consequence, the state has
progressively reduced its capacity to mediate socio-economic relations and limited its
ambition to provide minimal levels of social welfare to means-based tested social
programs, such as Mexico’s “Oportunidades.” Former corporatist capabilities of the state
were undermined, opening up possibilities for the reconfiguration of identities and
demands to the state along ethno-cultural lines (Hale 1997, Yashar 1998). Scholars have
debated the relationship between the implementation of neoliberal reforms and the
adoption of multicultural policies (Van Cott 2006): did neoliberalism enable the creation
of Indigenous-left coalitions to secure new cultural rights together with the defense of
socio-economic rights, or was multiculturalism a way for neoliberal elites to distract their
opponents from demanding more radical socio-economic changes? Rappaport (2003)
contends that “Colombian elites adopted multiculturalism along with administrative
decentralization as a neoliberal strategy for shoring up a deteriorating state” (321). Van
Cott responds, to the contrary, that there is little evidence that the implementation of
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multicultural policies replaces redistribution. In the absence of contestation (as in the
height of dependency theory discourses) of the international economic order, to which
Mexico, Peru, and Colombia have powerfully signaled their adherence,100 return claims
signal an attempt to retain at least a small part of the national sovereignty – on the
discourse of the nation through the possession of cultural heritage objects.
Mexico offers a case in point. It is tempting to interpret as more than mere
coincidence the unfolding of two simultaneous events in August 1982: Mexican
journalist José Luis Castañeda, who had stolen the Aubin Tonalamatl Codex from the
French National Library in Paris in June (he would later claim to have acted out of
nationalism) was arrested in Cancun the same week 101 as Mexico defaulted on its
sovereign debt.102 From a criminal case involving stolen property, the affair became a
matter of national sovereignty for a state whose financial situation was precarious. The
Teotihuacan murals case was also unfolding in those years and, as described in chapter 2,
Mexican state authorities (in particular its heritage management branch, the INAH) were
more aggressive in their negotiations with the De Young Museum in the 1980s than they
were with the Viennese museum in the following decade. As Mexico was negotiating its
inclusion into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the USA and
Canada, Mexican anthropologist Guillermo Bonfil feared that NAFTA would represent,
more than an actualization of the old project of national sovereignty and modernization
carried by the Mexican state since the Revolution of the 1910s, an abandonment of these
100
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principles.103 According to anthropologist Nestor García Canclini,104 Bonfil’s argument
revealed his distress at contemplating the agony of Mexican revolutionary nationalism,
progressively replaced by a North-American (rather than global) neoliberalism.
Throughout the 1990s, though, “the [Mexican] administration made much in
public of its exclusion from the NAFTA talks of all questions of national patrimony”
(O'Toole 2003, 284): if economic nationalism (embodied in ISI policies) had been
overwhelmed by the neoliberal credo, at least the state had to try and retain its
prerogative on heritage conservation and valorization, so central to its nationalist
discourse. In 2005, Jorge Triana, a Mexican Congressman for the PAN, made a similar
argument linking free trade to a threat to Mexican cultural identity: proposing a
legislative resolution requesting the executive branch to claim the return of the penacho
to the Austrian government, Triana argued that “for Mexico, the topic of national identity
is very complex, especially since the country entered the [NAFTA] free trade agreement
with the USA and Canada, and the constant changes and special situations caused by
globalization.”105 Milenio can conclude that, “for millions of Mexicans, the location of
Moctezuma’s headdress is an issue at least as important as the privatization of oil
exploitation or the future of mass media.”106
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In Peru, just as symbolically, President Alejandro Toledo’s administration “raised
its voice” in its legal procedure against Yale University just a few days before the
signature of a free-trade agreement with the US in April 2006 – but, according to La
República, everyone had “forgotten about the incident” a week after the signature of the
text.107 Overall, the contrast is telling between the fate of primary resources such as oil,
gold, and other minerals, whose exploitation is increasingly open to foreign investment
after decades of national control (for the very purpose of being exported, in line with the
economic history of the region) and that of archaeological and historical artifacts that
were also, in many instances, extracted from the soil, but whose export is now tightly
controlled and in most instances forbidden. The neo-colonial patterns of international
trade based on the export of raw materials of the late nineteenth century have been
replaced by the investments of transnational corporations, but Latin American economies
are still very much dependent on a few primary products. Meanwhile, return claims
sustain an anti-colonial discourse that fulfills two tasks simultaneously: they symbolically
restore the sovereignty of the dispossessed country for their internal audience, as
described above, and they promote a positive image of countries now capable of caring
for their own heritage – a heritage so important for their tourist appeal.108
The deterioration of macroeconomic conditions in the region before and during
the implementation of the neoliberal reform packages has also had a sociological impact:
migration towards countries of the Global North have modified old social equilibria, now
that millions of Latin American immigrants form diasporas that provide much needed
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Roberto Ochoa, “El juicio del siglo,” La República, May 30, 2006.
As I discuss in chapter 4, the inclusion of Mexico, Peru, and Colombia in the global economy and
improved security in rural areas has also meant spectacular increases of tourist arrivals to these countries
over the past decades.
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economic relief to their country of origin, at the same time that they contribute to
additional social transformations in their new country of residence. Latin American
(particularly, Mexican) communities have grown exponentially in the United States since
the 1980s; several hundred thousand Colombians and Peruvians live abroad, in the US,
too, but also in Spain. The existence of these diasporas has in turn introduced a new
factor to be taken into account in the permanent construction of the discourse of the
nation: how to cohere the sense of an imagined community among a population
geographically dispersed? Material heritage may have a role to play: Guillermo Bonfil
had touched on the question of the Mexican diaspora and its relations with the
“homeland”; he had hoped that Mexican-Americans could become allies of Mexican
causes thanks to the greater flow of ideas allowed by NAFTA.109 So far, however,
diasporas have served as counter-arguments to the return claims: Richard Burger and
Lucy Salazar reached out to local Peruvian community organizations to involve them in
the presentation of their touring Machu Picchu exhibition through several US cities,
arguably contributing to the fostering of a sense of heritage among immigrants and
second-generation Peruvians living abroad.110 Similarly, Monika Therrien111 proposed,
rather than to seek the return of the Quimbaya collection, to organize in the Museum of
America in Madrid a series of cultural activities aimed specifically at the Colombian
diaspora in Spain.
Crisis of the state, crisis of the nation?
The three factors analyzed above (democratization, internal armed conflicts,
neoliberalism) point to a double crisis affecting the legitimacy of Latin American states at
109

Guillermo Bonfil, op. cit., note 103.
Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar, interview, Nov. 4, 2017.
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Monika Therrien, interview, Jun. 28, 2018.
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the end of the twentieth-century: first, a “crisis of social domination,” i.e., a crisis with
“deep repercussions within the state institutions [that] can be fully understood only from
the perspective that recognizes the state first and foremost as an indispensable support of
domination within society” (O'Donnell 1988, 26). Contested from the outside (through
the inclusion of the countries in the financial networks of the global economy) and the
inside (by non-state armed actors such as the EZLN in Mexico, Shining Path in Peru, the
FARC in Colombia, but also by greater political participation permitted by the process of
democratization), the top-down, homogenizing discourse about the nation needs
reinvigoration.
But another type of crisis, also mentioned by O'Donnell (1988), is looming
simultaneously: “A crisis of hegemony is also a crisis of the state, but not solely or
primarily as a set of institutions. Rather, it is a crisis of the state in its original and
fundamental aspect: a crisis of the state in society” (30). In the late twentieth-century,
what remains the main function of the state in Latin America? The response need not be
understood only as that of a state considered as an arena for political competition, but
also as the Weberian set of institutions that (successfully) claims monopoly of the
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Thus, the state must both
legitimize its own position vis-à-vis the society it claims to administer, but also toward
the groups that are in a dominant position within it (its place within society). The
discourse over the nation comes in handy to accomplish this task. For Martín-Barbero
(2000), the crisis of the nation-state calls in national identity for the preservation of the
state itself: the nations were not created by assuming differences but by subjugating them
to the state, which centralized rather than integrated. Following Centeno and Ferrero’s
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(2013a) typology of state capacity and strength, I argue that states seek to compensate a
relative loss in their economic capacity by strengthening their “symbolic power” (in
Bourdieusan terms) or “legitimacy” (a more Weberian concept).
Through heritage management, the state, as an autonomous, dominant
organizational force, legitimizes its own existence and reasserts its capacity to produce a
coherent, sustained, permanent, essentialist discourse about the nature of the society it
controls: the state embodies the criollo-mestizo nation that has appropriated the
Indigenous past, a nation that in turn found its own realization through the birth of the
independent state. As an arena where groups compete to access the levers of power, the
late-twentieth-century state favors a social and racial status-quo: even though the
oligarchies of the previous decades have slowly given way to more plural societies,
economic and social inequalities have not disappeared (quite the contrary, they have
worsened in the wake of the 1980s and 90s neoliberal policies).
Return claims, or the performance of nationalism
Claiming the return of artifacts is a way to mark the permanence of the nation as a
stabilizing factor for the country, in the face of the social, economic, and political
transformations described above. Massive internal migrations and the exodus of a part of
the population abroad may have modified the internal composition of the population, but
the nation (who we are) remains (must remain) the same. Thus, President Alan García
can declare that “the arrival of the archaeological remains of the Inca fortress [Machu
Picchu] strengthens the national pride and the self-esteem of all Peruvians,”112 evidencing
that return claims are merely performative: governments – with the mostly uncritical

112

“García sobre piezas de Machu Picchu: ‘Su regreso representa nuestra dignidad’,” El Comercio (Lima),
Mar. 30, 2011.

139

support of mainstream media, when it comes to claiming the return of estranged cultural
objects – “perform” a sense of collective identity by ascribing such meaning to these
objects. Hence it becomes irrelevant that the Machu Picchu collection lacks outstanding
“museumable” objects worthy to be displayed and that the headdress may not be
Montezuma’s (or may not be a crown): each object matters only as it performs as a
symbol of unity and identity (van Bussel 2012). Declarations such as García’s and their
reproduction in newspapers demonstrate that there is a commonly accepted (and seldom
questioned) belief in historical continuity and in the grounding of national identity in a
distant past. It is not necessary that these identity claims be grounded in deep personal
beliefs to be used by political entrepreneurs. Their enunciation reifies national identity in
the face of the challenges discussed above.
Hence, communication is constitutive of the formation of the national principle,
and the discourse becomes more important than the actual content of any policy or the
nature of any claimed object. This, however, is a discourse that now constrains the very
entity that has first forged it: the state. This explains that the Colombian state, even
though it grew uninterested in the concept of heritage it itself fostered,113 cannot, through
the voices of the presidency and the MREC, acknowledge it as such. To hide their
disinterest and inaction in the cases of the Quimbaya collection and the San Agustín
statues, these state entities retreat behind the secrecy of diplomatic talks.
Considering return claims as performative discourses also leads me to consider
whether a claimed object actually returns is relatively irrelevant. What matters is that it is
claimed. For Barkan, “often the longing itself for these unavailable objects or sites
constitutes an essential component of the group’s identity” (2002, 17). As long as it is
113
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absent, the object serves the discourse of unification because it coalesces the nation
around a discourse of historical injustice committed by the other (and national discourses
function by building an “us” vs. “the other”). Hence, in the logic of an instrumentalist use
of the return claims, the attitudes of the Mexican, Colombian, and Peruvian governments
reveal diverging strategies regarding nation-building. Peruvians chose the short-term
benefit of obtaining the return (I will return to the long-term consequences of the
resolution of the Peruvian cases in chapter 6). Mexicans, on the contrary, seem to bet on
the benefits of a strategy based on an elongation of time; the nation, coming from the
deep past and with a vocation to eternity, can wait a little longer. Quite the contrary, if the
topic can reappear periodically and remobilize the discourse about the identification of
the contemporary nation with the Aztec past, why rush the resolution of a case that
strengthens the discourse? Wouldn’t the return of the object somehow kill the potential
for mobilization? As a consequence, the communication challenge for Mexican
authorities has been to manage expectations while demonstrating the state authorities’
commitment to the cause. Very skilled in this exercise, the director of CONACULTA,
Rafael Tovar y Teresa, declared, shortly after his visit to Vienna in 1996 following
President Klestil’s public speech in favor of return, that the decision to formally request
the penacho resulted from the state “assuming a responsibility with the national and
cultural identity”; but, in the same interview, he warned the reader that it would be
“premature” to have great expectations about the penacho because it was a “process that
would take a long time.”114 This interview shows the state’s cautiousness on the topic but
also its will to demonstrate, to its own population, that it cares about the national heritage
114
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(hence, about the wellness of the nation) and will act in its defense. Colombian
authorities, finally – by far the most reluctant of all three states to engage in a battle with
foreign counterparts – made the choice to ignore the potential to mobilize the nation
around claims, either because the state never fully appropriated other pre-Columbian
cultures than the Muisca or because the official ideology of multiculturalism, inscribed in
the 1991 Constitution, prevents the state from attempting the appropriation of a preColumbian heritage it has only very recently started to care for.
A final aspect of the performativity of return claims is their constant association
with anniversaries of important events as milestones to be celebrated with a gesture from
the holding country. Mexican diplomats hoped in 1988, 115 1998, 116 and 2008 117 that
Austria would return the penacho in acknowledgement of the fiftieth, sixtieth, and
seventieth anniversaries, respectively, of Mexico’s protest against the Anschluss. Other
possible dates for a return included 1992, for the 500th anniversary of the “discovery” of
America, and 1996, to celebrate the millennium of Austria.118 One of the reasons that
Alan García hurried into a public campaign in fall 2010 was to obtain the return of the
Machu Picchu collection in time for the celebration of the hundredth anniversary of
Bingham’s expedition.119 The negotiations over the calendar for the return of the Paracas
textiles set a deadline in 2021, for the celebration of the bicentenary of the independence
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of Peru120 – but also 400 years of the city of Gothenburg.121 Why is it important to make
returns coincide with symbolic anniversaries? Nora (1992) states that the growing
phenomenon of commemorations affects all contemporary societies based on the free will
of human beings rather than divine will: the dates of their own history have replaced
those of Christianity. Similarly, Muñoz Burbano (2012) evokes the influence of Auguste
Comte, for whom it was important that the secular state substitute the recurrent
celebration of events strengthening the sense of a civic community for the religious
ceremonies – positivism was, indeed, a dominant ideology in Latin America throughout
the first decades after independence. If framed to coincide with the celebration of secular
anniversaries, the returns of cultural objects thus become symbolic gifts from the nation
to itself, as they chant the secular liturgy of national anniversaries.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have placed the claims for the return of cultural objects presented by
Mexico, Peru, and Colombia since the late twentieth century in the historical continuity
of constructed nationalist discourses, from the Latin American independences in the early
nineteenth century through the impact of ideologies such as indigenismo and
multiculturalism. I argued that return claims represent new instruments for the states to
re-legitimize their position as producers of national identity, in a time when their position
vis-à-vis their own society is challenged by social, economic, and political changes, and
that this discourse is actually strengthened, rather than undermined, by individuals who
demand from the state that it continues to enforce this discourse. In the context of the late
120
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twentieth-century sense of “crisis,” fearing for its role both as arena where most
economically important decisions were made and wanting to accompany the insertion of
the country into the global economy, the state refocused on what it had learned to do for
almost two centuries: that of an articulator of the nation – this “imagined community”
within the national territory it administers. While return claims may appear as subversive
of the established international order from the vantage point of museums and universities
in the Global North that hold on to their intellectual and economic privilege, these claims,
when examined in the context of Latin American nationalist discourses, embody a rather
conservative discourse that supports the perpetuation of nationalism (whether we call it
“Indianesque” or “Creole”) inherited from independence.
Yet, this intellectual history of the relationship between the state and the nation
mediated by material heritage does not provide a causal mechanism that necessarily
explains why Latin American states present these return claims. In the following chapter,
framing my argument in the intellectual environment I have discussed in this chapter, I
propose an explanation of return claims as the result of a path dependent process of
institutionalization of cultural policies in all three countries.
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Chapter 4 – The expansion of the cultural state: return claims at the confluence of
cultural policy, tourism development, and foreign policy
My analysis of return claims has so far focused on their use in the construction of
national discourses. In this chapter, I shed a different light on the reasons why Latin
American states request the return of cultural heritage objects and, specifically, why they
have been doing it since the late twentieth century. I envision these claims as a state
policy that accounts for the evolution of three main fields of public policy: culture,
tourism, and foreign relations. Taken in isolation, none of these fields is sufficient to
explain the attitude of Latin American states regarding return claims; studying them in
conjunction, however, reveals that the importance each state gives to return claims
depends on the delicate balance among potentially conflicting policy aims.
My approach follows the precepts of historical institutionalism. Taking “history
seriously” (Pierson and Skocpol 2002, 698), I consider that the construction of a
sustained national discourse and the strengthening of state institutions require time and do
not take place in an ideological or institutional vacuum. Hence, it is necessary to explore
how formal institutions and organizational structures, as well as the policies these
implement, interact to produce specific outcomes: the return claims. A historicalinstitutionalist analysis functions at a mid-range theoretical level between macroconcepts (such as nation and nationalism, which I explored in the previous chapter) and
the actions of political entrepreneurs (I develop my analysis of specific actors’ agency
and preferences in the following chapter). The historical-institutionalist literature
understands institutions as “both formal organizations and informal rules and procedures
that structure conduct” (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 2). I focus here on the formal
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organizations in charge of specific fields of state policy and the (sometimes uneasy,
occasionally informal) arrangements they use to coordinate among themselves.
First, I analyze the emergence of cultural policy in Latin America as the backbone
of return claims. I show the high degree of convergence in the institutionalization of
culture and the arts as a field of state policy in the three countries I study. I identify a
path-dependent process that locks in the management and defense of national heritage as
a key function of the modern state; I name this process the “expansion of the cultural
state.” I focus on three important steps that have led to the formulation of return claims:
the creation of national museums and of archaeological institutes, and the passing of laws
protecting heritage and prohibiting the export of cultural objects. For each step, I analyze
unresolved issues revealed by return claims, interrogate the capacity of claiming
countries to care for the objects they want the return of, and discuss the limitations of the
state’s commitment to defend what it has constructed as the nation’s heritage.
In the following section, I turn to the interaction of heritage management as a
field of state intervention with a core concern of Latin American states: economic
development. More precisely, I show how return claims occur at a time when the
institutionalization of the culture and arts sector coincides with the exponential increase
of tourism as a (potential or actual) factor of economic development, based on the
commodification of material heritage. This coincidence is most evident in Peru’s
campaigns to obtain the return of the Machu Picchu and Paracas collections since the
2000s. Finally, I detail how return claims sometimes contradict the objectives of a more
traditional field of state sovereignty: foreign relations. Focusing more in detail on the
case of the Mexican penacho, my analysis reveals the difficulty of coordinating actions
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and discourses among actors of the cultural state, and of balancing the goal of obtaining
the return of a cultural heritage object with other policy objectives, such as the conclusion
of free trade agreements.
I conclude this chapter arguing that the interaction among these three fields of
public policy helps explain why return claims have appeared earlier in Mexico than in
Peru and Colombia. It also contributes to explaining the differences in attitudes among
the three countries, in particular why Peru has pushed harder for the return of the Machu
Picchu collection and the Paracas textiles than the other two countries have.
The expansion of the cultural state: a case of path dependency
This section analyzes developments in Mexico’s, Peru’s, and Colombia’s cultural
policies. I explore how the strengthening of state capacity to promote the notion of a
national heritage epitomizes the growing importance of culture as a field of state
intervention, a phenomenon I term the “expansion of the cultural state.” I argue that
cultural policy has become a favorite field for state intervention in times of retrenchment
from other policy fields, such as economic development and the provision of social
services, and that return claims appear in a late stage of maturation of the cultural state.
The importance of heritage in cultural policy in Latin America
“Cultural policy refers to the institutional supports that channel both aesthetic creativity
and collective ways of life, (…) embodied in systematic, regulatory guides to action that
are adopted by organizations to achieve their goals” (Miller and Yúdice 2002, 1).1 In
1

I am fully aware that restricting my analysis of cultural policy to the sub-field of heritage may reproduce a
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cultural policy – a bias I have denounced elsewhere (Losson 2013). This choice also bears the risk of
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Latin America, cultural policy has been largely built on the idea that the state ought to be
in charge of protecting the material heritage of the nation. In spite of recent evolutions,
heritage remains the cornerstone of cultural policies in the region. Bordat (2013) notes
that, indeed, the main components of cultural policy in Mexico, including the central role
of heritage, have remained broadly similar since the late twentieth century, all through a
period of political (with the end of the rule of the PRI) and economic change (with the
greater insertion of the country in the global economy). I have shown that this remains
true in Peru, too (Losson 2013).
However, other scholars consider that the consensus in favor of putting heritage at
the center of cultural policy is now being challenged. In Peru, Arista Zerga (2013) argues
that cultural policy is affected by a crisis of “social perception about cultural heritage”
(15): the state has too often neglected, in the definition of its heritage policy, to include
the expectations and needs of those who have a stake in the conservation of this heritage
(in particular, local communities, Indigenous or not). As a consequence, heritage is
sometimes considered an obstacle to modernity by these communities or is valued only as
an economic asset for tourism development, rather than an object or a site worth
preserving for cultural (hence, identity) reasons. Lombardo de Ruiz (1997) has made
similar comments about Mexico. When commodified or instrumentalized for other
purposes, heritage, rather than being a symbol for all citizens to care about, becomes a
thing that has to be managed. In this context, what is the importance of cultural heritage?2

2

As Mexican ornithologist Dalia Ayala, a member of the first Mexican commission sent to Vienna to
examine the penacho in 2002, put it, “heritage is important, but not that much” (interview, Aug. 28, 2017).
On a similar note, Colombian lawyer José Antonio Rengifo considers that lo cultural [what relates to
culture] yields before so many urgent matters that have to be dealt with (cf. chapter 3, note 79). Rengifo
also formulated this idea during our interview, Jun. 26, 2018. He was referring, in particular, to security
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A historical perspective helps understanding how heritage has become a cornerstone of
cultural policies in the region.
An extensive and multidisciplinary literature has shown that the construction of
public policies of heritage protection in Latin American countries has been incremental.
Table 1 summarizes important dates in the implementation of measures of heritage
protection directly relevant to cases of restitutions and returns. I argue here that this
process of institutional consolidation was necessary before Latin American states could
envision claiming the return of cultural heritage objects.
Table 4.2: Chronology of heritage protection measures (1820s-2010s)
Colombia
Creation of a
national museum
Other
important
museums
Most important
laws protecting
cultural heritage
Regulation of
archaeological
excavations
Limitation of
exports of
archaological
objects

Mexico

Peru

1823

1825

1822

1939 (Museum of Gold)

1964 (National Museum
of Anthropology)

1931,3 1959, 1936, 1997
and 2008,4

1879, 1897, 1902, 1914,
1930, 1934, 19725

1822

1939

1893, 1911

1906

1894

1822 (Decreto supremo de
San Martín), 1911, 1929

2002 (Museum of the Royal
Tombs of Sipan)
2020 (expected: MUNA)
255 norms from 1821
through 2010:6 1822,
1929, 20047

issues and the internal armed conflict in Colombia). Similarly, Juan Ossio considers that, in Peru, culture
has always been a secondary issue [la quinta rueda del coche], at best (interview, Apr. 25, 2017).
3
Law No 103 "By which aid is given to the conservation of the archaeological monuments of San Agustín"
4
General Law of Culture, 1997; modified 2008.
5
Federal Law for Archeological, Artistic, and Historical Zones and Monuments, Apr. 28, 1972.
6
Instituto Nacional de Cultura, Dirección Nacional, “Apuntes para la defense de los intereses del Estado
Peruano – Reclamo peruano a la Universidad de Yale,” n.d., July 2010; ADGDPC.
7
General Law of the Cultural Heritage of the Nation, n. 28296.
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Agencies in
charge of
archaeology
and/or heritage
State-led
excavations /
Protection of
archal areas
Acceptance /
ratification of
UNESCO 1970
Inscription of
heritage sites on
UNESCO’s
World Heritage
Bilateral treaties
on restitutions of
illegally exported
cultural objects
Return claims

19188, 19389, 195210

191811, 1930,12 193913

1941,14 1962,15 197116

1936-7, 1941 (San
Agustín)

1880s; 1905 and 1920s
(Teotihuacan)

1944, 1968, 1981 (Machu
Picchu)

1988

1972

1979

1995 (San Agustin)

1987 (Historic center of
Mexico City)
1987 (Teotihuacan)

1983 (Machu Picchu)

Colombia has five with
other Latin American
countries + with the
USA17
2005-… (Quimbaya
collection)
2012-… (San Agustín
statues)

Mexico has five with
other Latin American
countries + with the
USA18
1978-1985 (Teotihuacan
murals)
1987-… (penacho)

Peru has seven with other
Latin American
countries + with the
USA19
2001-2011 (Machu Picchu
collection)
2008-2021 (Paracas
textiles)

Sources used: Morales-Moreno (1994), Florescano (1997b), Litvak and López Varela (1997),
Mould de Pease (2003), Earle (2007), Alva Guerrero (2009), Maxwell and Ypeij (2009), CNCA
(2012), Restrepo-Navarro (2015).
8

Creation of a national bureau of fine arts, in charge of the conservation of public monuments.
Creation of the National Archaeological Service.
10
Creation of the Colombian Institute of Anthropology (ICAN), which became ICANH in 1999 after
merging with other state agencies.
11
Creation of a department of anthropology, within the Secretary of Agriculture, led by anthropologist
Manuel Gamio, who conducted research at Teotihuacan.
12
Creation of a Department of Artistic, Archaeological, and Historical Monuments.
13
Creation of the National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH), which still exists today and was
successively attached to the National Council for Culture and the Arts (CONACULTA) in 1988, then the
more recently created Secretary of Culture (2015).
14
Creation of a department of artistic education and cultural outreach within the Ministry of Education.
15
Creation of the Casa de la Cultura [House of Culture].
16
Creation of the National Institute of Culture (INC), which replaced the Casa de la Cultura and was later
absorbed in the Ministry of Culture, created in 2010.
17
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Colombia Concerning the Imposition of Import Restrictions on
Archaeological Materials from the Pre-Columbian Cultures and Certain Ecclesiastical Material from the
Colonial Period of Colombia, 2006.
18
Treaty of Cooperation for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural
Property, United States-Mexico, Jul. 17, 1970.
19
Agreement Respecting the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural
Properties, Sep. 15, 1981, United States-Peru, TIAS, No. 10, 136; and Peru-US Memorandum of
Understanding Concerning the Imposition of Import Restrictions on Archaeological Material from the PreHispanic Cultures and Certain Ethnological Material from the Colonial Period, Jun. 9, 1997.
9
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The young independent republics of Latin America showed very early on a
concern for heritage. In the following sections, I look more in depth at three institutions
of particular importance to understand the formulation of return claims: the museum, the
regulation of the archaeological practice, and the bureaus in charge of the discipline.
Museums at the heart of cultural policy and return claims
In Latin America as in the Western world in general, museums aim to tell a national
narrative through the display of artifacts (Preziosi 2012). Coggins (2002) identifies a
fundamental difference, however, between the concept of national museum in Europe and
Latin America: while European national museums display ancient art from other
civilizations and see themselves as exemplary and educational institutions (reflecting the
internationalist approach), national museums in countries such as Mexico, Peru, and
Guatemala20 are designed to demonstrate the enduring connection between past and
present (the nationalist approach). In the context of Southeast Asia, Anderson (2006)
underlined the role of museums and heritage in the formation of nations in modern times.
Through the creation of museums, archaeological research, and the reconstruction of
ancient monuments, colonial empires claimed to protect an antique heritage deemed
much superior to the contemporary colonized Natives; heritage, in part, served to justify
colonial domination. The post-independence states of the twentieth century “inherited
this form of political museumizing” (183) to assert their own legitimacy. A similar
process of appropriation of the ancient past by the new republics has taken place in Latin
America. Earle adds that “if the formation of museums illustrates the development of
elite national sentiment – and many intellectuals in 19th century Spanish America
believed that it did – then the process of museumification in Spanish America suggests,
20

Coggins does not discuss Colombia in her analysis, but her comments apply to this country, too.
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as Benedict Anderson has argued, that Spanish America was in the vanguard, not the rear
guard, of the nationalist movement” (2007, 152).
In Mexico, President Guadalupe Victoria, advised by writer-politician Lucas
Alemán, established a national museum with the goal of creating a national history for
the new republic as early as 1825 – a tool of nation-building that the Porfirian regime
(1870-1910) and the revolutionary state consolidated in the following decades. A similar
logic prevailed at the opening of the world-famous National Museum of Anthropology in
1964, which legitimized the image of the Mexican nation as mestiza and rooted in the
pre-Columbian past (Morales-Moreno 1994, Florescano 1997b). In Colombia, the
National Museum was founded in 1823, although in its origins it focused more on the
natural sciences, the arts, and trophies of the heroes of the independence, ignoring the
remains of pre-Columbian cultures (González 2000). While the National Museum still
exists, the star among Colombian museums is now the Museum of Gold, opened in 1939.
In Peru also, the national museum was founded by the leaders of the movement
for Peruvian independence in order to promote the idea of a national identity for the new
republic. Its first collections included minerals and vegetal specimens, as well as cultural
remains from pre-Columbian cultures. This museum is now the National Museum of
Archaeology, Anthropology, and History of Peru (MNAAH).21 Because my two case
studies for this country have been resolved, Peru offers me the best insight into how
museums are an important part of the politicking (understood both in terms of elaboration
of a public policy and as a fight among diverging interests) surrounding the return of
cultural heritage objects. The case of the Machu Picchu collection, in particular,
illustrates the rivalries among individuals that can soar in the professional field of
21

See website of the MNAAH: http://mnaahp.cultura.pe/elmuseo/historia, last accessed May 15, 2019.
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heritage, the dilemmas and conflicts in the allocation of financial and symbolic resources
from the center towards the provinces, and the dual nature of Peruvian nationalism, split
between Lima and Cusco, as analyzed in the previous chapter.
Peru generally lacks the high-quality museums that attract tourists to Mexico and
Colombia.22 As a consequence, there was no obvious choice of a museum to host the
Machu Picchu collection upon its return. This question became a recurrent topic of
discussion not only between Peru and Yale, but also among Peruvians. While Juan
Ossio23 told me, in retrospect, that bringing the collection back to the citadel (or to the
nearby town of Aguas Calientes) was not an option contemplated when the return was
announced in 2010, archival documents and newspaper articles reveal that the idea
actually floated for several years, before it was abandoned. There is, indeed, a site
museum that would have allowed the collection to return to “the closest possible to its
place of origin,” according to a regional director of culture in Cusco. However, it receives
less than 20% of the visitors to the ruins.24 In 2002, Blanca Alva proposed a new
curatorial program for the museum; her intention was to provide visitors with the
contextual information necessary to better understand the site as well as an “effective tool
for the restitution of the archaeological materials transferred by Hiram Bingham to the
22

A notable exception is the Museum of the Royal Tombs of Sipán, in the northern department of
Lambayeque, near the city of Chiclayo. Opened in 2002, this world-class museum hosts a collection of
archaeological objects unearthed in the nearby site of Sipán in 1987. While Lima has several interesting
museums – among which the remarkable MNAAH, housed in an old colonial house – their museography
pales in comparison with Mexican and Colombian museums. The National Museum of Archaeology
(MUNA) to be opened in 2021 represents Peru’s next attempt to add a “destination-museum” to its list of
tourist attractions.
23
Interview, Apr. 25, 2017. An anthropologist, Ossio was named minister of culture by Alan García, at the
creation of the ministry in 2010. He was in charge of the new ministry when Yale announced it would
return the collection.
24
Fernando González-Olaechea, “Un museo poco conocido en los alrededores de Machu Picchu,” El
Comercio, May 23, 2011. Opened in the early 1960s, the museum is named after Peruvian archaeologist
Manuel Chávez Ballón. Chronically underfunded, it lacks spectacular pieces and an attractive museography.
Also, it is inconveniently located off the road that leads from Aguas Calientes to Machu Picchu. As a
consequence, most tourists ignore its existence.
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United States.” 25 In 2002, also, as he was preparing the touring exhibition “Unveiling the
Mystery of the Incas,” Yale archaeologist Richard Burger presented to Peru’s First Lady
Eliane Karp the project of a new site museum at Machu Picchu, which would display part
of the objects and archives from Bingham’s expeditions held in Yale.26 In early 2003, as
the Peruvian side prepared its arguments to ask for the return of the collection, the
objectives still included the display of the entire collection in Machu Picchu.27
By May 2003, however, Eliane Karp was mentioning the possibility of housing
the returned collection in a to-be constructed Gran Museo del Tahuantinsuyo28 [Great
Museum of the Inca Empire] in Cusco29 as well as the establishment of a “center of
interpretation” in Machu Picchu.30 The high commission created in July 2006 to follow
the case of the Machu Picchu collection31 included one representative from the regional

25

“Propuesta de implementación del Museo de Sitio de Machu Picchu,” reproduced in Mould de Pease
(2003), pp. 187-91. At the time, Alva was research director of the INC’s National System of Museums. She
participated in the Peruvian delegation that inventoried the collection in Yale, in 2008. She provided
administrative support for the political appointees at the direction of the INC throughout the dispute.
26
“Preliminary proposal,” enclosed with letter from Richard Burger to Eliane Karp, Jul. 31, 2002;
ADGDPC. The objects would be “made available” to the new museum while others would remain in Yale.
27
“Proyecto de términos de referencia para las conversaciones entre el Gobierno del Perú y la Universidad
de Yale para concertar un acuerdo en material de las [sic] bienes materiales y restos óseos que se
encuentran en el Museo Peabody de Historia Natural de la Universidad de Yale y que fueron encontrados
por las expediciones científicas que dirigió Hiram Bingham,” enclosed with fax from Ambassador Manuel
Rodríguez Cuadros, viceminister and secretary general of foreign affairs, to Luis Guillermo Lumbreras,
director of the INC, Feb. 3, 2003; ADGDPC.
28
Tahuantinsuyo (also spelled Tawantinsuyu) is the Quechua name for the Inca empire.
29
This project of a new museum in Cusco dedicated to Inca culture was carried for many years by
archaeologist Luis Lumbreras, who was the director of the INC during Alejandro Toledo’s presidency and
a close adviser of Eliane Karp on the subject of the return claim to Yale. Many in the community of
anthropologists and historians in Peru, among whom Juan Ossio, have also supported this project. The
following administration under Ollanta Humala (2011-16), however, abandoned the project and decided
instead to build a new museum of archaeology (MUNA) in Pachacamac, near Lima – a project supported,
among others, by another protagonist of Peru’s return claims, Luis Jaime Castillo.
30
“Términos de referencia para las conversaciones entre el Gobierno del Perú y la Universidad de Yale
para concertar un acuerdo en material de los bienes materiales y restos óseos que se encuentran en el
Museo Peabody de Historia Natural de la Universidad de Yale y que fueron encontrados por las
expediciones científicas que dirigió Hiram Bingham,” enclosed with letter from First Lady Eliane Karp to
Dorothy K. Robinson, vice-president and general counsel, Yale University, May 12, 2003; ADGDPC.
31
Congreso de la República, “Ley n. 28778 de repatriación de los objetos arqueológicos que forman parte
de la colección Machupicchu de la Universidad de Yale,” El Peruano, Jul. 13, 2006.
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government of Cusco and one from the local government of Machu Picchu.32 This double
appointment was more symbolic than practical: the negotiations were effectively handled
by the presidency with the support of the MREP and the INC. Yet, it shows the special
status of Cusco as the cradle of Peruvianness, which the central government
acknowledged by involving the local authorities. (In the Paracas textiles case, on the
contrary, local governments were not involved.) 33 In December 2006, the regional
government of Cusco approved the creation of a regional museum of Cusco,34 where the
Machu Picchu collection would be housed upon its return.35 Up until the day when the
return of the collection was announced, articles in the Peruvian press mentioned the
possibility that a new site museum would be built in Machu Picchu.36
However, the collection ultimately found a home in Casa Concha, a house that
belongs to UNSAAC, in Cusco. Conservation issues may explain why the option of
returning the collection to Machu Picchu or Aguas Calientes was abandoned: Richard
Burger evoked the risks of huaycos,37 Juan Ossio mentioned the humidity and lack of
appropriate security conditions in Machu Picchu,38 and it could reasonably be argued that
the costs of doing research on the collection would have been higher if researchers had
32

Aguas Calientes has attempted to rename itself as “Machupicchu Pueblo” over the years. Both names can
alternately be found in official and tourism documents. I use Machu Picchu in this sentence because it is the
one that appears on the documents from the high commission, but prefer Aguas Calientes in the rest of my
work in order to avoid confusions between the archaeological site and the town below it.
33
Possible reasons for the lack of involvement of the local authorities in the department of Ica (where
Paracas is located) include the nascent stage of the tourism industry in that region, which has only grown
recently; consequently, the absence of resources generated by tourism for the local government; the
absence of quality museum infrastructure in the region; and the difficulties facing the local administration
in rebuilding the region after a devastating earthquake in August 2007. Yet, at a more symbolic level, Ica
and Paracas simply do not carry the same political weight as Cusco to stand up to Lima.
34
Yet another project of museum that, as of early 2019, has been abandoned.
35
Informe de la Comisión de Alto Nivel para la Repatriación de los objetos arqueológicos que forman parte
de la colección Machu Picchu (CANRMP), Dec. 29, 2006; ADGDPC.
36
“Aguas Calientes acogería piezas de Machu Picchu,” Perú 21, Nov. 21, 2010.
37
Interview, Nov. 4, 2017. Huaycos are flash floods that typically occur in the Andes during the rainy
season, and are most severe during episodes of the climatologic phenomenon of El Niño.
38
Interview, Apr. 25, 2017.
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had to travel to Machu Picchu to access it, instead of the more convenient and better
connected city of Cusco. Yet, I suggest another interpretation of this outcome: the weak
institutionalization of cultural policy in Peru, the importance of Cusco for the national
discourse, and personal rivalries combined to explain the choice of Cusco.
This story also reveals the limits and inefficiencies of cultural decentralization in
Peru. Existing infrastructure, in particular the site museum of Machu Picchu, was
ignored. The INC proved unable to make a decision and implement a clear policy
regarding the building or restoration of at least one major museum in Cusco, in great part
because the topic was of interest for the most prominent professionals of the field and,
beyond, in the entourage of the president. Successive projects carried by different actors
failed one after the other, leading to the paradoxical situation of a collection that was
returned to the Peruvian state but ultimately escaped its curatorial control. Indeed,
UNSAAC, though a public institution, is not under control of either the central offices or
the Cusco bureau of the Peruvian Ministry of Culture, which absorbed the INC in 2010.
Journalist Sarah Nutman wrote that Peruvian archaeologist Luis Jaime Castillo was
instrumental in helping Yale curators Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar reach a lastminute agreement with the UNSAAC.39 The university, which Mould de Pease (2003,
126) credits for having pressured the Peruvian government to ask for the return of the
collection in 2001, was not part of the high commission mentioned above and remained a
marginal actor of the return claim until the last few weeks of the negotiation.40

39

Sarah Nutman, “Digging into Peru deliberations, Part II,” Yale News, Feb. 15, 2011.
UNSAAC is seldom mentioned in the archival documents I was able to consult at the Ministry of Culture
in Lima, which confirms my idea that its involvement in the return claim was marginal, and that the idea of
depositing the collection at the university was only introduced in the last stretch of the negotiation.
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Regulating archaeology and its products: are Latin American countries ready for the
return of the objects they claim?
Another important evolution evidenced in Table 1 is the progressive institutionalization
of the practice of archaeology. I have already noted, in the previous chapter, the
importance of archaeology in the construction of a discourse of homogeneity and unity
for the ethnically diverse Latin American nations. From independence, the new republics
passed multiple decrees and laws regulating this activity. These legal norms specified the
legal basis for the public ownership of these objects on behalf of the nation; created
organs of control and implementation of these measures, with no enforcement power but
at least some capacity of coordination with other state entities; regulated and carried out
excavations, works of conservation, etc.; created specialized schools to educate
archaeologists and museum professionals, who built an expertise in all the steps of
heritage conservation; and controlled and prevent the export of archaeological and other
objects that have been determined as belonging to the national heritage.
Yet, Latin American states demonstrated a greater capacity to pass laws than to
enforce them: as noted by Earle (2007, 137-40), the first laws passed in Mexico and Peru
shortly after independence remained ineffective, illustrating both the institutional
weakness of the state and the “still-uncertain place of the preconquest era within the
emergent historia patria [patriotic history]” (139). Table 1 shows a second wave of
protective legislation starting in the 1880s and that continued into the twentieth century,
prompted by the further incorporation of the pre-Columbian history into the official
history of the nation (Earle 2007) and the influence of foreign travelers and
archaeologists, as well as the development of collectionism (Botero 2006). Increasingly,
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these laws tended to focus on the public property of historical monuments and
archaeological materials, which could explicitly not be appropriated by individuals
because they were now the property of the nation.
The return cases I examine here are directly linked to this normative activity: the
1911 decree in Peru41 was passed as news of Bingham’s activities in the Andes were
starting to provoke an outcry; the authorization of exporting the product of his research
was granted to Bingham in 1912 as a derogation to this decree. In Colombia, law n. 103
from 1931 – generally considered the first major law in Colombia protecting
archaeological sites and objects – concerned more specifically San Agustín, following the
explorations and removal of archaeological objects by German archaeologist Preuss in
the 1910s. However, the state’s incapacity to enforce the protective laws it passed
continued well into the twentieth century, as the case of the Paracas textiles and the
Teotihuacan murals exemplify: these objects were taken away well after the first
measures protecting heritage and preventing or limiting their exportation were passed.
Because of the sketchy record of their country in enforcing its own laws, several
archaeologists in Peru and Colombia asked whether the country really had the capacity to
care for the claimed object. (If they exist, I have not heard similar concerns in Mexico.)
Looting from archaeological sites and theft from these countries’ museums or other
historical buildings are, indeed, real concerns for heritage professionals. To be sure, the
task is immense: “the number and diversity of Peruvian cultural heritage properties
impedes the enforcement of effective and appropriate control to better protect this
heritage” (Alva Guerrero 2009, 146). Airing these critiques, however, has been limited to
scholarly circles. While scholarly articles mention the shortcomings of the management
41

Decreto Supremo [Supreme Decree], Aug. 19, 1911.
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of Peru’s museums and archaeological sites (Alva Guerrero 2009, Shady Solís 2011,
Higueras 2013), the general press has not publicized these reservations about Peru’s
capacity to receive the objects it claimed. Similar concerns exist in Colombia: potential
returns would create new logistical problems for the state. Considering the lack of
financial resources dedicated by the state to the cultural sector in general, and the
museums and archaeological sites in particular, some protagonists of the return claims
advocate in favor of alternatives to returns.42
Institutionalizing heritage: the creation of politicized bureaucracies
A third important step in the process that, ultimately, led to the formulation of return
claims was the creation of public agencies in charge of the supervision and execution of
archaeological campaigns and, beyond, the protection of national heritage (including, but
not limited to, the pre-Columbian objects found in archaeological excavations). The first
entities, in the early twentieth century, were most often bureaus ascribed to the ministries
of public education and even, in the case of Mexico, the ministry of agriculture. In the
course of a few decades, they gained greater autonomy and became powerful (if also,
sometimes, inefficient) bureaucracies: these agencies include the National Institute of
Anthropology and History (INAH) in Mexico, the Colombian Institute of Anthropology
and History (ICANH), and the National Institute of Culture (INC) in Peru. They secured
political support and resources from the executive, in great part because their work could
be instrumentalized to support the construction of nationalist discourses, fostering the
idea of unified, mestizo nations rooted in a deep past – even though, of course, experts of
the field recurrently complain that the state resources allocated to the task of conserving
42

Santiago Jara Ramírez, director of cultural affairs at the MREC, expressed such concerns (interview, Jun.
27, 2018). These reservations, coming from the state entity in charge of the negotiations about the
Quimbaya treasure and the San Agustín statues, inform the executive’s prudent approach to these cases.

159

and valorizing material heritage, and fighting against the trafficking of cultural heritage
objects, remain largely insufficient.
These institutions became themselves highly politicized entities (Litvak and
López Varela 1997). Because they concentrated the resources dedicated to material
heritage, they were, indeed, throughout their history, the stage for interpersonal feuds
among archaeologists, anthropologists, and historians. Examples of these include, among
many others, the sharp criticisms publicly expressed in national newspapers, twenty years
later, against Gastón García Cantú and Enrique Florescano, who were directors of INAH
in the early 1980s during the negotiations with the De Young Museum, 43 and the
conflicts among Peruvian anthropologists around the construction of new museums to
display the objects returned from Yale and Gothenburg, as detailed above.
Return claims: a case of path dependency
All the nuances presented above notwithstanding, Table 1 reveals a path-dependent
process through which the state, once it has stepped into the idea of defining the remains
of the past (archaeological of course, but also colonial, and later modern) as heritage, is
soon constrained to pass successive laws that slightly modify the content of previous
measures to adapt them to current practices. This process is directly relevant to the
question of return claims, for several reasons.
First, it has contributed to fostering the very concept of a national heritage and its
reification as a “thing” that cements the nation and needs to be defended. The state has
constructed the definition of the national identity around this concept of heritage.44 The
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See chapter 2, notes 88 and 89.
For example, evaluating the reasons to introduce changes to the text of Law 28778 from 2006 about the
recuperation of the Machu Picchu collection, a note of the Peruvian congress justifies the proposed
modifications on the basis that they serve the goals of the “state policy” of “affirming national identity,” as
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multiplication of legal norms and the creation of state institutions have made the idea of a
national heritage concrete and visible to the population, for example by opening
archaeological areas and museums for the public to visit. Over the past three decades, the
question of return claims has represented a test of the success of this state-led
construction of the concept of national heritage. On the one hand, states have partially
failed in this task: as many professionals I have interviewed mentioned, most people in
their country care little for heritage, because they have not been educated to it. If
education is key for people to understand the value of heritage, then heritage is not that
“thing” that people instinctively care for. 45 For Lombardo de Ruiz (1997), heritage is a
form of acculturation, since its meaning and importance have to be learned. Heritage, in
her opinion, conveys the values of the dominant elites. On the other hand, the efforts to
promote the concept of heritage have been, at least in part, successful: as my case studies
reveal, there are civil society actors who do abide by the discourse about the importance
of heritage and pressure the state to act accordingly (I analyze the role of these actors in
chapter 5). Also, when mobilized through the media, audiences show concern for and
interest in the return of cultural heritage objects, as demonstrated by the high number of
visitors to the exhibitions presenting the returned objects.46
Second, the chronology of institutional change reveals how the state has
legitimized its monopolistic position over the ownership and management of the past

defined in the National Agreement [Acuerdo Nacional]. Congreso de la República, “Exposición de motivos
sobre el proyecto de ley que modifica la ley 28778,” Jul. 2, 2010; ADGDPC. The Acuerdo Nacional is a
forum for debate and dialogue among the three administrative levels of governments and social and
political institutions, in order to define the main guidelines of state action.
45
As Eugenia Serpa (coordinator of the “cultural goods group” within the bureau of heritage of the
Ministry of Culture; interview, Jun. 25, 2018) told me, “it is because state entities have promoted the notion
of heritage that people got interested in it. People value cultural heritage once these entities’ competencies
are defined and they start acting.”
46
See chapter 2, note 41.
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(López Caballero 2008), crowding out the field of heritage protection, interpretation, and
promotion. Looters and promoters of private excavations, collectors, researchers outside
the direct control of state institutions (particularly foreigners), which were the main
protagonists of (pre-)archaeological excavations up until the early twentieth century, have
lost their legitimacy to this practice. By strengthening the idea that a national heritage
belongs, by definition, to the national community, the state, as the administrative
embodiment of this community, has built a monopoly over the practice of archaeology
and over the ownership of its results.47 By the same token, Indigenous communities have
also been deprived of the capacity to claim being the natural heir of these objects.
Third, even though the state was often reactive (as illustrated by the 1911
Peruvian decree mentioned above) rather than proactive, this process of capacity-building
has signaled the state’s growing interest in heritage conservation. Since the claimed
objects have been taken away because of the state’s carelessness or inaction in previous
decades and centuries, it is essential for the state to bring new evidence of its
commitment to national heritage, historically and at the moment of the claim. For
example, demonstrating that the Machu Picchu collection was, indeed, a part of Peru’s
heritage, even by the legal standards of the early twentieth century, was a constant
preoccupation of the Peruvian side. To counter Yale’s claims that it held the Machu
Picchu collection in accordance with the Peruvian legislation of the 1910s, INC Director
Cecilia Bákula wrote that “without a doubt, the legislative policy of Peru has been, since

47

However, the private possession of archaeological objects is still legal in Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, as
long as these objects are not exported. This system is not without flaws. Atwood (2004), who has covered
the discovery and looting of the tomb of the Señor de Sipán in northern Peru in the late 1980s, is critical of
the Peruvian system of registration of artifacts: it is legal to own them, within Peruvian borders, as long as
they are registered to the competent authorities. For Atwood, this system protects wealthy collectors while
punishing poor looters who search for archaeological objects to sell for survival.
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our origin as a nation, solid and firm regarding Peru’s inalienable rights on its cultural
goods.”48 Hence, the progressive strengthening of state capacity in heritage conservation
is important because it shows why a state, having reinforced the protection of what
remains, can now turn to objects that were removed from the national territory before it
had the capacity or will to prevent it.
In interviews, several practitioners established a direct connection between the
formulation of return claims and a wider policy of heritage protection, forming a policy
feedback loop: the likeliness of recuperating objects that have left the territory is
enhanced by the state’s demonstration that it makes substantial efforts to limit (if not
entirely prevent) the looting and stealing of more objects, and that it has built the
institutional capacity to care for these objects. In turn, to be credible in its efforts to
protect what is still underground and/or on the national territory, the contemporary state
must demonstrate its interest in recuperating these important objects that have already
gone out. This link between return claims and the fight against the looting and trafficking
of cultural objects is often articulated in Peru,49 Mexico,50 and Colombia. State agencies
in both Mexico51 and Colombia52 collaborate to prevent the trafficking of cultural objects
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Letter from Cecilia Bákula Budge, director of INC, to Eduardo Ferrero, Jun. 9, 2010; ADGDPC.
Enphasis added. This was a moral and ethical, rather than legal, argument: it would most likely not have
impacted Peru’s case in court favorably, since US courts have consistently refused to enforce the laws of
other nations regarding heritage protection.
49
This argument was made by Luis Jaime Castillo (interview, Apr. 24, 2017) and by Liliana Cino (director
of cultural relations and heritage protection in the Peruvian Ministry of Exterior Relations during Alan
García’s second presidency; consul general of Peru in Los Angeles from 2011 through 2017). For Cino
(interview, Jul. 16, 2017), the Machu Picchu case is part of Peru’s larger efforts to recover possession of all
objects taken away from the country, regardless of when it happened.
50
See for example the declarations of Rafael Tovar y Teresa, president of CONACULTA: “there is a very
clear policy of recuperation of [our] cultural heritage that the Mexican government has implemented
successfully over the last few years” (cited in Adriana Malvido, “El Penacho (…), op. cit., ch. 3, note 114).
51
“Bases de coordinación para procurar la recuperación de monumentos arqueológicos, monumentos
históricos, monumentos artísticos y vestigios o restos fósiles ilícitamente sustraídos del territorio nacional
que celebran la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores; la Procuraduría General de la República; el Instituto
Nacional de Antropología e Historia; y el Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes y Literatura.” Oct. 10, 2011.
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and to obtain the restitution of objects seized by foreign authorities, in accordance with
multilateral or bilateral treaties. Enhanced museum expertise and security, prevention of
looting of archaeological areas, strengthened customs and border controls, all are
elements that allow Latin American states to void the counter-argument that they are not
capable of taking care of the objects they are claiming.53 Additionally, the historical
involvement of the state in heritage protection also needs to be proven to convince the
other party that the interest for the claimed object is not recent.54
The larger symbolic importance of this demonstration of state capability in the
field of heritage conservation shall not be underestimated. Historically, Latin American
states have defended the interests of urban political and landowning elites to the
detriment of large sectors (in particular, Indigenous) of the population. These states have
often neglected to build a capacity to efficiently tax their own population, preferring to
loosely tax exports and imports, which contributed to the historical weakness of these
states’ “infrastructural capacity” (Centeno and Ferraro 2013a). In turn, this lack of state
capacity has created dismal social and territorial inequalities and provided opportunities
52

“Convenio de cooperación n. 2990-1 de 2017 de cumplimiento de funciones administrativas para
prevenir y contrarrestar el tráfico ilícito de bienes del patrimonio cultural colombiano, celebrado entre el
Ministerio de Cultura, el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, la Procuraduría General de la Nación, la
Fiscalía General de la Nación, la Policía Nacional, la Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales, la
Unidad Administrativa Especial de Aeronautíca Civil, el Archivo General de la Nación, el Instituto
Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, el Servicio Geológico Colombiano, el Servicio Nacional de
aprendizaje, la Universidad Externado de Colombia y la Asociación ICOM de Colombia.” First signed in
2005, this agreement is renewed periodically.
53
For example, Peruvian archaeologist Luis Jaime Castillo, a former vice-minister of cultural heritage,
recalled (interview, Apr. 24, 2017) that, because Yale tried to use the absence of an adequate facility to host
the Machu Picchu collection as a justification to deny the return claim, the Peruvian side did not let the
Swedish party build a similar case about the Paracas textiles: during the negotiation, Castillo argued that
Peru did have a facility that already hosted an important collection (the MNAAH in Lima) and qualified
staff. Yet, Castillo considers that this question established a moral obligation to build a new facility in Peru
to conserve the textiles in similar conditions as in Sweden (an important argument in the controversy
surrounding the creation of the MUNA, which he supported – see chapter 2, note 54).
54
Among others, former ambassador of Mexico to Austria, Olga Pellicer, made this point during our
conversation (interview, Aug. 31, 2017): Mexico has been “consistent” in demonstrating its will to prevent
cultural heritage objects – in particular, pre-Columbian – from leaving the national territory.
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for non-state armed actors to challenge the state’s authority and monopoly over the
legitimate use of military force. In this context, both the development of a discourse of
state ownership over the remains of the past and the demonstration of its actual capacities
to care for them evidence the concern of state bureaucracies to make up for their past
weakness, lack of concern, disinterest, or incompetence. Protecting the national heritage
is one way, among others, for Latin American states to (re)establish their legitimacy.
The expansion of the cultural state
Considering all the developments above, I interpret the formulation of return claims in
the late twentieth century as an additional step in a process I name the “expansion of the
cultural state.” By cultural state I mean the ensemble of state institutions and policies that
participate in the broader field of culture (in the wider anthropological sense of the word)
and the arts (a more restrictive conception of the cultural field, easier to circumscribe for
the purpose of cultural policy research). The cultural state encompasses different
administrative levels of central and local governments as well as bureaus and other
institutions in charge of the implementation of public policies related to cultural topics.
For example, in Latin America, questions related to multi- or intercultural education and
rights are sometimes ascribed to the ministry of culture (as in Peru and Colombia) but
often split among several state institutions. Historically, heritage and the arts have been
assigned to specialized agencies under the secretary of education, while indigenist
institutes 55 have been in charge of the management of ethnic diversity and the
implementation of policies towards specific ethnic groups within the nation. The
expansion of the cultural state describes the progressive institutionalization of the field of
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See chapter 3, note 19.
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arts and culture throughout the twentieth century,56 which includes not only the creation
of the agencies mentioned above, but also the growing importance of cultural topics in
the portfolio of diverse ministerial entities (foreign relations, tourism), as well as the
progressively higher administrative rank given to the field of culture.
The ministerialization of culture over the past two decades represents a
culmination of this latter process. In Peru, the INC was widely accused of being a corrupt
and inefficient institution.57 One solution to the problems plaguing this agency, largely
discredited among national and international researchers, was to replace it by a new
ministry of culture,58 without clear evidence, however, that the new structure could
overcome the shortcomings of its predecessor (Losson 2013). The Ministry of Culture
was created in 2010, at the end of Alan García’s second presidency.
In Mexico, the process of greater institutionalization of culture started when the
federal government created the National Council for Culture and the Arts
(CONACULTA) in 1989 as an “ambitious centralization of cultural objectives” (…)
“aiming in particular to undertake a ‘reaffirmation of national identity’ and to promote
the country’s image abroad” (O'Toole 2003, 276). A new agency that overlooked all the
other public institutions in charge of heritage (including the INAH), the arts, and the
cultural industries, CONACULTA, created as neoliberal reforms were being
implemented in Mexico, was in turn absorbed in the new Secretary of Culture, in 2015.
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Following Dubois (1999), I mean by “institutionalization” a series of processes that include the creation
of a coordinating bureaucracy at the highest bureaucratic level, the definition of policy objectives, and the
allocation of a specific budget to the sector of arts and culture.
57
Email from Federico Kauffmann Doig to Mariana Mould de Pease, Jan. 31, 2006; ADGDPC. Kauffmann
Doig is a renowned historian and archaeologist; his email is copied to several dozen other archaeologists
and experts, including parties to the Machu Picchu case such as Yale archaeologist Richard Burger.
58
This idea is expressed in “Defensa del patrimonio cultural. Una buena noticia sobre la recuperación del
patrimonio arqueológico de Machu Picchu,” an unpublished article by archaeologist Hugo Ludeña that was
shared with other archaeologists and experts by email dated Dec. 15, 2005; ADGDPC.
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The INAH, however, has remained an institution largely autonomous from both
CONACULTA and the new secretary.
Similary, in Colombia, the Ministry of Culture, created in 1998, oversees but did
not absorb the ICANH, which remains largely autonomous from the ministry to conduct
the archaeological policy of the state, as the audience at the Constitutional Court in the
Quimbaya case demonstrated.59 The cautious attitude of the Colombian executive in the
return cases, however, adds nuance to my argument about the expansion of the cultural
state. Critically considering the role of the Colombian executive in the management of
the national heritage, Therrien argues that the state, indeed, forged the concept of national
heritage but has not followed through to promote it (at least not the way it did in Mexico
and Peru),60 only paying lip service to the narrative of its importance. The attitude of the
Colombian state reveals a skepticism regarding (or even a critique of) the very concept of
national heritage, which lays low against other policy priorities and may represent a
financial and anti-developmentalist burden, rather than a tool for nation-building.
Understanding the chronology of return claims in the light of the expansion of the
cultural state: return claims in times of neoliberalism
Return claims are a late manifestation of the expansion of the cultural state (the 1980s in
Mexico, the early 2000s in Peru and Colombia). Examining the expansion of the cultural
state helps understand better why the Mexican cases of return claims appeared earlier
than Peru’s and Colombia’s: the Mexican revolutionary state of the 1920s and 1930s
59

Indeed, while the representative of the Ministry of Culture sided with those of the presidency and the
Ministry of Foreign Relations to argue against the return, the director of the ICANH preferred to analyze
the reasons why and processes by which identities are constructed through objects and the meanings
attached to them. Rather than refusing to consider the return of the Quimbaya collection, the director
declared that Colombians had renounced to build their national identity around pre-Columbian elements.
Yet, he did not exclude the possibility that the collection could be considered part of the national heritage.
60
Interview, Jun. 28, 2018.
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started the enactment and enforcement of legal norms and policies promoting heritage
earlier than its southern neighbors. The emergence of archaeology as a common practice
can be traced to the 1970s in Peru61 (Alva Guerrero 2009, Shady Solís 2011) and possibly
even later in Colombia. 62 In Mexico, the earlier development of archaeology also
combined with other factors to foster pride in the nation’s ancestors among contemporary
Mexicans: a greater emphasis on the construction of the nation as mestiza, the promotion
of this identity through the arts,63 and the creation of modern museums that dramatized
the nation through the display of spectacular artifacts (Florescano 1997a, Cottom 2008).64
Comparing three countries reveals that path dependency is not an endogenous process:
the implementation of heritage protection policies does not occur within each country in
isolation from others. States learn from each other: Table 1 shows a pattern of
institutional convergence in the adoption of legal norms and the creation of institutions.
The experience of one country influences others; Mexico has, in this regard, represented
an avant-garde that has inspired its South American counterparts. This process continues
today: experts (historians, archaeologists, anthropologists, and professionals involved in
the fight against the traffic of archaeological and other cultural objects) meet and
exchange their experiences. They also maintain contact with their colleagues in other
countries at personal and institutional levels.
Paradoxically, as the neoliberal agenda tends to shrink the size of bureaucracies,
over the past four decades Latin American states have continued to create new governing
61

Luis Guillermo Lumbreras – a former director of the MNAAH and of the INC – remembered (interview,
Apr. 24, 2017) how the Peruvian archaeological community was made of only a handful of people when he
started his career in the 1960s, while Mexican archaeologists were already several hundreds.
62
Monika Therrien (interview, Jun. 28, 2018) mentioned that there were very few archaeologists working
in Colombia until the 1990s.
63
The most famous example being the golden age of Mexican muralism in the 1920s through 1940s.
64
Lumbreras also recalled the opening of Mexico City’s new National Museum of Anthropology in 1964 as
a reference and example to follow for all Latin American countries.
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institutions in the field of arts and culture and increased their competencies. In times of
retrenchment from other fields of state intervention,65 the state has, on the contrary,
(re)invested the cultural field as a mediating space for its relationship with the national
community. Defying the neoliberal ideology of a lesser role of the state within society,
the cultural state in Latin America re-inscribes the state in its society, speaking to and of
the project of nation-building, rendered necessary by the challenges facing the state.66 In
other words, return claims serve for the state to demonstrate a renewed sense of agency: it
makes up for its capacity loss in other policy fields by investing in the cultural field. This
may explain that return claims have appeared earlier in Mexico, where the neoliberal
reforms started in the 1980s, earlier than in Colombia and Peru.
This evolution is less paradoxical if understood within the growing influence of
multicultural discourses in the wake of the adoption of neoliberal economic models: in
this sense, neoliberal reforms have been accompanied by a growing demand on the state
to manage new topics linked to the recognition of ethnic and linguistic difference and
diversity. Hence, return claims are at the intersection of traditional conceptions of state
intervention in the field of culture (the protection of material heritage) and new
discourses about the plurality of the nation. When it claims the return of specific objects,
the state can accommodate the neoliberal canon it applies to its economic and social
policies because it acts in a sector (heritage conservation) that has been largely exempted
from market laws. 67 Latin American states have had success in delegitimizing and
outlawing the trade in archaeological and other cultural heritage objects, through their
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See chapter 3, note 99.
Including internal armed conflicts as well as internal and external mass migrations (see chapter 3).
67
This is not to say that heritage is completely foreign to market logics, in particular because of its
importance for tourism development policies. I return to this topic below.
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own legislative activity and the adoption of international instruments such as the 1970
UNESCO Convention. Beyond the small circles of art dealers and collectors, the idea of
public property of cultural objects has gained larger acceptance worldwide in the second
half of the twentieth century. As signaled above, the state has successfully carved out a
niche for public action where it is widely seen as having few, if any, competitors.
The Peruvian experience illustrates the strength of the nationalist narrative based
on heritage against the application of neoliberal reforms. From the early 1980s, several
consecutive presidents have confirmed the neoliberal, resolutely market-oriented
economic development model for the country. 68 Simultaneously, several legislative
projects sought to switch heritage management from a state-centric approach towards a
new model friendlier to private initiative.69 These projects facilitated the declassification
of protected areas where these hinder infrastructure or mining projects and offered
archaeological sites such as Machu Picchu in concession for its exploitation by private
actors. In spite of these attempts, which were opposed by several sectors of civil society
and the archaeological establishment (Flores Ochoa 2004), Peru has become the most
successful country of the three I am studying here in claiming the return of longdisplaced cultural objects. In the light of the historical construction of state capacities to
defend national heritage, Peru’s return claims symbolize the path dependent process of
growing state control over heritage management, even as the country settled into a new
economic and administrative (neoliberal) model.70
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Alan García’s first presidency, from 1985 to 1990, represents, however, an interruption in this process
and the only (though largely unsuccessful) departure from this model throughout this period.
69
Projects for greater involvement of private initiative in heritage management (and the fear thereof) exist
in many countries. See for example, in Mexico, Arturo Jimenez, “CNCA: la iniciativa de Fox no busca
privatizer el patrimonio cultural,” La Jornada, Nov. 3, 2005.
70
Another argument, of course, would be that return claims form part of a strategy of blame avoidance: as
political leaders (in the executive and legislative branches) have favored logics of economic development
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Tourism: return claims and the commodification of heritage
The second field of public policy related to the formulation of return claims is that of
economic development, through the promotion of tourism. Most of the cultural objects
claimed in the cases I study are linked to places that have transcended their status as
research or scientific sites to enter the realm of tourism exploitation.71 In this section, I
evidence the chronological coincidence between the rise of tourism and the formulation
of return claims as global phenomena. I do not suggest a direct link of causation between
the total aggregate of tourism arrivals or the relative weight of tourism in the economy of
a country with the formulation of a claim.72 If this were true, we would expect Mexico to
be the most buoyant, since it is by far the country among the three that receives the
greatest number of international visitors annually. Rather, I evidence that Peru’s
aggressiveness in pursuing this goal coincides with an exponential increase in tourist
arrivals (rather than a superior total of arrivals), permitted by the political and economic
stabilization of the country since the early 2000s. This development is, in part, the result
of tourism promotion campaigns that highlight Peru as a destination for cultural tourism,
centered mostly on Machu Picchu, the country’s most widely advertised attraction.
Heritage tourism in Peru represents an archetypical example the “expediency of culture”
(Yúdice 2003), whereby cultural practices such as heritage, rather than being considered

over the conservation and defense of the national heritage, return claims may be considered as a very public
(and publicized) stunt to try and demonstrate the state’s adherence to its discourse in favor of this heritage,
even though its policies would demonstrate otherwise.
71
The exception in my sample is the Quimbaya collection, whose place of provenance (the tomb of the
cacique) cannot be visited. This does not mean that the collection could not be used for tourism: the
museum where it would be presented upon its return would certainly advertise it.
72
The causal mechanism here would be that the country would promote its rich material heritage through
the publicization of return claims, showing that this heritage is so important that the country needs these
objects back, and indirectly inviting tourists to visit the country and “share” this heritage on its home soil.
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an end in themselves, are instrumentalized as resources; the cultural state is being put to
the task of sustaining the booming tourism industry.
I also show that Machu Picchu remains an exceptional case. Return claims and
tourism interact differently in Mexico and Colombia. In Mexico, the expansion of
tourism dates further back in time and has been based on a more varied branding strategy.
In Colombia, cultural tourism has also increased over the past decade, but the two sites in
point (San Agustín and the Quindío) do not boast the same potential as Machu Picchu to
become an icon of their country among international audiences.
Heritage tourism in Mexico, Peru, and Colombia
The formulation of return claims since the last two decades of the twentieth century
coincides in time with a boom of tourism worldwide. In Mexico, Peru, and Colombia, the
total number of international arrivals has increased considerably. 73 Tourism also
represents a growing share of the three countries’ gross domestic product (GDP).74 The
greater inclusion of these countries in the global economy – a major objective of their
economic and foreign policies – has also meant spectacular increases of tourist arrivals.
Latin American countries have in great part promoted cultural tourism, i.e., a form
of tourism in which the cultural (material and immaterial) heritage of a place and its
people are constructed as the main attraction for international and national visitors (Baud
and Ypeij 2009). Heritage management is tightly linked to tourism because the latter is
usually considered the only form of economic development compatible with the criteria
73

International arrivals to Peru have boomed from approximately 480,000 in 1995 to just above 4 million
in 2017; over the same period, this number jumped from 20.2 million to 39.2 million in Mexico, and from
1.4 million to 4.3 million in Colombia. Source: World Bank.
74
Travel and tourism accounted for 16% of Mexico’s GDP in 2017, up from 14.4% in 2000. During the
same period of time, the sector has jumped from 8.1% to 9.8% of the GDP in Peru, and from 5.4% to 5.8%
in Colombia. Source: “Contribution of travel and tourism to GDP as a share of GDP (%),” data compiled
by Knoema: https://knoema.com/atlas/topics/Tourism/Travel-and-Tourism-Total-Contribution-toGDP/Contribution-of-travel-and-tourism-to-GDP-percent-of-GDP
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of conservation. All other economic activities are seen as altering the nature of a
protected site and would make it lose its character as a place of heritage. Yet, greater
influxes of visitors imply new challenges. The social and economic equilibria of the
receiving communities are shaken. The logics of tourism development often collide with
those of the conservation of fragile monuments and ecological systems that were not
meant to receive thousands or millions of visitors annually. Finally, opening a site also
implies the building of infrastructure and provision of services to cater to tourist
demands. This task often falls on the state (Silverman 2002, Shady Solís 2011).
The promotion of tourism is predicated on promises of an increased influx of
foreign currency for the country and of economic and social development for the local
communities. However, these promises are not always fulfilled; tourism can be a mixed
blessing, at best. The profits generated by the industry often remain in control of large
transnational groups, and only marginally trickle down to locals. Tourism is not
necessarily correlated with development. For example, the region of Cusco, though the
major tourist attraction in Peru, ranks among the lowests in the country in terms of human
development (Ruiz Rubio 2010). Tourism is boosted by (and causes further)
commodification of material heritage, essentialized and folklorized for the promotion of
the country abroad (Herrera 2013).
Promoting tourism also implies the projection of an inviting (sanitized,
unthreatening) image abroad. For this purpose, return claims can represent a doubleedged sword. On the one hand, the image of the country may be damaged if the claiming
country is perceived as too aggressive by international audiences (principally North
American and European, which provide the greatest numbers of international visitors to
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Latin American countries). On the other hand, the claim can help project the claimant as
a country that cares for its material heritage, giving a positive image to audiences
interested in cultural tourism.
Machu Picchu, a logo for Peru
Tourism is an increasingly important source of economic growth for the country. I
suggest here that the aggressive attitude of the Peruvian executive when it claimed the
Machu Picchu and Paracas collections is linked, at least in part, with the economic
importance of this sector. Tourist attractions in Peru include mountaineering in the Andes
and wildlife in the Amazon, but is heavily skewed towards providing visitors with
“cultural experiences”; the campaigns led by PromPerú, the official agency in charge of
promoting the country internationally, often essentialize Peru’s indigeneity and market
the country as a destination where the (mostly Inca) past is offered as a timeless
experience for visitors (Vich 2007, Silverman 2015). Archaeologist Luis Lumbreras
argues that the interest of the criollo Peruvian state for the heritage of the “Indians”
remains marginal and is mostly driven by the potential income of foreign currency that
can be derived from tourism.75 So close is the relationship between heritage and tourism
in Peru that the option to combine both sectors in a single administrative entity was
seriously considered during the debates about the creation of the ministry of culture.76
Machu Picchu is the centerpiece of Peru’s touristic attractiveness. Rice (2018)
argues that tourism has actually helped construct Machu Picchu as a symbol of Peruvian
nationalism; Machu Picchu was not already an established national symbol before
tourism. In this sense, tourism has contributed to re-centering Peruvian nationalism from
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Interview, Apr. 24, 2017.
Pedro A. Morillas, “Debate. Ministerio de Turismo y Cultura,” La República, Aug. 11, 2008.
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the coast, where the criolla elites live, to the country’s Andean region. The promotion of
Machu Picchu for touristic purposes dates back to the 1920s 77 and has continued
throughout the century.78 The internal armed conflict in the 1980s and early 1990s halted
the expansion of tourism, but the first decade of the twenty-first century saw an
exponential growth of the sector.

Figure 4.1: Evolution of tourist visits to Machu Picchu (1980-2017)
In 2017, 1,411,279 tourists visited Machu Picchu,

79

of which 76% were

foreigners (or 3,867 per day on average),80 up from 77,295 in 1991 (when the internal
armed conflict limited the overall number of tourists visiting Peru) and 420,390 in 2000
77

See for example “Una excursion a Machupicchu,” El Sol (Cusco), Oct. 1, 1929.
In Oct. 1948, El Sol advertised the opening of a new tourist office aimed at providing help to visitors not
acquainted with the city. This opening coincided with the visit to the region of Hiram Bingham, who was
returning to Cusco for the first time since 1916. For the fiftieth anniversary of Bingham’s expedition, many
were seeing the great potential for further developing tourism in Cusco and Machu Picchu (René Guevara
and Demetrio Túpac Yupanqui, “La solución turística para Machupicchu,” El Sol, Mar. 3, 1961).
79
Source: Mincetur, Ministerio de Cultura.
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Even though UNESCO recommends limiting the daily access to 2,500 persons to avoid overexploitation
of the site (Source: WHC-ICOMOS-IUCN-ICCROM, Reactive Monitoring Mission to “Historic Sanctuary
of Machu Picchu” (Peru). Mission report, Feb. 22-25, 2017).
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(the year that marked the return to democracy and the beginning of the movement to
obtain the return of the collection). Figure 4.1 details the dramatic increase in the number
of visitors to Machu Picchu from 1980 to 2017, particularly from its lowest point in the
early 1990s.81 The return claim accompanied this increase throughout the 2000s.82
The growth of the tourism industry in Peru has been based on the unabashed
commodification of Machu Picchu. In the twenty-first century, PromPerú’s campaigns
have used Machu Picchu to promote a sanitized vision of Peru as a safe and friendly
country. All references to the conflicts that abound in and around Machu Picchu are, of
course, avoided. Most tourists never learn about these conflicts, which include: attempts
to privatize the management of archaeological sites; the project of building a cable car
from Aguas Calientes to Machu Picchu; the fate of peasants who live within the protected
area; and the low level of socio-economic development of Aguas Calientes – in spite or
because of Machu Picchu (Flores Ochoa 2004, Mould de Pease 2004, Maxwell and Ypeij
2009, Ruiz Rubio 2010).
In this context, the claim did not aim so much at promoting the collection itself as
a potential museum attraction,83 but rather as contributing to the international visibility of
Machu Picchu as a site to be visited. The potential of the collection for tourism
development was not lost on the parties to the negotiation: Yale archaeologist Richard
Burger, as he proposed the creation of a site museum in Machu Picchu in 2002, argued
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Source: Ministerio de Cultura – Dirección Regional de Cultura, Cusco / Observatorio Turístico del Perú
The recovery started in the mid-1990s, before the return claim was presented to Yale, so the former can
obviously not be attributed to the latter – nor am I arguing here that the increase throughout the 2000s was
caused by the claim. Rather, I consider that a critical reading of the return claim must take into account the
economic stakes of the development of the tourism industry in Peru throughout the period.
83
Yet, this aspect shall not be discarded entirely: Casa Concha in Cusco, where the museum pieces of the
collection are presented, attracted 70,000 visitors in its first year (2011-12; source: Agencia Andina). My
visit to the page dedicated to the museum on TripAdvisor (a website that aggregates tourists’ comments) in
March 2019 showed that 78% of reviewers reported that their visit was “excellent” or “very good.”
82
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that “the site museum [would] attract tourists to the region,”84 and the Peruvian side was
conscious that “Peru [would] maximize the added value of the objects to promote
tourism.”85 Peruvian newspapers also conveyed the idea that the returned collection could
“boost the tourism industry.”86 In July 2007, just as President Alan García had named his
minister of public housing Hernán Garrido Lecca as a special envoy to negotiate the first
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Yale, Machu Picchu was chosen by millions
of voters worldwide as a “New7Wonders of the World,” a campaign that was derided by
UNESCO and in academic circles for its unbridled commercialism.87 The impact of the
event was sufficiently significant that a report from the INC in July 2010 used this
election as a sign that “the importance of Machu Picchu has gone beyond the limits of a
national culture to become a symbol of Peruvianness worldwide.”88
The Inca citadel has come to symbolize Peru for worldwide audiences and,
transcending its status of “lost city of the Incas” (Bingham 1951), has become an icon of
global tourism (Flores Ochoa 2004, Aguilar Díaz 2011). In an interesting twist on
Anderson’s idea of the “map-as-logo” (2006), 89 Machu Picchu has become, quite
literally, a logo: the shape of Huayna Picchu – the small mountain that overlooks the
ruins and features prominently on all the visitors’ pictures – is stylized and endlessly
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“Preliminary proposal,” op. cit., see note 58.
“Informe de status: Objetos de Machu Picchi en Posesión de la Universidad de Yale,” memorandum
condiencial, Feb. 3, 2003; ADGDPC.
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“Yale dio lista de reliquias sacadas de Machu Picchu,” La República, Aug. 14, 2007.
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https://new7wonders.com/. On a more positive tone, Silverman (2014) considers that the New7Wonders
of the World campaign vastly contributed to the further popularization of the chosen “wonders” among
non-specialized audiences.
88
Instituto Nacional de Cultura, Dirección Nacional, “Apuntes para la defensa de los intereses del Estado
Peruano – Reclamo peruano a la Universidad de Yale,” n.d., July 2010; ADGDPC.
89
In the “Census, map, museum” chapter of Imagined Communities, Anderson (2006) details how a piece
of a map can be “detached from its geographical context,” becoming “an infinitely reproducible series,
available for transfer to posters, official seals, letterheads, magazines and textbook covers, tablecloths, and
hotel walls. Instantly recognizable, everywhere visible, the logo-map penetrated deep into the popular
imagination, forming a powerful emblem for the anticolonial nationalisms being born” (175).
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reproduced by private companies selling tourist services in Cusco and by the state itself.90
Hence, Machu Picchu is a place that serves the double purpose of embodying
Peruvianness, based on an official pride in the country’s pre-Columbian past, and of
promoting the country as a worthwhile destination for international audiences in search of
“authenticity.” 91 Ironically enough, though, most Peruvians cannot afford a visit to
Machu Picchu92 and the collection returned from Yale has been installed in Cusco’s city
center, which has itself been “museified,” i.e., turned into a sector mostly reserved for
and used by tourists and the locals who work in tourism (Silverman 2006). For Peruvians
even more than for foreign visitors, Machu Picchu is a logo, not an actual place they have
access to.
Finally, the claim for the Machu Picchu collection reveals the convergence of
state and private interests in tourism promotion. As noted in chapter 2, José Koechlin, the
CEO of the luxury tourism company Inkaterra,93 was among the first individuals to
become interested in the possibility of bringing the collection back to Peru. Koechlin was
also the representative of the local government of Machu Picchu in the high commission
in charge of overseeing the return claim process.94 His presence in this commission
introduces the suspicion of a conflict of interest about where to locate the collection upon
its return to Peru: it has been argued that creating a more attractive museum for audiences
to visit in Machu Picchu could have encouraged visitors to spend more time in Aguas
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In 2008, at the height of the dispute between Peru and Yale, Lima hosted the European Union, Latin
America, and Caribbean (ALCUE) summit; the logo of the event featured the stylized shape of Huayna
Picchu, even though the event was taking place hundreds of kilometers away.
91
This term, extensively discussed in the academic literature, is often put forward in tourism campaigns.
92
As revealed in figure 4.1, the majority of visitors to Machu Picchu are foreigners, not nationals. For most
Peruvians, the cost of traveling by plane (or even by bus) to Cusco, then by train to Machu Picchu, and the
admission fee (US$30 for Peruvians, $70 for foreigners) is much too high to even consider a visit.
93
Among other properties, Inkaterra owns two luxury hotels in Aguas Calientes.
94
Informe de la CANRMP, op cit., note n. 35.
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Calientes, a town used by tourists as a train hub from/to Cusco, but where most avoid
spending the night.95
Beyond Machu Picchu and the Cusco region, PromPerú has, over the past decade,
started to promote tourism towards other regions of the country. Paracas, for example,
has been developed as a new destination for luxury beach tourism, particularly towards
domestic audiences, and as a hub for cultural tourism.96 Yet, the textiles returned from
Sweden are not part of this new narrative, in part because they are kept in a museum in
Lima, and not in the region.
Quimbaya and San Agustín: out of sight, out of mind?
As the Colombian state has progressively regained control of its territory from the
guerrilla and paramilitary groups since the 2000s, tourism has grown as an important
economic sector. Yet, as the figures presented in the introduction of this section show, it
is less important than in Mexico and Peru. Besides, the pre-Columbian past is not as
defining a feature of tourism promotion campaigns. Advertising for tourism in Colombia
does include cultural tourism, but is more focused on the colonial past (specifically,
Cartagena de Indias, on the Caribbean coast) than on the pre-Columbian past. Hence,
tourism is not a strong motivation for the Colombian executive to seek the return of the
Quimbaya collection and the San Agustin statues, for different reasons.
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See Arthur Lublow, “The Possessed,” The New York Times, Jun. 24, 2007. In the article, Koechlin claims
his interest in the collection was out of patriotism and had nothing to do with business. He told me the same
thing when I met with him in Lima (interview, Apr. 28, 2017).
96
For example, the ruins of an adobe city, Tambo Colorado, and, a few hours drive further south, the Nazca
lines, are part of touristic packages in Paracas. A group of large-scale geoglyphs whose origin is uncertain
(they date back to approx. 500BC-500AD), the Nazca lines, whose origin is disputed, can only be seen
from above. They share with Machu Picchu the status of being logoized: PromPerú has alternatively used
the image of a stylized hummingbird and the initial capital P of “Peru” in the shape of Nazca lines as logos
for Peru’s country brand.
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The site where the Quimbaya collection was found cannot be visited. Yet, if it
were to be returned to Armenia, the capital of the Quindío department, the collection
could certainly become an attraction for visitors. The region is already touristic, but for
reasons that have little to do with the pre-Columbian past: the culture of coffee and a mild
climate that contrasts with the heat of the coast and the cold of the highlands. Colombia is
the third largest producer of coffee in the world,97 and a great part of this production
comes from the Quindío department. The coffee culture was introduced in the region in
the late nineteenth century, thus is culturally associated with the criollo-mestizo majority,
not with Indigenous cultures. Tourism altogether is on the rise in the Quindío, but
remains mostly domestic: fewer than 10% of visitors are foreigners.98 If presented in
Armenia upon its hypothetical return, the collection could attract local and national
visitors – at least in its first months of exhibition.99 Its impact on international visitors
remains uncertain.
San Agustín, on the other hand, is hailed as one of the most spectacular
archaeological sites in Colombia. However, the touristic potential of San Agustín suffers
from its geographical isolation from major urban centers and the poor quality of
communication infrastructure that would allow greater numbers of visitors to reach it.
Also, the internal armed conflict with the FARC left the area inaccessible to tourists for
long periods during the 1990s. As a consequence, the archaeological park of San Agustín
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Source: International Coffee Organization.
Source: Cámara de Comercio de Armenia y del Quindío.
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I would expect a similar effect if the collection was deposited in a museum in Bogota, for example, the
National Museum or the Museum of Gold, which are already the most visited of the country (Source:
Revista Digital Nueva Museología). At least a temporary increase in the number of visitors can be expected,
due to the interest of local audiences for objects whose return was highly mediatized. This effect may wane
quickly, however.
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received only 107,542 visitors in 2018, up from approximately 28,000 in 2002,100 but
fewer than 8% of the figures for Machu Picchu. Only 17.3% of these visitors were
foreigners. The archaeological park is important for the economy of this small town,
though. It also generates conflicts between sectors of the population that benefit from
tourism and those, such as the Yanacona community relocated in the area in the early
2000s, who do not; these conflicts are related to land use and right-of-way through the
protected area (Jackson and Ramírez 2009).101 Overall, the geographical isolation of San
Agustín diminishes its potential to grow as a tourist destination for international
audiences.102 Combined with the lower importance of the pre-Columbian past in the
national discourse in Colombia than in Peru and Mexico, this fact contributes to explain
the low interest showed by the Colombian executive in the return of the statues held in
Berlin. Overall, I conclude that tourism is unlikely to be a factor that would push the
Colombian executive to seek more pro-actively the return of the cultural objects held in
collections abroad.103
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Source: Sistema de Información Turística del Huila, ICANH.
See also Neyder Salazar, “Crisis en el patrimonio cultural del Parque de San Agustín,” El Espectador,
Jul. 6, 2011. One major issue concerns a road that cuts through the park and that Yanaconas claim the right
to use, because the alternate road obliges them to take a long detour through a dirt road in poor conditions.
Conservation issues recommend, on the contrary, to limit the use of the road through the park.
102
This, however, is not in itself a sufficient explanation for the relative under-development of tourism in
San Agustín: Machu Picchu shares these handicaps. Yet, the Peruvian government’s policy of tourism
promotion to Machu Picchu has led to building the appropriate infrastructure, including the railroad that
links Cusco and Aguas Calientes.
103
That is not to say, however, that there is no connection at all between archaeological heritage and
tourism in Colombia. Considering heritage protection from a broader perspective, Eugenia Serpa (Jun. 25,
2018) suggested that, rather than considering heritage as a commodity to promote tourism in Colombia,
tourism should be thought of as an opportunity to increase heritage protection in the country: representing a
new source of foreign currency but also endogenous economic development – since most tourism activity
in Colombia is generated by domestic visitors – tourism increases the interest of the executive for topics of
heritage conservation at the same time that it brings financial resources that can be dedicated to the task.
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Mexico: with or without returns, a favorite destination of cultural tourism
Tourism is a major sector for the Mexican economy, yet I argue that, contrary to Peru, it
does not represent an incentive for the Mexican executive to further seek the return of
cultural objects. This may seem counter-intuitive, since archaeology has played an
important role in promoting Mexico as a tourist destination since at least the 1940s
(Patterson 1995, Schmilchuk 1995, Brading 2001): in 1938, in the legislative project for
the creation of INAH he sent to congress, President Lázaro Cárdenas mentioned that “the
exploration of archaeological ruins (…) has demonstrated that, on top of scientific results,
it can bring magnificent economic returns as it attracts foreign tourists” (cited in
Lombardo de Ruiz 1997, 208). Today, sites such as the Mayan ruins of the Yucatan
peninsula (in particular Chichén Itzá, another site that was designated a “New Seven
Wonder” together with Machu Picchu) and Teotihuacan receive millions of visitors
annually: 4.1 millions visited Teotihuacan in 2018, 83% of which were nationals, up from
3.68 millions in 1996 (23% were foreigners that year).104 The high number of domestic
visitors highlights the degree of appropriation of their material heritage by Mexicans;
Teotihuacan, located at the northern edge of Mexico City, is a popular weekend
destination for families, and receives hundreds of thousands of school students yearly.
Mexico promotes itself through a wide variety of tourist attractions, including its
colonial cities and natural landscapes (in particular the beaches of the Caribbean). Yet,
cultural (material and immaterial) heritage is also a major draw of international tourism.
In this context, the display of cultural objects in foreign museums could be read as free
advertising for Mexico. The Austrian ambassador did not hesitate to use the argument
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several hundred thousand visitors to Teotihuacan every year – a far from negligible figure.
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when he declared that the penacho “does good publicity” for Mexico.105 The object is,
indeed, prominently featured on the website of the Weltmuseum in Vienna and instantly
connects visitors to Mexico. 106 From this perspective, seeking the return of cultural
objects would be detrimental to tourism promotion.107 On the other hand, as mentioned
above, presenting a claim is also a way to project a positive image towards international
audiences, for whom cultural heritage is a positive value: asking for the return of cultural
objects demonstrates that the country cares about the material remains of its past and is
capable of taking care of them. European and North American audiences interested in
cultural tourism value most particularly the heritage of Indigenous communities. Hence,
the performance of a strong and historically rooted cultural identity (albeit an exoticized
one) represents an asset in tourism promotion, rather than a threat. Many in Mexico see
no conflict between promoting tourism to the country and seeking the return of
Moctezuma’s headdress: “Mexico shall not apologize for having taken [the headdress] as
an icon of its identity and has all the cultural and historic right to ask for its return.”108
Yet, I argue that neither the penacho nor the Teotihuacan murals can represent
tourist attractions that could impact the attitude of the Mexican executive in the
formulation of the claims. In line with the nationalist discourse analyzed in the previous
chapter, the penacho is a symbol for domestic Mexican audiences; most international
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visitors, however, are probably content with admiring the copy displayed in the National
Museum of Anthropology. Similarly, the returned murals, which joined the collections of
already established museums in Mexico City and on the site of Teotihuacan, had no or
little impact on tourism. Overall, Mexico was already a worldwide popular tourist
destination by the time the question of restitutions and returns became an important topic
of discussion internationally and, as signaled above, the branding of tourism in Mexico is
based on a greater variety of attractions than in Peru. These two reasons lead me to
conclude that tourism was a comparatively less important factor for Mexican authorities
to claim the return of cultural objects, which may explain in part their cautiousness in the
handling of the claim, compared to their Peruvian counterpart.
In the next section, I continue with the examination of the penacho case to
illustrate how, in the realm of foreign relations, conflicting diplomatic interests explain
that the three countries have adopted diverging attitudes in claiming the return of objects.
Foreign policy: balancing diverging interests in claiming cultural heritage objects
The conduct of foreign affairs is an attribute of state sovereignty par excellence. It is the
third field of public policy that must be considered in an analysis of why and how states
seek the return of cultural heritage objects. In this section, I argue that the conduct of
foreign relations collides with the process of expansion of the cultural state and
intervenes as a mitigating effect that constrains how aggressively states seek these
returns. More precisely, I contrast the two Mexican cases and draw two conclusions: first,
a return claim is more likely to happen when the entities of the cultural state can negotiate
directly with the holding institution; second, the outcome of a return claim also depends
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on whether the diplomatic corps of the claimed country protects the holding institution.
The Colombian and Peruvian cases support these findings.
Mexico: free trade agreement vs. penacho
Return claims illustrate the expansion of the cultural state: culture ceases to be a topic of
domestic policy alone and reaches the realm of diplomacy. Certainly, the Mexican
Secretary of Exterior Relations (SRE) has long had a bureau of cultural affairs as a tool of
soft power, so is not a total newcomer to cultural affairs. Yet, return claims imply a
higher level of coordination among state agencies that do not often work together. The
SRE thus becomes an agent of the cultural state, yet one that must articulate the objective
of obtaining a return with other, broader, objectives of Mexico’s foreign policy. My two
cases illustrate the potential contradictions among these objectives. Also, the main
protagonists are different in the two cases: in the Teotihuacan murals case, the INAH was
able to negotiate their return directly with the holding institution, while the SRE kept a
low profile. In the penacho case, however, the SRE has been heading the negotiation.109
Mexico’s foreign policy: escaping the dependency on the USA
In the wake of Wagner’s bequest to the De Young Museum in San Francisco, curator
Kathleen Berrin, who had led the team in charge of the conservation of the murals and
negotiated their return to Mexico, organized, in the early 1990s, a major exhibition about
Teotihuacan. Obtaining the loan of objects from Teotihuacan from the INAH proved an
arduous task, which took several years. Berrin explains these difficulties by at least three
factors (2017): the strength of the Mexican nationalist cultural narrative, the asymmetry
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I look more in depth at the penacho case for a practical reason: my case studies are either developing or
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the penacho in the Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada of the SRE in Mexico City. The folder
contained documents related to the case from 1986 through 2000 (later years were still classified as of
August 2017). All documents cited in this section are from this folder, unless noted otherwise.
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of US-Mexico relations, and the free trade agenda symbolized by the conclusion of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).110 The negotiations over the fate of
the Teotihuacan murals, which unfolded from the late 1970s through the mid-1980s, took
place, indeed, as Mexico had lost the special relationship it had enjoyed with the USA in
the decades following World War II: Mexico was trying to diversify its international
relations, maintain its traditional position against interventionism, support progressive
political movements in Central America, and dialogue with regimes adversarial to the
US, such as Castro’s Cuba and Sandinista Nicaragua – all without alienating its northern
neighbor (Covarrubias 2003). From 1978-82 particularly, under the administration of
Miguel López Portillo, Mexico enjoyed a stronger relative position thanks to the high
price of oil and its economic growth. Yet, that period came to an end with the 1982 debt
crisis, and López Portillo’s successors, Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88) and Carlos Salinas
de Gortari (1988-94), endorsed free trade as the best option to ensure the country’s
economic development.
One important factor must be added to Berrin’s analysis for the analysis of that
return case: the administrative nature of the state agency that undertook the negotiations
on the Mexican side. Because of the usual disinterest of US federal authorities for topics
of cultural policy in general, and heritage conservation in particular, the museum and the
city of San Francisco were left largely on their own to negotiate with the Mexican side.
Consequently, the INAH became the direct interlocutor of the museum, the SRE acting as
a facilitator but not a direct negotiator. In the Teotihuacan murals case, the cultural state,
embodied in the INAH (which, in the early 1980s, was not yet under the umbrella of the
110
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returning the murals that preceded the exhibition, as well.

186

larger agency CONACULTA, created in 1988), was relatively unencumbered by other
priorities of Mexican diplomacy. The INAH could push its nationalist discourse, as
underlined by Berrin, and claim the murals with relatively little concern of causing
collateral damage to the bilateral US-Mexican relationship, which was handled elsewhere
(in Mexico City or Washington DC, far from San Francisco) and by a different set of
institutional actors (the SRE and the presidency).111
Contrasting with this case, the archives I consulted in Mexico City about the
penacho reveal that the objective of obtaining this return has clashed with the necessity of
maintaining a good bilateral relationship with Austria, as part of Mexico’s foreign policy
objective to strengthen its economic relationships with the European Union (EU). Unlike
the Teotihuacan murals case, the penacho case reveals how the negotiation was made
more difficult for the Mexican side by the fact that it was handled by the SRE itself,
which had to balance competing objectives. This may appear paradoxical, considering
that the bilateral relationship with Austria is considerably less important for Mexico than
its relationship with the USA. The public nature of the collections of Vienna’s
Ethnological Museum (the future Weltmuseum) explains this situation. A public entity,
the museum was shielded from having to negotiate directly with a foreign state, and
could count on the support of Austria’s federal administration. As detailed below, the
SRE kept a tight control over the negotiation process, and the INAH was not able to lead
its own negotiations with the museum, as it did in San Francisco.
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here is that neither the SRE nor the US embassy in Mexico were the lead authorities in the negotiation.

187

As noted in chapter 3, Mexico and Austria share a long history. Mexico has long
had a diplomatic mission in Vienna because the city is the headquarters of several United
Nations agencies, yet Austria cannot be considered a top priority of Mexico’s diplomacy.
Mexico has tried to diversify its diplomatic ties in Europe, for example re-establishing
official relations with Spain after Franco’s death. Yet, the Austria of the late 1980s
seemed more important for its history as a former empire from Mitteleuropa than for
being a heavyweight of international politics. Having followed a policy of neutrality
between the Western and Socialist blocs, Austria was not yet a member of the European
Economic Community. This situation changed in the mid-1990s: when Austria became a
member of the European Union (EU), Mexican diplomats started considering the country
as an opportunity to further diversify Mexico’s economic and political relations. Austria
was now a country “count[ing] with favorable perspectives to occupy an outstanding
place in the European context in the forthcoming years.”112 The bilateral relationship
could be “deepened” because Austria represented a bridge between Western and Eastern
Europe and had great economic potential. The relationship did, indeed, intensify from the
1990s onwards, with reciprocal visits of heads of state and ministers.
As they tried to evaluate the risks of “damaging the bilateral relationship,”
Mexican diplomats noted that the annual volume of commercial exchanges remained
modest and that the negative consequences of presenting a formal claim to Austria “shall
not be exaggerated.”113 A much more important stake for Mexico, however, was the
signing of a free trade agreement with the EU. As noted above, the insertion of Mexico in
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investments in Mexico had barely reached half a million dollars over the previous five years.
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the global economy, through the signing of free trade agreements, has been a priority of
Mexican diplomacy since the 1980s. NAFTA was the most important of those, of course,
but the treaty with the EU, signed in 2000,114 as well as other free trade agreements with
other Latin American states, were pieces of the same puzzle (Covarrubias 2003). Hence,
the relationship with Austria involved a much more strategic objective than maintaining
good economic relations with Austria alone, since Austria occupied the rotating
presidency of the EU in the second half of 1998.115
The timing of diplomacy is longer than that of domestic politics, causing
frustration and misunderstanding among audiences who would have liked to see the case
resolved more quickly. The documents I consulted justify the frustration expressed by
civil society actors such as Xokonoschtletl or Blanca Moctezuma, who accused the SRE
of not being interested in the penacho, not doing everything in its power to obtain its
return, and, even worse, of treason.116 Yet, these actors are probably wrong about the
reasons for the SRE’s prudence. More than a lack of nationalist commitment or a betrayal
of the Indigenous component of the nation, this attitude is the result of competing
interests that the SRE must manage to articulate the country’s foreign policy.117
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The difficulty of coordinating among state agencies
The archives also evidence the difficulties for different state agencies to coordinate their
work, in multiple instances. In 1988, Xokonoschtletl claimed to have received support
from the Mexican Secretary of Public Education, taking by surprise the embassy in
Vienna and the SRE in Mexico, which had not been consulted on the matter.118 He later
informed the embassy that he had also received support from INAH, which the embassy
seems to have ignored.119 Confusion has also reigned regarding the letter sent in March
1991 by Roberto García Moll, director of the INAH, requesting the return of the
penacho. 120 Two weeks later, the bureau for Western European affairs of the SRE
informed the embassy in Vienna that the Mexican government was not requesting the
return – either ignoring that a letter was sent from the INAH, or contradicting it. The
confusion about this letter lasted for several years.121
On a personal level, Mexican ambassadors seem to have had good relations with
the head officers of INAH and CONACULTA who visited Austria during this period.
However, the relationships among agencies continued to be difficult. In May 1994, the
embassy in Vienna asked the SRE to clarify CONACULTA President Tovar y Teresa’s
declarations about the “steps” [gestiones] being taken in the penacho case.122 From
August 1995, coordination finally started to improve with the organization in Mexico
118
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City of a series of meetings with representatives from the SRE, INAH, and
CONACULTA, which ultimately led to the formulation of a policy regarding the
penacho.123 This policy had been many years in the making.
The difficulty of defining a position.
Numerous functionaries of the SRE have expressed their doubts about the importance and
opportunity to claim the return of the penacho; none of them ever explicitly declared
against this goal in writing, however. These doubts explain the apparent indecision of
Mexican diplomacy about whether it should request the penacho at all. They also explain,
in part, that Mexico has not succeeded, as Peru did in the Machu Picchu case, to obtain
the return. Consensus among state agencies and a high priority given to this goal would
be necessary.
For many years, Mexican diplomacy, unable to formulate a policy, remained in a
reactive position to the initiatives of other actors. The penacho became a topic of concern
in fall 1987, after Xokonoschtletl’s first public protest in Vienna. As the fiftieth
anniversary of Mexico’s protest against the Anschluss approached, Ambassador Cuevas
Cancino was considering, in October, that there was a “favorable climate to start
negotiations.” 124 However, two months later, having consulted “informally” about a
possible return and firmly been replied that it was not an option, he advised that it would
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“not be convenient to insist.”125 Then, in early 1988, as the political crisis surrounding the
revelations of Austrian President Waldheim’s Nazi past deepened in Austria, the
ambassador warned that Xokonoschtletl’s activities were only adding “new reasons for
concern” for Austrian authorities.126 Clearly, Mexican diplomats intended to maintain a
cautious attitude.
In the late 1980s, the Mexican embassy in Vienna kept asking the SRE in Mexico
City for instructions on how to manage this case, without obtaining a clear answer.127
Meanwhile, the consular services had to provide assistance to Xokonoschtletl and his
dancers on repeated occasions, as these were arrested or needed to renew their passports.
Asked about how to handle this colorful character, the SRE invariably replied to show
sympathy for his cause without entering into an argument with the Austrian authorities.128
In June 1992, Ambassador Anguiano in Vienna proposed a change of tactics:
officially requesting the return of the penacho would force Austrian authorities to define
their position on the issue, or to at least propose an alternative solution.129 In November, a
new ambassador, Claude Heller, told the secretary general of the Austrian ministry of
foreign relations that the “Mexican government would welcome with satisfaction the
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devolution of the object.” Heller reported to the SRE that “Austrian authorities have
difficulties providing a definitive solution” to this question.130 Soon after, he suggested
that the next visit of the secretary general to Mexico could be an opportunity to launch a
bi-national commission to examine the penacho and make recommendations on the
future of the object.131 The ambassador made another point: Mexico may have been
cautious not to create a diplomatic issue by asking for the penacho, but surely Austrian
authorities would be just as cautious not to offend their Mexican interlocutors by
answering negatively.132 The SRE seemed not too impressed by the proposal, considering
that Mexico and Austria were “beginning a new phase in their relationship” that should
not be made more difficult by including the penacho in the bilateral agenda.133
Finally, in February 1995 came an acknowledgement that the SRE had been
stalling on the question of the penacho: the office of the legal counsel of the SRE
suggested it was time to define a clear position on the topic.134 Yet, a few months later,
the Mexican embassy in Vienna again complained that it had not yet received instructions
regarding the official position of Mexico, even though finding a “definitive” solution to
the issue seemed indispensable to avoid creating an ambiguous diplomatic situation with
Austria.135 The inter-institutional coordination meeting from August 1995, mentioned
above, should have brought clarity to the matter and put the SRE on a clearer path.
Yet, when Roberta Lajous was appointed ambassador in Vienna in August 1995,
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she seemed to adopt the “wait-and-see” strategy of her predecessors. Claiming that the
case had attracted too much publicity and that everybody she was meeting in Vienna was
expecting her to make an official claim; she asked that the instructions she was given a
few days earlier to present such claim before October 12 of that year be rescinded.136 This
episode clearly illustrates the different interests Mexican diplomacy was trying to
balance, the relatively low level of priority that the SRE was giving to the penacho, and
the cautiousness that characterizes Mexican diplomacy in general.137
In June 1996, a diplomatic note considered that the Austrian government may
agree to return the penacho and that “an official claim by Mexican authorities to get the
penacho back would have a positive impact on public opinion in our country.”138 A few
days later (as recounted in chapter 2), Austrian President Klestil declared on television
that he was favorable to a return of the penacho. The diplomatic activity in July 1996 was
intense and documents from the SRE reveal that the return of the penacho was seen as a
real possibility at the time. In spite of the subsequent visit of Mexican authorities later in
the summer (CONACULTA President Tovar y Teresa delivered a letter, signed by
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Gurria, “express[ing] the interest of the Mexican
government in the offer by President Klestil to gift the penacho”),139 that window of
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opportunity closed as the conservative members of the governing coalition and the
museum establishment in Austria refused the return. In any case, the decision of a return
would have to be taken by the Austrian parliament, not the executive (and even less so
the president, whose functions are mostly honorary). As it has happened many times in
the penacho case, Mexican hopes to obtain this return were dashed.
Three conclusions can be drawn from the 1996 episode. First, after the 1991 letter
from the INAH director, the Mexican government manifested its interest in the penacho
in writing for the second time – invalidating the claim by the Austrian party, maintained
well into the 2010s, that Mexico never officially solicited the return of the penacho (I
return to this question in chapter 5). Second, the idea to offer “compensation” to Austria
and the Ethnological Museum in exchange for the generous gesture of returning the
penacho was mentioned for the first time.140 Third, the episode was sufficiently important
that the SRE derogated to its policy of maintaining secrecy about its actions and released
a press communique providing an official account of the visit of the heads of
CONACULTA and INAH to Austria.141 Mexican diplomats had expressed on multiple
occasions throughout the first years of negotiation the necessity to remain discreet about
the topic of the penacho.142 This feature of diplomacy often conflicts with the strategy of
civil society actors such as Xokonoschtletl and Blanca Moctezuma who, on the contrary,
seek maximum media exposure to advance their cause. That the SRE broke its usual
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policy of discretion demonstrates the exceptionalism of the summer 1996 episode. To be
sure, much continued to happen “under the radar” over the following fifteen years.143
At the end of the decade of the 1990s, it was clear that Mexican diplomacy had
managed not to let the penacho become a serious problem for its relationship with
Austria. The visit of Mexican Secretary of Exterior Relations Rosario Green to Austria,
in 2000, was an occasion for Mexican diplomacy to confirm that the relationship was “of
a good level,” even though neither country was a priority for the other. 144 Most
importantly, the free trade agreement with the EU was signed in 2000.
There were further moments of intense diplomatic activity in the 2000s, as
recounted in Chapter 2. In the context of President Fox’s attempts to redefine Mexico’s
foreign policy around the pursuit of a pro-human rights and democracy agenda
(Covarrubias 2011), Mexican diplomacy seems to have shown greater will on the topic of
the penacho, particularly around three moments: the first bi-national commission in 2002;
the 2006 episode, at the end of Fox’s presidency, when Patricia Espinoza, who later
became Felipe Calderón’s secretary of exterior relations, was ambassador in Vienna; and
the second bi-national commission, which concluded with the determination of the
impossibility of moving the penacho without causing irreparable damage.145
Colombia’s and Peru’s foreign policies: contrasting cases
After this detailed analysis of the Mexican cases, I argue that Colombian diplomacy faces
a similar set of constrains as the SRE, which reduces its ability to seek the return of the
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Quimbaya collection and the San Agustín statues, even though Colombian civil society
and the judicial branch asked the executive to do so. I also argue that, in comparison, the
Peruvian executive has benefited from the relative diplomatic weakness of its adversaries.
The implications of the return claims for Colombia’s foreign relations must be
understood within the context of the country’s relationship with the USA and its efforts to
develop autonomous relations with other economic and political partners. In this regard,
the overall problematic facing Colombia’s foreign policy is hardly unique, resembling
that of Mexico and Peru. Spain and Germany (the countries involved in the Quimbaya
and San Agustín cases) represent “traditional partners”146 that Colombian diplomacy
seeks to cajole rather than disturb, favoring goals such as a free trade agreement with the
EU, which was signed in 2013. President Santos was also looking for the support of the
EU to obtain his country’s accession to the OECD (Ramírez 2011), finally agreed upon in
2018. It was important to project an image of Colombia as a country that has overcome
the internal problems that have plagued it over the previous decades, such as drug
trafficking, internal armed conflict, and human rights abuses (Escobar Lozano 2014), and
to avoid any topic that may thwart this plan. In this context, the declaration of the
Ministry of Culture, according to which claiming the Quimbaya collection “would
represent a lack of seriousness and respect towards friendly states, especially as these,
showing their faith and trust in Colombia, invest countless economic resources that
generate jobs and progress for the country,” can be better understood.147
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“'Estos 8 años diversificamos la agenda política exterior': Canciller,” interview with Foreign Relations
Minister María Ángela Holguín, El Tiempo, Jul. 13, 2018.
147
The Bogota newspaper El Tiempo did not buy the argument, though, calling it “dubious” (“La saga del
tesoro,” El Tiempo, Nov. 11, 2009).
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Additionally, because the claimed objects belong to public collections in Madrid
and Berlin (as is the case for the penacho in Vienna), Colombia cannot deal directly with
a museum, as Peru did in the case of Yale, and Mexico with the De Young. Combined
with a high degree of centralization around the figure of the president in the formulation
of the country’s foreign policy, to the detriment of the ministry of foreign relations
(Tickner 2003, Randall 2011), the hispanophilia of Colombian elites148 and the lack of
interest in the topic from the office of the presidency (both under Alvaro Uribe and Juan
Manuel Santos)149 also contribute to explaining the reluctance of Colombian diplomacy
to aggressively engage in the goal of obtaining the return of these objects.
Peru’s diplomacy, on the contrary, has been less cautious than its Mexican and
Colombian counterparts in its handling of return claims. The involvement of the
presidents themselves and the type of adversaries faced in these demands can explain this
outcome, which seems at odds with St. John’s assessment (2011) of Peruvian foreign
policy as pragmatic rather than ideological. Indeed, while Peru has switched, through the
second half of the twentieth century, between periods of tight alignment with the USA
and efforts to establish a closer relationship with the USSR and its allies and to foster
economic integration with other Andean countries, Alberto Fujimori decisively chose a
line favoring US interests in the 1990s, adopting a pro-market and pro-free trade stance
(Berríos 2003). Neither Toledo (2000-06) nor García (2006-12) questioned these
orientations in the country’s foreign and economic policies (St. John 2011).
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See chapter 3.
As noted in chapter 2, two previous presidents – Julio Betancur and Ernesto Samper – had shown a
personal interest in the Quimbaya collection. I am not aware of declarations by either Uribe or Santos on
the topic, however.

149

198

The relationship with the USA is, of course, central in the definition of Peru’s
foreign policy, and free trade is one of the main stakes in the relationship. In December
2005, Toledo’s minister of foreign affairs Oscar Maúrtua actually insisted that the
“situation [with Yale University] must not impact negatively the very good relationships
with the USA that have recently been strengthened with the conclusion of the
negotiations over the free trade agreement.”150 His concern proved unfounded and the
treaty was signed in April 2006, yet only implemented in February 2009, under Toledo’s
successor, Alan García – one of many topics in foreign relations that show continuity
rather than change between the two presidents. As noted in chapter 3,151 Toledo took
advantage of the signing of the treaty to make more aggressive declarations about the
return of the Machu Picchu collection. García continued the claim and pushed it as far as
threatening Yale’s president Richard Levin with launching a penal procedure, apparently
undaunted by the stakes of maintaining good relations with the USA. This might not
sound surprising coming from García, a charismatic young president who in his first term
(1985-90) often used “strong and confrontational language” and displayed an antiimperialist discourse in line with the traditional rhetoric of his left-leaning party, the
APRA.152 Yet, his words usually went “beyond the actions he was willing or able to take”
(Berríos 2003, 221). By the time of his second presidency (2006-11), after the collapse of
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“Reunión sobre la recuperación de piezas arqueológicas localizadas en la Universidad de Yale” [minutes
of a meeting that took place at the Peruvian embassy in Washington DC], Dec. 14, 2015; ADGDPC.
151
See chapter 3, note 107.
152
The American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) was founded by Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre in
1930. Promoting a left-leaning, anti-imperialist, pan-Americanist, and economically nationalist discourse,
Haya de la Torre himself never governed Peru, as APRA was repressed by police and military forces, most
spectacularly during the coups of 1948 and 1962. Alan García Pérez was the only Peruvian president to
have been elected as the candidate of APRA, in 1985. Though a toned-down version of Haya de la Torre’s,
his rhetoric during his first presidency was still that of a left-leaning populist leader seeking to
counterbalance US hegemony by establishing a closer alliance with the Eastern bloc and other Latin
American countries.
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the USSR, the international system had greatly changed and García had become a much
more pragmatic head of state. Throughout the negotiation, García demonstrated his
personal interest in the topic. While the MREP and the INC were constantly involved in
the negotiation,153 García tried to circumvent both bureaucracies by naming his minister
of public housing as his special envoy, which led to the signing of the first MOU in 2007.
Ultimately, the case was resolved through a final negotiation that personally involved the
president, in November 2010 in Lima, with the visit of Ernesto Zedillo.
Why did he and his predecessor Toledo take an aggressive stance towards a US
educational institution to claim the return of the collection? I argue that it was precisely
because Yale, though a prestigious Ivy-league university, remains a private institution
that never garnered support from the US federal authorities.154 The US government,
content with the reestablishment of its sphere of influence in Latin America through the
disappearance of the communist threat, the imposition of the neo-liberal agenda, and an
official support of Peruvian authorities to coca eradication policies, never cared much for
a few cultural objects, which represented no threat to this agenda. Quite to the contrary,
the return of the collection allowed satisfying the demands of an always-susceptible
Peruvian nationalism. Toledo and García’s declarations were aimed at an internal
audience; demonstrating their attachment to the nationalist ideology bore virtually no
153

As signaled by former INC Director Cecilia Bákula (interview, Apr. 27, 2017), there was a form of
rivalry between the two entities, as Foreign Affairs did enjoy a higher status in this negotiation thanks to its
ministerial rank, which the INC did not have. On the other hand, the INC had the technical expertise that
the ministry of foreign relations lacked.
154
US Ambassador Michael McKinley declared the “good will” of his country to help reach an agreement
between Peru and Yale and recalled that Yale is a private institution, in which the US cannot intervene
(“EEUU apoya a Perú en el caso de Yale,” La República, Sep. 5, 2008). His successor, Rose Likins,
declared that “the US government is not part to this dispute. I cannot comment because we have no firsthand information. I hope this case will be resolved as soon as possible, but I cannot say more because we
do not participate [in the negotiation]” (quoted in “Alan García pidió a Baracj Obama que la U. de Yale
devuelva piezas arqueológicas de Machu Picchu,” El Comercio, Nov. 2, 2010). Off-the-record, I was told
that the US embassy, which has organized conferences on the topic of antiquities trade and trafficking, did
not show active support to Yale and, to contrary, proved quite sympathetic to the Peruvian cause.
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consequence for their other foreign policy objectives. Demonstrating continuity from one
government to the next probably played in their favor, showing that the topic was of
importance beyond the personal interest of the incumbent.155
In the case of the relationship with Sweden, the stakes were lower for Peru’s
diplomacy – a case that could be compared to the Mexico-Austria relationship. Sweden
was obviously not a priority for Peru; García even closed the embassy in Stockholm for
two years. 156 Peru’s more aggressive diplomacy to obtain the return of the Paracas
textiles than Mexico’s on the penacho case has several explanations, including the
attitude of the museum and city of Gothenburg, which proved willing to cooperate; the
relatively low involvement of Swedish state authorities, who were observers during the
negotiation but did not participate actively;157 and the lower salience of the case in the
media, which allowed both parties to negotiate more serenely, except when García
threatened to file criminal charges in his final days in power.158 Overall, even though
Sweden is a member of the EU, with which Peru has had a free-trade agreement since
2013, the bilateral relationship remains of less concern for Peru than that with other
Western European powers. These, to be sure, were unlikely to support Sweden on this
topic, seeing with skepticism – at best – the Swedish admission of guilt and will to return
cultural objects displaced decades ago, which bore the risk of setting a precedent. I return
to this topic in chapter 6.

155

This idea is suggested in the minutes of the Dec. 14, 2005, meeting. See supra, note 150.
See website of the Peruvian embassy in Sweden: http://www.peruembassy.se/relaciones-politicodiplomaticas/peru-suecia.html. The embassy was closed from 2010 and 2012, and the Peruvian
representation remained during these years at the level of a consulate general.
157
Cecilia Lönnroth, planning official for the city of Gothenburg (interview, Mar. 25, 2019).
158
See chapter 2, note 47. This declaration can be interpreted as a last bravado tactics by a president
seeking to make a splash before bowing out – much, as noted above, in the style of his first presidency
when his words tended to go farther than his real intentions.
156
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have situated the claims for the return of cultural heritage objects at the
intersection of three policy fields: heritage management, tourism promotion, and foreign
policy. Return claims signal the maturing of the cultural state. While these states have
reinforced their capacity in the core policy field of heritage management, they have
learned to articulate potentially conflicting policy objectives: constraints of heritage
conservation can clash with the objective of tourism expansion and claiming the return of
an object involves balancing other objectives in foreign policy.
I have argued that return claims appeared in Mexico earlier than Peru and
Colombia most likely because Mexico has developed both strong institutions in charge of
heritage management and its tourism sector earlier than its two South American
counterparts. The perspective I adopted in this chapter also sheds light on the behavior of
the three states. In Peru, the objectives of obtaining the return of two collections
coincided with the interest of the tourism industry without clashing with vital interests in
foreign policy; as a consequence, the Peruvian state has been the most proactive of the
three in seeking (and obtaining) returns. Additionally, Peru benefited from the nature of
the adversaries it faced: in the Machu Picchu case, the claim was directed at a non-profit
organization that received little to no support from the US federal government; in the
Paracas case, its interlocutor was a party willing to reach an agreement and to return the
object. In Mexico, the cultural objective of obtaining the return of heritage objects was
not directly related to the interest of the tourism industry, whose development pre-dated
by far that of return claims. Juggling multiple and sometimes conflicting interests,
particularly free trade, Mexican diplomacy has not made the return of the penacho a
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policy priority the way its Peruvian counterpart did in the Machu Picchu case. Finally, in
Colombia, neither the Quimbaya collection nor the San Agustín statues represent a
priority for the heritage administration compared to the fight against current trafficking of
cultural heritage objects. Tourism promotion is less heavily based on the country’s preColumbian heritage. Also, the MREC is notably the most conservative of the three on the
topic of return claims. In consequence, the Colombian state is the most prudent in its
requests to Spain and Germany and seems more interested in damage control than in
actually obtaining the returns promoted by actors from Colombian civil society. Both
Mexico and Colombia’s diplomatic entities have handled the negotiations because these
involved the central governments of the countries where the objects are located; they
could not negotiate directly with the holding institution, as Peru did.
I have also argued in this chapter that return claims are the result of a path
dependent process in the expansion of the cultural state. Path dependency constrains the
future choices of policy makers, but does not over-determine them. Different choices
remain possible; return claims did not have to occur. Consolidating their capacities to
manage and preserve the tangible heritage within their own borders to refute one of the
arguments often presented against the very idea of returning cultural objects may sound
like a reasonable strategy on the part of the claiming countries. Yet, reading the whole
process of the strengthening of state capacity as leading ineluctably to return claims
would be a rather functionalist (ex-post, reconstructed, and ultimately unsatisfying)
explanation. As I will demonstrate in chapter 5, actors do have agency – including that of
not acting on specific topics, such as return claims.
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If the important steps I identified in the strengthening of the cultural state
(creation of museums, legislation over the protection of heritage) have constructed the
path that led to the decision to present a claim, the claim itself represents a critical
juncture. Critical junctures are “moments of structural indeterminacy and fluidity during
which several options for radical institutional innovation are available, one (…) is
selected as a consequence of political interactions and decision-making, and this initial
selection carries a long-lasting institutional legacy” (Capoccia 2016, 101). As Cecilia
Bákula told me, once a state has presented a claim, “there is no turning back”: a claim
cannot be withdrawn.159 Thus, we must understand the motivations of the actors of the
claim as they make the decision to formulate it. So far, my argument has functioned at a
macro, relatively high level of abstraction, and followed a constructivist-modernist
approach to nation-building to situate how depersonalized nation-states have appropriated
the pre-Colombian past to forge mestizo nations, before turning to a historicalinstitutional reading of the articulation of three policy fields. In the following chapter, I
turn to a micro-level analysis of the return claims: who does, within and at the margin of
the state, push for the return of cultural heritage objects? Beyond the reproduction of the
nationalist discourse as it has been implemented by the state over several decades, what
are these actors’ motivations?
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Interview, Apr. 27, 2017.
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Chapter 5 – Who claims and whose claim? Agency and politics among actors of
return claims
After examining the discourses that return claims support and the policy threads that lead
to their formulation, I turn to a more detailed examination of the actors who, within each
country, push for and make these claims. I analyze their motivations and highlight the
zones of contacts and conflicts among them. As I do this, I overcome a limit of the
literature on returns and restitutions, which tends to represent the claiming state as a
unified entity acting on its own will (“Greece” or “Mexico” standing as a free willing
agent), obscuring the political dynamics at play within these countries. I depict the state
both as an arena for conflict among different actors seeking to reproduce or alter
discourses on the nation and as a somewhat independent actor whose entities must
mediate diverging interests and balance different policy options for the management and
ownership of the national heritage.
In the course of my research, Paul Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework
(ACF) (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, Sabatier and Weible 2007) proved a useful
conceptual framework to analyze how, over the past three decades, Latin American
countries have presented claims for the return of cultural heritage objects, regardless of
changes in the political party or majority in power. The ACF considers that, because
contemporary policy-making is complex, participants must specialize and form a
subsystem dedicated to a specific topic. It explains policy change as the consequence of
economic and political transformations that are external to the policy subsystem but
affect policy-making, constitutional modifications, or changes in the core beliefs of this
subsystem. Within each subsystem, coalitions are, indeed, built around a series of beliefs
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that are stable over time and resistant to change. Actors of the coalitions tend to privilege
information that confirms their existing beliefs and screen out dissonant information,
which explains why policy change is difficult to bring about. An important contribution
of the ACF is to avoid focusing on the traditional iron triangle of policy-making;1 other
actors such as individuals, researchers, and the media also play a role in policy-making.
Few scholars have used the ACF to study cultural policy, even though Saint-Pierre (2004)
concluded from her analysis of Quebec’s cultural policy that it could greatly help
increase our understanding of that field.
In this chapter, I consider the formulation of return claims as a policy subsystem,
composed of individual and institutional actors who act according to their own beliefs
and interests. I consider these actors’ rationality as bounded by the cognitive framework I
have described in the preceding chapters. In chapter 3, I presented the core policy beliefs
of the coalitions that promote returns: these actors consider their material cultural
heritage – including objects made before the existence of the contemporary nation state –
as a cornerstone of their national identity. Such beliefs and values about the nation, built
over decades by the independent Latin American republics, change slowly, which implies
that the actors supporting return claims, themselves bound by these beliefs, remain stable
over time. In this context, claims take shape, in part, as the consequence of changes
external to the sub-field of heritage protection: the opening of Latin American economies
to transnational free trade; the promotion of cultural tourism as a basis for economic
development; internal armed conflicts rooted (at least in part) in structural socioeconomic inequalities and deeply engrained racial biases against Indigenous

1

Iron triangle refers to the overwhelming importance of Congresspersons, bureaucrats, and lobbyists in US
policy-making.
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communities; and the process of gradual democratization that increases possibilities for
political participation. Thanks, in great part, to the institutional arrangements described in
chapter 4, the belief in the importance of heritage for the construction of the nation has
become hegemonic, crowding out all possibility for adverse coalitions to develop. As a
result, no movement or coalition within the claiming countries openly opposes the
principle of returns, even though, as exposed below, some actors within state agencies
show little enthusiasm for the process.
In chapter 5, I first highlight the key role of civil society actors as triggers of the
claims, in four of my six case studies. I continue with an analysis of the role of the
experts, whose position on a specific claim is better understood as part of what Smith
(2006) has termed the “authorized heritage discourse” (AHD). Then, I disaggregate the
state authorities in charge of the negotiation with the claimed institution or country and
demonstrate that the success of a claim depends on the attitude of the executive branch,
and more specifically the involvement of the president. I close this chapter with
considerations about the absence of Indigenous communities from the return claims,
which reproduces the national discourses that have appropriated the Indigenous past
without fully acknowledging contemporary Indigenous communities.
At the birth of the coalition: civil society actors
While there were early attempts at claiming the return of cultural objects (see chapter 2),
the current movement at work in all three countries was triggered by individual actors
from civil society. Four of my six case studies (the Machu Picchu collection, the
penacho, the San Agustín statues, and the Quimbaya collection) have appeared as a result

207

from the pressure by civil society actors over state authorities.2 Return claims show that
Chechi (2015) forgot to include individuals in his list of “the most active and vocal nonstate actors in the cultural heritage domain,” which only includes non-governmental
organizations, private companies, and non-state armed groups.
As I have explained in chapter 2, return claims form part of the renegotiation of
the national discourse in the context of the democratization process in Latin America,
which provides citizens with new legal and media channels to engage with the state. The
individuals asking for the return of cultural objects express diverse motivations that range
from a claim to represent the Indigenous population of their country to efforts to hold the
state accountable for its past faults and current inaction. State entities in charge of the
return claims, in all three countries, have sought to sideline these individuals from the
claiming process, mostly by discrediting their legitimacy and motives. Serving a cause
has a cost for these individuals: they are soon exposed to the criticism of other civil
society actors, the media, experts, and government officials. 3 Also, they are often
marginalized from the return claim itself once the executive branch and its agencies (the
ministries of foreign affairs and culture, as well as the agency in charge of heritage
management) have taken over the claim. Of course, state officials and functionaries are
2

In the other two cases, the claiming state responded to a solicitation from the holding institution. I return
to these two cases in chapter 6.
3
Entering into the details (and discussing the validity) of such accusations is besides the point of my
argument. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 223) prefer to focus on beliefs rather than on interests as the
element that glue a coalition together, arguing that interests and beliefs covary and that disentangling them
may result in a methodological impasse. For this reason, I prefer to focus on these individuals’ beliefs, as
they are stated in written documents and declarations, than on guesses about possible other interests. If
money is what motivated them, they will likely have been disappointed by the rewards. They will have
found more satisfaction if the spotlight of national media was their incentive: they have been, and often
continue to be, widely covered in the media. I do wish to underline, however, that these individuals have
made many foes. Regardless of whether their involvement was disinterested or motivated by potential
material or symbolic advantages, they are the reason for the very existence of the claims. Their engagement
has become, I believe, a raison d’être, a cause that justifies the (financial, professional, reputational) risks
that they take; in that sense, their time- and resource-consuming commitment to their cause can be
considered rational.
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the only authorities legally entitled to lead such negotiations, but two reasons at least
explain why these individuals are being kept at a distance.
First, their insistence on denouncing the state’s inaction and holding it
accountable for enforcing the policies that should protect the national heritage, for the
benefit of the national community, has fostered enmities in official circles. Second, these
individuals also contest part of the country’s official historiography (of the object, the
conquest, and the nation-state), promoting an oral history that challenges well-entrenched
interests and rewriting part of the (post-)colonial history to amend historical wrongs.
These two factors combine at different degrees in the stories I recount in the next pages.
Regardless of state efforts to marginalize them, these individuals all keep a position of
watchdog even after the executive has taken over the claim.
Mexico: the power of oral history
Xokonoschtletl Gómora and Blanca Moctezuma Barragán benefited from the slow
liberalization of the semi-authoritarian and corporatist regime of the PRI: in the late
1980s and 1990s, as individuals without the backing of powerful unions or other
corporatist bodies, they managed to be heard at different levels of the state bureaucracy.
They represent a sublimated Indigenous past (Gómora as a self-described “activist of the
national identity” and leader of a group of danzantes,4 and Moctezuma Barragán as a
descendent of the last Aztec emperor5) that protected them as they were being vocal

4

Near Mexico City’s Constitutional Square, groups of danzantes (dancers in “traditional” attire) perform
(neo-)Indigenous dances on the plaza between the cathedral and the Templo Mayor – the archaeological
remains of Aztec capital Tenochtitlán’s main religious center.
5
Blanca Moctezuma claims that her grand-mother entrusted her with the memory and memorabilia of their
ancestor Tecuichpo, a daughter of Montezuma’s. She derives her legitimacy not only from being a fifteengeneration descendant of the Moctezuma family, but also from her ancestor Juana Horcasitas Can
Moctezuma, who, Blanca claims, had already started the process of asking the return of the penacho with
Emperor Maximilian of Habsburg, in 1863 (Text of a press conference by Blanca Moctezuma in Mexico
City, Jan. 1997; AHGE-SRE).
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against the Mexican state’s alleged disinterest in the penacho.6 Attacking them publicly
(or, at least, dismissing their claims) would have represented an insult to the national
discourse, rooted in Mexico’s pre-Columbian past, that the PRI itself had largely
promoted since it took control of the state in the 1930s. Since they contributed to the
perpetuation of the national narrative, the PRI likely considered them an annoyance
rather than a threat. Their criticism was directed at the country’s government but they
never questioned what “Mexico” is or the state’s ownership over the object.7 Both are in
favor of the penacho being presented in the national palace or a national museum upon its
return to Mexico.
Consequently, both were left relatively free to contest part of the country’s
official historiography, as they promoted their version of Mexico’s history based on oral
and popular traditions. According to Gómora, the return of “Montezuma’s crown” (a term
largely discredited in academic circles)8 will play a role in regenerating Mexican society
and identity, shattered by the Spanish conquest.9 His version of the conquest, along with
Blanca Moctezuma’s oral history based on her family’s tradition, have challenged the
idea that the penacho was, indeed, a gift from Emperor Montezuma to Emperor Charles
V – an official narrative still on public display in Vienna in 199710 and defended by

6

See chapter 4, note 116.
For example, Blanca Moctezuma wrote to Austrian President Heinz Fischer and Chancellor Viktor Klima
in January 1997 “on behalf of the Mexican people, Mexico’s Indigenous people, and the Moctezuma family”
to claim the return of this “symbol of power,” which is the “property of the people of Mexico and the
Moctezuma family” (Letter from Blanca S. Barragán Moctezuma to Viktor Klima, Chancellor of the
Republic of Austria, January 1997; AHGE-SRE).
8
See Chapter 2. There is no certainty as to the exact function of the object; yet the most commonly
accepted understanding is that it was a ceremonial object rather than a personal attribute of power of the
tlaotani, the Aztec emperor.
9
See chapter 3, note 60.
10
An exhibition titled “Lügen” [Lies] took place in Spring 1997 in Vienna’s Theater Museum. It included a
panel about the penacho (but not the object itself) indicating that the object was not Montezuma’s feathered
crown. The panel, however, explained that the object had been sent as a gift by Hernán Cortés to Emperor
7
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Mexican and Austrian authorities well into the 2000s, but that historians now consider
dubious at best (Feest 2012). On this point at least, official history has integrated the
alternative versions promoted from a bottom-up perspective. For Blanca Moctezuma, the
penacho was stolen by (not given to) Cortés, sent to Spain, and captured by French
privateer Jean Florin, who brought it back to Europe. In this version, the object was in
France, then Italy, before entering Ferdinand of Tyrol’s collection at the end of the
sixteenth century. 11 Gómora’s and Moctezuma’s narratives, largely diffused in the
Mexican press through the 1990s and 2000s,12 picture the loss of the penacho as a
constant reminder of the disaster that the “discovery” of America meant for the Aztec
empire, and denounce the Mexican state’s inaction, which would be due to its civil
servants’ malinchismo.13 Xokonoschtletl and Blanca Moctezuma know each other, of
course. Both express sympathy towards the other because they share the objective of
returning the penacho to Mexico, yet they have not collaborated in pursuit of this
objective.14 They have chosen vastly different strategies to pursue their goal. In response,
state authorities have had, at best, ambiguous relations with them.
On the one hand, since his first demonstration in Vienna in 1987 and throughout
the 1990s, the SRE has seen Xokonoschtletl as a self-interested individual exploiting the
dancers he was bringing from Mexico to march and dance in Vienna every summer, as
Charles V (Letter from Roberta Lajous, Ambassador of Mexico in Vienna, to Foreign Relations Secretary
Jorge Chen, Mar. 13, 1997, and enclosed translation of exhibition materials).
11
Text of a press conference by Blanca Moctezuma, op. cit., note 5. Blanca Moctezuma and her husband
Jesús Juárez Flores also told me this story when we spoke (interview, Jul. 28, 2018).
12
See for example Anne Huffschmid and Adriana Malvido, “Sólo Zedillo puede gestionar su devolución,”
La Jornada, Dec. 3, 1994; Elba Chávez Lomeli, “Soy descendiente de Moctezuma: Queremos en México
su penacho,” Impacto, n. 2355 and “Falta coraje para traer el penacho de Moctezuma,” Impacto, n. 2356
(1995); Adriana Malvido, “Descubre el AGN por primera vez, el testamento de Tecuichpo,” La Jornada,
Jan. 12, 1996; Antonio Bertrán, “Busca nieta de Moctezuma recuperar el penacho,” Reforma, Jan. 18, 1997.
13
See Chapter 3, note 51.
14
I could only speculate on the reasons why they have not collaborated more intensely – these could
include jealousies, leadership of the cause, etc.
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revealed by several communications between the Mexican embassy in Vienna and the
SRE in Mexico City.15 The relationship between the danzante and the Mexican embassy
remained strained throughout the following years, mostly because of Xokonoschtletl’s
continued accusations of inaction and disinterest against the Mexican diplomatic corps
and government, which give a “very bad impression of the country.”16 This concern,
however, proved largely unfounded, as I will show in chapter 6: Xokonoschtletl’s actions
found widespread support in Austria. The multiplication of incidents (including fights
with the police, short-term incarceration, a car accident, and attempts by several dancers
to recover their passports, confiscated from them by Xokonoschtletl) that forced the
Mexican consulates (in Austria but also in other European countries) to assist the

15

In October 1987, the Mexican ambassador sent a detailed report to the SRE about his meeting with
Xokonoschtletl; the ironic tone of the communication reveals a certain scorn towards the “oral tradition”
defended by a “great actor” and shows concerns that the dancers in his group may not be in Vienna on their
own will (Informe sobre los danzantes “Aztecas” en Viena, prepared by Ambassador Cuevas Cancino for
the bureau of cultural affairs of the SRE, Oct. 22, 1987; AHGE-SRE). In December, the Embassy and the
Austrian Ministry of Foreign Relations were wondering where the financial support for the long-term stay
in Vienna of such a large group was coming from, and whether the return of the penacho was their real
motive (Memorandum para información superior, from the bureau for Western European affairs of the SRE,
Dec. 16, 1987). A memorandum from 1992 describes Xokonoschtletl as an “adroit opportunist” who has
made a modus vivendi of claiming the penacho in front of Vienna’s museum; his discourses “lack
seriousness” as he claims supernatural powers. He “exploits a historical-emotional aspect that allows him,
as leader of the movement, to attract public attention and live off a problem he created.” He “fables” about
the penacho and his life to win support among Mexicans and foreigners, especially women (Memorandum
prepared by Ambassador Eugenio Anguiano for the SRE, May 19, 1992). The following year, after
Xokonoschtletl’s arrest, subsequent to a fight with the Austrian police, the embassy describes him as an
individual “ready for permanent controversy, who may be emotionally unstable (he has messianic attitudes,
he is convinced to be the heir of pre-Hispanic traditions and pretends to have healing and priestly faculties).
His character is violent, provocative and gives the impression that he is a ‘social resentful’ who has found
in alleged Indigenous causes and claims a form of living, taking on the position of a cacique or caudillo
among the people he leads.” His group is “relatively homogenous,” formed of “humble and ignorant people”
who are under his “absolute control” (Diplomatic cable from the Mexican embassy in Vienna to the
direction of consular affairs of the SRE, Sep. 17, 1993).
16
Email from the Mexican embassy in Sweden to the SRE and other Mexican embassies in Europe, Aug.
26, 1997; AHGE-SRE. The archive I consulted in Mexico city contains messages from Mexican embassies
in several European countries. Indeed, for several summers, in order to garner wider support to his cause,
Xokonoschtletl led his danzantes through a European tour that included several capitals and concluded in
Vienna, in front of the museum. Mexican consuls and ambassadors in the countries that Xokonoschtletl
visited wrote to the SRE asking for instructions.
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danzantes, also explains the fatigue that transpires from the official correspondence
throughout the 1990s.
However, Mexican bureaucracy has been divided about Xokonoschtletl. While
functionaries of the SRE complained about him, the INAH, on the other hand, provided
his organization, Yankuikanahuak, an official recognition in 1991, at the same time its
director García Moll first wrote to the Austrian federal minister of culture to ask for the
return of the penacho.17 This support provoked tensions among state agencies: the
Mexican ambassador in Vienna expressed his frustration about seeing other (unnamed)
state entities support Xokonoschtletl.18 Regardless, the INAH renewed its recognition to
Xokonoschtletl at least once, in 1993,19 even though there never was unanimity within
the archaeological community about him: for example, archaeologist Felipe Solis echoed
the diagnosis of the SRE, arguing that Xokonoschtletl had “made a business” of the
penacho, “giving a superficial image of Mexico.”20 Xokonoschtletl also received the
“moral” support from the Secretary of Public Education Miguel Gónzalez Avelar.21 He
has stopped taking big groups to Europe since a serious accident on a German highway in
2006; he has not since then been able to fund other trips to Vienna to protest in front of
the museum. As of 2018, he lived in the southern Mexican state of Tabasco.

17

In this letter, the INAH “recognizes officially and authorizes the association Yankuikanahuak as its
auxiliary in the following objectives: (…) the recuperation, protection, conservation, restoration, promotion,
and diffusion of the cultural, paleontological, archaeological, and historical heritage of the Mexican nation.”
This recognition is valid for two years (Letter from INAH Director Roberto García Moll to Perpetual
General President and Honorary Treasurer of Yankuikanahuak, Xokonoschtletl Antonio Gómora, Jul. 16,
1991; AHGE-SRE).
18
Letter from Ambassador Eugenio Anguiano to SRE, Jun. 30, 1992; AHGE-SRE.
19
Letter from INAH National Coordinator Joaquín Alvarez Vásquez to Xokonoschtletl Gómora, Mar. 4,
1993; AHGE-SRE. This recognition may have been renewed in 1995.
20
Huffschmid and Malvido, “Fuese o no (…), op. cit., chapter 2, note 59. Solis was at the time the subdirector for archaeology at the National Museum of Anthropology. He would go on to be the director of the
museum from 2000 to 2009.
21
Memorandum (…), 1992, op. cit., note 15. González Avelar served in that function from 1985 to 1988.
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Blanca Barragán Moctezuma became a public figure a few years after
Xokonoschtletl: Mexican newspapers mention her from the mid-1990s onward. Her
modus operandi has been very different from Xokonoschtletl’s: rather than demonstrating
in Vienna, she lobbied Mexican authorities in Mexico City. In the process, she made
many enemies, who grew weary of her insistence; many functionaries in the SRE, in
particular, disparaged her motives as well as her genealogical claim to be the heir of the
last Aztec emperor. However, her less adversarial style than Xokonoschtletl’s has led the
Mexican administration to treat her differently: the government of the PAN used
cooptation tactics in the purest style of its PRI predecessor by naming her Mexico’s
cultural attaché to the countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), based in Kuala Lumpur, from 2009 through 2014. This tactic kept her
physically at bay from the Mexican media, where she used to regularly criticize the
state’s inaction. She was not entirely deprived of all agency on the topic of the penacho,
though: she was able to meet with Austrian President Heinz Fischer in November 2010 in
Kuala Lumpur.22 Throughout these years, however, her capacity to access the Mexican
media and to visit (or bother, depending on the perspective) SRE functionaries in Mexico
City was greatly reduced.
The Peruvianization of history
In Peru, the flag bearer of the claim for the return of the Machu Picchu collection is
Mariana Mould de Pease. The widow of Peruvian historian Franklin Pease, who died in
1999, she dedicated the following years to uncovering the memory of the collection of
objects taken away by Hiram Bingham in the 1910s and that had been largely forgotten
since the 1920s. Contrary to Xokonoschtletl and Blanca Moctezuma in Mexico, she was
22

Adriana Malvido, “Atrás del penacho,” Milenio, Jan. 19, 2011.
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not a stranger to the small academic and intellectual circles of the Peruvian capital (the
“experts” I describe in the following section), whom she knew through her husband. She
had also traveled to Yale with him, where she had met archaeologists Richard Burger and
Lucy Salazar. Her research, which she published in press articles and in a book (2003),
evidenced that the Peruvian state has not followed up with Yale to claim the return of the
collection earlier in the twentieth-century.
Mould de Pease is not the person who made the return of the Machu Picchu
collection happen because she was left out of the direct negotiations. But it is possible
that the collection would have remained just another ensemble of objects deposited in a
museum of the global North if it were not for her insistence or, as I have often heard, her
stubbornness, to bring the topic to the fore. In the process, of course, she attracted
criticism as she entered a minefield of professional rivalries. For many in Peru, Mould de
Pease’s only credential as a historian is to be the widow of a prestigious historian of the
Catholic University. Yet, her research into Yale’s archives, which proved that the objects
taken by Bingham should have been returned in the early 1920s, was funded by public
agencies. 23 In turn, her association with specific individuals within the Peruvian
archaeological establishment (in particular, the polarizing figure of Luis Lumbreras) no
doubt caused jealousies and probably explains why her employment with the INC was
terminated with the change of administration in 2006, as Lumbreras himself left the INC.
Other dimensions of her work also explain the enmities she inspired. Her articles
and book are critical of the commodification of Machu Picchu since the late 1990s,
23

As she acknowledges in her book (2003), Mould de Pease benefited from several contracts with the INC
(under three successive directors, including Luis Lumbreras, who was director of that agency during
Alejandro Toledo’s presidency). Also, the Peruvian National Council for Science, Technology, and
Innovation (CONCYTEC) provided financial support for her to present her work at the conference of the
American Association of Archaeology (AAA) in 2002.
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particularly the failed attempt at building a cable car from Aguas Calientes to the
archaeological site. More generally, the case of the Machu Picchu collection reads as a
critique of the oligarchic república aristocrática that governed the country at the turn of
the twentieth century, focusing solely on the interests of Lima’s elites and making little
case yet of the pre-Columbian heritage. Mould de Pease’s writings are also an indictment
of the practices of anthropologists and archaeologists from the early twentieth century,
when codes of ethics had not yet provided guidelines for researchers about how to deal
with either living human subjects or human remains or how to handle the products of
archaeological excavation. She advocates in favor of a greater consideration of the role of
Peruvians (or, at least, Peru-based individuals) in the process of “discovering” Machu
Picchu and, beyond, of Peruvian perspectives in the historiography of their own country.
Colombia: facing the inaction and disinterest of the state
In Colombia, the claim for the return of the Quimbaya collection can be interpreted as the
reversal of hispanophile President Holguín’s actions,24 who in 1893 saw no harm in
gifting a collection of pre-Columbian artifacts to Colombia’s former colonizer – and, in
doing so, violated the 1886 constitution, according to the 2017 decision of the Colombian
Constitutional Court. As noted in chapter 3, return claims can serve, for those who
support them, to redress historical injustices. In Colombia, they represent an attempt by
civil society actors to hold the state accountable for past errors. Their sometimes
ahistorical readings of the facts that led to the displacement of the claimed objects
notwithstanding, these actors want the state to honor its commitment (inscribed in the
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Holguín, having spent several years in Europe as ambassador of Colombia, was an admirer of Spain, and
a close personal friend of Regent Queen María Cristina.
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legal norms it has passed over the course of two centuries and in the 1991 Constitution)
to protect the country’s material heritage in the name of the nation.
Jaime Lopera, the president of the Academia de Historia del Quindío (AHQ), has
worked for the return of the Quimbaya collection for more than fifteen years. Like
Mariana Mould in Peru, he is not himself an expert. As an amateur historian who has
published books and essays about the history of the Quindío department (Lopera
Gutiérrez 1986, 2003, 2011, 2015), he remains at the margin of academic circles but is
familiar with them. The AHQ is active locally in the department of Quindío and its
capital Armenia, organizing conferences, maintaining a website with contributions from
its members about the history of the region,25 and occasionally publishing monographs
about regional history. Lopera is also well connected in the Colombian political
establishment, having served as commercial attaché at the Colombian embassy in Spain
and, briefly, as governor of the Quindío department and Colombian minister of transport.
I suspect that these links explain the generally conciliatory tone of his declarations as
well as his reluctance to engage in a judicial action against the Colombian state. As a
result, he is the only one among all the individuals I present in this chapter who has not
been excluded from the return process after the executive has taken over. Invited by the
Constitutional Court to speak at the public audience organized in January 2016, Lopera
now sits on the committee charged by the Court to oversee the Colombian government’s
actions in the matter. The respectability earned in his administrative and political career,
together with the moral authority gained through his regular appearance in the media to
comment on the Quimbaya case, made him less disposable than Felipe Rincón, the
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See: http://academiadehistoriadelquindio.blogspot.com/. The site focuses more particularly on the
Quimbaya collection and its context.
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lawyer who launched the demanda de acción popular [class action] but who was
ultimately not invited to sit on the supervisory committee.
The involvement of administrative courts is a specific feature of the Colombian
cases, as lawyers of that country 26 have demanded their own state, on behalf of
Colombia’s civil society, to form return claims. As Felipe Rincón and his colleague José
Luis Rengifo have argued,27 the point of the procedure they launched in 2005 was not so
much to obtain the return of the collection to Colombia than to make sure that the
Colombian state would do everything in its capacity to that end. While Lopera chose the
diplomatic route by sending letters to Colombian and Spanish authorities, Rincón opted
for a more aggressive strategy through the courts. Even though the Constitutional Court
ruled in his favor, it excluded him from the list of members of the supervisory committee.
Critics have been ferocious against Rincón, claiming that only financial gain would have
motivated him to initiate the demanda popular, thus casting a shadow over the intentions
of a lawyer who had previously taken on other demands against corporate interests.28
The other Colombian case also involves a duo composed of an individual
interested in history (but not a professional historian) and a lawyer, who teamed up to
force the executive to take up the claim. David Dellenback is a US-Colombian citizen
established in San Agustín who offers services to tourists. In his self-published book29
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Peruvian lawyers have also shown some interest in the cases concerning their own country, but under a
different modality: that of assessing the legal validity of Peru’s claim against Yale, not to hold the Peruvian
state accountable for its actions.
27
Interview, Jun. 26, 2018. José Antonio Rengifo is also involved in another legal battle involving the
Colombian state over the ownership of the remains of a Spanish colonial ship (the San José galleon),
claimed by Spain, Colombia, and a company specialized in submarine exploration, Sea Search Armada.
28
At the time the figure of the demanda popular was introduced, a percentage of the damages obtained by
the plaintiff was to go to the lawyer who introduced the demand. This provision of the law has since been
canceled, which would invalidate the accusation against Rincón.
29
Published in 2012, the bilingual book Las estatuas del Pueblo Escultor: San Agustín y el macizo
colombiano / The statues of the Pueblo Escultor: San Agustin and the macizo colombiano is available on
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about the statues, he does not use the term San Agustín, which refers to a post-conquest
settlement, and prefers to name the culture that made the statues as the Pueblo Escultor
[the Sculpting People]. Regardless of his lack of formal academic credentials, Dellenback
has studied the statues and arrived at his own conclusions. He is also the person who was
insistent enough to obtain authorization to visit the warehouses of the Ethnological
Museum in Berlin in 1992, where he found statues taken by German archaeologist
Theodor Preuss in the 1910s, some of which remained uncatalogued. Dellenback argues
that the creators of the San Agustín statues buried them, hence the statues should be
returned to the ground to ensure their conservation, as they deteriorate rapidly in the open
air. This argument obviously complicates, if not completely contradicts, the touristic
exploitation of the site. Dellenback is very critical of the Colombian archaeological
“establishment” (referring to the ICANH), which he considers an obstacle rather than a
support for his campaign for the return of the statues. Again in parallel with the
Quimbaya case, Dellenback wants to make sure that “at least Colombia will ask for the
statues back.”30
Dellenback has received the help from lawyer Diego Márquez Arango, whom he
met at a book fair in Bogota. Márquez built on Dellenback’s collection of more than

his website https://puebloescultor.org. Dellenback describes his book as both a guide for visitors to the
archaeological park and an attempt to decipher the secrets of the culture that built the statues. In the
tradition of the Black Legend about the Conquest, Dellenback writes that “we Americans (who have lived
our lives in this hemisphere) (…) have been given the impression that the conquest of America was some
kind of harmonious, egalitarian, symbiotic ‘meeting and mixing of races.’ It was not, as anyone who reads
the source materials knows: it was destruction, rape, violation, genocide, horror and domination by sword,
fire and cross, all visited by one side (that of the Europeans) upon the other (that of the Americans)” (244).
30
Interview, Sep. 29, 2018. Dellenback has also been active in the popular opposition to the removal of
several statues from San Agustín, in 2013, when the ICANH tried to remove several statues from the
archaeological park to display them in Bogota as part of a temporary exhibition (Diego Martínez Celis,
“¿‘El silencio de los ídolos’ o el silenciamiento de las comunidades?,” Errata, Revista de Artes Visuales
(Bogota), 12, Jan.-Jun. 2014). Dellenback also expresses his frustration of being kept in the dark regarding
the state of the negotiations over the return of the statues from Berlin, even though the ICANH had
committed to keep the local community informed of the process.
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2,000 signatures among San Agustín inhabitants and launched a judicial procedure.
Márquez has used legal figures such as derecho de petición [right of petition] and
demanda de acción popular. As Dellenback recalls, even the signing of a petition can be
a scary action, because political violence has imposed a law of silence on many social
and political issues, particularly in the Colombian countryside. However, the 1991
Constitution has opened new avenues for citizens to dialogue with the state and demand
the respect of fundamental rights, including collective rights to cultural patrimony. The
Quimbaya and San Agustín cases reveal how new legal figures such as the demanda de
acción popular have empowered Colombian citizens to present demands to the state.
The role of the media and general audiences
So far in my argument, I have used national newspapers in Mexico, Peru, and Colombia
as sources of information and of discourses to be decrypted; yet the press itself is not just
a passive by-stander, maintaining an objective posture on return claims. Journalists such
as Adriana Malvido 31 have contributed to maintaining the claims in the spotlight,
providing detailed accounts of the objects and the cases, and sometimes pressuring the
executive to ask for its return. Newspapers have also opened their pages to the actors
themselves32 and to observers.33 Overall, the media are an objective ally of the claims, if
only because they have helped prevent the topic from fading out of public view. The
Mexican press has been somewhat ambivalent towards Xokonoschtletl and Blanca
Moctezuma, either portraying their cause in favorable terms, acknowledging their
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Malvido has worked successively for the Mexican newspapers Unomásuno, La Jornada, and Milenio, for
which she has covered extensively the case of the penacho since the 1980s.
32
For example, Mariana Mould de Pease publishes op-eds regularly in Lima- and Cusco-based newspapers.
33
For example, Alister E. Ramirez, a professor of Spanish language and Hispanic American literature at
Borough of Manhattan Community College in New York City interested in topics of heritage in Colombia,
has published several articles in El Tiempo about the Quimbaya collection.
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leadership in the cause,34 or echoing criticism or irony towards them.35
The press relays – thus, contributes to reproduce – nationalist discourses based on
the construction of a national heritage though the appropriation of the Indigenous past. It
also plays a role in demonstrating the variety of voices in heritage issues: whether
because they like a good story that features an underdog taking on the state, or because
topics of material heritage sell well, national newspapers show a recurrent interest in
these high profile claims – in particular the Machu Picchu collection, the penacho, and
the Quimbaya collection. The press acts as a conveyor belt between all the other actors
and what could be termed, for lack of a better term, the “general audience,” which I have
consciously decided not to include as an actor of the claims. This is not to say that
citizens in the three countries are not interested in returns. In the Machu Picchu case, the
thousands of people who gathered in public marches in early November 2010 to demand
the return of the collection36 and the crowds who visited the Machu Picchu exhibition in
the Peruvian presidential palace37 demonstrate that a genuine interest can be constructed
among citizens for topics related to heritage conservation. How the media present the
topic to their audience (as justice made to the country, as a victory over a foreign
institution that unjustly or illegally held objects belonging to the nation, as the return of
objects that reflect the national identity, etc.) is decisive in fostering this interest.
Alternatively, activism within a community can also raise this interest, as demonstrated
by the signatures David Dellenback collected in San Agustín in favor of his claim for the
34

For example, journalists Anne Huffschmid and Adriana Malvido recognize that, regardless of the
criticism against Xokonoschtletl, “the object and the dispute would have remained confined to the silence
of its Viennese vitrine without his noisy fight” (“Sólo Zedillo,” op. cit., note 12).
35
For example, journalist Antonio Bertrán mocked Blanca Moctezuma’s green contact lenses and her
features that seemed to contradict her claim of royal Aztec ancestry (“Busca nieta de Moctezuma recuperar
el penacho,” Reforma, Jan. 18, 1997).
36
Fabiola Torres and Vanessa Romo, “Un pedido sin condiciones,” El Comercio (Lima), Nov. 6, 2010.
37
“Muestra de piezas (…)”, op. cit., chapter 2, note 41.
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return of the statues. These examples remain exceptions rather than a norm, however.
Return claims remain the matter of a limited number of actors in each country. In
Mexico, Xokonoschtletl could not mobilize more than a few dozen people when he
organized a march in Mexico City towards the Austrian embassy.38
The overall lack of popular mobilization in favor of a return claim illustrates the
relatively low salience of heritage as a subject of public concern and engagement. It also
reveals the limitations of the nationalist discourse about, or through, heritage. Education
and the media are key instruments of this construction: heritage is not something people
spontaneously care about. The experts I interviewed often blamed the poor state of public
education as a major reason why people care little for the history and heritage of their
nation, expressing the view that people cannot care about something they do not know
about.39 If public education represents a long-term strategy for experts to develop interest
in topics of heritage conservation among their co-nationals, the media represent an ally
that can be immediately mobilized. Yet, as my cases demonstrate, the support of the
media requires work from the promoters of a claim. The cases of the penacho, the Machu
Picchu collection, and the Quimbaya collection have been more extensively covered than
those of the Teotihuacan murals, the Paracas textiles, and the San Agustín statues.
The experts and the reproduction of the “authorized heritage discourse”
The second category of actors who intervene in all the cases I examine are the “experts.”
These are individuals who, because of their academic and professional credentials (as
archaeologists, anthropologists, historians, and/or arts managers) are called to form an
expert opinion on the desirability and feasibility of a return. Experts may also be civil
38

Myriam Audiffred, “Un ‘mexica thiaui’ desolador,” Reforma, Sep. 15, 1996.
In interviews, Colombian experts often blamed the absence of history classes in public schools’ curricula
for their fellow country people’s relative disinterest.

39

222

servants of the cultural state, in charge of the administrative procedures to present the
claim. The permeability between these two roles is explained by the political nature of
the administrations in charge of arts and culture – and more precisely the management of
cultural heritage and archaeological sites. State agencies in charge of heritage represent a
strategic locus of power whose conquest provides prestige and financial resources to
implement projects; they are also the arena where the public (or national) interest is
articulated in the form of heritage policies that select, value, and protect the remains of
the past – including objects held abroad and deemed important enough to be claimed.
Experts and authors
I analyze the importance of experts in the formulation of return claims within Smith’s
(2006, 2012) argument about the “authorized heritage discourse” (AHD): this dominant
Western discourse about heritage not only naturalizes a range of assumptions about what
heritage is and means, but also regards as sacred the values, knowledge, and technical
opinions of experts. For Smith, the AHD is an elite discourse that gives primacy to
monuments and to aesthetically pleasing objects that embody an identity; these objects
are fragile and must be taken care of by qualified experts. The AHD considers heritage as
a “thing” inherited from the past and to be transmitted to future generations, obscuring
the processes of construction that “make” an object or a site a piece of heritage, as well as
competing (non-elite) views about this object or site. This gives experts a privileged
status in the debates about whether cultural objects should be returned to their “country of
origin.” These experts, just like all the other actors involved, believe in the importance of
the nation and are attached to official narratives about the nation, which they largely
contribute to reproduce. To be fair, the existence of a specific discourse may be inherent
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to any professional community that specializes in a topic, because of the dedication and
time commitment necessary to master it. The AHD is thus a function, as well as the
language, of the professionals in charge of the management, at both the political and
technical levels, of heritage objects. As I will demonstrate below, while experts try to
differentiate both levels, it is difficult, in practice, to distinguish between them. The AHD
is by no means only a technical discourse; it is also a political one that permeates the
public discourse about heritage.
The professional practices linked to the AHD are justified by the position of
knowledge (hence, of power) of these experts: they know what ought to be done with an
object upon its return. Since the value of heritage (other than its immediate touristic use)
must be taught and learned, experts also consider themselves the legitimate mediators
between the object and the population (the “general audiences” I mentioned above).
Objects that left the national territory decades or centuries ago may have lost their
original meaning. The role of the expert is to (re)construct the historical, scientific, and
aesthetic values of the object; the expert is the one who can make sense of
decontextualized objects. Experts justify their conservationist agenda by the vast loss of
information due to the state and its population’s ignorance, carelessness, or greediness.
This agenda may provide a justification for the insulation of experts from the rest of the
population, and their lack of responsiveness to civil society actors: in San Agustín, for
example, local civil society actors have blamed successive directors of the ICANH for
not consulting with them about removing statues and for not following up with them
about the return claim they initiated.40
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This is not to say, of course, that experts (in particular, archaeologists) in Latin
America have not rethought their practice in relation to their social environment. In the
late 1970s and early 1980s, currents within the discipline, such as post-processual
archaeology41 and social archaeology,42 have sought to address the social responsibility
of the expert and its position within society. The analysis of an authorized discourse is
not necessarily an indictment of cynical or instrumentalist practices; quite to the contrary,
many experts are sincere in their belief in the power and importance of material heritage
for the identity of their nation. I do not question the veracity of their engagement in and
commitment to their practice as archaeologists, anthropologists, or historians, or their
desire to communicate the value they place in the objects they study and conserve to the
rest of the population. Yet, experts see the return of cultural heritage objects as a topic
that should be reserved for their expertise, which they justify by the fragility and
uniqueness of the desired objects, their geographical remoteness, the need to conduct
negotiations in relative secrecy, and the larger significance of the object for the nation as
a whole. These attributes also create conflicts for the experts between their allegiance to
the national discourse and their professional duty as conservationists.
Characteristics of the AHD in return claims
The pervasiveness of the AHD in return claims is revealed in at least four phenomena.
Politicization. First, experts tend to insist that the return claim should remain a
“technical” or “administrative” procedure, and not be “politicized,” as if the work of the
expert was a purely technical task that had no political transcendence. Politicization
41

See chapter 3, note 26.
“This alternative form of archaeology proposes to destroy the false theory-praxis, science-advocacy
dichotomies, and argues that the archaeologist has an important responsibility (…) in situating historical
knowledge at the center of Latin America's social struggle. (…) Social archaeology proposes a more
political and socially relevant way of addressing our inquiries into the past” (Benavides 2001, 360).
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refers here to the overtaking of the topic by politicians (the president and his entourage,
of course, but also congresspersons) who seek to reap the benefits from a hypothetical
return (or, at least, enjoy some media time speaking about the topic). The use of this term
betrays a reluctance to see returns become a subject of public debate, remaining rather a
topic to be discussed among authorized experts. Their academic credentials confer to the
experts a privileged position to nourish the discourse about the nation and its past,
bringing evidence in support of (or potentially contradicting) official narratives through
their analysis of archaeological, anthropological, or archival records. Among countless
examples, archaeologist Hugo Ludeña wanted to “avoid the politicization of the
recuperation of the Machu Picchu archaeological pieces because this [was] an
archaeological, technical, and administrative problem, more than a political one, which
[could] be used for electoral objectives.” He feared that some politicians would use this
dispute “to get easy media time” but “would forget their promises afterwards.” 43
Following the return of the collection, Higueras (2013) called for the consolidation of
Peru’s “patrimonial sovereignty” through the strengthening of the country’s capacity in
heritage management as well as a “diminution of the political ingredient” (20).
These calls against the politicization of return claims and in favor of their
treatment as technical issues are problematic and must be considered critically, for at
least two reasons. One, as signaled above, the border between the position of the expert
and that of the politician is not always clear-cut. Anthropologists, archaeologists, and
historians may be called to occupy high-level positions in the cultural apparatus of the
state, either within the specialized institute in charge of the field (INAH, ICANH, ex-
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INC) or within the ministries of culture.44 From these “cargos de confianza” [positions of
trust], these experts make decisions that will be validated at the highest political
(presidential) level. That experts do not necessarily seek the spotlight or will not appear
in the photo-ops that accompany the announcement of returns does not make them
immune to political calculation. Second, the claim of no-politicization, in the name of a
positivist vision of the work of the expert based on a faith in objectivity and rationality, is
invalidated by the process of expansion of the cultural state I have described in the
previous chapter: the work of archaeologists and anthropologists can be instrumentalized,
and these experts can carry political agendas (the example of indigenist intellectuals
comes to mind). Even considering politicization from a strictly instrumentalist
perspective, the idea that experts would not seek political benefits (at least within their
own field of expertise, if not beyond) cannot be discarded beforehand.
Arguing against the politicization of return claims is really an argument for
experts to remain in control of the management of objects: as the Peruvian cases show,
politicization (understood as the appropriation of a case by the highest political
authorities, at the presidential level) is actually a sine-qua-non condition to obtain the
return. Prudence and the rationalization of the management of a case, as for instance by
delegating a decision to an expert commission (as in the case of the penacho), do not
offer very good prospects of success for a claiming state. As a consequence, experts in
the claiming country must rally to the state authorities’ efforts if they want to be able to
care themselves for this object; if they do not, the object will most likely remain under
the control of other experts, in the claimed institution and country.
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Self-legitimization. This insistence on keeping return claims a technical topic is also an
instrument of self-legitimatization. Experts must constantly reassert their expertise as
conservationists, on several fronts. On the one hand, as I have discussed in chapter 4,
Latin American experts must oppose the argument put forward by the holding institution
that the claiming country does not have the capacity to properly take care of the claimed
object. Demonstrating that they take conservation seriously is the best weapon for experts
to undermine the resistance in the holding institution. Consequently, resisting the
politicization of the claim allows experts to prove themselves as valid interlocutors for
their foreign counterparts, as they equally place the highest value on conservation
standards. On the other hand, using the language and arguments of the AHD allows Latin
American experts to legitimize themselves in the eyes of their own politicians: refusing
the politicization implies affirming a position of professional independence that allows
experts to push their own state to hold to the norms these states created. Experts may find
themselves in an adversarial position towards state authorities, who are often accused of
caring little for the nation’s heritage.
A corollary to the call to avoid politicization of a return claim is a strict legal
reading of the return cases. Most experts in claiming countries support interpretations of
the applicable legislation that favor the claims rather than undermine them. Yet, in some
cases, limiting one’s appreciation of a claim to its legal aspect may justify that the return
is impossible. The AHD, predicated on the name of science posed as a supreme value,
demands that politics abide by standards defined in professional settings and by the laws
– even if, occasionally, this implies that an object should remain where it is rather than
being returned. In this sense, the AHD does not necessarily advocate in favor or against
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returns as a matter of principle. The attitude of the Colombian executive agencies that, at
the Constitutional Court, argued that their understanding of the laws in place in 1886
does not justify claiming the return of the Quimbaya collection to Spain, obeys this logic:
protecting heritage implies not only ensuring that objects are kept in the facility with the
best possible conditions of care (on this aspect, Colombia would be capable of handling
the collection perfectly) but also that these objects are protected by a consistent legal
framework and could not be subjected to fluctuating political interests.
De-legitimation of civil society actors. Third, the strength of the AHD is revealed in the
production of delegitimizing discourses against the individuals who launched the claim.
These, because they do not boast the academic titles and positions of the experts,
represent a challenge to the experts’ intellectual (and political) authority when they assert
alternative historical narratives or criticize the poor conservation practices of heritage
sites. It is thus necessary for the experts to de-authorize these individuals by ridiculing
the oral history or traditions they embody, for example by mocking Gómora’s folkloric
dances, deemed a reimagined staging of pre-Columbian religious performances rather
than an authentic ritual, as well as Blanca Moctezuma’s alleged familial history, which
opposes the “oral tradition” of her family against the work of historians, made of “lies.”45
An alternative strategy is to show contempt for their lack of academic credentials,
questioning the conclusions Mould de Pease drew from her work in Yale’s and Peru’s
archives, ignoring the work of non-professional historians involved in the AHQ, or
dismissing David Dellenback’s non-archaeological work in San Agustín.
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Press conference, see note 5. I have shown above, however, that, at least in the case of the narrative about
how Austria came into possession of the penacho, experts have had to admit that Gómora and
Moctezuma’s versions of a robbery were just as plausible as that of a gift.
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Returns, not repatriations. Fourth, the existence of the AHD in Latin America implies
that, from an academic and administrative perspective, certain practices are preferred to
others in the movement of objects back towards their country of origin. Coming from
respected museums in the USA, Spain, or Austria, the cultural objects I discuss here are
to be returned to an appropriate facility in the claimant country, where the process of
conservation, research, and exhibition will continue. Upon their return, their social
function will be that of museum objects, used for scientific inquiry, educational and
aesthetic display, and/or elements of an historical-nationalist narrative. Hence, the status
of the object as material heritage whose meaning is controlled by an official discourse (on
the necessary technical process to be applied to ensure its conservation, as well as on the
nature of national heritage and, beyond, the meaning of the nation) is not questioned in
the return process. These objects will not be returned, as they potentially are in the USA
under the terms of the US 1990 NAGPRA, to an alternative social function in
(Indigenous) communities of origin, for example as a funerary bundle, religious attribute,
or symbol of a polity. Admittedly, these functions refer to social and political contexts
that no longer exist in the claiming country, for the reasons I have detailed in Chapter 2.
But this possibility is simply not discussed in the cases I study. The preference for the
practice of returns over that of repatriations explains the absence from these claims of a
specific category of actors, the Indigenous communities, to which I return below.
Beyond the AHD: divisions and unity among the community of experts and its
consequences for return claims
The very existence of the AHD as a professional discourse does not imply that expert
communities in each country are unified bodies within and among disciplines. To the
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contrary, rivalries for the control of archaeological sites, museums, and other heritage
sites, as well as access to resources and political appointments in the central
administration in charge of this field, are particularly strong in Latin America, where the
nation-state is officially the owner and steward of all heritage sites. I have already
discussed in chapter 4 the disputes over the construction of new museums in Peru in the
context of the shortcomings of the decentralization of the cultural state. These disputes
also highlight strong personal enmities within the archaeological and museum
establishment of the country. Yet, the political infighting within the expert community
tends to happen outside the media spotlight and to recede as most experts align publicly
behind the objective of obtaining a return. Oppositions may remain over the method or
who should be in charge of managing the claim (and obtain the rewards in case of
success), but the goal itself is most often undisputed in public. Most importantly, a return
tends to happen only if the expert community openly supports it (as in the Peruvian
cases); when the community is divided (as in Mexico about the penacho) or does not
strongly back the civil society actors who want this return (as in Colombia), the political
field is open for other policy objectives, in particular in foreign relations, to take priority.
Return claims put experts in the difficult situation of having to balance possibly
contradicting interests and allegiances. On the one hand, Peruvian experts involved in
return claims such as Blanca Alva involved in return claims have argued that their
country has the capacity to care for the objects upon their return. Former INC Director
Cecilia Bakula insisted that the Machu Picchu collection had to come back because it
belonged to Peru; what would happen to it in Peru was not what should matter in the
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conversation.46 In this case, the expert community largely aligned with the objective of
claiming the return of important cultural objects, dismissing concerns about the country’s
capacity to care for them. A chorus of archaeologists and historians publicly objected to
the September 2007 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Peru and Yale.47 In
the Paracas case, expert-administrators such as Luis Jaime Castillo48 and Sonia Guillén49
also expressed that the principle of the return should not be obscured by reservations
about Peru’s capacity to care for the objects – which the country does have, in their
opinion. This is not to say that these experts ignored the standards of conservation that
are so important in their profession. On the contrary, they owed their positions within the
cultural state to their academic credentials. Yet, in a clear example that return claims are
themselves political objects, they gave primacy to the concepts of national sovereignty
and respect of national legal norms over strict conservation concerns: they were ready to
assume the risks of deterioration during the process of transportation back to Peru and to
possible mishaps in conservation processes upon their return. A few experts expressed
reservations about the return of the Paracas textiles because of Peru’s sketchy track
record in the conservation of such materials. Yet, their concerns remained confined to
discussions among experts and did not make it to the national media; the political
importance of the pieces trumped conservation concerns, and Peru came through with the
project of returning the textiles.
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Interview, Apr. 27, 2017.
“Piezas de Yale retornarán en 99 años,” La República, Mar. 4, 2008; “Acuerdo cuestionado,” La
República, Mar. 17, 2008. The first agreement reached by the García administration, this document was
considered too lenient towards the university because it allowed Yale to keep most of the collection for an
additional ninety-nine years.
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government of Ollanta Humala (2011-2016).
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Interview, Apr. 25, 2017. Guillén is an archaeologist who leads a research and conservation project in
Leymebamba, in northern Peru. She was director of the bureau of museums of the Ministry of Culture,
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On the other hand, Mexico offers a case where experts have put aside nationalist
considerations and aligned with conservationist arguments against a return. The expert
community has been ambivalent about this return, occasionally exposing their differences
of opinion in the media about the nature of the object and its conservation.50 The three
Mexican experts who traveled to Vienna in 2002 were not given direct access to the
penacho; they returned to Mexico aggrieved by the treatment received from their
Austrian counterparts. But the bi-national commission that conducted an extensive
conservation process in 2011-12, composed on the Mexican side by restorer María
Olvido Moreno Guzmán, concluded that the penacho was now too fragile to travel and
would not resist the vibrations of plane transportation.51 She has presented her findings in
scholarly articles (Moreno Guzmán 2014) and in public conferences in Mexico.52 Her
conclusions are the very reason why the Mexican claim has been stalling since 2012. The
quasi-abandonment of the claim by Mexican authorities is a testimony of the power of the
AHD, as conservation considerations have trivialized the attempt to return the object to
Mexico: it would be unthinkable to risk the deterioration of one of the only surviving
examples of pre-Columbian feather art. In this light, the geographical location of the
piece becomes irrelevant: the priority is its conservation. Other experts in Mexico put in
doubt Moreno Guzmán’s conclusions, arguing that she surrendered to the Austrian
arguments against the return, and that, if properly packed, the penacho would not suffer
extensive damage on its way back to Mexico. Also, the binational commission is
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See, for example, Huffschmid and Malvido, “Fuese o no (…), op. cit., chapter 2, note 59. Also, all SRE
personnel I was able to speak to confirmed that there never was unanimity, within the Mexican expert
community, about whether Mexico should claim the penacho.
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Luis Carlos Sánchez, “El Penacho de Moctezuma, su retorno, imposible.” Excelsior, Jun. 7, 2014.
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See the video of a conference at Antiguo Colegio San Ildefonso in Mexico City on Sep. 7, 2013:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nlu3gMhrMw
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suspected to have responded more to diplomatic pressures than to a scientific or scholarly
agenda.53 Overall, this case confirms, again, the eminently political nature of expert
opinion: for those who participated in the conservation process, the fragility of the piece
trumps any other consideration; for their adversaries, who do acknowledge that the piece
must be handled with great care, the case in favor of returning the penacho is not
undermined by the fragility of the piece. On the contrary, they argue that the
Weltmuseum itself has not always offered the best conditions of conservation,54 and that
the excellence of Mexican museums in conservation practices needs not be demonstrated.
Most importantly though, the highest political authorities in Mexico (in the
presidency and the SRE) have sided with the expert opinion against the return, and have
dropped the case – at least for the moment. A cynical take on this case would consider
that this situation reveals how expedient the expert discourse can be for political
authorities in implementing a strategy of blame avoidance: accepting the argument of the
fragility of the object allows Mexican state entities to avoid admitting their own failure at
bringing the object back to Mexico. It also provides a justification for putting the topic at
rest (at least until the penacho again represents a convenient political weapon) without
appearing to completely drop the claim. Mexican diplomats can retreat behind the
technical discourse to put the topic aside and continue working on other policy objectives
of greater importance to them. The scientific discourse, centered on conservation issues
and the historical record of the piece, has displaced the political discourse to avoid
resolving the question of the return, at least temporarily: “when it comes to technological
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Luis Carlos Sánchez, “Penacho de Moctezuma guardado sin razón,” Excelsior, Jun. 29, 2015.
Idem.

234

questions, what was ‘impossible’ [the return] yesterday can become possible in a
heartbeat.”55
In Colombia, finally, the fate of the Quimbaya collection meets with prudent
considerations from experts. Many of them have deferred to the legal argument that
Colombia does not have a legal case to claim its return. Those currently employed in the
Ministry of Culture and the ICANH focus on cases of restitutions and the fight against
illegal contemporary trafficking, but show little interest in intervening in this return
claim, which is left to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, expert voices currently
independent from state entities, such as Clemencia Plazas,56 a former curator and director
of Bogota’s Museum of Gold, argue in favor of the return – for academic and emotional
reasons. From an outsider position, however, her opinion – regardless of how respected
she is – has little impact on Colombian executive authorities. Overall, my conversations
in Bogota and my reading of the Colombian press would support David Dellenback’s
claim that the expert community in Colombia is not fully engaged in favor of the returns,
thus does not exert strong pressures on the executive authorities to follow through with
the injunctions of the courts. Alternatively, this position may also reveal that experts have
not achieved a similar level of political influence as in Peru and Mexico so as to be in the
position to exert such pressures.
The claimant state: a unified actor?
The claims I examine here are inspired by civil society actors and often backed by
experts in the scientific community, but they cannot prosper without the intervention of
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Plazas had engineered the exchange of objects with the Museum of America, which holds the Quimbaya
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state entities. In this section, I disaggregate the state, the interactions among branches of
power, and their respective contributions to the launch and conduct of the claim.
Within the ACF, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) reject the idea of a unified
and autonomous state in theorizing the policy process (37), considering the state as an
arena within which coalitions (of which specific state entities or functionaries may form
part) compete to push their policy preferences. However, in the policy subfield of claims
for the return of cultural heritage objects, the state must become a unified actor, or at least
appear to do so, for two reasons. First, claims are an international matter, and states
remain the most important (if not only) subjects and actors in international relations.
Return claims must be officially presented and sustained by states. Civil society
individuals may present their own request to the holding institution, but these are seldom,
if ever, answered. Only once the state (or at least some of its entities deemed of a high
enough rank in the administrative hierarchy) gets interested in the matter does the claim
acquire an official status that makes it impossible for the holding institution abroad to
ignore. As the Peruvian cases demonstrate, the unanimous involvement of state agencies
is a decisive factor to determine the outcome of a claim. The second reason why the state
shall be analyzed as a unified actor is because the state itself (as a conceptual entity, and
as the sum of its numerous agencies) is constrained by the national discourse it has forged
and is supposed to embody; state entities cannot promote divergent narratives on the
nation. Hence, no state entity ever officially pronounces against a return, even if it uses
different arguments (in particular, legal) to justify its prudence.
My case studies demonstrate different equilibria in the balance of power among
branches. I explore the role of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in each
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country, revealing the importance of presidentialism (a salient feature of Latin American
regimes) as a key factor to explain the likeliness of success of a claim.
Peru: a presidential affair
In Peru, all branches of power and state entities have supported the efforts to obtain the
return of the Machu Picchu and the Paracas collections, but it is the president, at the head
of the executive, who set the tone for the entire administration. That several successive
presidents (Alejandro Toledo, Alan García, and Ollanta Humala) personally got involved
in the issue suggests the potential political benefit to be obtained from a success and the
salience of heritage as a political (rather than merely technical) topic. To prosper, a return
claim must be seized by a political entrepreneur who will carry out this project; in Peru,
these entrepreneurs were the presidents themselves.
In the Machu Picchu case, state involvement with the claim initiated in the INC,
where Mariana Mould de Pease was working as a consultant. The Ministry of Foreign
Relations (MREP) became involved after being consulted by the INC over the possibility
of claiming the collection. The topic left the technical level with the involvement of
President Toledo and First Lady Karp; after 2002, there was no detaining the
politicization of the claim that some experts decried. Toledo had made a campaign
argument of his Indigenous roots and organized an inauguration ceremony at Machu
Picchu upon his election in 2001; he entrusted his wife (herself an anthropologist) to lead
aggressive negotiations with Yale. This presidential involvement, in turn, meant that all
state agencies were put to the task of supporting the goal of obtaining the return of the
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collection.57 Yale archaeologists Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar, who developed an
enmity with Karp, claimed she was acting purely out of private interest. She most
certainly would have wanted to obtain the return of the collection before the end of her
husband’s presidency, in order not to leave the political benefit of the announcement to
his successor. However, many observers and participants in the claim soon came to the
conclusion that nothing would happen before the following presidential election.58 As
negotiations were stalling, however, Toledo and Karp locked in the topic by creating a
high commission integrating members from different state entities and pushing the topic
in the Peruvian media, making it difficult for Toledo’s successor to dismiss it.59
Lawyer Felipe Rincón, involved in the Colombian case of the Quimbaya
collection, half-jokingly reminded me of the popular saying that, in order to bury a topic
politically, the best solution is to create a commission – he was referring to the
supervisory committee instituted by the Colombian Constitutional Court. Nothing of the
sort happened in Peru, however. Alan García, who had been a contested president during
his first term in the difficult decade of the 1980s (Crabtree 1992), saw the political
opportunity offered by the Machu Picchu case and led the negotiation to its conclusion.
García chose a different approach, circumventing the MREP and the INC by naming his
minister of public housing, Hernan Garrido Lecca, as his special envoy, hoping to keep
(or retake) the upper hand on negotiations that had been stalling. This strategy first
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Mould de Pease (Jan. 31, 2006) and in archaeologist Hugo Ludeña’s unpublished article “La devolución de
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seemed productive, leading to the signature of the September 2007 MOU; it soon
backfired, however, when the expert community unanimously condemned the terms of
the agreement as too lenient towards Yale. Following the signature of the MOU, INC and
MREP staff were again involved; for example, INC functionaries traveled to Yale to
inventory the collection. Yet, it is the personal involvement of the president that led to the
resolution: García headed a popular march in Lima in November 2010, and it was only
with the visit of former Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo as a special representative of
Yale that a final agreement was signed – after a discussion among presidents.
A similar process took place in the Paracas case, which initiated under one
president (García) but concluded under his successor (Humala). García’s untimely
declarations at the end of his second term60 had provisionally cooled the relations with
the Swedish counterpart. Yet, from the newly created Ministry of Culture (which
survived the political transition), expert-functionaries Luis Jaime Castillo and Sonia
Guillén were able to rekindle the relationship, backed up by minister Ana Diana Calderón
and the support of President Humala, who personally welcomed the first batch of textiles
returned in June 2014 during a ceremony at the presidential palace.61
This presidentialization of return claims has left relatively little political space for
other branches of power to intervene. Over the years, the unicameral Congress requested
information about the process, authorized expenses for INC office ials to travel to Yale to
inventory the collection, as well as funds to hire a law firm to represent Peru in US
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Roberto Ochoa Alonso Marín,“El tesoro textil de los paracas vuelve al Perú,” La República, Jun. 9, 2014.
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courts, and declared the return of the Machu Picchu collection of “national interest.”62
But Congress did not need to incentivize the executive. Following the return, however,
Congressman Yohnny Lescano created a controversy in the Peruvian media,63 claiming
that not all artifacts had been returned. Though his claim was soon debunked and he was
accused of seeking votes for his impending reelection,64 this incident reveals how easily
claims can be politicized, i.e., instrumentalized for (real or expected) political gain.
The overtly nationalist tone of presidential declarations65 in the press throughout
the claim process reveal the never-finished, always to be reactivated, process of national
construction in Peru. In the decade following the internal armed conflict between the state
and non-state armed actors and the return to democracy, interrogations about the meaning
of Peruvian identity were pervasive in Peruvian society and media. The question of
national identity could be activated easily from the highest political sphere. Both Toledo
and García knew this and tried to use it for their political advantage. Regardless of their
personal beliefs about the value of heritage and the Indigenous past, they were ready to
spend political capital on this issue, hoping for a significant return on their investment.
From a presidential perspective, however, I argue that the Peruvian experience
works as a cautionary tale for presidents inclined to use return claims for their own
political benefit. The return of the Machu Picchu collection (and to a lesser extent of the
Paracas textiles) have been largely covered, and in overwhelmingly favorable terms, by
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the Peruvian media. Media coverage put forward the leadership of the presidents and
depicted these returns as victories for Peru and the respect of the country’s rights and
sovereignty. Yet, with distance, whatever benefit these presidents enjoyed in terms of
image lasted little longer than the time the media were dedicated to the topic, and was of
little help in overcoming the political difficulties they faced at the end of their terms; it
certainly did not help them get reelected later.66 As of early 2019, the three presidents
were under judicial investigation in relation to the continental scandal of corruption
involving the Brazilian public works company Odebrecht. Another reason for presidents
to reconsider their involvement in a return claim is that the time necessary to claim an
object and obtain its return is longer than that of a presidential term; the resolution will
most likely benefit their successor. As Hugo Ludeña warned about the Machu Picchu
case, opening a legal claim, in particular, is a dangerous choice because courts’ decisions
are uncertain; Ludeña concludes, however, that losing a claim may serve the interests of
the most nationalist among the country’s politicians.67
Mexico: when is a return claim “official”?
Mexico boasts a somewhat different situation from Peru’s. The incremental involvement
of state agencies (that is, the progressive expansion of the coalition that supports the
return of the penacho) illustrates Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s hypothesis (1993, 213)
that within a coalition, administrative agencies tend to adopt a more centrist position than
their non-state allies. The administrations of the PRI presidents Carlos Salinas de Gortari
and Ernesto Zedillo showed a prudent but constant interest in the penacho. The election
of two consecutive PAN presidents – Fox in 2000, Calderón in 2006 – did not profoundly
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alter the national discourse (Peimbert Moreno 2011), so the presidential attitude towards
the penacho remained strikingly similar: an official interest stated in public declarations,
and negotiations delegated to the SRE and the embassy in Vienna, with support of the
INAH. As I have shown, the latter is the one among state institutions that has
demonstrated most clearly its support to the claim, for example by offering official
recognition to Xokonoschtletl,68 in spite of the absence of unanimity among Mexican
experts about the penacho.
As early as October 1987, the Mexican embassy in Vienna suggested that Mexico
should present an “official petition” to the Austrian government.69 Since then, return
claims have been formulated in writing, on three occasions. First, in 1991, INAH
Director Roberto García Moll “officially requested the devolution of the penacho.”70
Then, in 1996, Foreign Relations Secretary Gurria wrote to his Austrian counterpart,
Wolfgang Schüssel, to “express the interest of the government of Mexico in the recent
offer by Federal President Thomas Klestil to gift the penacho to our country.”71 These
two requests occurred during governments of the PRI. Finally, in 2006, under a PAN
administration, Ambassador Patricia Espinoza sent a verbal note expressing her “deep
interest” in the initiative of Austrian congresspersons in favor of gifting the penacho to
Mexico; she hoped that this initiative would “prosper and that the penacho would be sent
back to Mexico, considering the great cultural value of this object for the Mexican
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nation.”72 In spite of these three instances, Austrian authorities have repeatedly affirmed
that their Mexican counterparts have never formally requested this return.73 To be sure,
Mexican media have largely conveyed this idea and, as a consequence, civil society
actors and even a few congresspersons74 in Mexico seem to believe it, too.75
When can we consider, then, that a state has officially claimed the return of an
object? This question speaks of presidentialism as a defining feature of the Mexican
regime. The INAH and even the SRE are denied the status of authorities with the capacity
to make a request on behalf of the Mexican state.76 All actors involved in the claim, in
both countries, imply that only a request from the president himself would qualify as
official. 77 This may not come as a surprise to observers of Mexican politics: the
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preeminence of the presidential figure in the Mexican regime, established by the 1917
Constitution, shows traces of the traditional figure of the caudillo, and Mexican political
culture still values authority and strong leadership as important attributes of power.78
That the authorities from the Austrian federal republic, whose consociational model of
parliamentary democracy favors the rule of parties over that of individual leaders, would
use a similar argument, may be more surprising – unless it is considered as a dilatory
tactic, as Austrian authorities anticipate that Mexican presidents will not let themselves
be drawn into a controversial issue with an uncertain outcome.
Mexican presidents have not personally requested the return, as was the case in
Peru. Possible explanations for this lack of presidential involvement include that the
Mexican state may have felt less necessity to reaffirm the mestizo identity of the Mexican
nation, as neither the 1994 Zapatista insurrection nor the neoliberal transformation of the
national economy since the 1980s have created the same sense of urgency that arose in
Peru: the mestizo national conscience constructed by the Mexican state since the early
twentieth-century may have represented a discourse that needed less positive
reinforcement than it did in Peru. The SRE may also have tried to avoid involving the
president too closely to protect him from a negative answer. In conclusion, the relatively
low profile kept by Mexican presidents can be interpreted in two ways: either as a
Diana Alvarez Rendón to Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo, Jun. 12, 1998; AHGE-SRE). President
Fischer and former Chancellor Viktor Klima of Austria reportedly suggested to Blanca Moctezuma to ask
the Mexican government to present a request for a “loan” of the penacho under the form of a letter signed
by the Mexican President himself (in Sergio Raúl López, “Plantean préstamo a México,” Proceso, Nov. 15,
2002). Blanca Moctezuma wrote to President Fox that “for the Austrian government, the Mexican president
is the only one who, through his chancellery, must make this type of claim” (Letter from Blanca
Moctezuma Barragán to Presidente Vicente Fox Quesada, Oct. 28, 2001; APBMB).
78
In a letter to President Zedillo, Mexican citizen Diana Alvarez describes the person who will undertake
the task of claiming back the penacho as “having the following virtues: a pure soul, with sincere and
authentic love for its people, honest, and most of all, with a brave heart,” depicting the president as an
idealistic, Christ-like figure (Letter from Diana Alvarez Rendón to President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de
León, Jul. 27, 1995; AHGE-SRE).
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welcome restraint that has avoided a deterioration of Austrian-Mexican relations, keeping
hopes alive that the return may still happen in the future (Peimbert Moreno 2011) or, in
comparison with the Peruvian cases, as the very cause of the Mexican failure to obtain
the return of the penacho.
The decision of the presidential office not to intervene as publicly as its Peruvian
counterpart did open some political space for Mexican congresspersons to intervene in
the debate. The lower chamber of Congress twice requested, in 200579 and 2009,80 that
the executive branch seek the return of the penacho through diplomatic means, adding to
the chorus of civil society and expert voices demanding that the executive act more
decisively on the matter. These initiatives were introduced by legislators from rival
parties (the PAN and the more leftist Convergencia, respectively), showing that topics
related to national heritage transcend partisan lines to adhere to a common narrative.
Colombia: the judiciary dimension of return claims
The Colombian cases boast a highly distinctive feature compared to Mexico’s and Peru’s:
the importance of the judicial branch in the formulation of the claim, which reveals a
different equilibrium among branches of power. This difference stems largely from the
provisions and implementation of the 1991 Constitution. The Constitutional Court, in
particular, is considered the “soul” and “guardian protector” of the principles and
institutions defined by the constituent assembly (Van Cott 2000, 91); it plays an
important role in the defense of Colombian citizens’ fundamental rights. The procedure
of acción de tutela [writ of protection], which lawyers Felipe Rincón and José Antonio
Rengifo used in the Quimbaya case, also empowers citizens (Van Cott 2000, Rengifo

79
80

“Con punto de acuerdo (…),” op. cit., chapter 2, note 72.
“Con punto de acuerdo (…),” op. cit., chapter 2, note 73.
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Lozano 2008). With its October 2017 ruling, the Constitutional Court (the highest court
of appeal in this case, which had previously been through two lower levels of
administrative courts) demanded that the executive branch take all appropriate action to
seek the return of the Quimbaya treasure. The involvement of Colombian courts finds no
equivalent in Mexico and Peru.81
Three entities of the executive branch (presidency, foreign relations, culture)
initially refused to join the coalition to pressure the Spanish government into negotiating
a return agreement. At the February 2016 audience in the Constitutional Court, they
argued that the Quimbaya collection was not considered a part of the national heritage at
the moment President Holguín gifted it in 1893, that all matters of international relations
are of the sole discretion of the president, and that international treaties and conventions
on heritage protection did not apply to the case of the Quimbaya collection because of the
principle of non-retroactivity.82 These entities chose a different argumentative route than
their Mexican counterpart to avoid fully engaging in a diplomatic dispute: while the
Mexican SRE has adopted the expert opinion that the penacho cannot travel to avoid
continuing its pressures on Austrian authorities, the Colombian executive has used an
interpretation of its own laws. Seemingly indifferent to the fate of lost cultural objects
and to the opinion of their constituents, these three entities have decided to privilege good
relationships with important European partners. The expert-functionaries of the Ministry
of Culture have largely abided by the strictly legalistic reading of the case promoted from
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In Mexico, the topic of the penacho has not been brought to court. In the case of the Machu Picchu
collection, while the Peruvian minister of justice was a member of the commission originally instituted by
Toledo and renewed by García, the only courts involved were in the US, not in Peru.
82
Corte Constitucional, Sentencia SU649/17, 19 October 2017. The full text of the decision, which
includes the interventions at the February 2016 public audience, is available at:
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2017/su649-17.htm, last accessed May 12, 2019.
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the MREC and the presidency, leaving aside the anthropological, historical, and aesthetic
lectures of heritage promoted by civil society and the community of experts. For Smith
(2006), heritage tells us more about those who care about an object today than about what
this object meant in the past. Clearly, the Colombian executive does not wish to revisit
the legacy of a former authority in power.83
These entities’ argumentation confirms the different relation that the Colombian
state has built with the past of its nation, if compared with its Mexican and Peruvian
counterparts. Defining heritage in legal terms, the state seems to leave aside
anthropological understandings of heritage and shows its reluctance to at least fight
(diplomatically) for the return of the objects, against the opinion of some experts and
other state agencies. During the same audience, indeed, other agencies such as the office
of the attorney general, the ombudsman’s office, and the ICANH proved much more
receptive to the arguments of the plaintiff, stating the importance of pre-Columbian
cultures for the Colombian people. ICANH Director Ernesto Montenegro expressed an
opinion based on an anthropological understanding of the concept of identity. Ultimately,
the ICANH seems a weaker institution than the Mexican and Peruvian agencies in charge
of heritage management, unable to impose a pro-heritage agenda on other state entities.
The cultural state in Colombia had made less headway into permeating other areas of
policy-making, along the lines of the model I described in chapter 4.
The lower administrative courts, however, had already integrated the ICANH’s
anthropological arguments about national identity in their reasoning, for example when
the administrative judge in Bogota first declared the unconstitutionality of Holguín’s gift
83

In that context, as pointed out by several interviewees, that María Ángela Holguín, President Santos’
minister of foreign affairs from 2010-18, is related to Carlos Holguín (her great-grand-uncle) may also be a
factor that explains, at least in part, the state’s inaction during her long tenure.
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to the Queen of Spain84 – a decision upheld by the Constitutional Court. Facing the
impasse of a divided and reluctant executive branch, the judicial branch acted as the
power broker to consolidate a coalition in favor of the return of the collection.85
Even though the decision of the Court included the creation of a monitoring
committee, the impact of this judicial involvement may remain limited for the outcome of
the claim: decisions by Colombian courts cannot be enforced onto a foreign government
and, in the absence of a legal case to obtain the return through international conventions,
the attitude of the executive branch remains the decisive element for the success of the
claim. The state must display an intense political will through diplomatic negotiations to
achieve it. Since October 2017, in order to comply with the decision of the Constitutional
Court, the executive has formally participated in at least seven meetings of the
supervisory committee. 86 Yet, arguing that the proceedings of the meetings are
confidential and that negotiations must be conducted in secrecy, the executive has not
provided information about the advancement of the claim.
As of July 2019, because the case is pending, the conclusions that can be drawn
regard the process rather than the outcome of the claim. The audience and decision of the
Constitutional Court acted as critical junctures: the executive may seek to delay the
negotiations with Spain through the work of a commission whose whereabouts remain
secret, but there is no way out of the return claim for the Colombian executive: stalling
does not make it go away. The decision in the Quimbaya case has also impacted the San
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In his decisions, the judge “acknowledged the obvious historical and cultural connotation and value of
these cultural goods for our people; they form part of our national identity” (quoted in “Mincultura apelará
en el caso del Tesoro Quimbaya que se regaló a España,” El Tiempo, Nov. 17, 2009).
85
Contrary to Peru and Mexico, the Colombian legislature has not been involved in the discussions about
the Quimbaya collection.
86
“¿Y en qué va la repatriación del tesoro Quimbaya?,” El Tiempo, Feb, 18, 2019.
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Agustín case. As lawyer Diego Márquez acknowledged, the executive has agreed to enter
into a pacto de cumplimiento [compliance agreement] with the plaintiffs after a first
decision in a lower administrative court; there was no necessity of lengthy appeals, as in
the Quimbaya case. In this case too, however, secrecy prevents the public (including the
plaintiff) from knowing the state of the negotiations with Berlin.87
Explaining the position of the executive: seeing across party lines
I have identified factors that determine the attitude of the state in return claims; these
seem to hold regardless of political transitions. Does partisanship explain the position of
the executive in return claims? In Europe, left-wing parties have shown a better
disposition towards return claims than their right-wing counterpart – I return to this
question in the next chapter. I do not see a similar pattern in Latin America.
In Peru, three successive presidents belonging to three different parties have
demonstrated their will to engage with the topic. Arguably, political parties in Peru are
little more than ad-hoc vehicles for their candidate to be elected (Crabtree 2010);
García’s APRA is one of the oldest left-wing parties in Latin America,88 yet the APRA of
his second term was a much-less ideologically driven political organization than that of a
few decades earlier. Toledo’s Perú Possible and Humala’s Partido Nacionalista Peruano
[Peruvian Nationalist Party] are political formations that barely survived beyond the term
of their leader. Toledo had run on a centrist platform, Humala on a toned-down version of
his previous populist declarations. All three presidents abided by the rules of free trade
and enterprise; none challenged the neo-liberal legacy from the 1990s (Vergara and
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According to Manuela Fischer, curator in charge of the South American collection of Berlin’s
Ethnologisches Museum, “there is no restitution request by the Colombian government,” as of January 10,
2019 (personal communication).
88
See chapter 4, note 152.
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Encinas 2016). In this context, Peruvian return claims are better understood as political
instruments for the incumbent president than as a consequence of their party affiliation.
In Mexico, the dramatic defeat of the PRI in 2000 did not imply a drastic change
in the conduct of the negotiations over the fate of the penacho. It is difficult to establish
whether party affiliation has had an impact on presidential involvement in return claims.
It may be argued that PAN presidents Fox and Calderón adopted a more nationalist tone
than their PRI predecessors Salinas de Gortari and Zedillo and showed more personal
interest in the return of the penacho. Yet, it is unclear whether this attitude stems from
partisanship, since the PAN has not sought to seriously challenge the ideological grounds
of Mexican nationalism (Peimbert Moreno 2011). Journalist Adriana Malvido argues that
timing may explain this situation better than ideological or programmatic differences
along party lines:89 after a decade and a half of civil society efforts and diplomatic
negotiations, the conditions had been established for PAN presidents to take initiatives
such as the 2006 verbal note and the 2010-12 bi-national commission of experts. Whether
Andres Manuel López Obrador, elected in 2018 on a radical-left platform, will take on a
different course of action, possibly inspired by his commitment to the welfare of the
country’s Indigenous communities, remains an empirical question.
In Colombia, neither Alvaro Uribe (in office 2002-10) nor Juan Manuel Santos
(2010-18) has demonstrated any personal interest in return claims. Both ran on
independent platforms seeking to overcome the traditional cleavage in Colombian politics
between conservatives and liberals. The political divide that grew between both men after
Santos’ election (Santos had previously been Uribe’s defense minister) has been much
commented; they held different views on many issues – most particularly the conduct of
89

Interview, Jan. 16, 2019.
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the peace process and the negotiation of a peace agreement with the FARC. Political
partisanship seems of little consequence for the Quimbaya and San Agustín cases.90
The absent parent in the family picture: Indigenous communities and return claims
The return claims I study concern objects created by pre-Columbian Indigenous cultures,
yet I have made few mentions until now of contemporary Indigenous communities. My
research reveals that they are barely concerned with, let alone involved in, the
formulation of the claims. While it is important to eschew any essentializing argument
that would necessarily associate a pre-Columbian object with contemporary Indigenous
communities, their conspicuous absence speaks volumes about the relationship between
these three Latin American states and their Indigenous populations.
Returns, not repatriations
Watkins (2005) considers that the position of Indigenous populations should be taken into
account as that of “cultural intra-nationalists” who challenge both the positions of the
internationalists who oppose returns and the nationalists who favor them. For Watkins,
Indigenous communities are even more peripheral than the states that seek the return of
an object from their national heritage. My case studies reveal a discrepancy in the
practice of returns and repatriation between Latin America and other parts of the world.
In the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Scandinavia, the practice of
repatriations to native communities has expanded over the past three decades. For
example, US museums, through laws such as NAGPRA, have been invited to re-examine
their collections and reconsider their relations with Native American communities –
90

Felipe Rincón (interview, Jun. 26, 2018) suggested that conservatives may have a stronger interest in
claiming the collection back, trying to make amend for President Holguín’s (a conservative) error. The
interest that President Betancur, a conservative too, took in the topic in the 1980s may confirm this
hypothesis. Yet, the case of Ernesto Samper, a liberal president who also spoke about the collection (see
chapter 2) contradicts it: the interest in the Quimbaya collection does not correlate with partisanship.
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implying a concept of the nation from which these communities are somewhat
differentiated. In Latin America, however (with, possibly, a slight difference in the case
of Colombia), the hegemonic discourse on the nation has left little to no space for specific
communities to be considered, today, the legitimate heirs of pre-Columbian artefacts.
This is not to say that repatriations – in the definition I have given of this term in chapter
1 – do not take place at all in Latin America, 91 rather that this practice is the exception
rather than the norm.92 Where and when they happen, repatriations seem to result from
initiatives coming from Western organizations, with a few notable exceptions, especially
in Argentina.93
I was surprised to notice a misunderstanding, in Peru particularly, about the
application of NAGPRA: several individuals and organizations have argued that Western
museums should give back cultural objects held in their collections to Peru because they
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For example, Mould de Pease (2003) mentions the repatriation of human remains from the National
Museum of American Indians in Washington DC to Peru: Ramiro Matos, a Peruvian anthropologist who
has implemented the provisions of NAGPRA from the Smithsonian Institution, and anthropologist Jorge
Flores Ochoa in Cusco, organized the repatriation of human skulls that were reburied near Cusco in 1996.
Anthropologist Sonia Guillen criticizes this process (interview, Apr. 25, 2017) for not originating from a
demand from a Peruvian community, but only from the unilateral actions of these anthropologists. In
Colombia, Restrepo-Navarro (2015) mentions the case of the Kogi community that, considering itself the
descendant of the Tayrona culture, sought to recover, through the intervention of a French NGO,
Tchendukua, the possession of a pendant sold at an auction house in Paris. The sale was preempted by the
French state, and the object is now exhibited in the Louvre. Tchendukua negotiated with the museum the
organization of a healing ceremony in the museum. Clemencia Plazas (interview, Jul. 21, 2018) also told
me about a healing ceremony that a community from the northern Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta requested
to be organized in the Museo del Oro in 1988, instead of obtaining the repatriation of objects from the
museum’s collection.
92
The extent to which repatriation requests in Latin America emanate endogenously from an Indigenous
community or are inspired in Western ethical concerns that seek to reproduce the principles of NAGPRA in
the region would represent an interesting topic for further empirical research.
93
Counterexamples include the repatriation of the remains of Mapuche chief Inakayal to Patagonia, in
Argentina, in 1994 (Endere 2009) and those of cacique José Gregorio Yancamil of the Rankülche
community, in 2006 (Curtoni and Chaparro 2007). These two cases concern a country where the
independent republic tried, in the late nineteenth century, to physically eliminate Indigenous populations
through military campaigns (the “Conquest of the Desert”).
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also give to Native American communities in the context of NAGPRA.94 This argument
seems to ignore entirely the process of appropriation by the nation-state that I have
described in chapter 2. In Latin America, only states claim the return of cultural heritage
objects from other countries, and not for the purpose to, in turn, deposit the object within
an Indigenous community.95
Bauer, Lindsay, and Urice (2007) are well aware that, as archaeologists, their
approval of the return process of the Machu Picchu collection to Peru would mean
supporting the project of a centralizing nation-state, which would in turn further
disenfranchise the communities this process was supposed to help: “Peru’s patrimony law
prevent[s] existing Indigenous groups from curating what is arguably their heritage on
their own terms” (52). While these authors obviously put great care in avoiding the trap
of essentialism, they somehow abide by it – in a very multiculturalist way – by assuming
that there does exist an Indigenous community to whom these objects should return. This
(North-American, or Anglo-Saxon) multiculturalist bias makes them miss the subtleties
of nation-building processes in Latin America, where the state has blended ethnic
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In her book, Mould de Pease (2003) argues that the criteria of NAGPRA should be applied to the Machu
Picchu collection, even though the law was meant to apply only in the USA. Also referring to the Machu
Picchu collection, anthropologist Jorge Flores Ochoa declared that “in the USA, NAGPRA regulates the
restitution to Indigenous communities of objects that were taken from their ceremonial sites. This same
norm should apply in this case.” (“Piezas de Yale retornarán en 99 años,” La República, Mar. 4, 2008). The
Peruvian Minister of Labor Jorge Villasante declared that “in the United States a law was passed that forces
museums to show cultural remains, and to look for communities and return this heritage if these
communities demand it” (“Villasante: Yale debería devolver piezas de Machu Picchu por cuestión ética,”
La República, Dec. 14, 2008). Neither Mould de Pease Flores nor Flores Ochoa nor Villasante seems to
note that the Machu Picchu collection was being claimed by a state, not an Indigenous community.
95
The National Congress of American Indians wrote to Xokonoschtletl to express their support of his
efforts to obtain the “recovery of the feathered crown” to “the Native peoples of the continent” because this
objective “coincides with our own efforts on the Indian [sic] Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,”
adding that “non-Aboriginal governments, organizations and businesses which collect, ‘own’ and display
Native artifacts must realize that these items do not belong to anyone other than the Aboriginal people and
should be returned.” (Letter from Wayne Ducheneaux, NCAI President, to Xokonoschtletl, Mar. 25, 1991;
AHGE-SRE). The NCAI seems unaware that the possibility to give the penacho to any entity other than the
Mexican state has never been discussed.
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identities into the mestizo-national mold. Consequently, the nation-state has also
successfully delegitimized the claims that Indigenous communities could have had on
these objects. Bauer, Lindsay, and Urice do not identify which community the Machu
Picchu objects could be repatriated to, nor do they detail how this process would benefit
its members. In this particular case, it is very difficult, however, to identify an
Indigenous, non-mestizo, community in or around Cusco, that would be more legitimate
than any other group (including the nation) to claim these objects. To be sure, none has.
As anthropologists such as De La Cadena (2000) have shown, Indigenous
identities and mestizaje are defined at least as much in social and educational terms as
along ethnic, cultural, or racial criteria. An Indigenous identity is not exclusive of a
national identity. Hence Cusqueños can feel Indigenous, mestizos, and Peruvian. Besides,
repatriating an object to a particular group or community would imply an uncontested
authority and legitimacy over the ownership of this object, which, as noted by Brown
(2003), is far from obvious in complex contemporary societies where multiple
organizations claim to represent people with an Indigenous-ethnic identity on cultural,
linguistic, but also socio-economic criteria. The corporatist state in the twentieth-century,
throughout Latin America, has blurred the lines among these criteria. Indigenous
identities often intersect with socio-professional categories such as peasants.
Finally, the scarcity of repatriation processes in Mexico, Peru, and Colombia also
represents an application of Smith’s AHD, since, in the return claims I am studying,
control of returned objects is left entirely to state entities and their agents, the experts. In
this discourse, there is little regard for alternative (specifically Indigenous)
representations of heritage. The object’s function is to help forge the deep past of the
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nation in a linear conception of time; its pre-Hispanic ancientness is what gives it value.
Museified in the country that currently holds it, the object has lost its other social
functions in the contemporary world. It does not recover these functions when it is
returned.96
Below, I analyze the claims to indigeneity of several actors involved in return
claims and the position of organizations that represent Indigenous communities about
these claims. I have found little interest in this process among the representatives of
Indigenous communities I was able to speak to. In both Mexico and Peru, it is generally
assumed that no Indigenous community can claim ownership over the penacho and the
Machu Picchu collection, respectively, thus revealing that the state has efficiently
completed its task of appropriating the pre-Columbian past – and, to some extent, to
incorporate Indigenous groups into the national mould. In these two countries, the state
has not sought to involve Indigenous communities in the return claims. In Colombia, on
the other hand, Indigenous communities have been consulted on this question.
Mexico: Indigenous or neo-Indians?
The Indigenous question is present in the case of the penacho, but not in that of the
Teotihuacan murals. Because of (or thanks to) Manuel Gamio’s anthropological study in
Teotihuacan in the 1920s, that ancient city is fully integrated into the narrative of
continuity between pre-Columbian cultures and the contemporary Mexican state. The
Nahuatl-speaking communities that live near Teotihuacan were not involved in the return
of the murals.
96

For example, many if not all the objects that compose the Quimbaya, Machu Picchu, and Paracas
collections are related to funerary rituals, yet none is to be reburied upon their return to Colombia or Peru.
Similarly, nobody expects a Mexican president (or whoever else would consider themselves Montezuma’s
heir) to wear the penacho. These objects will not escape their current condition as museum objects,
whereas NAGPRA opens the possibility for objects to be reburied or cremated.
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Multiple actors, on the other hand, want the Mexican state to claim the penacho in
the name of Mexico’s Indigenous communities – but as an element of pride for the
nation, not as a separatist argument for Indigenous communities from the state. Mexican
state authorities, however, do not seem to consider that they (should) have an Indigenous
interlocutor on the matter. The state has tried to get rid of the civil society actors who
claim to represent Indigenous Mexicans and has not made any effort to seek alternative
interlocutors among Indigenous communities.97 Cultural objects such as the penacho
belong to the nation-state, into which the identity of the dominant Indigenous group
(Aztec) has been dissolved through the narrative of mestizaje, making this heritage
indistinguishable from Mexicanness. While there are several million Nahuatl speakers in
Central Mexico, all Mexicans are supposed to claim descent from the Aztecs. Hence,
these objects are not appropriable by an ethnic minority and can only be claimed by the
state. This is the sense of INAH Director García Moll’s statement, in 1991, when he
wrote that “this Institute officially requests the devolution of the penacho” because
“diverse Indigenous groups and peoples from this country solicited countless authorities
to initiate this process.”98
These “diverse Indigenous groups and peoples” include Blanca Moctezuma and
Xokonoschtletl, of course, but also a constellation of other organizations that all claim to
represent part of or all Indigenous communities in Mexico. Defining indigeneity in racial
and cultural terms, Xokonoschtletl considers himself Indigenous, which has brought him
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A notable exception was at an inter-ministerial meeting on the topic in June 1996, when the subdirector
for visual arts of the direction of cultural affairs of the SRE mentioned that, “to better evaluate the topic, the
representativeness that some sectors of the population grant to it [i.e., Indigenous communities] should be
taken into consideration” (Minuta de la reunion de trabajo acerca del penacho de Moctezuma, Jun. 13,
1996; AHGE-SRE). This recommendation had no practical effect.
98
Letter from Robert García Moll, op. cit., note 70.
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support from other Indigenous organizations but also exposed him to the criticism from
other organizations

99

and from the Mexican government, which disputes his

indigeneity.100 Blanca Moctezuma’s discourse also tends to conflate race, ethnicity, and
culture to describe Mexican indigeneity: her claim for the return of the penacho, which
“our contemporary Indigenous people understand, must serve to revitalize our traditions,
our culture and our history” – an “our” that seems to embrace all Mexicans, regardless of
their ethnicity.101 In her letters to Mexican presidents, she has progressively incorporated
references to Mexico’s Indigenous groups, beyond her own status as a descendant of the
last Aztec emperor.102
Beyond these two figures, other organizations pretending to represent Indigenous
communities have also shown an interest in the penacho and written to express their
support to the objective of obtaining its return.103 Altogether, they form a galaxy of
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“Sólo Zedillo,” op. cit, note 12.
The Mexican embassy in Vienna has repeatedly questioned whether Xokonoschtletl really speaks
Nahuatl, as he claims (Informe sobre los danzantes, op. cit. note n. 14), and referred to Xokonoschtletl and
the members of his organization Yankuikanahuak as an “allegedly Indigenous group” (Diplomatic cable to
the SRE, May 3, 1994; AHGE-SRE).
101
Press conference, op. cit., note 5.
102
In 1994, she introduced herself as Montezuma’s heir, without referencing contemporary Indigenous
communities (Letter from Blanca Moctezuma to President Ernesto Zedillo, Dec. 22, 1994; APBMB). By
2000, she was considering that the most important opinion on the topic of the penacho was that of “deep
Mexico, the Indigenous world” (without distinction among the many communities), which allegedly would
“welcome the back-up from its own government to recuperate this great symbol of unity” (Letter from
Blanca Moctezuma to President Vicente Fox, Oct. 28, 2001). Finally, in 2018, she wrote to López Obrador
on letterhead of a rather mysterious “Consejo Supremo Nacional Indígena” (Letter from Blanca
Moctezuma to President Andres Manuel López Obrador, Aug. 2, 2018).
103
Among other examples, the Movimiento Confederado Restaurador de Anauak asked for President De La
Madrid’s support for their efforts to bring the penacho back to Mexico (Letter from Izkalotzin Maria del
Carmen Nieva López to President De La Madrid, Feb. 23, 1988; AHGE-SRE). In an apparently
coordinated effort, representatives of the “nahua-tlakotenko” and “otomi” people also asked for the return,
accepting that the penacho would go to the National Museum of Anthropology (Letters to Mexican
President Salinas de Gortari and Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitsky, Mar. 2, 1991). Also, Blanca
Moctezuma is not the only one who claims the penacho on the basis of her ancestry: another woman
introduced herself as Montezuma’s descendant and as the head of a “Museum Emperor Montezuma” in
Tijuana. Claiming to have received the support of all fifty-six [sic] ethnic groups in the country and to have
“managed” the return of the penacho, she asks to be invited to the ceremony of return of the penacho
(Letter from Virginia Ortiz de Zarata Silva y Nieto De Andrada Moctezuma de Soler to President Zedillo,
Jul. 19, 1996). This letter arrived during the very publicized episode of July 1996, when Austrian President
100
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supporters whose representativeness of Mexico’s Indigenous communities is hard to
assess. If anything, their discourses demonstrate that being Indigenous is compatible with
being Mexican. None of them disputes the legitimacy of the Mexican state as the owner
of the penacho or that the object should go to a national museum upon its return, which
circles back to a narrative of the nation that has successfully coopted a deep Indigenous
past not necessarily linked to present Indigenous communities. Also, their discourse often
mixes an esoteric language with a nationalist discourse of collective healing.104
Galinier and Molinié (2013) have labeled “neo-Indians” these quasi-religious
groups who boast concerns for the rebirth of Indigenous identities and define a
cosmovision that fuses new-Age mysticism with recreated, pseudo-Indigenous
performances and reminiscences of Christianism – a new tradition being invented. They
consider Xokonoschtletl “an adroit priest of neo-Indianity” (93) and describe the
“traditional” dancers who perform in front of Mexico’s presidential palace as neo-Indians
who wear pre-Hispanic clothes (Hollywood-style), do not speak Amerindian languages
but a few Nahuatl words, and have adopted an Aztec name. The case of the penacho,
which seems of greater interest among urban neo-Indians than for organizations that
represent Indigenous communities from throughout the Mexican territory, reveals the
difficulty of establishing strict lines between Indigenous and non-Indigenous worlds, but
Klestil declared in favor of gifting the penacho to Mexico – a possibility that this woman apparently
thought would materialize.
104
I have presented examples of this discourse, promoted by Blanca Moctezuma and Xokonoschtletl, in
chapter 3. Others use similar language. For example, Bernardina Green, founder of the Movimiento de la
Mexicanidad [Movement for Mexicanity] argues that “the return of the penacho had been mathematically
calculated by our ancestors [the Aztecs]” (Adriana Malvido and Anne Huffschmid, “Símbolo de poder,” La
Jornada, Dec. 3, 1994). Diana Alvarez Rendón, who considers herself a “human being with some psychic
sensibility” who “can see possible solutions to our country’s current issues” (Letter to President Ernest
Zedillo, Apr. 20, 1995; AHGE-SRE), kept writing to Mexican presidents throughout the 1990s. She asked
them to claim the return of the penacho because its “energetic force symbolizes the peace that the country
has lost.” She hopes for the “improvement” [superación] of the nation through the return of the penacho
(Letter to President Ernesto Zedillo, Nov. 20, 1995).
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also that “separating the Westernized Indian from the ‘authentic’ one is a (possibly
meaningless) operation that is extremely difficult to perform” (Galinier and Molinié
2013, 4).105 What is clearer, however, is that pre-Columbian Indigenous objects keep
being appropriated, either by the state or by civil society organizations; this process has
blurred the definitions of indigeneity in the country. The practice of repatriation of sacred
objects to an Indigenous community is difficult because “pure indigeneousness” would
be hard to determine. Galinier and Molinié also underline the ambiguous role of
anthropologists in the birth of neo-Indianism; the support from INAH Director García
Moll to Xokonoschtletl may be understood in his context.
The cause of the penacho has received the support of other Indigenous
organizations from throughout the Americas 106 and beyond, 107 also demonstrating
Xokonoschtletl’s capacity to mobilize internationally. Similar questions can be raised
about the level of representativeness of these organizations among Indigenous
communities in their own country, as well as how “authentically” Indigenous they are.
Ultimately, such distinctions matter little: these letters bring some form of legitimacy to
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For example, I attempted multiple times (unsuccessfully) to interview representatives from the Congreso
Nacional Indigena (CNI), an organization founded in 1996 in the wake of the 1994 rebellion led by the
Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional [Zapatist Army of National Liberation – EZLN] in the southern
Mexican state of Chiapas. I interpret this apparent lack of interest for the topic as a sign that cultural objects
such as the penacho have long lost (if they ever had it) their significance for Indigenous communities in
Mexico, particularly among non-Mexica (Aztec), non-Nahuatl-speaking communities. The penacho is most
likely not a useful tool to deal with the social, political, or even cultural issues they seek to address through
the constitution of movements such as the CNI. The object is available, though, to be symbolically seized
by actors in the wake of the neo-Indian movement, for revivalist purposes, as an element of the reconstruction of a sublimated past. This past remains disconnected from the preoccupations of many
contemporary Indigenous communities, particularly those that reside in rural areas, far from the urban
centers where the neo-Indianist movement is stronger.
106
Letter from Wayne Ducheneaux, op. cit., note 95; Letter from the Assembly of First Nations / National
Indian Brotherhood (based in Ottawa) to the Ambassador of Austria in Canada, in support of
Xokonoschtletl, Nov. 15, 1991; AHGE-SRE.
107
An “Indigenous Mayan Community,” based in Germany, wrote (in English) in support of Tlatuani [sic]
Xokonoschtletl. “Tlatoani” is the Nahuatl word for “ruler” (Letter from the director of the organization to
Xokonoschtletl, Sep. 7, 1987; AHGE-SRE).
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their recipient. These expressions of support also demonstrate that the topic of returns and
repatriations is increasingly seen as a potential tool of political leverage for Indigenous
organizations in their fight on other topics of concern. 108 At the same time, they
contribute to reifying the notions of a common Indigenous past and community, as if all
Indigenous people had a common interest in the penacho and its return would benefit
them all. The penacho becomes a postcard of an undifferentiated Indigenous past across
the continent.
In Europe, and more particularly, of course, in Austria, two visions of the
Indigenous conflict in the penacho case. On the one hand, an exotisized view of
“Indians” as colorful but oppressed and deserving of support; 109 this view, which
sometimes verges on ignorance and racism, 110 assumes that the penacho should
necessarily be important to an undifferentiated global Indigenous community. On the
other hand, a few Austrian experts express their disbelief and doubts about this return,
and more particularly about the figure of Xokonoschtletl.111 Concerns about the fate of
Indigenous communities also serve as an argument against the return: Mexico, as a state
that treats its Indigenous population poorly, should not be gifted an object that belongs to
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An organization called Union Achiri writes from La Paz, Bolivia, to express its support to
Xokonoschtletl and “the Aztec people,” but the letter soon turns into a description of the organization’s
own issue regarding land rights, implying a sense of solidarity among Indigenous organizations across
countries, beyond the specific topic of concern for each of them (Letter from Julio Tumiri Apaza, president
of Unión Achiri, to Xokonoschtletl Gomora, Dec. 10, 1991; AHGE-SRE).
109
Following a debate on national television in Austria on Nov. 24, 1987, spectators wrote to complain
about the way the “Indian” (referring to Xokonoschtletl) had been treated by the host of the show and
expressed their support for the return (Letter from Ambassador Francisco Cuevas Cancino to SRE, Dec. 2,
1987; AHGE-SRE).
110
Some Austrian media have described the ”authentic Apache tipis” built by Xokonoschtletl and his group
of danzantes in Vienna (“Sólo Zedillo,” op. cit, note 12).
111
A lawyer, René Kuppe, considers that Xokonoschtletl is “a tourist attraction that tends to reproduce the
famous stereotype of the noble savage” (quoted in Huffschmid and Malvido, “El Penacho hace buena
publicidad (…), op. cit., chapter 4, note 105).
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the latter. 112 Alternatively, the penacho should be returned, but to an Indigenous
(preferably Nahuatl-speaking) community.113 Both options ignore the complex process
of appropriation that has blurred the separation between the nation and pre-Columbian
communities, or melted the latter into the former.114 The Mexican diplomacy has been
very aware of this issue and tried to make sure that they were seen as paying attention to
the needs of the country’s Indigenous communities: in several instances, the Mexican
embassy warned the SRE of the danger for the Mexican government of being perceived
as privileging the interests of a powerful elite and of neglecting, or even mistreating, its
Indigenous minorities.115
Peru: Indians and Incas
In Peru, too, the state has successfully deprived local Indigenous communities in the
Cusco region of the agency to claim Machu Picchu as theirs: no specific community
today, even among Quechua speakers, can claim the citadel abandoned around the time
of the conquest. As I have exposed in chapter 3, Cusco is in many regards the cradle of
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Idem. Kuppe also declared that “the Mexican government, which is famous for its mistreatment of its
Indigenous people, cannot be considered the successor of the Aztecs.”
113
In another TV debate about the penacho in Austria in July 1996, a spectator asked whether the object
would be given to the government or to “the Indigenous people” (Encrypted email from the Mexican
embassy in Vienna to SRE, Jul. 9, 1996; AHGE-SRE). Kuppe also proposed that the penacho be returned
not the government but to “Mexican Indians” (“El Penacho hace Buena publicidad,” op. cit., note 111).
114
Among the very few voices in Austria to acknowledge the process of mestizaje, Rudolf Burger, dean of
Vienna’s University of Applied Arts, declared on television that the penacho “is not only an Indian symbol,
it also is a mestizo symbol” (quoted in Adriana Malvido, “El Penacho de Moctezuma, motivo de disputa en
Austria,” La Jornada, Jul. 20, 1996).
115
In 1992, Ambassador Eugneio Anguiano warned that the embassy could no longer ignore
Xokonoschtletl’s campaign in Vienna because it would give the impression that “Mexico’s diplomatic
missions abroad are insensitive to ‘popular causes’ and receive only bankers, businessmen (…), and all
other groups but peasants and dispossessed Indigenous people.” (Memorandum de conversación, op. cit.,
note 76). A few years later, Ambassador Roberta Lajous warned that “the Mexican government must not
give the impression that it is reticent about tackling Indigenous affairs (Encrypted email, op. cit., note 113).
This communication follows Austrian President Klestil’s declarations in favor of the return; Lajous is well
aware that, in the context of the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, a larger discussion about Indigenous affairs
in Mexico could involve a condemnation of the country for violations of human rights. Throughout
Zedillo’s presidency (1994-2000), the Mexican government, indeed, faced increased external scrutiny on
questions of democracy and respect for human rights (Covarrubias 2003).
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Peruvianness, yet it is the Peruvian republic, whose capital is Lima, that is the heir of the
late Inca empire. While the return of the collection to Peru and its physical installation in
Cusco may have contributed to appeasing the often-contentious rivalry between the two
cities, they do not signal a change in the relations between the state and Indigenous
organizations. These have not been consulted or associated with the claim – nor, for that
matter, are they particularly interested in the process.
In Peru, “the political actors that class themselves as Indigenous have not
unleashed protracted challenges about the ownership and management of heritage sites
and objects” (Herrera 2013, 280), in great part because ethnic identity intersects in
complex ways with urban and rural social conditions and political fights around issues of
land rights, mining, etc. This is not to say that culture and heritage are not important
topics for Indigenous organizations; rather, that they are more concerned with bilingual
education and the transmission of immaterial heritage practices than with objects whose
ownership by the state they do not dispute. For Blandina Contreras Yance,116 return
processes are very much linked to the preservation or rediscovery of knowledge and
technical know-how: during our conversation, she did express interest in the return to
Peru of Huari textiles she saw in Madrid – not necessarily for the objects themselves but
for the forgotten technique they represent. In her opinion, this return would only make
sense if the objects were to be made available for their study to Indigenous communities
in her region of Ayacucho. When I asked her about Machu Picchu, Contreras Yance
replied that the commodification of the citadel through the development of the tourism
industry, which has had no positive impact for Indigenous communities, is another reason
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President of the peasant-Indigenous Andean organization Omucai Pachamama and representative of the
Confederación Campesina del Peru [Peruvian Peasant Confederation] (interview, Apr. 30, 2017).
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why these communities are suspicious of the Peruvian government’s actions in favor of
returns – a process in which the state has not consulted with Indigenous organizations.117
Indigenous participation in the return process of the Machu Picchu collection did
exist, however, through the participation of the figure of an “Inca” and his entourage in
the public protest in Cusco to demand this return from Yale118 and in the organization of
a ceremony upon the arrival of the collection in Cusco, after their presentation in the
presidential palace in Lima.119 This ceremony participates in the “Incanization” of Cusco,
a top-down process imposed by municipal elites and premised on the grandeur of the Inca
empire (Silverman 2002). This Inca also belongs to the world of neo-Indianism described
by Galinier and Molinié (2013), who consider that “neo-Incas” see archaeological sites
more as places of worship than as areas to be protected. Their involvement in the
ceremonies involving the return of the Machu Picchu collection reveals their political
relevance, at least at the local level in Cusco, as both political and academic authorities
accept (and probably seek) their presence. The theatralization of the arrival of the objects,
paraded in front of the Inca on Cusco’s main square, supports the idea that “neo-Incaism
permeates the entire social and symbolic life of Cuzco’s inhabitants and manifests itself
117

My interview with Blandina Contretas Yance represented an important step in my development as a
researcher who interacts with the subjects of his research through interviews. In her discourse, which
clearly has incorporated the lexicon of international human rights and fluidly connects the dots between
heritage, identity, language, land rights, mining, consulta previa [previous consultation – a legal
mechanism whereby Indigenous communities should be consulted previous to the beginning of extractive
projects on or near their ancestral land], etc., Contreras Yance argues in favor of the recovery of the knowhow and knowledge related to arts and craft as the basis for “sustainable development.” She did not once
mention the question of repatriating human remains, although, prompted by my questions, she showed
interest in the idea of obtaining the repatriation of objects. Realizing how her concerns and those of the
organizations she represents (the defense of collective rights and the strengthening of the Indigenous
movement’s institutional capacity) widely diverged from the state-centric process of returns and from the
museum-based practice of repatriations, I was left wondering whether I was overstepping my role. By
analyzing the reasons why the return of old stones and bones were not of her concern, was I unintentionally
suggesting that she should care about those? Was I imposing on her ideas that I gathered through my
academic readings, inspired in Anglo-Saxon museum practices?
118
Cinthia Garreta, “El Perú unido le reclama a Yale,” La República, Nov. 6, 2010.
119
“Luego de cien años… el reencuentro con nuestro pasado,” La República, Jul. 3, 2011.
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in their day-to-day lives” (122). Galinier and Molinié argue that neo-Indianism in Peru is
more intrinsically linked to political power than in Mexico, Toledo’s inauguration
ceremony in Machu Picchu in 2001 representing a culmination of this movement. That
local authorities sought the presence of the Inca at the moment the Machu Picchu
collection returned from Yale, after a stop in Lima, participates in the same movement of
political legitimation through the identification with the sublimated Inca past.
Colombia: the multicultural exception?
As I have shown, the process of appropriation of the pre-Columbian past by the nationstate has made fewer inroads in Colombia than in Mexico and Peru. Additionally, the
adoption of multiculturalism and the strengthening of the judicial branch in the 1991
Constitution have led to the opening of new spheres of political participation and greater
respect for Indigenous communities’ fundamental rights (Van Cott 2000). This evolution
finds a direct application in the formulation of claims for the return of the Quimbaya
collection and the San Agustín statues: these claims did not originate among Indigenous
communities or individuals, yet these have been associated with the process to a greater
extent than in Mexico and Peru.
Representatives of two Indigenous organizations were invited to speak at the
audience organized by the Constitutional Court in February 2016.120 Their statements
before the Court found an echo among non-Indigenous attendees, 121 who may only then
have started to consider these communities as legitimate actors of the claims. During the
120

Gabriel Mujuy Jacanamejoy, representative of the Inga people, who live in the Amazonian department
of Putumayo, and Rosendo Ahué Coello, from the Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia (ONIC).
ONIC is a nationwide organization that has attempted to run in elections during the 1990s but has since
then preferred to focus on activism.
121
Other actors of this process have talked about these interventions before the Court as grounded in solid
arguments, moving, and even “human” – comments that reveal a certain sense of exoticism, almost a
surprise that these communities would declare on the topic and show some interest.

264

audience, these representatives argued that, even though no Indigenous community can,
today, claim direct descent from the ancient Quimbaya groups, the return of the
collection would benefit all Indigenous communities in Colombia and represent a form of
collective spiritual healing. They did not request, however, that the collection be
managed directly by an Indigenous community, but rather that it be returned to its native
land: Colombia. Rosendo Ahué Coello told me that “even though the Quimbaya people
who lived in a large part of this country have disappeared, there are still 102 Indigenous
peoples, and we feel violated in our rights when we see sacred objects and elements in
other places.”122 Thanks to the recognition they have enjoyed since the adoption of the
1991 Constitution, Indigenous communities in Colombia can take advantage of fora such
as the Constitutional Court to push their own political agenda by linking topics that may
seem anecdotal, such as return claims, to a large discourse about their ancestral relation to
their land and other questions connected to human and environmental rights.
The question of a direct linkage between the Quimbayas who made the objects in
the sixth century AD and the Indigenous communities who currently live in the Quindío
came up several times during my research. Anthropologist Roberto Restrepo told me that
contemporary Emberá communities who live in the department of Quindío do claim to
descend from the Quimbayas.123 While it may be possible to trace a linkage, through an
anthropological study, between the Emberás and the Quimbayas who inhabited the region
at the time of the Conquest (the “Quimbaya tardío” or late Quimbaya), the latter shall not
be assumed to themselves be the direct descendants of previous populations of the region
(the “Quimbaya temprano-clasico,” or early-classic Quimbaya). Rather, they were the
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Ahué Coello is ONIC’s advisor for traditional and Western medicine (interview, Jul. 3, 2018).
Interview, Jun. 29, 2018.
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result of migrations that took place over several centuries between the creation of the
objects and the Spanish conquest.124 As a consequence, a genetic or cultural heritage
would likely be impossible to prove. Yet, the narrative supported by organizations such
as ONIC, which conflates the history and interest of all Indigenous groups throughout the
country, allows one to recreate a direct link between ancient and contemporary
Indigenous communities, making the latter legitimate stakeholders in the return claim in
the eyes of the other participants to the process – a feat that Indigenous organizations in
Mexico and Peru have not emulated.
In San Agustín, “the majority of researchers considered the statues and associated
material outside any contemporary cultural context, that is, simply as the remains of past
peoples. There was no attempt to establish cultural continuities of any kind with extant
societies” (Gnecco and Hernández 2008, 445). The population of the contemporary town
of San Agustín is largely mestizo, with the exception of the “re-indigenizing” Yanacona
community (Jackson and Ramírez 2009), which is not involved in the return claim. The
claim for the statues is a cause of the village of San Agustín, which is regularly in conflict
with the Yanacona community.125 The process of re-indigenization, which focuses on
land holdings and resource transfers from the state, is not mediated through the
community’s identification with material remains of another Indigenous culture.126 Yet,
confirming that the Colombian judicial branch considers Indigenous communities as
legitimate actors of return claims, as well as useful political allies, the judge in charge of
the acción de tutela on this case suggested to David Dellenback to get Indigenous people
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Clemencia Plazas, interview, Jul. 21, 2018.
See chapter 4, note 101.
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At least not these ones, and at least not for now.
125
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involved in his claim.127
Hence, the Colombian cases show an apparent paradox: in a country with a much
smaller Indigenous population than Mexico’s or Peru’s, where the national discourse is
less predicated on the appropriation of the Indigenous past, and where the executive has
shown little enthusiasm to claim the remains of pre-Columbian cultures, Indigenous
organizations have been associated with the claiming process to a greater extent than
their counterparts in the other two countries. This paradox is only apparent: the variation
in the importance of the pre-Columbian past for the construction of the national discourse
and the importance of the multiculturalism in Colombia help explaining it.
Conclusion: understanding the formation of a winning coalition
In this chapter, I have sought to evidence that return claims are not the product of
structural, institutional, or ideological forces that would necessarily lead to a claim.
Rather, their existence depends on the agency of a series of actors who take upon
themselves to propose, formulate, and carry the claim to the holding institution. I
analysed the role of four types of actors: civil society individuals who initiate the
movement to claim a specific object; experts who use their knowledge to legitimize their
role as technicians in charge of the care of the objects; and state authorities, who do not
always work in coordination towards the recuperation of the object. Finally, I analysed
the ambiguities of Indigenous involvement in the claims. I have shown that return claims
are largely the result of politically motivated decisions made by these actors, who pursue
their own interests, bounded by the largely unchallenged intellectual framework that
values material heritage as one of the main sources of national identity. I argued that, in
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Interview, Sep. 29, 2018. Dellennack claims that Indigenous people in San Agustín “never stood up” to
defend the statues.
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Mexico and Colombia, executive authorities are reluctant to embark on a crusade to
recover cultural objects held in collections abroad because the movement is launched by
civil society actors. These actors promote an alternative discourse on the (historic,
ethical, political) value of this heritage or are critical of the government’s action. Peru
provides a counter-example, where the civil society actor who initiated the claim left
room for state authorities to seize the discourse of nationalist reevaluation of the
archaeological past and make it their own.
Overall, following the proponents of the ACF, who emphasize the importance of
ideas and values in the constitution of a policy coalition, I argue that it is the agency of
each category of actors that determines why, with relatively similar core beliefs regarding
the importance of material heritage for the construction of the nation, each country comes
to manage return claims in different ways. Yet, the importance of these core beliefs
makes it impossible for any actor to entirely drop from a coalition: while state agencies
may decide not to push the claim actively (as they did in Colombia), this can be
reactivated at any time, when politically convenient or when new developments offer a
more favourable window of opportunity. Officially abandoning a claim would be
considered unpatriotic by the other members of the coalition and, beyond, within the
general population.
In the next and last chapter, I turn to an examination of the attitude of other
actors: the supporters and adversaries of return claims in the claimed country. I then
propose a modelling of the configurations to predict the likelihood of an object being
returned to the claimant country.
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Chapter 6 – Looking abroad: the role of international actors in explaining return
claims and their resolution
I have focused so far on domestic explanations of the phenomenon of return claims and
shown that state authorities initiate claims in reaction to pressures from their own civil
society. In this final chapter, I show that state authorities also respond to the actions and
declarations of actors beyond their own borders. Because return claims are international
in essence, the attitude of a broad set of actors, in the holding country and beyond, must,
indeed, be considered.
First, I look at the international context that has set the stage for Latin American
states to formulate return claims. I analyze the role of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as the main international organization
that focuses on topics related to heritage and explore the importance of a few important
cases as role models for Latin American countries, particularly Greece’s claim for the
return of the Parthenon Marbles. I continue by analyzing the role of holding institutions
in return claims. I review the legal and technical arguments used by Western holding
institutions to justify their opposition to returns and contrast their attitude with that of two
institutions – the De Young Museum in San Francisco and the Museum of World
Cultures in Gothenburg – that have decided to voluntarily return cultural objects, on the
basis of ethical criteria. I round up this analysis of international actors by highlighting
cases where claiming states have found allies in the country of the holding institution. I
then summarize my findings about the relative importance of domestic and international
actors and conclude that their combination, rather than the presence/absence of any of
them in particular in the return process, helps understand the outcome of a claim.
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Finally, I examine the modalities of the returns that have already taken place. I
analyze the “mutually beneficial repatriation agreements” (MBRAs) signed in the three
cases that have been resolved (the Teotihuacan murals, the Machu Picchu collection, and
the Paracas textiles). MBRAs (Falkoff 2007) represent an alternative to the dichotomy
return/no return by proposing a variety of legal and technical figures to establish the
bases for future collaboration between the claiming country and the holding institution. I
also introduce a more critical view of MBRAs, arguing that they have not always brought
the expected benefits in terms of long-term collaboration and scientific research.
The international environment
In this section, I focus on the paradoxical role of UNESCO: on the one hand, the
organization has implemented a series of legal instruments and mechanisms that favor
restitutions and morally supports the principle of returns; on the other hand, these
instruments, mechanisms, and support have proven ineffective to help resolve return
claims. I then look at the multiplication of cases worldwide, which has encouraged Latin
American states to move forward with their own claims.
The role of UNESCO
Since the end of the Napoleonic wars in Europe, a corpus of legal texts has built up to
address the question of the restitution of displaced cultural objects, particularly as a result
of armed conflicts and foreign occupation. This historical process, which has been
analyzed in extenso (Merryman 1986, Greenfield 2007, O'Keefe 2007, Vrdoljak 2008,
Chechi 2014), ultimately led to the adoption of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transport of
Ownership of Cultural Property. This text, which was promoted throughout the 1960s by

270

states such as Mexico and Peru (Jowers 2003), among others, meant to be a compromise
between the interests of source nations, concerned with the growing traffic of cultural
objects, and those of market nations,1 which meant to protect the interests of their
museums, art collectors, and dealers.
Among the criticisms most often addressed toward the 1970 Convention, two
arguments stand out as having direct consequences for my case studies. First, the
Convention cannot be applied retroactively, so 1970 is theoretically the earliest date for a
displaced object to be covered by the provisions of the Convention. In practice, this date
is more recent by several years, or even decades, depending on the date of ratification by
the member states.2 One of the consequences of this restriction is to introduce the
distinction between restitutions and returns that I presented in Chapter 1, because all the
objects whose story I analyze here were displaced before 1970.3
To address this concern, UNESCO has created, in 1978, the Intergovernmental
Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its
Restitution in case of Illicit Appropriation (ICPRCP). This Committee aims at providing
a venue to facilitate negotiations between two states in their dispute over the ownership
and possession of cultural objects in cases where international conventions do not apply –
for example, for objects displaced before the adoption of the UNESCO 1970 Convention,

1

See chapter 1, note 3.
As signaled in chapter 4, Mexico (1972) and Peru (1979) ratified the text quickly after its adoption. This
is not the case, however, of Colombia (1988) but also of most market countries, where the lobby of art
dealers and collectors has contributed to the late adoption of the text. Spain ratified the convention in 1986,
Germany in 2007, Austria only in 2015. The United States, in this regard, represents an exception, having
ratified the convention in 1983. However, the country has, since then, refused to adopt more stringent
measures than the ones envisioned by the Convention or to reform this text. For example, the US has not
signed the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.
3
The Teotihuacan murals, which were most likely looted in the late 1960s, miss the mark by only a few
years, although both Mexico and the USA ratified the Convention early on. In this particular case, another
text – the 1970 bilateral Treaty of Cooperation – was also implemented just a few years too late to apply.
2
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and more particularly in colonial times (Prott 1995, Greenfield 2007). In Colombia,
Felipe Rincón, the lawyer who introduced the demanda de acción popular [class action],
asked that the Colombian authorities take the claim for the Quimbaya collection to the
Committee.4 In their declarations to the Constitutional Court, several experts argued that
the Committee was, indeed, a possible venue for Colombia to negotiate with Spain; the
judge upheld the argument and indicated that the Colombian government should use the
ICPRCP to claim the collection.5
In spite of a few successes,6 however, the role of the Committee has remained
very limited, for several reasons. First, the Committee is no more than a diplomatic
venue, with no coercive power; it can only help resolve cases when both member states
agree to use this forum, which seldom happens.7 The claiming states themselves seem
reluctant to use this mechanism: the Colombian authorities have argued against it on the
basis that the Quimbaya collection was not displaced during colonial times but willingly
gifted by an acting president to a foreign head of state.8 Peruvian authorities have also
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Corte Constitucional, Sentencia SU649/17, October 19, 2017.
Idem. The newspaper El Espectador mentioned this detail in its report on the decision of the Court
(“Recuperar el tesoro Quimbaya, orden perentoria al Gobierno,” Oct. 19, 2017).
6
The most recent instance of a negotiation led under the aegis of the ICPRCP concerns the return of the
Boğazköy Sphinx from Germany to Turkey, in 2011, according to the webpage dedicated to the ICPRCP
on UNESCO’s website (http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/restitution-of-culturalproperty/return-or-restitution-cases/, accessed June 20, 2019).
7
Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs María Angela Holguín declared, immediately following the
decision of the Constitutional Court, that Spain has not agreed to bring the Quimbaya case before the
committee, and that there exists “no coercive measure” to force that country to do so. (“No hay medios para
obligar a España a devolver tesoro: Gobierno,” El Tiempo, Oct. 20, 2017).
8
Santiago Jara, director of cultural affairs in the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argued that the
ICPRCP is not an adequate forum because it deals with colonial cases, while the Quimbaya collection was
a gift that, in his opinion, did not have to do with colonialism (interview, Jun. 27, 2018). Similarly, the
representative of the Ministry of Culture declared, before the Constitutional Court, that the ICPRCP is not
an appropriate venue to claim the Quimbaya collection because the Committee can only take on cases of
illicit appropriation, including colonization, and that the Quimbaya collection does not meet this standard.
Indeed, Article 4 of the UNESCO 1970 Convention states that “cultural property received as a gift or
purchased legally with the consent of the competent authorities of the country of origin of such property”
(…) “forms part of the cultural heritage of each State,” which would vindicate Spain’s claim over the
collection. However, as I have already argued in the previous chapters, such an interpretation by
5

272

avoided bringing their cases before the Committee, considering that they did not need the
validation of a third party to prove their right over the Machu Picchu collection and the
Paracas textiles,9 and that bringing UNESCO into the conversation would have added one
more level of “politicization” to an already thorny affair. 10 Similarly, Mexican
diplomacy, even though UNESCO offered the services of the ICPRCP,11 has preferred to
continue the negotiation bilaterally with Austria.12
The second main criticism addressed to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, as the
professionals who work against the trafficking of cultural heritage objects commented in
all three countries, is that the definition of cultural objects protected under the terms of
the Convention is ambiguous. Objects coming from (regular and clandestine)
archaeological excavations, though theoretically protected under Article 1 of the
Convention, are de facto excluded: indeed, Article 7 requires “the requesting Party [to]
furnish, at its expense, the documentation and other evidence necessary to establish its
claim for recovery and return.” Hence, only dutifully registered objects are covered by
the Convention, leaving aside looted objects since these were, by definition, uncatalogued
scientifically by the competent state authorities.13 Subsequent international conventions,

Colombian executive agencies eschews any critical reading of the post-colonial reality in Colombia at the
time of the gift, which allowed an acting president to gift a public good to the head of state of the former
colonizing power.
9
Luis Jaime Castillo, interview, Apr. 24, 2017.
10
Luis Guillermo Lumbreras, interview, Apr. 24, 2017.
11
Koichiro Matsuura, director of UNESCO, declared that UNESCO could help Mexico reestablish
negotiations with Austria. “Ofrece la UNESCO mediar por penacho,” Reforma, Mar. 29, 2006.
12
Alejandro Estivil, interview, Mar. 22, 2019.
13
Among the cultural objects I examine here, only the Machu Picchu collection (which was excavated by
Bingham and left the country with the approval of Peruvian authorities under the condition it would be
returned within eighteen months) and the Quimbaya collection (unscientifically excavated but registered by
the Colombian collectors who bought it before it was purchased by the Colombian state and gifted to the
Queen of Spain) left the country with the approval of local authorities. The exact origin of the other objects
had to be reconstructed ex-post. The first bi-national commission meant to demonstrate that the penacho
was indeed from Mesoamerica by proving that the feathers were from species endemic to that region (Dalia
Ayala, interview, Aug. 28, 2017). Archaeologist René Millon took years to find the apartment compound in
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such as UNIDROIT 1995, 14 have sought to address both limitations by including
unregistered archaeological artifacts in the list of protected objects.
In spite of these criticisms, the convention remains a watershed: it is credited for
having contributed to a change in the acquisition practices of the main museums around
the world. Most major museums have indeed adopted guidelines that require the
disclosure of the history of an object upon its acquisition. An object that had not yet left
its country of origin by 1970, or legally afterwards, is unlikely to find an institutional
buyer, for it may be subject to a restitution claim from the dispossessed state.15
Most importantly, the Convention has contributed to creating a more favorable
environment for the presentation of return claims by establishing a moral (if not always
legal) right for states to own their cultural heritage and to claim the return of longdisplaced cultural heritage objects: “cultural property constitutes one of the basic
elements of civilization and national culture, and its true value can be appreciated only in
relation to the fullest possible information regarding is origin, history, and traditional
setting.”16 A series of resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) has confirmed these principles. For example, Resolution 73/130 commends

Teotihuacan where the murals originated from (Millon 1988). The consul of Sweden, Sven Karel, probably
bought the Paracas textiles in a market in Lima, or directly to the looters, so there is no record of their
excavation; Carmen Thays, curator of the MNAAH, (interview, Jul. 24, 2017), said that a stylistic analysis
of the textiles allowed identifying their most likely origin – the cemetery of Arena Blanca in the Paracas
peninsula. Finally, only Preuss took notes of the exact location of the statues he shipped to Germany. In
these four cases, it would have been difficult – not to say impossible – to prove the origin of these objects,
as requested by the Convention, in the absence of pre-registration before their exportation.
14
UNIDROIT Convention On Stolen Or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, Jun. 24, 1995. Text available
at: https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/cultural-property/1995-convention (last accessed Jul. 3, 2019).
15
For example, the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City accepted to return a series of statues to
Cambodia after it was demonstrated that these statues were still on site in 1970 and had most likely been
taken out of Cambodia during that country’s civil war (Tom Mashberg and Ralph Blumenthal, “The Met
will return a pair of statues to Cambodia,” The New York Times, May 3, 2013).
16
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property 1970. Full text available at: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/
illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-property/1970-convention/text-of-the-convention/ (accessed Jun. 20, 2019)
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UNESCO’s work “for the return or restitution of cultural property of fundamental
spiritual, historical, and cultural value.” 17 In this sense, legal texts are as much a
discourse on the value of heritage for the construction of nationalist discourses as the
press articles and official declarations I have cited throughout this work. Additionally, in
1978, UNESCO Director-General declared that “men and women who have been
deprived of their cultural heritage ask for the return of at least the art treasures that best
represent their culture,” calling “upon the governments of the Organization’s Member
States to conclude bilateral agreements for the return of cultural property to the countries
from which it has been taken.” 18 For this reason, as I noted in Chapter 1, the
internationalists have also criticized the 1970 UNESCO Convention, which would be, in
their opinion, too favorable to the nationalist position and detrimental to the interests of
knowledge and conservation of the heritage of all mankind. For art law scholar
Merryman (1986), “UNESCO 1970 is largely about national retention of cultural
property” (844).
Overall, texts of international law appear more as an important backdrop for the
formulation of return claims rather than a practical mechanism for the resolution of
disputes. Beyond this lack of practical impact, however, the symbolical importance of
UNESCO shall not be underestimated. The organization has greatly contributed to
legitimizing return claims19 and to the emergence of an international norm favoring the
principle of returns.
17

United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/73/130, Return or restitution of cultural property to the
countries of origin, adopted Dec. 13, 2018. Similar language has been used in multiple resolutions adopted
by the UNGA since 1972.
18
Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow, “A plea for the restitution of an irreplaceable cultural heritage to those who
created it,” 1978: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000034683 (last accessed July 5, 2019).
19
For example, evaluating the situation caused by Xokonoschtletl’s first public protest in Vienna, the
Mexican embassy in Vienna considered, in November 1987, that “UNESCO has reached the conclusion
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The impact of other cases
In parallel to the progressive development of a norm and of texts of international law in
favor of restitutions and returns, the multiplication of highly publicized disputes has also
contributed to a greater awareness of this topic among heritage professionals and general
audiences. The Greek claim over the Parthenon Marbles, in particular, has become an
iconic cause that has inspired the proponents of return claims in Latin America.20
In 1982, Melina Mercouri, then minister of culture of Greece, started an
international campaign for the return of the Parthenon Marbles, taken from Greece by
Lord Elgin, who sold it to the British government in 1816. The Marbles have since then
been on display in the British Museum. Mercouri’s speech to the delegates to UNESCO’s
World Conference on Cultural Policies (Mondiacult) in Mexico City in August 1982 was
widely reported in the Mexican press21 and inspired Mexican officials to think about
objects from their own cultural heritage that could be claimed back.22 References to the
Greek claim for the Parthenon Marbles abound in articles in Latin American newspapers,
which use it to contextualize and justify the claims presented by their own country.23

that objects held in the museums of various countries that have a special value for the people from where
they originated should be returned to their place of origin” (Aide-mémoire from the Embassy of Mexico in
Vienna, Nov. 23, 1987; AHGE-SRE). The fact that UNESCO had previously recognized the right of
countries to recover cultural objects they consider an important piece of their national heritage clearly
appears, in this document, as an argument in favor of officially requesting the return of the penacho.
20
Felipe Rincón mentioned this case specifically during his intervention before the Constitutional Court.
21
See for example Crescencio Cárdenas, “Han saqueado al mundo los países colonizadores: Grecia.
Reclama la devolución de las joyas arqueológicas,” El Universal, Jul. 30, 1982; Charálambos Hadzilambis,
“Melina rechazó a su clase social: cuarenta días de angustia le dieron su dimension política,” Proceso, Aug.
5, 1982.
22
Rafael Tovar y Teresa, who at the time was the director of cultural affairs of the SRE, declared,
following Mercouri’s speech at Mondiacult, that “our country now has a solid argument to ask for the
return of Montezuma’s penacho that is in Vienna, and of our ancestors’ codices that are in Europe and in
the Vatican” (quoted in Adriana Malvido y Braulio Peralta, “Los bienes culturales deberán retornar a sus
países de origen: la Mondiacult,” Unomásuno, Aug. 6, 1982). Yet, no further development on this case
happened until Xokonoschtletl started his protests in Vienna in 1987.
23
The Egyptian claim over the Nefertiti bust held by the Neues Museum in Berlin is another case often
referred to by Latin American journalists.
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Throughout Latin America, cases concerning the region have also made
headlines. For example, the theft of a Mayan codex from the French National Library by
a Mexican citizen in August 1982 showed many Mexicans that important cultural objects
were to be found abroad, not in Mexico.24 Mexicans, as they were mounting the claim for
the penacho, also remembered that the De Young Museum had returned part of the
Teotihuacan murals in the 1980s, and that the Vatican had returned a codex in 1990.25
The Peruvian success in obtaining the return of the Machu Picchu collection has inspired
Colombians since 2011. 26 National newspapers also report on a regular basis on
restitutions of cultural objects seized by customs in North America and Western
Europe.27 A particularly publicized story was that of the tomb of the Señor de Sipán, in
Northern Peru, which was looted in 1987; several objects were found in the US over the
following decade and sent back to Peru (Atwood 2004).
Interviewees in all three countries have signaled that, in the absence of an
international consensus in favor of returns (but also because they have chosen bilateral
negotiations over multilateral forums), each country is left very much on its own to
obtain the return of the objects it claims. In the context of a bilateral diplomatic
negotiation, the solidarity of other countries cannot go beyond declarations of principles
at international conferences28 or in informal conversations. Yet, all these cases I cite

24

Francisco Magón A,. “Que no le digan el códice ‘robado’,” Excelsior (Mexico City), Aug. 19, 1982.
Malvido and Huffschmid, “Fuese o no (…),” op. cit. chapter 2, note 59.
26
“Huilenses piden repatriación de 35 estatuas que llevaron a Alemania,” El Tiempo, Jan. 21, 2013; Juan
Sebastián Jiménez Herrera, “Machu Picchu y el Tesoro Quimbaya,” El Espectador, Jan. 30, 2016.
27
Among many other examples, see Francisco Roque Bacarreza, “Recuperó Perú 700 valiosas piezas de su
Tesoro precolombino, llevadas como contraband a EU,” El Universal, Aug. 6, 1982; Pier Barakat Chávez,
“Hay 40 procesos para repatriar unos 5,000 bienes culturales,” El Comercio (Lima), Jun. 21, 2014; “Ya está
en Bogotá el tesoro que devolivó España,” El Tiempo, Sep. 1, 2014.
28
For example, Zahi Hawass, secretary general of Egypt's Supreme Council on Antiquities, organized the
first Conference on International Cooperation for the Protection and Repatriation of Cultural Heritage in
Cairo in 7-8 April 2010. Hawass is a reference throughout Latin America for the advocates of restitutions
25
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above participate in a global conversation on the importance of cultural heritage for each
nation and help evidence that claims for specific objects do not happen in a vacuum:
heritage and its significance have become part of the flow of news in mainstream media.
Overall, return claims happen in a context of greater awareness of topics of heritage – an
awareness that each new case contributes to build up. Each story serves as a recurring
reminder for general audiences that other important objects are still missing.
The role of the holding institution
Keeping in mind this international context, I turn to an analysis of the positions defended
by holding institutions. I contrast the attitude of those who refuse the very principle of
these returns, on legal and technical grounds, with the more progressive take of two
institutions (the De Young Museum in San Francisco and the World Culture Museum in
Gothenburg) that have chosen to enter into return agreements with the claiming country.
These two cases reveal that national authorities in claiming countries are not only
reactive to solicitations from their own civil society; they also react to approaches made
by holding institutions.
Rejecting returns
In the cases I examine, holding institutions use well-rehearsed arguments against the
principle of returns. Following the line of thought of the internationalists, these
arguments also reproduce some of the tropes of the authorized heritage discourse that I
have analyzed in chapter 5 – but to oppose, rather than support, the return claim.
and returns, who celebrate his energy and activism in securing the return of many pieces to Egypt. At the
Cairo conference, Peru’s representative Liliana Cino declared that her country was seeking the return of
both the Machu Picchu collection and the Paracas textiles. Peru hosted the second conference of this kind
in 2011; it is during his opening speech for the conference that then-President Alan García threatened to sue
the city of Gothenburg see also chapter 2, note 47 and 48). In those conferences, participating countries
declared in favor of Peru’s requests (“Comunidad internacional respalda reclamo peruano para recuperar
mantos paracas,” El Comercio, Jul. 6, 2011).
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First, holding museums and their experts push back against the undesirable
“politicization” of return claims. Cuno (2010), a notable opponent to returns and a
proponent of the internationalist position, regrets the political use of the archaeologists’
work, because politicization is detrimental to the object itself, to research, and to science.
Echoing this concern, Wilfred Spiel, director of the Kunsthistorischen Museum [Museum
of Art History] in Vienna, regretted that the debate about the return of the penacho was
about “politics” rather than “culture.”29 For Andrés Gutiérrez, curator of the department
of pre-Columbian America at the Museum of America in Madrid, “heritage is cultural,
not political, so in my opinion what matters is that the objects are safe, researched, on
view – not that they are in one place or another. (…) I think that claiming these objects
right now does not make much sense.”30 Thomas Seligman, from the De Young Museum
in San Francisco, adds that the museum sought to “avoid as much as possible [Mexican]
individuals whose motivation might be political” (1988, 17).31 Similarly, his colleague
Kathleen Berrin tends to oppose the goals of the De Young Museum’s curators, which
she ingenuously describes as only geared towards new knowledge and education, to the
political agenda of the highly politicized bureaucracy of the INAH, which, in her account,
seems only interested in the Mexican national narrative (2017, 100).
The common feature among these Western authors and curators is to pretend that
heritage is a technical concept and that their own work is apolitical and would be driven
29

Quoted in Adriana Malvido, “El Penacho de Moctezuma, motivo de disputa en Austria,” La Jornada, Jul.
20, 1996. Seipel was participating in a public debate on national television following President Klestil’s
offer to gift the penacho back to Mexico.
30
“La lucha de algunos por recuperar el tesoro Quimbaya, hace más de un siglo en España” (TV program),
Noticias Caracols, Feb. 11, 2018. Available at: https://www.caracoltv.com/los-informantes/la-lucha-dealgunos-por-recuperar-el-tesoro-quimbaya-hace-mas-de-un-siglo-en-espana (last accessed June 22, 2019).
31
However, Berrin (1986) admits that politics crippled back into the negotiation process in several
occasions, especially as irreconcilable positions on technical issues were dealt with at what she coyly refers
to as the “administrative” level, i.e., the highest executive (hence, political, in the case of a state
bureaucracy such as INAH) level.
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by a disinterested concern for science. By opposition, return claims would only be driven
by less acceptable – “political” – motives. Such a discourse resembles much, of course,
what Smith (2006) describes as the authorized heritage discourse (AHD) which, as I
commented in chapter 5, is also a characteristic of experts in the claiming countries.32 On
both sides of the claim, thus, experts seek to maintain the fiction that heritage has
everything to do with science, but not with politics. From the perspective of the holding
institution, this position denies to source countries the possibility of practicing the same
kind of politicking that the countries where universalism originated (Western, former
colonizers) have practiced as they were building up the collections of their universal
museums. Under the pretense of scientific objectivity, these experts seek to block any
possibility to reverse the relation of power and dependence they have contributed to
construct through knowledge: according to this discourse, only science produced in the
West is pure from political influences, while research in claiming countries is only aimed
at sustaining a political (nationalist) stance.
The second argument to refuse returns is based on an affirmation – sometimes
implicit, most often explicit – by Western experts that their expertise and superior
technical capacity alone justify that the objects remains where they are. Of all the cases I
examine in this research, the penacho case offers the most striking example of how
contemptuous Western scholars have felt about their colleagues from developing
countries, 33 as well as the Indigenous communities claiming objects from Western
32

See pp. 223 and 224 for a summary of Smith’s argument.
Rudolf Distelberger, an Austrian art historian, provocatively asked: “if Mexicans care so much, why
didn’t they conserve at least one work in feathers themselves?” He added: “today, it is so easy for people to
travel, why don’t they come here to see their penacho?” (quoted in Anne Huffschmid and Adriana
Malvido, “Por ser único, el Penacho de Moctezuma es “la pieza más valiosa en Viena: Kann,” La Jornada,
Dec. 3, 1994). Austrian journalists also wrote that “Mexicans should be grateful that Austrians took good
care of the penacho for such a long time” (Informe sobre los danzantes “Aztecas” en Vienna, prepared by

33
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collections as theirs.34 Arguably, the Austrian position, which was still rooted in the
1990s in a tradition of art history scholarship little influenced by post-modernism and
post-colonial studies, has moved away from the derogatory language it used in the 1990s.
The organization of the two bi-national commissions and the later publication of the
volume El Penacho del México Antiguo (Haag et al. 2012) have certainly contributed to
improve relationships among experts of both countries. Since the early 2000s, the
Austrian side has preferred to argue that the penacho is also part of its own heritage, that
it was acquired legally, and that returning it would represent a dangerous precedent (more
on this below). Negative comments about Mexico’s capacity to care for the object and for
its Indigenous population, however, have disappeared from the Austrian discourse.
The Western experts’ concern to appear as good custodians of their collections is
exemplified by their tendency to justify their holding of the collection by producing new
scientific knowledge. My case studies reveal a clear trend in favor of researching and
publicizing results about the objects at the same time that return claims are mounting.
While the publication of the book Feathered Serpents and Flowering Trees (Berrin
1988a) by the De Young Museum came as fast as could have been expected after the
objects came into its collections,35 such is not the case for other objects. Yale published

Ambassador Cuevas Cancino for the bureau of cultural affairs of the SRE, Oct. 22, 1987; AHGE-SRE).
Peter Kann, director of the Ethnological Museum in Vienna from 1994 to 2002, declared: “‘With all due
respect for these beliefs, what is written in the Indigenous prophecies is irrelevant for me as the director of
a museum. Indigenous peoples unfortunately have very limited knowledge about their own culture, because
no one teaches them. This is how the most abstruse stories are born about their past: for example, this
headdress is loaded with meanings that it does not have” (quoted in Anne Huffschmid and Adriana
Malvido, “Por ser único (…),” op cit., note 33). A sign that mentalities, however, were already changing is
that, in the same article, ethno-jurist René Kuppe argued, against Kann, that “at the very least, indigenous
people should be allowed to decide the content of the museographic information.” Dalia Ayala, the
Mexican feather specialist who participated in the first bi-national commission in 2002, recalled (interview,
June 24, 2017) having observed a generational gap among Austrian curators, between an old guard adamant
about their right to keep the penacho and a younger generation more open to dialogue.
35
With the bequest settled in 1978, the publication was released ten years after the museum came into
possession of the murals. These ten years were occupied with the negotiations with the INAH over the
34
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the catalogue Unveiling the Mystery of the Incas (Burger and Salazar 2004) together with
the presentation of the touring exhibition in 2003-04.36 As mentioned above, the second
bi-national commission that examined the penacho concluded with the publication of El
Penacho del México Antiguo (Haag et al. 2012), two decades and a half into the dispute
between Mexico and Austria.37 Finally, the Museum of America published El Tesoro
Quimbaya (Perea, Verde Casanova, and Gutiérrez Usillos 2016) as the case was reaching
the Constitutional Court in Colombia.38 These three publications came decades or even
centuries after the holding institution acquired these objects. Their purpose seems to
address a recurring complaint in the claiming countries that the collections have not been
properly researched and taken care of, which would invalidate that argument in favor of
the collections staying in their current holding institution. It is, of course, tempting to ask
why these publications did not appear earlier, and why they are the first to be dedicated to
these objects. I suspect that, in this battle of experts, these publications have served, at
least in part, to justify that the Western scholars should, indeed, remain in charge. For
example, Yale curator Richard Burger has admitted that the collection had suffered
damage in the university’s storage room and that little research at all was performed on it
before he took over in the 1980s.39 Implicitly, the exhibition and the book Unveiling the
Mystery of the Incas represented a justification for the collection to remain at Yale, since
return of the collection and by the technical issues related to the conservation of these fragile objects
(Berrin 1986). The book was published shortly after the first presentation of the murals in San Francisco.
36
This means that the first significant monograph about the collection was finally published more than
eight decades after the collection had arrived at New Haven. The touring exhibition was organized as Peru
was already showing interest in the collection. Curators Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar had requested
from Peru the loans of additional pieces for the exhibition, which were denied.
37
The book is also available in German. Strikingly, the publication makes no mention of the dispute over
the ownership and possession of the object between Mexico and Austria.
38
Significantly, Verde Casanova’s essay in that volume (2016), provides a detailed account of the finding,
purchases, travels, divisions, and current locations of the collection, but ignores entirely the question of its
return to Colombia – a major shortcoming of this otherwise extremely detailed work.
39
Arthur Lubow, “The possessed,” The New York Times, Jun. 24, 2007.
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there was now a team (himself and Lucy Salazar) actively working on it.
The third series of arguments used to refuse returns refer to the legal status of the
objects. These arguments highlight the absence of a legal basis for the claim. First,
museums contend that they acquired the requested objects legally (at least according to
the standards of the time of the acquisition). Second, these objects left their country of
origin legally; in two cases – the Quimbaya collection and the penacho – the holding
institution and country have argued that the object was a gift, so they are under no
obligation to give it back.40 Third, museums also argue that the time spent in their
holding institution protects these objects from return claims,41 or even that the statute of
limitations precludes any legal action against the holding institution.42
Even when the holding institutions are willing to cooperate with the claiming
country, legal considerations enter into play. The De Young Museum, which has agreed
to return half of the murals bequeathed by Harold Wagner, has largely built a narrative of
how ethically it managed the Teotihuacan murals case by highlighting that it was in no
legal obligation to return them at all, since neither the 1970 UNESCO Convention nor the
1971 bilateral treaty between Mexico and the United States applied to this case (Seligman
1988). In Sweden, the authors of a report ordered by the City of Gothenburg to decide on
the best course of action had to admit that neither the 1970 UNESCO Convention nor the
1995 UNIDROIT Convention could support the return of the Paracas textiles; the authors

40

The validity of the gift of the Quimbaya collection was the object of the decision of the Colombian
Constitutional Court, which has argued that President Holguín did not have the power to gift objects
purchased with public funds. In the penacho case, the possibility that the object was a gift from Montezuma
to Emperor Charles V is only one among other theories to explain how the object traveled to Europe in the
sixteenth century. While this version has been largely relayed in mainstream media, it is now contested in
academic and museum circles; there is no definitive historical evidence to support it (Haag et al. 2012).
41
See chapter 2, note 126 about the San Agustín statues case. A similar case was made about the penacho
in Austria.
42
This was one of the main arguments of Yale University in the Machu Picchu case.
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considered, however, that the City could leave aside a strict reading of the applicable
international law and base their decision on the recommendations of the International
Council of Museums (ICOM) (Willén 2011).43
Finally, an oft-rehearsed argument against returns is that claimed objects are
better located in Western capitals because they can be appreciated by a wide audience
that visits these museums. “[Universal] museums serve not just the citizens of one nation
but the people of every nation. (…) To narrow the focus of museums whose collections
are diverse and multifaceted would therefore be a disservice to all visitors.”44 This
argument is both inaccurate and offensive. It is inaccurate because, as I have detailed in
previous chapters, the claimed objects would actually be returned to museums in the
claiming country, where museums do receive very high numbers of visitors, just as they
do in the Western world.45 Even if a larger movement were to take root worldwide,
(which, as I detail below, I do not believe will happen), it would result in the transfer of
objects from Western museums to other museums in the claiming countries. While the
model of the encyclopedic museum as it exists in the former colonial powers may be
challenged, the museum as an institution is not. Quite to the contrary, throughout the
world, new museums are are being built or are being expanded. Hence, the “emptying” of
museums would actually mean a new equilibrium among museums of the world, and it is
43

The ICOM Code of Ethics, last revised in 2004, recommends that “Museums should be prepared to
initiate dialogue for the return of cultural property to a country or people of origin. This should be
undertaken in an impartial manner, based on scientific, professional and humanitarian principles as well as
applicable local, national and international legislation, in preference to action at a governmental or political
level.” The guide adds that “when a country or people of origin seeks the restitution of an object or
specimen that can be demonstrated to have been exported or otherwise transferred in violation of the
principles of international and national conventions, and shown to be part of that country’s or people’s
cultural or natural heritage, the museum concerned should, if legally free to do so, take prompt and
responsible steps to cooperate in its return” (ICOM 2017).
44
Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal Museums, 2002.
45
For example, the National Museum of Anthropology in Mexico City received approx. 2.6 million visitors
in 2018; 14.8% were foreigners (source: INAH).
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up to the Western, universalist museums to engage with their counterparts in claiming
countries to provide them the opportunity to put the claimed objects in the wider context
of human kind’s history.46 The argument of limited access for audiences in case an object
would be returned is also offensive because it introduces a hierarchy among visitors,
reducing audiences in the claiming countries to a less-than-important public: in this logic,
a visitor in Vienna, Berlin, or Paris would be more valuable than the visitor in Mexico,
Lima, or Bogota. Lamenting that the penacho would not be on view for (mostly
European) visitors in Vienna because it would now be on view in Mexico (where 90% of
the visitors of the Museum of Anthropology are Mexicans) is, simply speaking,
demeaning for Mexican audiences.47 The access that universal museums pretend to offer
to millions of visitors yearly concerns only the most-privileged human beings who can
afford to live in these cities or travel to them as tourists.
The four arguments discussed above are often combined. For example, the
Austrian minister of foreign affairs Wolgang Schüssel replied to the Mexican request in
September 1996 that, “regretfully,” Austria could not give the penacho back for legal and
conservation reasons. 48 Overall, the arguments against returns, used by the holding

46

As a visitor, I am personally very fond of universal or encyclopedic museums. The extension of this
model worldwide, through long-term projects of collaboration between universal museums and national
museums in the claiming countries, could be a rather elegant outcome to the growing phenomenon of return
claims. Indeed, if universal museums claim that they are uniquely positioned to offer a broader narrative of
the history of human kind through its artistic output, then these museums could ideally collaborate to the
formation of universal museums in countries that do not yet enjoy this particular type of museum institution
within their own border.
47
Not to mention the fact that, as of 2019, for socio-economic reasons, a greater number of European
visitors may have a chance to visit Mexico one day than the other way around.
48
Schüssel writes that “this crown [sic] (…) legally became the property of Austria a long time ago” and
that “Austria will make sure, through careful methods of conservation, that this fragile witness of
indigenous cultures of America will be preserved for generations to come” (Letter from Austrian Minister
of Foreign Affairs Wolfgang Schüssel to Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs José Angel Gurría Treviño,
Sep. 15, 1996, Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada).
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institutions, delve on a series of topics that experts in the claiming country are also
interested in (see chapter 5).
It is the strength of the authorized heritage discourse, as Smith has defined it, to
transcend oppositions on the subject of returns. On opposite sides of the debate, experts
use arguments drawn from the same repertoire. The opposition to return claims, built in
great part on the arguments of the internationalists (Merryman 1986), reveals an
important contradiction. Internationalists favor greater movements of cultural objects
through borders. Source nations should not retain cultural objects they are not using for
research or exhibition, because these objects, considered as commodities, could be
purchased abroad by museums and private collectors. Because of the principle of
inalienability of their collections,49 however, museums in market nations do not seriously
consider the possibility that this claim for the marketability and movement of cultural
objects applies to their own collection. They do not consider, for example, that these
objects may move back to another country. Hence, free trade and flows of cultural objects
work only in one direction, from source country towards market countries, but not the
other way around. Free trade is about the freedom of objects to move, but not that of
people; within the AHD promoted by the Western institutions that want to keep control of
the claimed objects, this is also true about knowledge and its production. By keeping the
object, they remain the only possible authors of a discourse about these objects, denying
the claiming country from the right to add to the knowledge produced in the West.

49

Either because they are part of public collections subjected to this principle, as is the case in Spain,
Germany, and Austria, or because they are in public trust, as is the case in the British Museum, thus can
only be de-accessioned by legislative acts or a decision from the board of trustees.
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The case of the Teotihuacan murals offers an interesting example to develop this
idea. Berrin justly remarks that her 1993 exhibition about Teotihuacan50 was audacious
because it offered a reinterpretation of Teotihuacan (from the point of view of her own
discipline, art history, rather than anthropology), which was an annoyance for the INAH,
an institution used to being the sole producer of the official discourse about the meaning
and place of Teotihuacan in Mexican history (2017, 98). What Berrin does not appreciate
is that hers has been as much as the Mexicans’ an attitude of control and power through
knowledge; it is striking that the 1988 publication Feathered Serpent and Flowering
Trees contains no contributions from Mexican scholars. From this perspective, the
Mexican hesitations about sending objects on loan become more understandable. The
possession of cultural heritage objects implies the possibility to produce knowledge, thus
generating a form of power. By keeping half of the murals that had been donated by
Wagner, the De Young Museum had clearly shown its intentions to hold on to as much
knowledge and power as possible.
The obsession of the precedent: will Western museums be emptied of their collections?
In this section, I analyze more in detail one argument often put forward by the adversaries
of return claims: the setting of a precedent. Agreeing to one return would be like
“opening Pandora’s box: all ministries of culture from around the world would jump on
us” and claim other objects, according to the Austrian ambassador in Mexico Kurt
Hengl.51 Like “a snowball,”52 a series of new claims would follow and lead to emptying
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“Teotihuacan: Art from the City of the Gods,” presented in San Francisco in 1993.
Huffschmid and Malvido, “El penacho hace buena publicidad (…),” op. cit., chapter 4, note 105.
52
Mexican lawyer Eréndira Salgado Ledesma, quoted in Antonio Bertrán, “El Parlamento puede decidir,”
Reforma, Jul. 27, 1996. In this article, the lawyer cites Colombia’s claim for the Quimbaya collection as an
example of this possible movement towards more cases of return claims, which could be inspired by the
hypothetical return of the penacho.
51
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the museums of the world. Actors of the claims in the claiming countries are, of course,
aware of this counter-argument,53 which is ubiquitous in the articles about the penacho,54
the Teotihuacan murals,55 and the Machu Picchu collection.56
I wish to demonstrate here the inanity of this argument, for several reasons. First,
as I have noted, each case of return is historically situated and one agreement may not be
easily transposable to other cases. For example, Terry García, from the National
Geographic Society, in the USA, argued that, in the Machu Picchu case, there are
documents from the 1910s that prove that Yale had committed to return the objects.57
Most cases are not based on similar evidence, however. The historical uniqueness of each
case (particularly of the conditions in which an object left its country of origin, whether
the claiming contemporary state already existed at the time, and the conditions in which
the holding institution acquired the object) limits the establishment of a precedent.
53

In the penacho case, for example, Mexican diplomats were presented with the counter-argument of the
precedent in their first contacts with their Austrian counterparts on this subject (Encrypted telex, signed by
Ambassador Cuevas Cancino, to the SRE, Dec. 11, 1987; AHGE-SRE). A few years later, Blanca
Moctezuma wrote to President Fox that “the main reason why the Austrians do not want to deal with this
issue openly as a devolution-restitution is that it would set a precedent that would force many European
museums to return objects of doubtful provenance” (Letter from Blanca Moctezuma Barragán to Presidente
Vicente Fox Quesada, Oct. 28, 2001; APBMB).
54
A few quotes that illustrate this point: “This kind of objects exists around the world, so in order [for the
penacho] to be returned, other museums should do the same… the ‘crown’ will stay here” (Elizabeth
Gehrer, minister of culture of Austria, quoted in Adriana Malvido, “(…) Motivo de disputa (…),” op. cit.,
note n. 29). The possible return of the penacho was being treated as “a gracious act” rather than “a claim”
in order to avoid setting a precedent that could have as a consequence that, “in the future, the most
important museums in the world would remain empty” (Alfredo López Austin, Mexican historian, quoted
in Antonio Bertrán, “Acto de gracia o de derecho?,” Reforma, Aug. 24, 1996). “[Returning the penacho]
would set a precedent that would impact museums not only in Europe but throughout the world.” (Benita
Ferrero-Waldner, minister of foreign relations of Austria, quoted in Antonio Bertrán, “El Penacho de
Moctezuma se quedará en Austria,” Reforma, Jan. 23, 1997).
55
[Talking about why half the murals had stayed in San Francisco:] “We [Mexicans] do not have the
right to claim what is not covered by the international law established by UNESCO. It’s as if we said
that Greece has a right to claim the Parthenon marbles. Ethically, we would have this right, because
they [the murals] are Mexican heritage, but then museums around the world would cease to exist.
The Greeks would also ask for their heritage. (Maria Teresa Uriarte, Mexican historian, quoted in
“Castro Leal y Uriarte niegan el ‘regalo’,” Proceso, Nov. 13, 2005).
56
“Another argument of Yale’s is that the return of the [Machu Picchu collection] would set a dangerous
precedent for other institutions and museums throughout the world, where many foreign objects are kept.”
(“Yale debe devolver piezas incas al Perú,” La República, Jun. 20, 2008).
57
Idem. See also chapter 2.
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Second, the experience of returns up to 2019 contradicts the idea that a massive
transfer of objects from museums in the West towards claiming countries is looming. As
Prott (1995) noted, the record of claims presented to the ICPRCP “hardly justifies claims
by some museums that responding to such requests would provide dangerous precedents
and result in ‘emptying the museums of Europe.’” (I would argue that the argument could
be extended to the cases that have not reached the Committee, as their number remains
limited in the context of the millions of objects held in Western museums.) As Constance
Lowenthal58 has suggested (2000), the fear of precedent is an unconvincing argument: it
would “not be possible even if it were someone’s goal. And I don’t know whose goal it
might be. (…) I don’t see that there’s going to be a huge assault on museums.” Of course,
Mexican media signaled that “an Austro-Mexican agreement [on the penacho] could
serve as a legal ‘precedent’ that would give rise to other negotiations,”59 and Peruvian
President Alan García declared upon the return of the Machu Picchu collection that Peru
would claim more objects from its national heritage held abroad.60 There may be other
emblematic objects that Peru61 or Mexico will claim in the future, but these will remain a
far cry from emptying Western museums from their American collections.
The report published by Felmine Sarr and Bénédicte Savoy about the return of
cultural heritage objects from French public collections to African countries (2018) also
brings elements that support the idea that massive transfers are unlikely. Even though the
58

A former director of the International Foundation for Art Research (IFAR).
“Qué quiere Austria a cambio de prestar el penacho de Moctezuma,” Noticieros Televisa, Apr. 27, 2012.
60
“Peru is important enough to ask to the rest of the world not only these treasures [the Machu Picchu
collection] but many other things too. Let’s welcome these parts of our past!” (quoted in “García sobre
piezas de Machu Picchu: ‘Su regreso representa nuestra dignidad’,” El Comercio (Lima), Mar. 30, 2011. I
have already mentioned in previous chapters that García’s declarations tended to be emphatic and shall be
taken with a grain of salt.
61
According to the ministry of culture, “Peru, by no means, has renounced its right to claim, in the future,
other cultural objects identified as part of the national heritage” (Press released quoted in “Ministerio de
Cultura negó que el Perú renuncie a reclamar patrimonio,” El Comercio (Lima), Mar. 8, 2011).
59
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authors recommend contemplating the return of a large array of objects taken from Africa
in the context of asymmetrical relations under colonial rule,62 they acknowledge that the
process of returning objects can only concern, for the time being, a limited quantity of
objects.63 Priority must be given to symbolic objects, in particular those seized during
military campaigns and by colonial administrators, or collected during scientific
campaigns during colonial rule. Hence, I do not expect – even though Sarr and Savoy
clearly call for a larger movement of returns and restitutions – that many objects will,
indeed, be returned to each country, beyond a few highly symbolic ones, as has been
announced by President Macron of France in the case of Benin.64
My third argument against the idea that setting a precedent will unleash a vast
movement of returns comes from my empirical observations. From my own research, I
deduce that the fear of emptying Western museums is nothing less than a fantasy. No
one, in any of the three countries I visited, ever expressed the view that all preColumbian (or colonial, or modern) cultural objects held in museums and collections
62

Sarr and Savoy justify their argument, in part, by the fact that, for some African countries, most of the
remaining objects from pre-colonial cultures produced on their territory are to be found in Western
museums, which heightens the need for an important number of such objects to return to Africa. This is not
the case, however, of Latin American countries, where expansive collections remain unexploited
scientifically or for exhibition purposes. Hence, Latin American efforts focus on the return of a few objects
with a specific attached meaning or on rare objects (for example, in the case of Mexico, codices and objects
made of feathers, of which the country has fewer examples than other types of materials, such as ceramics).
63
The report does mention several reasons that make the emptying of French museums an unlikely
outcome (and an undesired one, as well). For example, the documentation about the provenance of objects
is seldom precise, so it will be difficult to identify whom the objects shall be returned to. African experts
are themselves conscious of their yet limited financial and technical capacity to receive several hundred or
thousand objects and properly care for them, especially if these objects were to be returned suddenly.
Finally, the authors delve on ideas surrounding the sociability of these objects, which have been
disconnected from their original context for decades or centuries but have acquired different meanings in
their new home. Overall, Sarr and Savoy’s report acknowledges that a sudden wave of returns that would
empty French museums of their collections is unlikely. Interestingly, the authors, concluding that objects
will have to be returned to state authorities, remain rather vague about the future of the objects upon their
return: while they invite to reconsider Western paradigms of heritage and conservation, they do not seem
interested in the political stakes of the returns and in the actors interested in these, within each African
country.
64
Farah Nayeri, “Return of African artifacts sets a tricky precedent for Europe’s museums,” The New York
Times, Nov. 27, 2018.
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abroad should be returned. Seeking the return of a few symbolic objects does not prevent
the advocates of the claim from recognizing that the presence of objects of one culture in
collections abroad participates in a global dialogue among cultures, foster scientific
knowledge and mutual understanding, and represents, to some extent, an instrument of
promotion for the country of origin.65 Additionally, museum professionals are aware of
the large, untapped collections still available to them for research and of the limited
capacity of their country to properly care for hundreds of thousands objects that could be
claimed and to prevent thousands more from illegally leaving their borders. I have
acquired the conviction, during my research, that the argument that setting a precedent
would lead to emptying museums is, at best, a figure of speech and, at worst, a fiction
(not to say a lie) that serves no other purpose than manipulating domestic opinion in the
holding countries. This narrative presents claiming countries as cultural nationalists
seeking to destroy the benefits that Western civilization – through its scientific
institutions of knowledge and conservation, the museums – offers to the world.
An ethical stance on returns
In the light of the multiple arguments opposed by Western museums to returns, the
attitude of the few institutions that have voluntarily agreed to return part of their
collections stands out.
The case of the Teotihuacan murals is striking because it unfolded from the late
1970s through the mid-1980s. In the wake of the adoption of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention, Clemency Coggins’s article about the extent of looting in Mesoamerica
65

For example, the opening of a new “Mexican Room” in the British Museum in 1993 raised questions, for
some, about how the objects in the museum’s collections had arrived to London, while others lauded the
promotion of Mexican culture in a prestigious museum (Fernando del Paso, “Saber amar nuestro
patrimonio,” Proceso, May 31, 1993; Adriana Malvido, “Inglaterra nunca ha aceptado restituir los bienes
culturales,” La Jornada, Aug. 13, 1993).
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(1969), and the adoption of stricter codes of ethics for acquisitions by the Association of
American Museums, the awareness regarding the trafficking of cultural heritage objects
had reached new heights (Seligman 1988). Yet, the practice of returns was very much
incipient still, so the attitude of the De Young Museum certainly puts it at the vanguard
of a movement that would subsequently expand. Not everybody in the museum world
was happy with the museum’s effort to collaborate with Mexican authorities; Seligman
adds that he was “challenged by some American museums colleagues that the voluntary
return of objects to Mexico sets difficult precedents” (22). From a strictly legal
standpoint, the museum could have decided to keep the entire collection, since the judge
of the US district court ruled that The Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco were the legal
owner of objects that had left the Mexican territory before the implementation of current
bilateral and multilateral agreements on the matter. The decision to return part of the
murals was, thus, an ethical decision.
Of course, the distance given by the three decades that have passed since half the
murals were returned to Mexico allows taking a more critical stance on the agreement
signed between the museum and the INAH.66 Seligman and Berrin’s recount of the
process that led to the return of approximately half of the murals bequeathed by Wagner
could be criticized as self-serving – a post-hoc justification that theirs was an ethical
posture.67 The major question today remains to know why, if “[they] believed that a
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“Agreement relating to the return of the Teotihuacan murals between the INAH and The Fine Arts
Museums of San Francisco,” Dec. 7, 1981. The document uses the word “return,” deemed more neutral
than “restitution,” as detailed in Chapter 1.
67
Some parts of the story remain vague: Would the De Young Museum have reached out to the INAH if
the Mexican government, supported by the US Customs Service and the attorney general’s office, had not
sought the return when they learned of the bequeath? Also, Berrin (1988b) and Seligman (1988) have
written that they did not know of the collection before they learned of Wagner’s bequest. This affirmation
is of course unverifiable, but that two preeminent curators of pre-Columbian art would have never been
approached by Wagner himself or even been informed of his collection by a third party, is mystifying,
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voluntary return of a significant portion of the murals to Mexico would be ethically
warranted and important,” as Berrin has written (2007, 13), the museum did not take the
(bold but logical – and ethical) decision to return the entire collection, even though it was
not legally compelled to do so. Berrin argues that the museum wanted to keep part of
these murals for conservation, research, and education purposes, and that Mexican
museums had many such murals in their collections, while the De Young Museum had
none. This example reveals how ethics in returns continue to change. Certainly, the
agreement, over the return of the murals based on the admission on both sides of the
border that the objects had been looted, represented an innovation in the 1980s. Yet, three
decades later, this agreement hardly seems ethical under current norms and practices. In
2019, no other solution than the return of the entire collection would be possible.
The case of the Paracas textiles seems to vindicate this argument. Following the
admission that the collection had been taken illegally from Peru by the Swedish consul
Sven Karel in the early 1930s, the City of Gothenburg agreed to return the entire
collection. I contend that it would have been unthinkable, in the early 2010s, that the
Museum of World culture, having admitted to displaying stolen objects in its exhibition
“A Stolen World,” demand to keep part of these, as the De Young did in the early
1980s.68 The position of the city and the museum was founded on a strong ethical posture
to, first, acknowledge the dark history of their collections and, second, agree to a return.
considering how small the circles of art collectors and academics interested in pre-Columbian art must have
been in the San Francisco Bay Area in the late 1970s. Overall, few private collectors were interested in this
type of materials, difficult to handle. Museums, as a consequence, were the main buyers of murals at the
time. Seligman admits to having heard that Mexican murals existed in the Bay area; Berrin and Seligman
both claim that they only found out after learning of the bequest that Wagner had tried to sell his murals in
Los Angeles and to the De Young itself, earlier in the 1970s. It remains unclear, in those circumstances,
how neither of them would have known about the collection before the announcement of Wagner’s bequest.
68
It remains unclear, however, whether the curators and executives of the museum expected a Peruvian
claim to arise as a consequence of the presentation of this exhibition (Cornelia Lönnroth, interview, Mar.
25, 2019).
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In line with my analysis in chapter 5, I argue that the City of Gothenburg followed
through with the return process to Peru, 69 at least in part, for political reasons. The
personality and the political affiliation of the mayor of Gothenburg during the
negotiation, Anneli Hulthén, a social-democrat, seems to have been a decisive factor.70 In
Gothenburg, contrary to San Francisco, the ultimate decision was not left to the curatorial
level within the museum. Concerns for the conditions of conservation of the textiles
during the transport back to Peru and once in Lima, which must have been the top
priority of Swedish curator Anna Javér, did not take preeminence over the political and
ethical stance of the mayor, who had committed to the return. Conservation issues
delayed71 but did not stop the process.
Most importantly, these two cases show that return claims happen not only when
civil society in the claiming country pushes state authorities to act. Claims also arise
when the ethical concerns of holding institutions encourage these to reach out to the
authorities of the country of origin. As the Teotihuacan murals and Paracas textiles cases
show, negotiations remain arduous, even when the holding institution has accepted the
principle of the return; indeed, the complex interactions, in the claiming country, among
discourses about the nation, competing policy objectives, and political objectives of the
actors involved, which I have described in the preceding chapters, also apply in these
cases. The outcome, however, is more predictable: returns will ultimately happen when
the holding institution shows good will.
69

Only the textiles belonging to the collection of the City of Gothenburg were returned to Peru. The
Museum of World Culture in Gothenburg still conserves today other Paracas objects belonging to a
different collection from the City of Gothenburg’s.
70
Luis Jaime Castillo (interview, Apr. 24, 2017); Sonia Guillén (interview, Apr. 25, 2017).
71
Several months were necessary for the technical preparation of the return, which were occupied by a visit
of the Swedish curator to Lima, the construction of special crates that could absorb vibrations and control
for temperature and humidity during transportation, etc.
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Finding allies in the country of the holding institution: international supporters of
return claims
The presence of willing interlocutors was decisive to obtain a return in the cases of the
Teotihuacan murals and the Paracas textiles. In the absence of such a cooperating holding
institution, the support of international actors to the cause of the claiming country is a
necessary factor of success of the claim, as demonstrated by the Machu Picchu case –yet
not a sufficient one, as demonstrated by the penacho case.
In the case of the Machu Picchu collection, as a demand through US courts
seemed an unpromising and costly policy option for Peru to obtain the return, the
opinions and support of several non-Peruvian actors proved decisive. Particularly, the
National Geographic Society, which co-sponsored Bingham’s expeditions in the 1910s,
supported, through the voice of its president Terry García, the principle of a return72 – a
highly symbolic support since it is through the publication of Bingham’s photographs in
the National Geographic magazine in April 1913 that the world learned of the existence
of the Inca citadel. Among other supporters, Yale alumni73 and at least one US politician,
Senator Christopher Dodd,74 sided with Peru. Even Bingham’s descendants supported
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Terry García declared that “National Geographic was there, we know what was said and that the objects
were on loan and would have to be returned. (…) Even if a case can be built arguing that the statute of
limitations has expired, (…) everybody knew what the intention was and that [the objects] were on loan”
(quoted in “National Geographic apoya causa peruana contra la Universidad de Yale; National
Geographic dice que Yale debe devolver piezas incas,” El Comercio (Lima), Jun. 20, 2008).
73
Twenty-three Peruvian and Peru-based alumni wrote to Yale President Richard Levin on Sep. 21, 2010
that “Peru has taken appropriate steps towards settlement, and [we] call upon our University, for which we
have great affection, to respond in kind” (copy of the letter provided by Frederic J. Truslow, lawyer;
interview, Aug. 18, 2017). Using a similar language, three alumni, Roberto Zalles, Frederic Truslow, and
Susan Rolfe published an op-ed in Yale News on Oct. 8, 2010 “Rolfe, Truslow and Zalles: Return Peru’s
artefacts”). Another Yale alumn, Christopher Heaney, who authored a biography of Bingham (2010), also
considered that it was “a tragedy” not to see the objects return to Peru (quoted in “’Es una tragedia que
piezas no vuelvan’,” El Comercio (Lima), Nov. 19, 2010).
74
A Democrat from Connecticut, Dodd declared, upon his visit to Peru, that “the artefacts from Machu
Picchu belong to the people of Peru” and that he planned to mediate between both sides of the dispute to
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Peru against Yale. 75 As noted above, Peru also received moral support from other
countries claiming objects from their national heritage during a conference in Cairo.76
These public and publicized displays of support to the Peruvian cause became a liability
for Yale, whose reputation in the USA and in academic circles77 was at risk of being
seriously damaged – allegedly, a more important threat than the articles published in the
Peruvian press and the inconveniences that these caused for Yale researchers working in
Peru.78 Alan García mobilized these allies during his final public campaign in fall 2010,79
which led to the return agreement, signed in November. Hence, the Machu Picchu case
shows how securing the support from allies internationally and, most importantly, within
the country of the holding institution, represents an interesting avenue for claimants when
the requested party is reluctant to enter into an agreement.
The Mexican case of the penacho reveals, however, that such a strategy may not
be sufficient. Indeed, the Mexican claim has also found support from non-Mexican
actors, most particularly among Austrian politicians. Since the late 1980s, members of
left-wing parties have supported the possibility of a return.80 Austrian president Thomas
reach a solution (quoted in “Senador de EEUU: piezas incaicas en universidad Yale pertenecen a Perú,” La
República, Jun. 9, 2010).
75
John L. Bingham, grand-son of Hiram, declared that, “as we prepare the celebration of the hundredth
anniversary of the exploration and rediscovery of Machu Picchu, Yale has the opportunity to express and
expand this generosity of spirit” (quoted in “Es una tragedia (…),”op. cit., note 73).
76
Liliana Cino, interview, Jul. 16, 2017. Cino was director of cultural affairs of the Peruvian ministry of
foreign relations. See also note 28 about the conference.
77
For example, the article “Es una tragedia (…)” (op. cit., note 73) includes quotes from museum directors
from multiple countries in support of Peru’s claim.
78
On the other hand, few voices publicly spoke in defense of Yale. Lubow’s article (“The possessed,” The
New York Times, Jun. 24, 2007) could be considered a defense of Yale’s position as it focuses on the
shortcomings of Peru’s enforcement of its own norms and policies in terms of heritage conservation.
Journalist Enrique Patriau criticized Lubow for taking sides and unfairly representing the Peruvian actors of
the dispute (“Lo que Bingham nunca devolvió,” La República, Jul 1, 2007).
79
Alan García wrote to US President Barack Obama and asked him to intervene (“Alan García pidió a
Barack Obama que la U. de Yale devuelva piezas arqueológicas de Machu Picchu,” El Comercio, Nov. 2,
2010). I do not know whether President Obama did or not pressure the university on this topic.
80
The Mexican embassy observed, in late 1987, that representatives of the Green party had declared in
favor of gifting the penacho back to Mexico, as an acknowledgement of Mexico’s support to Austria during
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Klestil, though a member of the conservative party,81 is the most preeminent Austrian
politician to have publicly supported the return: he declared on public television in June
1996 that he was in favor of a return of the penacho to Mexico. His declaration met with
private and public criticism from members of the government, particularly within his own
party.82 His successor, the social-democrat Heinz Fischer, also declared in favor of the
return. This prominence of Austrian politicians in the debate about the penacho can be
explained by the status of the object, which belongs to a national collection. As a
consequence, the debate could not remain confined to the museum world nor be resolved
by a presidential decree: only an act of the Austrian parliament could authorize the
transfer of the object to another party. In this context, the opinions and wishes of the
Austrian president were only one small part of the equation, which explains why the
return did not happen in spite of the support of two consecutive presidents.
Overall, left-wing politicians in Austria have shown more openness to the idea of
a return, while conservatives have been openly adverse to the idea; yet, significant
counter-examples show that the topic has the ability to transcend partisanship.83 That
Mexican diplomats could never take advantage of the moments when a social-democrat
the Anschluss (“Memorandum para información superior.” Embassy of Mexico in Austria, Dec. 16, 1987;
AHGE-SRE).
81
Throughout his two terms (1992-2004) as president (a mostly honorific position), Klestil was often at
odds with members of his own party (the Österreichische Volkspartei – ÖVP [Austrian People’s Party]),
particularly during the government of Wolfgang Schüssel, who entered into an alliance with the far-right
party Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs – FPÖ [Freedom Party of Austria]), from 2000-07. Another figure of
the ÖVP who declared against the return of the penacho is Benita Ferrero-Waldner, successively undersecretary of state (1995-2000) and minister of foreign affairs (2000-2004).
82
Encrypted telex from Mexican ambassador in Vienna Roberta Lajous to the bureau of Western European
affairs of the SRE, Jul. 15, 1996; AHGE-SRE. In this document, the ambassador details her contacts with
different ministries as she prepares the trip to Vienna of the Mexican delegation, in response to President
Klestil’s offer to gift the penacho back to Mexico.
83
The example of President Klestil shows that the dichotomy between left-wing and conservative
politicians shall not be overstated. Other members of the ÖVP have shown support to the idea of the return:
Maria Rauch-Kallat, a member of the Vienna city council for the ÖVP, wrote to Mexican President Salinas
de Gortari, the SRE, and CONACULTA, suggesting that the Mexican government send a formal request to
its Austrian counterpart (Letter from Maria Rauch-Kallat to CONACULTA, Oct. 12, 1990; AHGE-SRE).
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was chancellor84 may be explained by the system of grand coalition, through which the
two main parties have led the country since WWII.85 The topic of the penacho never
reached consensus, and social-democrat leaders of the government may not have wanted
to clash with their coalition partner on this topic.
Over the years, a great variety of civil society members in Austria have also
shown their support to the idea of return, including in the museum and academic world.86
In addition, danzante Xoconoschtetl has garnered more than one hundred thousand
signatures from Austrian citizens during the summer marches he has organized;87 he has
also met with political and spiritual leaders such as the Dalai Lama, Pope John Paul II,
and the royal family of the Netherlands.88 However, as I have explained in previous
84

In the period between 1987 and 2012, when the negotiations were most active, several members of the
Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs – SPÖ [Social Democratic Party of Austria] have occupied this
position: Franz Vranitzky (1986-1997), Viktor Klima (1997-2000), Alfred Gusenbauer (2007-2008), and
Werner Faymann (2008-2013). Due to the Austrian system of coalition-government, these chancellors
always had members of the ÖVP acting as vice-chancellor and as minister of foreign relations. As a
consequence, even if these chancellors had been in favor of a return of the penacho, they would have had to
compromise with members of their own government with different opinions on the matter.
85
The only exceptions have come when the ÖVP has entered into coalitions with the far-right FPÖ.
86
For example, on Jan. 28, 1988, the Austrian association of writers and literary magazines published an
article in the newspaper Neue Tiroler Zeitung calling for the return of the penacho to Mexico for the fiftieth
anniversary of the Anschluss (“Justicia para México: Ideas para el año conmemorativo de 1988,”
translation in Spanish of the article; AHGE-SRE). In 1996, the rector of the University of Applied Arts,
Rudolf Burger, inspired President Klestil’s declarations to gift the penacho back, arguing that this gift
would not represent a legal precedent but would seal the friendship between Austria and Mexico for the
fiftieth anniversary of the Anschluss (“Rector austriaco propone devolver el penacho de Moctezuma,”
Excelsior, Jul. 2, 1996). Burger contextualized the object as symbolizing the transition from the preColumbian world to modern, republican Mexico (Adriana Malvido, “Los antecedentes del debate,” La
Jornada, Jul. 20, 1996).
87
The impact of public opinion on public policy making can be difficult to determine. Sabatier and JenkinsSmith argue (1993, 223) that the “general public” has neither the expertise nor the time to be active
participants in a policy subsystem. I do accept the argument, and also conceive the methodological
difficulty implied by a conceptualization of “the general public” as a policy agent. Yet, these signatures
reveal that the Austrian public opinion has clearly been made aware of the penacho issue; Xokonoschtletl’s
public protests in Vienna can probably be credited for this awareness. Additionally, the TV programs
organized on Austrian public television about the penacho show that Austrian public opinion is not
indifferent to the topic and is aware of this debate (see chapter 5, notes 109 and 113).
88
I suspect (but this is only a personal interpretation) that these leaders accepted to give audience to
Xokonoschtletl (as they do to dozens of people every year) due to a similar mix of concern and curiosity for,
as well as interest in, the fate of Indigenous communities from Mexico, as I have described in the case of
the Austrian public opinion (see chapter 5, notes 109 through 111). From Xokonoschtletl’s account, the
royal family of the Netherlands has supported his cause by financing international travel for his group.
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chapters, Mexican authorities have not sought to use these allies,89 privileging instead a
strategy of influence towards Austrian politicians through classical diplomatic channels.
This strategy has not been successful: it allowed the use of expert arguments about the
state of conservation of the object to be pushed forward to reject the return. It is possible,
though, that, thanks to the growing salience of the international debate about returns and
restitutions, supporters of the Mexican claim, in Austria as well as in other countries,
could be mobilized again, if the Mexican executive were to decide to reactivate the claim.
By comparison, the Colombian claims clearly suffer from the absence of
international allies supporting them. The civil society individuals invested in these cases
have not made the necessary contacts in the press or among civil society and politicians
in Spain or Germany in order to benefit from such support. Unsurprisingly, the
Colombian executive – a reluctant actor of the claim – has not sought supporters in Spain,
either. This absence of voices backing the Colombian claims in Spain and Germany in
turn strengthens these European governments’ position, since they are not being
questioned at home. Both governments have shown no willingness to negotiate.
Awareness of the claims in Spain 90 and Germany is low. My comparison of the
Colombian cases with those of Peru and Mexico does suggest, however, that the
advocates of the Colombian claims will need to build up a network of supporters
internationally to back up their cause.
89

I do not know whether Xokonoschtletl’s allies and Mexican authorities have been in contact over the
penacho case; since they are only mentioned by Xokonoschtletl himself, and not by the Mexican
ambassadors in Vienna or any other executive authorities, I assume they have not.
90
Spanish newspapers published articles following the decision of the Colombian Constitutional Court (see
for example Sally Palomino, “Colombia deberá reclamar a España el tesoro Quimbaya entregado en 1893,”
El País, Oct. 20, 2017), but there is no movement supporting the claim comparable with what has happened
in the US or in Austria. If my analysis above about the greater sensitivity of left-wing political parties in
Europe to the question of returns is correct, the election of the leader of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE)
Pedro Sánchez as president of the government in June 2018 may open a new window of opportunity for the
Colombian executive, in case the latter would decide to push harder for the return than it has done so far.
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Understanding the multiple interactions among actors of return claims: a summary
In this section, I present diagrams that summarize the relations among the main actors
involved in return claims. On the claiming side, actors include civil society members,
experts, and state authorities. As I have detailed in chapter 5, the commitment of each
actor to the success of the claim may vary, but none has ever dared oppose the goal
entirely. In some cases, the claimant benefits from the support of international actors. In
all cases, the state is reactive, either to the pressure of civil society actors or to
solicitations from the holding institution itself; in none of these instances have state
authorities initiated the return process on their own.
Figure 6.1 shows how the alignment of all actors on the claiming side allowed the
Peruvian claim to be successful: civil society actors pushed state authorities to claim the
return, backed by experts. In turn, a strong network of international support, in political
and academic circles, built up in favor of the return, isolating the defending institution,
which was not strongly supported by US federal authorities, either. Ultimately, Yale was
forced to agree to return the Machu Picchu collection in 2011.

Figure 6.1: Peru claimed the return of the Machu Picchu collection
from Yale University
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On Figure 6.2, the divided expert community in Mexico directly impacts the
attitude of state authorities, who have embraced the conclusions of the 2011-12 binational commission of experts and have, since then, all but stopped pressuring the
Austrian museum and state to obtain the return of the penacho. Simultaneously, as this
case has been dragging on for three decades, the civil society actors who inspired the
claim in the 1980s and 1990s have been less active in the media.

Figure 6.2: Mexico has claimed the return of Montezuma’s penacho
from Vienna’s Weltmuseum
This case reveals that the presence of strong international support is not a sufficient
condition to obtain a return: the many allies that civil society actors and Mexican
authorities have found in Austria and beyond cannot influence the museum and the
Austrian government, where the conservatives strongly oppose the very idea of the
return. Austrian state and museum authorities are less permeable to criticism and pressure
than the curators of the Peabody Museum at Yale and the president of the university, a
private institution.
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Figure 6.3 shows that the division within the Colombian state between the judicial
and executive branches, combined with the absence of supporters in Spain and Germany
to the Colombian claims, weakens these cases. The Museum of America and the State
Museum of Berlin, which are both public entities backed up by their respective
governments, are not currently exposed to strong pressures that would force them to
make concessions. The Colombian diplomacy, complying with judicial decisions,
officially negotiates with the Spanish and German governments, but the negotiations are
being kept under the seal of secrecy.

Figure 6.3: Colombia may claim the return of the Quimbaya collection
from Madrid’s Museo de América and the San Agustín statues
from the Ethnologishes Museum Berlin
The last two cases present a reduced number of actors. These claims initiated
because the holding institutions, voluntarily or not, prompted the claiming state to act.
Civil society actors have not intervened in these cases and international support was not
necessary, since both sides were willing to negotiate.
In the Teotihuacan case (Figure 6.4), which unfolded two and a half decades
earlier, the Mexican claim was embodied by the strongest possible alliance of expert and
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political will through the actions of the INAH, which was in charge of the negotiation.
Because the negotiation was from the start framed within a narrow circle of actors,
comprised of the De Young Museum’s and the INAH’s authorities, there was neither
space nor need for civil society actors or other international actors to intervene in the
conversation. Rather, actors in the museum community in the US pressured the De
Young not to return these murals.

Figure 6.4: Mexico obtained the return of half of the Teotihuacan murals
from the De Young Museum
In the case of the Paracas textiles (Figure 6.5), the international context was
important, since the negotiation started in the last years of the Machu Picchu case. The
Peruvian diplomacy occasionally had the opportunity to link both cases during
international conferences.
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Figure 6.5: Peru obtained the return of Paracas textiles
from Gothenburg’s Museum of World Culture
These diagrams reveal that the combination of political and expert power is key
for a claimant to obtain a return. The politicization, so decried by experts on both sides,
may actually be an indispensable ingredient of a claim: only if political leaders (at the
very least at the level of the ministry of culture or institute in charge of archaeology),
with the back-up of their own expert community, take on the task of obtaining the return
can sufficient pressure be exercised on the holding institution. Civil society actors in the
claiming country and international supporters of the claim are important additions to the
coalition of actors seeking a return, but the locus of decision resides in the alliance
between political and expert power.
Overall, these diagrams also vindicate an approach of return claims on a case-bycase basis: there is no one-size-fits-all configuration of power relations that ensures that a
return will happen, as a variety of mitigating factors (including the ethical commitment of
the holding institution) intervenes in the resolution of the case. This case-by-case
approach also contradicts the argument that one return could set up a precedent and
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trigger a flow of other returns. Quite to the contrary, I show here that the circumstances
that allow for one return to happen remain exceptional and linked to specific
circumstances that are difficult to reproduce in other cases.
What is there really in a return? Looking into the content of mutually beneficial return
agreements (MBRAs)
As cases of restitution and return claims have multiplied over the past few decades, the
literature has shown a growing interest in new forms of resolution of disputes over the
property of cultural heritage objects. Cornu and Renold (2010) and Roodt (2013) have
suggested that mediation, arbitration, and conciliation represent interesting – and
increasingly used – alternatives to regular courts, which tend to be costly and lengthy for
the parties involved.91 Ignoring this trend and eschewing other initiatives, such as the
ICPRCP, created by UNESCO to accompany bilateral negotiations and offer a forum of
discussion, the cases I examine have been settled through classical bi-partite negotiations
(state-state or state-museum). Three of my cases have concluded with an agreement (the
Teotihuacan murals, the Paracas textiles, and the Machu Picchu collection). The
negotiation process that has led to these agreements has been widely different in each
case – cooperative in the first two cases, adversarial in the third.92
In this section, I analyze the provisions of these return agreements, which consist
of arrangements more complex than the simple physical transfer of objects from one
91

When negotiations with Yale stalled, the Peruvian INC solicited funds to continue the claim in US courts
and estimated that the legal fees would add up to approximately $300,000 annually (Letter from Alejandro
Falconi Valdivia, director of the bureau of budget and planification of the INC, to Victor Hugo Díaz
Rodríguez, director of public budget of the ministry of economy and finance, Jun. 1, 2006; ADGDPC). The
payment of at least $50,000 was authorized to start the legal procedure; the high commission in charge of
supervising the return claim was hoping that, if Peru obtained the return of the collection, its exhibition in
Cusco or Machu Picchu would raise funds that would compensate or even surpass the costs of the trial
(Informe de la Comisión (…), op. cit., chap. 4, note 35).
92
In the terms of the memorandum of understanding signed between Peru and Yale University in
November 2010 (chapter 2, note 39), Peru agreed to withdraw its case against the university in US courts.
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location to the next. Falkoff (2007) has analyzed these “mutually-beneficial repatriation
agreements” (MBRAs)93 as a variation of “pure repatriation” (283), whereby the museum
that holds the claimed object returns it without receiving anything in compensation or
without further involvement in the life of the object.94
An array of potential solutions
MBRAs are not a ready-made solution for disputes over cultural heritage objects; rather
they contemplate a vast array of options that allow going around the thorny questions of
ownership and possession. Possible solutions that can form the basis of an MBRA
include, among others: the inclusion of cultural cooperation measures in the return
agreement;95 the possibility for the museum to obtain (long-term) loans from the claiming
country in exchange for the return of the claimed object; the return of the object only
after a last period of exhibition and research in the holding institution;96 the establishment
of a joint trusteeship over the returned object, particularly in the case of “celebrity
pieces”;97 and the production of replicas (Reppas 2007, Cornu and Renold 2010).

93

I have discussed in chapter 1 the confusion that arises, in my opinion, from the indiscriminate use of
repatriation as a synonym for return or restitution. Regardless of this disagreement over semantics, I find
Falkoff’s arguments, which I use in this section, compelling. The “R” in the acronym MBRA can easily be
substituted for “return” to keep in line with my own argument.
94
Cornu and Renold (2010) call this situation a “simple repatriation” (19).
95
These can include joint research projects, the organization of exhibitions, etc. As I detail below, the
agreements I examine all include this type of provisions.
96
For example, the first memorandum of understanding signed between Peru and Yale in September 2007
(see chapter 2, note 30) included a clause that stated that Yale would retain the “usufructuary rights” of all
but the museumable pieces of the collection for an additional ninety-nine years. It is this clause that drew
most criticism in Peru (Flor Huilca, “Piezas de Yale retornarán en 99 años,” La República, Mar. 5, 2008;
“Acuerdo cuestionado,” La República, Mar. 18, 2008) as well as among scholars in the USA (Christopher
Heaney, author of a biography of Hiram Bingham, denounced the terms of the 2007 MOU in an op-ed,
“Stealing from the Incas,” The New York Times, Oct. 7, 2007). Facing widespread criticism, the 2007 MOU
was not implemented.
97
Reppas (2007, 122) adds that, for these pieces, “co-ownership of the collection (…) could be included,
which would reap tremendous rewards in terms of good will (and perhaps even economic rewards) for the
foreign museum.” Certainly, the penacho and the Quimbaya collection could pretend to the title of
“celebrity pieces” and be the object of such a co-ownership or co-trusteeship agreement.
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As underlined by Falkoff (2007), the signing of MBRAs also demonstrates that
the positions of cultural nationalists and internationalists, as described in chapter 1, need
not be irreconcilable. Indeed, MBRAs contain clauses for further collaboration between
the two parties, which should benefit both. On the one hand, the claiming country
recovers possession of the claimed object, of course, but it may not have the financial
capacity to care for the object in similar conditions as the holding institution, even if it
has the technical know-how. In those conditions, further (financial, technical) assistance
is welcome. The agreement is also seen as an opportunity for the national scientific
community to engage with foreign researchers. Overall, agreements for future
collaboration serve to deflect the internationalists’ arguments by showing a willingness to
cooperate with foreign institutions, as long as these acknowledge the country’s ownership
and possession of the objects.
On the other hand, holding institutions also benefit, in two ways. First, they
continue to enjoy access (albeit limited) to the collections they used to care for. From the
point of view of the curators in charge of these objects in the holding institution, who
have built their career around their expertise on that particular collection or object, their
departure is heartbreaking;98 however, the signing of an MBRA often means that these
curators will still be involved in the life of these objects.99 Second, these agreements also

98

As I have gathered through my interviews, the departure of objects that have been the main focus of these
experts’ career is a difficult moment, professionally and personally. The context of the authorized heritage
discourse, which I have described in chapter 5 and above in chapter 6, does not mean that these experts
may not have, also, developed an emotional bond with these objects.
99
As detailed below, Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar manage the collection in Cusco. Swedish curator
Anna Javér has prepared the transfer of the Paracas textiles and traveled with them to Peru; she continues to
monitor them on a regular basis as she prepares the transfer of the rest of the collection. In the Teotihuacan
case, curator Kathleen Berrin has remained in charge of half the collection.
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represent a final exoneration of the holding institution’s responsibility.100 By looking into
the future rather than backward, they re-grant some of the respectability and legitimacy
that these institutions have lost during the dispute against the claiming country (Wolkoff
2010).
The analysis of the Machu Picchu archive shows that Yale’s intransigence and
delaying tactics led to the return of the entire collection after a dispute that lasted over a
decade. However, the Peruvian side would have accepted a compromise instead of an
entire return, but radicalized its position as negotiations were lagging. 101 This case

100

The financial provisions of the agreements help forge a sense that reparations are being paid. Indeed,
agreeing to cover the costs associated with the return is a proof of the ethical commitment to return objects
and, in a way, to repair (or repay) a wrongdoing caused to the claiming country. The De Young Museum
was “responsible for the cost of packing and shipping the murals which will be returned” (“Agreement
relating (…),” op. cit., note n. 66). Similarly, Yale covered all the costs associated with the return of the
collection to Peru (“Memorandum de entendimiento (…), op. cit., note 92). The Swedish part also paid for
all the costs implied by the return of the Paracas textiles, amounting to approximately two million dollars
(Press release from the Ministry of Culture of Peru, “El Ministerio de Cultura anuncia el inicio del proceso
de repatriación de los textiles Paracas en posesión de la ciudad de Gotemburgo, Suecia,” Jun. 6, 2014,
available at http://www.cultura.gob.pe/comunicacion/noticia/el-ministerio-de-cultura-anuncia-el-inicio-delproceso-de-repatriacion-de-los, last accessed July 2, 2019) – a commitment that Cornelia Lönnroth,
planning official for the City of Gothenburg, attributed to “feelings of guilt for what Sweden did against
Peru” (interview, Mar. 25, 2019).
101
The archives of the Machu Picchu case reveal how different options were successively contemplated,
and how Yale saw the establishment of an “ongoing educational collaboration” (Letter from Dorothy
Robinson to Eliane Karp, Oct. 27, 2003; ADGDPC) as an alternative to a “pure return.” In 2004, after a
meeting with Yale General Counsel Dorothy Robinson, Peruvian Ambassador Carrion was clearly
considering that, if Yale agreed to acknowledge Peru’s ownership of the collection and to return it to Peru,
“part of the collection [could be deposited] in the Peabody Museum,” at least temporally, for research
purposes (Letter from Ambassador José Alberto Carrión to INC Director Luis Guillermo Lumbreras, Jun.
21, 2004). In December 2005, the Peruvian side was still contemplating the possibility that the collection
could be split into two equal parts that would circulate between Peru and Yale (“Reunión sobre la
recuperación de piezas arqueológicas localizadas en la Universidad de Yale” [minutes of a meeting that
took place at the Peruvian embassy in Washington DC], Dec. 14, 2015). The loan of a “representative part
of the collection” to Yale was still on the table in January 2006 (“Yale Casa Strategy,” document from the
Peruvian embassy in Washington, D.C., Jan. 16, 2006). The signing of the first memorandum of
understanding in 2007, which provisioned that the research collection would remain at Yale for an
additional ninety-nine years, ultimately led to a radicalization of the Peruvian position. Peruvian authorities
were now convinced that Yale was not sincere in its efforts to reach an agreement. Negotiations broke
down and only re-started after Peru sued Yale before a civil court in Washington, D.C. After that point, the
option to return to Peru only part of the collection was not available anymore, and the final agreement
features the physical return to Peru of the entire collection. I argue here that, ultimately, Yale had to return
the entire collection because its leaders did not settle when they could have. (Further research into Yale
archives may help determine whether the decision not to settle in these early stages was made by Yale

308

evidences that the phrase “mutually-beneficial return agreement” can be a euphemism for
what is in reality the result of a hotly contested dispute and carefully negotiated
settlement. It also shows that such agreements can be undone more easily than they were
made: as I have already mentioned, the 2007 memorandum of understanding, widely
decried in Peru, was not implemented. Overall, the Machu Picchu case demonstrates that
the negotiation process itself, by involving radical arguments,102 directly impacts the final
agreement: an agreement, of course, supposes that both sides tone down the rhetoric and,
possibly, accept a solution of compromise.103
All the possible figures described above for a negotiated agreement do not
guarantee, however, that each case finds an appropriate solution. In the penacho case, as
mentioned in chapter 2, none of the contemplated options (donation,104 exchange of the
penacho for another object of symbolic value for Austria, temporary custody without
exchange, long-term loan of the penacho to Mexico with exchange of objects) have led to
an agreement (Peimbert Moreno 2011). The possible solution of a loan, in particular, has
drawn criticism relayed in the Mexican press.105
President Richard Levin, General Counsel Dorothy Robinson, and/or curators and archaeologists Richard
Burger and Lucy Salazar.) Yet, as I will show below, Yale has not lost everything in this agreement.
102
Egypt, for example, is famous for threatening to limit access to researchers from a country that denies its
return claims (Cornu and Renold 2010). Terry García, from National Geographic Society (interview, Aug.
18, 2017), had advised the Peruvians to follow this example, if it were necessary. But Peru, in the last
stages of the negotiation with Yale, took an even stronger stance by threatening Yale President Levin to
introduce a penal complaint against him (Nelly Luna Amancio and Juan Carlos Chávez, “Yale desconoce
su compromiso,” El Comercio, Nov. 7, 2010).
103
For example, INAH Director Gastón Garcia Cantu refused the first offer from the De Young Museum to
return half of the murals; he replied he wanted all of them to return. After a few more months of negotiation,
he accepted that only half of them would be returned, but required that the museum assume the costs of the
transportation back to Mexico (Seligman 1988). In the Paracas textiles case, however, no such compromise
was necessary, as the City of Gothenburg had agreed to the principle of returning all of the 89 textiles in its
collection. The negotiation dealt with technical aspects of the return rather than its principle.
104
In 1996, President Thomas Klestil had indeed proposed that Austria would return the penacho under the
form of a “gift” (“El Penacho de Moctezuma, motivo de disputa (…),” op. cit., note n. 29).
105
In 2012, as the Mexican diplomacy was still negotiating a temporary loan of the penacho, journalist
Oscar Cid de León wrote that “Mexico has never denied that Austria owned the penacho, but has insisted
that the object be returned because of its highly symbolic meaning. With the signing [of an agreement] that
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A critique of the MBRAs
I assess here the consequences of the agreements that have been signed in the three case
studies that have concluded. MBRAs are a relatively new practice, which is developing
with each new agreement that is reached. Only time will bring to light the full extent of
positive and negative effects of MBRAs.
Chronologically, the Teotihuacan murals case was the first to conclude. As Berrin
(1986) acknowledges, the agreement between the De Young Museum and the INAH106
has not immediately bore fruits, scientifically: after months of negotiation, the Mexican
and US teams could not agree about the best course of treatment for the long term
conservation of the murals, and each team ended up treating its share of the materials
according to its preferred technique. Berrin concludes that “collaboration is [not
necessarily] synonymous with agreement” (95). Collaboration has nevertheless been
possible, in the long run, as I have heard from both sides. For example, the INAH has
agreed to loan an important quantity of objects to the De Young Museum, particularly for
two major exhibitions in the US dedicated to Teotihuacan: “Teotihuacan: Art from the
City of the Gods” in 1993 (Berrin 2017) and “Teotihuacan: City of Water, City of Fire”
in San Francisco and Los Angeles in 2017-18,107 for which the majority of objects on

enables a loan, Mexico seems to give in” (“Esperan aval para penacho,” Reforma, Apr. 27, 2012). The
possibility of returning the penacho as a loan from Austria to Mexico also exemplifies that the fear of
establishing precedents works on the side of the claimants, too. Indeed, accepting any other solution than a
pure return would also set a precedent – that of accepting that Western museums are not obligated to
abandon ownership of the claimed objects. Archaeologist Eduardo Matos Moctezuma considered that
“Mexico must ask for the definitive return of the penacho. (…) To accept a loan would be an
acknowledgement that the piece belongs to Austria. (…) This would set a precedent for all the other
countries that are asking for the return of their heritage. (…) It would be a worldwide excuse to refuse the
devolution of heritage objects” (quoted in “Desaconseja Matos préstamo de penacho,” Reforma, Jun. 23,
2012). Matos, a Mexican archaeologist, is a specialist of the Templo Mayor. Ultimately, the option of a
loan was discarded when it was announced, later that year, that the object was too fragile to travel.
106
See note 66.
107
See the website of the exhibition: https://deyoung.famsf.org/exhibitions/teotihuacan-city-water-city-fire
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display came from Mexico. 108 This international partnership has allowed multiple
additional projects of exhibitions to come to light, either with loans from Mexico to the
De Young Museum or from the San Francisco museum to Mexican counterparts (Berrin
2007). In this sense, the return of the murals has indeed set a precedent – one for
increased collaboration among institutions dedicated to research and education, rather
than for more return claims.
In spite of this positive outcome, Falkoff (2007) is critical of MBRAs, considering
that “by minimizing the inherent risks and padding any possible loss, MBRAs encourage
museums to continue to acquire works of questionable provenance” (288). The
Teotihuacan murals case brings ambiguous evidence on this point: when the De Young
Museum had the opportunity to purchase an unprovenanced Mayan stela in 1999, the
institution proactively sought the acquiescence of Mexican and Guatemalan authorities
before purchasing it (Berrin 2007). While such consultations, which stemmed from the
increased level of collaboration developed with Mexican authorities through the
Teotihuacan murals case, represent a welcome development from previous decades, the
purchase itself remains highly problematic and does little to contradict Falkoff’s fear.109
The second case to be resolved was that of the Machu Picchu collection, in
November 2010. Almost a decade after the signing of the agreement, its impact seems
underwhelming. First, several years after its return to Peru, the Machu Picchu collection
108

Matthew Robb, curator of the exhibition and currently curator of the Fowler Museum of Art at UCLA,
Los Angeles (interview, May 13, 2019).
109
Certainly, in previous decades (and, in any case, before 1970), no North American museum would have
tried to clear the provenance of an object with the authorities of its possible country of origin before
acquiring it. Yet, that the museum ultimately acquired the stela remains problematic, at least from the point
of view of archaeology. Indeed, the purchase implies that a looted, unprovenanced stela can still find its
way into the collections of a public museum. The museum justified the purchase by the importance of the
object for other disciplines, such as art history (for which provenance is of lesser concern than for
archaeology) and by the fact that the stela, if not purchased by the museum, could have entered a private
collection, hence disappeared from public view for years or decades.
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continues to be displayed in Cusco within the framework of the “Unveiling the Mystery
of the Incas” exhibition, which toured the US before becoming a permanent display in the
Peabody Museum in Yale, then being transferred to Cusco. Developed by Yale curators,
this narrative has not been modified to reflect Peruvian points of view on the discovery of
Machu Picchu and continues to revolve around the personality of Hiram Bingham (Cox
Hall 2017).110 Besides, critiques abound in Peru over the handling of the collection,
which, in spite of the agreement between Yale and the Universidad Nacional San Antonio
Abad del Cusco (UNSAAC),111 remains firmly in control of the same curators who were
working on it at Yale, Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar. As Kersel and Luke (2015) note,
“even though the artifacts have been sent back to Peru, Yale is still exercising a heavy
hand in the public display and interpretation of the material” (76). The transfer of the
collection to Cuzco has not produced so far any significant body of research by Peruvian
researchers, who have limited access to the collection.112
In retrospect, the choice of Cusco itself to present the collection is debatable. This
choice was justified by the importance of the city for Peruvian nationalism and as a way
to bring the collection as close as possible to its context of origin.113 Yet, more than two
hours by train away from Machu Picchu, Cusco can hardly be considered the original
context where the collection was unearthed: the contemporary city is the result of five
centuries of cultural, political, social, and economic processes. In other words, Cusco

110

Yale curators Burger and Salazar (2012) present Bingham as a man of his time, who studied Machu
Picchu according to the best archaeological techniques available in the 1910s, and who actually pioneered
the archaeological study of the geographical and agricultural contexts of the city. This description is not per
se problematic. However, its lack of contextualization and confrontation with how Bingham has been and is
seen in Peru is.
111
See chapter 2, note 39.
112
Salazar and Burger organize workshops open to UNSAAC students every summer, when they are in
Cusco (Lucy Salazar and Richard Burger, interview, Nov. 4, 2017).
113
See chapter 4 for a more detailed analysis of this choice.
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today is no longer the city it was as the capital of the Inca empire – nor, for that matter,
the city that Bingham visited during his expeditions in the 1910s. Did Yale play the
essentialism card to justify that the collection should be located in Cusco, knowing that it
would escape the direct supervision of the central offices of the INC/Ministry of Culture?
Enrolling UNSAAC, indeed, allowed Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar to remain in
control of the collection, taking advantage of the administrative inefficiency and high
politicization within the university, which they learned to navigate. If the collection had
been deposited in Lima, they would most likely have lost all control over the
collection.114 In this sense, the return of the Machu Picchu collection seems to have
amounted to little more than a physical change of location – a disappointing outcome.
The impact of the return of the Paracas textiles – the third case that has concluded
– remains to be evaluated,115 as the final batch of textiles is to be returned by 2021.
Research projects regarding the consequence of the return for the conservation of the
textiles are conducted by the Swedish party (Javér 2017) with the involvement of the
Peruvian curator of the textile collection of the MNAAH, Carmen Thays.116 From the
perspective of international cultural property, this return is a success, since Peru has
recovered ownership and possession of objects that illegally left its territory in the 1930s.
Yet, many questions remain: in the long run, will the textiles be as well preserved in
Lima as they were in Sweden, as they await their transfer to the new National Museum of

114

Comments off-the-record from several interviewees in Lima have confirmed my impression. Sarah
Nutman concludes that Yale curators, by involving the UNSAAC in the final agreement about the return of
the collection, with the help of Luis Jaime Castillo (the former vice-minister of culture), were able to
remain in control of its management: “It had taken some time, but Peru had come to the conclusion Yale
wanted, apparently all by itself” (Sarah Nutman, “Digging into Peru deliberations, Part II,” Yale News, Feb.
15, 2011).
115
Cornelia Lönnroth (personal communication, Mar. 25, 2019) has ordered a report on the impact of the
return; this report is not available yet as of June 2019.
116
Carmen Thays Delgado, curator of textiles at the MNAAH, personal communication, Jul. 24, 2017.
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Archaeology in Pachacamac? Will Peruvian researchers be able to make significant
scientific contributions through renewed and eased access to the collection? Will the
Peruvian audience be able to admire these objects, beyond the temporary exhibition
organized upon their return in 2014?
In conclusion, it appears difficult to generalize the impact of MBRAs, which very
much depends on the involvement and commitment of the parties to the agreement to
keep the collaborative process alive.117 The articulation of alternatives to pure returns
under the form of MBRAs is also to be understood in the context of the obsession, among
Western museum specialists and politicians, to avoid setting a precedent by unilaterally
agreeing to return a cultural object to the claiming country. Writing before the conclusion
of the cases I am looking at, Falkoff (2007) argued that the multiplication of MBRAs is
actually detrimental to the setting of judiciary precedent: as disputes are settled on an ad
hoc basis, MBRAs “detract from the formation of such precedent” (289) because courts
do not have the opportunity to interpret the applicable international conventions and to
resolve some of the ambiguities of these texts.118

117

Collaboration, of course, can happen outside the scope of a MBRA, as the bi-national commission that
examined the penacho in 2011-12 would demonstrate. However, rather than being part of a larger
agreement that would involve the return of the object (temporary or permanent) to Mexico, this
collaborative process had as its main consequence the halting of the return process. Whether this was the
intention of the Austrian side from the beginning of the process remains open to interpretation. In the
Colombian cases, while at least two Colombian experts (historian Clemencia Plazas and anthropologist
Carl Henrik Langebaek Rueda) were invited to contribute to the monograph El tesoro Quimbaya (Perea,
Verde Casanova, and Gutiérrez Usillos 2016), it is unclear whether further collaboration among Colombian
and Spanish researchers can develop while these cases are pending. I am not aware of any significant
research project involving German and/or Colombian researchers on the San Agustín statues.
118
Mexican actors of the penacho claim have presented arguments that seem to support Falkoff’s view. In
2002, as the negotiations between Austria and Mexico revolved around the possibility of a long-term loan
of ninety-nine years [comodato], lawyer Jesús Juárez Flores (Blanca Moctezuma’s husband) considered
that “the judicial solution of a loan, which is contemplated in Mexican law, seems the most feasible to
obtain the return of the piece, in order not to establish a legal precedent that other countries could invoke to
claim the return of their heritage” (quoted in Sergio Raúl López, “Plantean préstamo a México,” Reforma,
Nov. 15, 2002).
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Of course, while MBRAs may be a way to avoid setting a legal precedent, they do
contribute to form a new ethics and praxis of returns;119 “it is as if a moral obligation of
restitution was gradually being established” (Cornu and Renold 2010, 7). How many such
agreements will be necessary to foster a wider acceptance of the practice among Western
museums remains an empirical question. It could, of course, be argued that these
museums will continue resisting for years or decades: as long as they are not under the
legal obligation to return these salient (and very few) objects, it is in these museums’
interest to continue dilatory tactics, as they know that time plays in their favor, implying
human, financial, and diplomatic costs. Most claiming states cannot afford long and
ruinous litigation processes in courts. Individuals invested in the cause get tired;
diplomatic and cultural personnel in claiming countries retire. Regardless of the criticism
to MBRAs, these ad-hoc agreements remain, for the foreseeable future, the only avenue
to settle the disputes about return claims.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have analyzed the attitude and position of actors and institutions in the
claimed country, highlighting both the emergence of an international environment
favorable to returns and the persistence of strong arguments against them, in particular
within the museum community in Western countries. I have opposed those to the ethical
attitude adopted by two institutions that have voluntarily agreed to return cultural objects.
I have revealed how agreements are reached on a case-by-case basis, which makes the
adoption of blueprints for the settlement of return claims an arduous task. Rather, the
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I have noted earlier in this chapter how all cases create a global conversation on the topic of return and
restitutions, and certainly each Latin American country follows closely the result of its neighbors’ attempts
at recovering certain objects from their national heritage.
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uniqueness of each claim plays against the idea that a return would set up a precedent
leading to emptying museums in the West.
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Conclusion
In the early twenty-first century, claims for the return of long-displaced cultural heritage
objects are mounting. In addition to the cases I have explored in my work, several new
cases have made headlines in international media since I started my research. For
example, French President Emmanuel Macron declared, in November 2017 in
Ouagadougou, that he wanted, “in the next five years, the conditions to be met for the
temporary or permanent restitution of African heritage to Africa.”1 Return claims, as I
have shown in this work, lead to protracted negotiations that last for years or decades. A
growing literature, crossing over several disciplines, including international law, history,
anthropology, and archaeology, has looked at this phenomenon and most often pitted two
conceptions of cultural heritage. On the one hand, the internationalists argue that the
location of a cultural object must be decided according to the interests of science and
education, for the benefit and in the name of humankind; on the other hand, the
nationalists consider that cultural heritage is constitutive of the identity of each nation,
which should give to nation-states the role of primary caregivers of this heritage. My
research is the first to examine in detail the nationalist side of the debate, focusing on the
domestic politics of return claims. In this study, I use approaches that are specific to a
discipline, political science, that had ignored this topic until now. First, I have looked at
the use of return claims to continue the construction of a nationalist discourse of unity
and homogeneity through the appropriation of the pre-Columbian past. Second, I adopted
a historical-institutionalist perspective to study the formulation of return claims as the
intersection of three fields of public policy: cultural policy, tourism promotion, and
1

Anna Codrea-Rado, “Emmanuel Macron says return of African artifacts is a top priority,” The New York
Times, Nov. 29, 2017. It is in the wake of this declaration that Bénédicte Savoy and Felmine Sarr wrote the
report I mentioned in chapter 6.
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foreign relations. Third, I used the Advocacy Coalition Framework to identify the
multiple actors involved in return claims and study their interactions.
Another originality of my work comes from my case studies: the literature has
largely ignored return claims originating from Latin American countries, preferring to
focus on a few high-profile cases such as the Greek claim over the Parthenon Marbles. To
be sure, as the extensive corpus of newspaper articles I have cited in this work
demonstrates, my case studies are hardly confidential. To the contrary, they have
attracted considerable media attention in the claiming country, of course, but also
internationally. I chose three countries (Colombia, Mexico, Peru) that share historical,
social, cultural, and political features (as former Spanish colonies, independent since the
early 1800s, boasting numerically important Indigenous populations dominated by the
criollo elite) but that each have their own trajectory: I have referenced how the specifics
of a country’s experience with internal armed conflict, political instability, economic
choices, and treatment of its Indigenous populations, among other factors, have impacted
the decision to form return claims. The complex interaction among these factors helps
understand why the executive, in some countries, decided to push for the return, while in
others it did not. In Peru, several consecutive presidents saw the return of the Machu
Picchu and the Paracas textiles collections as tools to reaffirm the strength of the nation,
shattered by a two-decade long internal armed conflict, a deep economic crisis in the
1980s, and the suspension of democratic rule in the 1990s. Pre-Colombian cultural
objects served this purpose precisely because the Peruvian state had, over the previous
century and a half, constructed the notion of a national heritage formed by objects from
prestigious pre-Columbian cultures. In Mexico, the strong political will shown by the
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INAH in the 1980s to obtain the return of the Teotihuacan murals contrasts with the
prudence of Mexican diplomacy and presidency in the penacho case; I believe this may
be explained by the fact that Mexican nationalism was not threatened in the late twentieth
century and early twenty-first century to the same extent that it was in Peru. In Colombia,
finally, state authorities have shown a lack of political will to claim the return of the
Quimbaya collection and the San Agustín statues – a stark contrast with the attitude of
their Peruvian counterparts – in spite of pressures from their own civil society. Possible
explanations include the lesser importance given to the pre-Columbian heritage in the
national discourse in Colombia, as well as the implementation of multicultural measures
inscribed in the 1991 Constitution, which recognize contemporary Indigenous
communities as groups differentiated from the rest of the nation.
Contributions of this research
My examination of the claiming side brings several contributions to the study of return
claims. First, I go beyond the limitations of legal studies of this phenomenon. Indeed, the
focus on the interpretation of legal texts, in order to discuss whether an object should be
returned or not, has limited our understanding of return claims and prevented from
questioning their origin. I do not mean that law is irrelevant: in Peru, Mexico, and
Colombia, as well as in the claimed countries, many of the arguments in favor or against
returns are built on diverging interpretations of legal texts. Yet, these texts are not
enforceable in cases of return, mainly because they cannot be applied retroactively. Most
importantly, debating the applicability and extent of laws does not provide any
explanations as to why states seek the return of specific objects. Leaving aside legal
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considerations over ownership and possession, I have focused on the politics of return
claims within each claimant country.
My second contribution is a confirmation of the internationalists’ arguments:
nationalism is, indeed, a driving force of return claims. In Latin America, these claims
embody the states’ continued efforts to construct the nation through the appropriation of
the pre-Columbian past – a process that started with independence in the early
nineteenth-century. Beyond this common characteristic, the object, conduct, and outcome
of each claim depend in great part on the specifics of each country’s nationalist discourse;
after all, as Anderson (2006) has noted, nationalism, as a social-cultural concept, is
universal, yet each nationalism has its own concrete manifestations (5). In the three
countries I have studied, the construction of nationalism involves, to different degrees,
the relation of the national community to its Indigenous populations, the centrality of the
state and its capital vis-à-vis its provinces, and its inclusion in the global economy. All
these factors are mediated by the claimed objects, which are meant to signal the link
between the contemporary imagined community and its deep past. For this reason, as I
have argued in chapter 3, a series of apparently distinct but intertwined factors, such as
the adoption of indigenist and/or multicultural policies to manage the country’s ethnic
diversity,

the

implementation

of

neoliberal

reform

packages,

and

political

democratization, have impacted the discourse on the unified nation since the late
twentieth century. My research shows that these factors influenced the decision and the
timing of the claims; all combined, they contributed to the feeling that the traditional
conception of the nation was being challenged. This conception of the nation was
inherited from the times of independence, when the criollo elite sought to define a unified
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imagined community for the newly independent republic. Over the course of two
centuries, this vision has progressively gone beyond the appropriation of objects from the
pre-Columbian past (which demonstrated the level of civilization achieved by preconquest Indigenous communities) to try and integrate their descendents (the
contemporary Indigenous) into the mold of a homogenized nation. Two schools of
thought, indigenism and multiculturalism, have been particularly influential in how Latin
American states have sought to consolidate national unity on the soil of ethnic diversity.
Return claims show that the process of appropriation of the pre-Columbian past has been
a success: in the Latin American countries I study, the state is uncontested in its role of
caregiver of the remains of this heritage; Indigenous communities show little or no
interest in taking care of these objects themselves. This heritage has, indeed, become
national. Hence, when political, economic, and social changes challenge the traditional
vision of the nation, return claims come in handy to reaffirm the centrality of the nation,
embodied in the state.
Additional research into the claims presented by other countries (in Latin America
as well as other continents) may support or contradict several of my findings about the
importance of nationalism. First, I have argued that return claims mostly represent a
performance of the nationalist discourse. For this reason, the claim itself is just as
important as its outcome. The nationalist discourse can be mobilized only as long as the
object is absent. Once an object is returned, it loses most of its capacity to be mobilized
for internal political motives. Second, I have shown that claims serve the objectives of the
state and those within it (politicians and experts) in charge of the construction of the
nationalist discourse based on cultural heritage. The cases I have studied concern the

321

return of cultural objects to a nation-state, and not, by any means, the repatriation of this
object to a local (Indigenous) community that claims to be the direct descendant of those
who produced the object. In Mexico, Peru, and Colombia (though to a varying extent, as I
have detailed), the state has appropriated the remains of pre-Columbian cultural objects,
leaving no room for competing claims to ownership or possession of the object within the
national community – a fact that the literature (in particular in international law) tends to
ignore, conflating the interests of the nation-state with those of sub-national communities.
This finding also evidences the need to maintain a conceptual difference, most often
blurred in the literature, between returns and repatriations. The latter concerns the transfer
of cultural objects and human remains back to Indigenous or native communities; while it
has become quite common in Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian, and Australasian countries, it
remains an exception rather than a rule in Latin America.
A third contribution of my work is to refute, however, that return claims happen,
as internationalists affirm, just because of nationalist politicking. Nationalism is, indeed,
central to the claim. Yet, I find that nationalism is a necessary but not sufficient condition
to the formulation of a return claim: if it were, all cultural objects broadly defined as
national heritage would be claimed (which, as I have also shown, is far from the case).
Only certain objects are claimed because they speak to a specific trait of each
nationalism, but not all objects can perform this task. Most importantly, while
nationalism (and the importance of cultural heritage in its construction) represents a core
belief that informs policy choices, it does not over-determine the formulation of a claim.
Claims do not inevitably happen; they are the result of conscious decisions made by a
series of actors who, separately or in coalition, build the claim.
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In this context, my research is the first to offer a detailed account of the beliefs
and agency of the actors involved in return claims. The literature tends to obscure the
diversity of these actors by presenting a country (“Mexico,” “Peru,” or Colombia”) as the
agent of a claim. I have shown that claims are actually the result of interactions among at
least three broad categories of actors within the polity: civil society actors who develop
an interest in the specific object; experts in charge of the conservation and management
of the cultural heritage of the nation; and authorities of at least three entities of the
executive branch of the state (the presidency and the ministries of culture and foreign
relations), which are in charge of the formulation of the claim and the ensuing
negotiations. In some cases, additional actors (among which, the judicial branch of the
state and Indigenous communities) may also be involved. While the core of my argument
has focused on domestic actors, I have also examined the actions and beliefs of actors in
the claimed country (holding institutions, politicians, and supporters of the claims).
I have reached several conclusions about the role of these actors. My research
evidences the importance of civil society actors in the formulation of return claims – an
unexpected finding, because the literature has so far shown little interest in these
individuals. State authorities, while central to the formulation of return claims (because
states remain the main actor of international relations – and return claims live in the
realm of international relations), are mostly reactive to solicitation from other actors
(civil society actors, who are convinced of the importance of cultural heritage for the
nation, in four of my six case studies; the holding institution, which critically examines
their collections, in two cases). This finding is surprising because the literature (and,
beyond, the general media) tends to describe state authorities as the leaders of the
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movement that seeks the return of cultural objects; I expected my research to confirm this
leadership. Rather, I find that states are followers, rather than initiators; they take on the
claim because other actors push them to do so. Nationalism, in this context, becomes a
driving force that not only frames the beliefs of all actors involved in the claim, but also
constrains the state that has itself forged it: state authorities cannot refuse to act in
defense of the national heritage. My research also introduces the idea that partisanship is
not a strong predictor of the attitude of the state’s executive authorities, both on the
claiming and the claimed sides.
I have also analyzed the role of the experts, who are at times supporters of return
claims (when they believe that their own country can take care of the claimed objects, as
happened most spectacularly in the case of the two Peruvian claims and the Teotihuacan
murals) but may also oppose them (when they believe that it is not in the best interest of
the object to be physically transferred, as happened in the case of the penacho). I have
shown that Indigenous communities are only marginally involved, if at all, in the claims.
Finally, a surprising finding is that UNESCO, though a proponent of the principle of
returns, plays a very minor role (if at all) in the resolution of return claims.
A fourth contribution of my research is to bring elements that explain the timing
of the claims and the variation in the outcome of the claims. On the one hand, I have
mentioned above the many factors that explain their appearance in the late twentiethcentury). In particular, the feeling of crisis in a nation whose traditional conception is
being challenged by political, social, and cultural changes helps explain that some actors
felt the need, in the late twentieth century, to reaffirm the discourse that sustained this
nation. Also, the historical-institutionalist perspective helps us understand that the
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strengthening of state capacity to care for the national heritage was necessary before the
state could claim objects held abroad and defeat the argument that it was not in the
technical capacity to do so.
On the other hand, the attitude of all the actors involved helps explain their
outcome. In particular, the will of political entrepreneurs (mostly, heads of state) to seize
the claim (to “politicize” them, as experts tend to deplore) is most important. In the
absence of a legal framework forcing a holding institution to return an object displaced
decades or centuries ago, it is the pressure exercised by these political entrepreneurs that
determines the outcome. When politicization does not occur, negotiations may remain at
the technical level (over whether an object can be moved, if it can be properly taken care
of in the claiming country, etc.), which may delay or prevent the return. Also, the
expansion of the cultural state, which has seen Latin American states increase their
actions in cultural policy at a time when they were decreasing their action in economic
and social policy, finds its culmination with the presentation of return claims, but other
fields of public policy (tourism development and foreign policy) interact in different
ways with the priorities of cultural policy to determine the attitude of each state in how
aggressively it seeks the return of cultural objects.
In this sense, examining return claims from the perspective of political science
has allowed me to depart from the traditional analyses of the phenomenon, focused on
questions of possession and ownership, or on conceptual debates about the meaning of
national and universal heritage.
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Internationalism vs. nationalism: final comments
Overall, my research brings new elements and adds nuance to the debate between
internationalists and nationalists and suggests two possible interpretations of return
claims. On the one hand, responding to the internationalists’ concern, return claims can
be perceived as subversive of a certain order of the world, in which a few museums
located in the Western world hold on to a privileged position of control over knowledge
through the display and interpretation of objects of the past. This position results from the
breadth and depth of these museums’ collections (constituted in a time when the legal
environment of heritage conservation was vastly different, these collections are
considered “universal” or “encyclopedic” and aim to reflect the extent of humankind’s
achievements); the museums’ technical expertise; and the extent of their financial
resources, usually superior to those of museums in the claiming country. From the
perspective of these encyclopedic museums, the nationalism of the return claims
represents, indeed, a contestation of their dominant position and a risk that their
educational and scientific missions will be jeopardized if they give up part of their
collections. I have argued, however, that return claims represent an opportunity to rebalance the production of knowledge worldwide: by providing access to these objects to
researchers from the claiming country, returns may allow bringing fresh perspectives on
objects that have already been researched. (Yet, the case of the Machu Picchu collection
works as a cautionary tale on this topic.) Also, by opposing returns, encyclopedic
museums may miss an opportunity to establish new forms of collaboration with other
museums worldwide. As the example of the Teotihuacan murals demonstrates, it is
possible to build on the return of a few objects to develop new projects. Ultimately, the
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very model of the encyclopedic museum could be expanded by imagining the exchange
of larger segments of existing collections between claiming and claimed countries, which
may lead to the establishment of encyclopedic museums in countries where this type of
museum does not exist yet.
On the other hand, examining return claims from the vantage point of the
claiming country brings a different interpretation. Under the light of nationalism, return
claims are a rather conservative tool to continue the construction of a unified imagined
community, in which all the ethnic, racial, and socio-economic components of the nation
blend. Return claims serve to strengthen a multi-secular discourse about the nation and,
because they posit the nation as the legitimate heir and owner of the objects, refute any
alternative claim (that could be presented, for example, by Indigenous communities).
Return claims are also an elite discourse, in at least two ways. First, the vision of the
nation they embody is that of a top-down discourse constructed by criollo elite to
progressively integrate subaltern (Indigenous) groups. Second, in the way they are
currently practiced in Latin America, return claims strengthen the role of state agencies
and experts, who are the only authorities conferred the right to build a discourse on the
nation through the claimed object: even when civil society individuals are at the origin of
a claim, they are marginalized once state authorities take over. Both understandings of
returns leave little to no space for alternative discourses to be constructed through these
specific objects.
My research supports the opinion of the scholars who have argued that the
dichotomy between the nationalist and internationalist stances is not always that clear cut.
As I have shown, the strength of the authorized heritage discourse implies that the care
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for the object is the principal concern on both the claiming (nationalist) and claimed
(internationalist) sides. In this light, return claims represent a less radical contest for
museums than repatriations: in cases of returns, objects remain under the control of
experts while, in cases of repatriations, the objects may end up under the direct care of an
Indigenous community, which may choose to rebury or cremate them, rather than
conserve them in a museum.
Another nuance to the debate between internationalists and nationalists is that the
conditions that made the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries a propitious
moment for the formulation of return claims may change quickly. Over the past three
decades, former colonized states have shown the need to keep constructing a nationalist
discourse through the re-appropriation of their past, embodied in estranged objects. This
re-possession and ownership of these objects may be a necessary step to allow re-sharing
them with the world, this time on their own terms. Internationalism, in this sense, is still
experienced as an imposition from the center of the “old” nations of Europe and North
America, i.e., as a continuation of European colonial power and US imperialism.
However, the enthusiasm that countries such as Mexico, Peru, and Colombia show for the
concept of “world heritage” promoted by UNESCO (all have numerous sites registered
on the World Heritage List) demonstrates that the construction of nationalism through
cultural heritage objects does not advocate in favor of cultural insularity. Rather, through
the influence of global tourism, cultural heritage is, often, seen as an attraction to
showcase the country to the rest of the world. Future research will benefit from the
experience of more objects being returned to their country of origin to examine the long-
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term impact of this process, bringing new elements to the redefinition of the debate
between internationalists and nationalists.
Do return claims have a future? Directions for future research
In this context, and beyond the particular cases I have examined, what is the future of
return claims? From the six case studies I have examined in this work, only three have
led to a return. My research has evidenced that returns happen on a case-by-case basis
(through the modality of MBRAs), which forces me to be careful about making
predictions regarding the outcome of the other three claims. Return claims are a multifactorial process. As the case of the penacho largely shows, a return is never certain to
happen until the very moment the object is physically transferred. Although its return to
Mexico was announced several times over the past three decades, the penacho is still in
Vienna. Yet, with the prominence of declarations such as President Macron’s in the
international media, the debate over returns is very much in flux internationally, and the
positions defended by each actor may evolve and lead to a return.2
In this research, I have proposed several explanations for why this phenomenon
(at least in Latin America) has appeared only in the last two decades of the twentieth
century. I have also argued that, in spite of the argument often made by holding
institutions, there is little reason to believe that agreeing to a few returns of highly
symbolic objects would ultimately lead to emptying Western museums of their
collections. I do not doubt that more objects will be claimed: a few successes will provide
2

For example, the Ethnological Museum of Berlin returned a collection of cultural objects to the Chugach,
a Native people from Alaska, in May 2018 (“Un museo de Berlín devuelve obras de arte robadas a los
indígenas de Alaska,” El País, May 18, 2018). This process of repatriation shows that the museum, which
holds the San Agustín statues that David Dellenback wants returned, may be more open to negotiations than
it was when it denied Dellenback’s request in 2013 (see chapter 2, note 126). But for this, of course, the
Colombian executive would need to formulate an official request, which it had not done as of January 2019
(see chapter 2, note 127).
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examples to political entrepreneurs around the world to claim other objects; also, under
the influence of postcolonial and postmodern theories, holding institutions will continue
to critically explore the conditions that led to the constitution of their collections. Yet,
this movement will likely be limited by the concern, among experts on both sides of the
debate, for the technical and financial limitations of claiming countries, which could not,
even if they wanted to, take care of all estranged objects under the best standards of care.
Even if the practice of returns does not expand as much as internationalists fear,
the twenty-first century will provide many cases for researchers to explore. Combined
with further examination of repatriation cases, returns will continue to offer opportunities
to re-think and theorize the processes of construction of imagined communities through
discourses involving objects made in the past; the place of museums in contemporary
societies – including their commodification for tourism purposes; and the de-centering of
the loci of knowledge production from the Western world towards their former colonies.
For Latin Americanists, many questions I could not answer remain open. First,
my own cases have not yet revealed all their secrets. Some of them have not concluded
yet. Even in the cases where the return took place, all the archives are not yet available.
Access to newer documents on these cases may bring nuance to my arguments and help
futher refine what we already know. Also, case studies from other countries than the ones
I have researched will bring yet additional layers of understanding of how nations have
been (are being) constructed in the region, and of the importance of the pre-Columbian
heritage in this process. Another important focus for research that runs parallel to the
question of returns is that of repatriations: will the practice of repatriating cultural objects
and human remains from national museums to Indigenous communities grow throughout
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the region? Will Latin American states start claiming the return of such objects on behalf
of Indigenous communities, then accept that these communities take care of the objects
themselves? If this phenomenon takes place, will it grow organically from Indigenous
communities in the region, or through the influence of their Native or Aboriginal
counterparts in other parts of the world? This will be, I believe, a particularly fascinating
topic of research for anthropologists. Finally, another question I left aside in this research
is that of the place of other components of the national heritage: my case studies all focus
on objects made before the Spanish conquest. More case studies will show how the
discourse about the nation will vary as objects from the colonial and modern periods as
well as, possibly, objects linked to Afro-descendant communities (which are too often
even further marginalized than Indigenous communities in contemporary Latin American
societies), are being claimed. Such claims may, indeed, bring slight alterations to the
national discourse I have analyzed in this research.
Another avenue for future research would be to confirm the generalizability of my
findings through a larger-N study of cases of return claims, within and across continents.
Among the many facets of this topic that would benefit from the perspective of additional
cases are the role of these claims in the construction of discourses about the nation
(whose specifics will likely vary across countries); the type of actors involved in the
claims (in particular, those of experts and local Indigenous communities), as well as their
beliefs and motivations (for example, is political partisanship really irrelevant, as my own
findings would imply?); and the timing of the claims (for example, why do returns seem
to have grown in importance over the past few years in sub-Saharian Africa, a region
little concerned by the phenomenon so far?).
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Constructed as heritage, objects from the past continue to tell us much about our
present. The study of their return back towards the places where they were produced
offers many avenues for future research.
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Annex A: List of newspapers and magazines cited in this work
From Colombia:
El Correo Nacional (daily; published 1890-1907, Bogota)
El Criterio (daily; published only in 1892, Bogota)
El Espectador (daily; founded 1887 in Medellín, published in Bogota since 1915)
El Quindiano (online news media; founded 2017, Armenia)
El Telegrama (daily; published 1886-1904, Bogota)
El Tiempo (daily; founded 1911, Bogota)
From Mexico:
Excelsior (daily; founded 1917, Mexico City)
Impacto (weekly magazine and daily newspaper; founded 1949, Mexico City)
La Jornada (daily; founded 1984, Mexico City)
Milenio (daily; founded 1974, Monterrey)
Noticiero Televisa (online news media, part of Televisa network)
Proceso (weekly; founded 1976, Mexico City)
Reforma (daily; founded 1993, Mexico City)
El Universal (daily; founded 1916 in Querétaro, published in Mexico City)
Unomásuno (daily; founded 1977, Mexico City)
From Perú:
Caretas (weekly; founded 1950, Lima)
El Comercio (daily; founded 1839, Lima; publishes regional editions)
Perú21 (daily; founded 2002, Lima)
El Peruano (official gazette; founded 1825, Lima)
Peruvian Times (online magazine published in English; founded 1940, Lima)
La Prensa (daily; published in Lima 1903-1984)
La República (daily; founded 1981, Lima)
El Sol (daily; founded 1901, Cusco)
From Spain:
El País (daily; founded 1976, Madrid)
Gaceta de Madrid (official gazette; published 1697-1935, Madrid)
From the United States of America:
The New York Times (daily; founded 1851, New York City)
SF Weekly (weekly; San Francisco)
Yale Daily News (daily; founded 1878, New Haven, CT)
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Annex B: List of interviews (by chronological order)
1. April 24, 2017, Lima: Luis Jaime Castillo Butters, archaeologist, Catholic University
of Peru; vice-minister of cultural heritage and cultural industries, Ministry of Culture
during the presidency of Ollanta Humala
2. April 24, 2017, Lima: Luis Guillermo Lumbreras, archaeologist; director of the
National Museum of Anthropology, Archaeology, and History (MNAAH) in Lima
(1973-1978); director of the National Institute of Culture during the presidency of
Alejandro Toledo (2002-2006)
3. April 24, 2017, Lima: Paloma Carcedo de Mufarech, art historian; director of cultural
heritage, Ministry of Culture during the presidency of Ollanta Humala
4. April 25, 2017, Lima: Juan Ossio Acuña, anthropologist; minister of culture (20102011) during the presidency of Alan García
5. April 25, 2017, Lima: Sonia Guillén, anthropologist; director of the bureau of
museums, Ministry of Culture, during the presidency of Ollanta Humala; since 2018,
director of the MNAAH
6. April 26, 2017, Lima: Mariana Mould de Pease, independent researcher; involved in
the claim for the return of the Machu Picchu collection
7. April 26, 2017, Lima: Blanca Alva Guerrero, director of heritage defense, Ministry of
Culture (until 2018)
8. April 27, 2017, Lima: Yohny Lescano, congressman, Popular Action Party;
intervened in the claim for the return of the Machu Picchu collection
9. April 27, 2017, Lima: Cecilia Bákula, director of the National Institute of Culture
during the presidency of Alan García (2006-10); ambassador of Peru to UNESCO
(2010-2012)
10. April 27, 2017, Lima: José Koechlin, founder and CEO of Inkaterra; involved in the
claim for the return of the Machu Picchu collection
11. April 30, 2017, Lima: Blandina Contreras Yance, president of Omucai Pachamama;
coordinator for women and family affairs, Andean Coordination of Indigenous
Organizations (CAOI)
12. July 17, 2017, Skype: Liliana Cino, director of cultural affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Peru; consul general of Peru in Los Angeles until 2017
13. July 24, 2017, in written: Carmen Thays, chief curator of textiles, MNAAH
14. August 18, 2017, Washington, DC: Terry Garcia, executive vice-president, National
Geographic Society (1999-2916)
15. August 18, 2017, Washington, DC: Frederic Truslow, lawyer, alumnus from Yale
University; involved in the claim for the return of the Machu Picchu collection
16. August 28, 2017, Mexico City: Dalia Ayala, ornithologist, National Autonomous
University of Mexico (UNAM), member of the first commission of Mexican experts
to Austria (2002)
17. August 29, 2017, Mexico City: Pedro Francisco Sánchez Nava, national coordinator
of archaeology, INAH
18. August 29, 2017, Mexico City: Sergio Estrada Rojas, director of international law and
legal counsel, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico
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19. August 30, 2017, Mexico City: Baltazar Brito, director of the national library of
anthropology and history, National Museum of Anthropology, INAH
20. August 31, 2017, Mexico City: Olga Pellicer Silva, professor, international studies,
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM); ambassador of Mexico in
Austria (1999-2002)
21. August 31, 2017, Mexico City: Marisol Pérez Lizaur, anthropologist, Ibero-American
University
22. September 3, 2017, San Juan de Teotihuacán: Saburo Sugiyama, archaeologist,
archaeological area of Teotihuacán
23. September 4, 2017, Mexico City: Lilia Rivero Weber, national coordinator of cultural
heritage conservation, INAH, during the bi-national commission that restored the
penacho (2011-12); curator, National Palace (2015-2018)
24. September 17, 2017, by Skype: Miguel Gleason, independent researcher about
Mexican cultural heritage abroad
25. October 2, 2017, by phone: Roberta Lajous Vargas, ambassador of Mexico in Austria
(1995-1999); ambassador of Mexico in Spain (since 2013);
26. November 4, 2017, New Haven, CT: Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar, curators,
Machu Picchu collection, Yale Peabody Museum of Natural History
27. December 19, 2017, by phone: Luz del Carmen Dávalos, director, faculty of
education, Anahuac University, Mexico City
28. May 25, 2018, by phone: “Xokonoschtletl” Antonio Gómora, leader of
Yankuikanahuak, organizer of public protests in Vienna to claim the return of the
penacho to Mexico
29. June 25, 2018, Bogota: Angela Escobar Lora, laboratory of archaeology, ICANH
30. June 25, 2018, Bogota: Eugenia Serpa Isaza, coordinator of the group of protection of
cultural goods, and Carla Medina Mendez, program of prevention against trafficking
of cultural goods, Ministry of Culture of Colombia
31. June 26, 2018, Bogota: Felipe Rincón Salgado, lawyer, and Antonio José Rengifo
Lozano, professor of international law, National University of Colombia; introduced
the demanda de acción popular in the case of the Quimbaya collection
32. June 26, 2018, Bogota: Maria Isabel Gomez Ayala, former coordinator of the group
of protection of cultural goods, Ministry of Culture of Colombia (1998-2010)
33. June 27, 2018, Bogota: Santiago Jara Ramírez, director of cultural affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Colombia
34. June 28, 2018, Bogota: Edgar Cabra, head of the legal office, ICANH
35. June 28, 2018, Bogota: Monika Therrien, anthropologist, Fundación Erigaie;
previously, technical subdirector, ICANH (2005-2007)
36. June 29, 2018, Armenia (Quindío): Jaime Lopera Gutiérrez, president, Academia de
Historia del Quindío
37. June 29, 2018, Armenia (Quindío): Roberto Restrepo, anthropologist, member of the
Academia de Historia del Quindío
38. June 29, 2018, Armenia (Quindío): Felipe Robledo, lawyer, member of the Academia
de Historia del Quindío
39. July 3, 2018, Bogota: Johana Garzón Cruz, communication officer, Servicio
Geológico Colombiano [Colombian Geological Survey]
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40. July 3, 2018, Bogota: Rosendo Ahué Coello, Advisor for traditional medicine and
Western health, Organización Nacional Indigena de Colombia (ONIC)
41. July 21, 2018, by phone: Clemencia Plazas, historian; former director of Bogota’s
Museo del Oro (1986-1997)
42. July 28, 2018, by Skype: Blanca Moctezuma Barragán, descendant of Aztec Emperor
Moctezuma, and her husband Jesus Juárez Flores, lawyer
43. September 28, 2018, New York City: Alister Ramírez Márquez, Professor of Spanish
Language and Hispanic American Literature, Borough of Manhattan Community
College
44. September 29, 2018, by phone: David Dellenback, US-Colombian citizen who
initiated the claim for the return of the San Agsutín statues from Berlin
45. October 1, 2018, by phone: Diego Márquez Arango, Colombian lawyer, involved in
the claim for the return of the San Agsutín statues from Berlin
46. November 1, 2018, by Skype: Lourdes Aranda Bezaury, sub-secretary of foreign
relations, Mexico (2003-2012)
47. January 16, 2019, by Skype: Adriana Malvido, Mexican journalist
48. March 22, 2019, by phone: Alejandro Estivill Castro, director of cultural affairs of the
Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs (2005-2007); as of 2019, Consul General of
Mexico in Montreal
49. March 25, 2019, in written: Cornelia Lönnroth, Planning Official Culture, City of
Gothenburg
50. April 26, 2019, by phone: Sabine Haag, Director, General Director of the
Kunsthistorisches Museum with its associated institutions, the Weltmuseum Wien
and the Theatre Museum (Vienna, Austria)
51. May 6, 2019, by phone: Victor González Fernández, Colombian archaeologist,
ICANH
52. May 13, 2019, by phone: Matthew Robb, curator of the exhibition “Teotihuacan: City
of Water, City of Fire” at the De Young Museum; currently curator at The Fowler
Museum at UCLA
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